Amber Bridge interview with Ulrich Brandenburg, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Germany to Russia
Germany is the driver of European integration. The debt crisis which hit some countries of the European Union causes concern about the future of the EU which combines various elements in itself. Skepticism is voiced also in your country. Is German attitude to EU changing? Can the problem highlight the next parliamentary election?
Germany is the driver of the European integration, but not the only one. I can name several other drivers, but in order to be brief in responding to your question I would like to recall our partner France with which we have recently marked the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Elysee Treaty on German-French cooperation. It is hardly surprising that skepticism is currently voiced in Germany because of the debt crisis. However nobody doubts our EU membership. What is being intensively discussed are the ways to curb the crisis. I cannot rule out the issue may play a role during Bundestag election campaign. But as I said, nobody seriously questions German membership in the E U.
Some specific aspects of European partnership trigger discussions. How promising is the EU Eastern Partnership policy today due to complex processes taking place in Belarus and Ukraine? How does it correlate with the Russian policy towards EU? Does it impede Russian-EU interaction?
The EU Eastern Partnership has never aimed at driving a wedge into Russia-EU cooperation. Strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union is of tremendous significance for both parties. It was again confirmed by all responsible officials during the latest EURussia summit in Brussels in December 2012. The Eastern Partnership aims at promoting political and economic integration between the European Union and interested partner-countries. It is only natural that the ties depend on domestic political developments in the countries.
Cooperation in Nord Stream pipeline construction was sometimes criticized as detrimental to some German partners in the EU. However the commissioned pipeline already plays a role in the development of energy cooperation between Russia and the EU. How would you assess the Nord Stream phenomenon from the current point of view? Have all the disputed moments been overcome to create a win-win situation? As the EU works to diversify gas supplies while Russia, in its turn, looks for new partners in Asia how would you describe the future of economic interdependence between Russia and the EU?
The Nord Stream gas pipeline continued the German-Russian long-term and successful energy cooperation. It was created as an additional competitive route which allows both Germany and the whole EU to gain direct access to one of the major gas suppliers in the world and vice versa – Russia received direct access to the most important sales market.
Future energy relations between Russia and the EU will mostly depend on the development of the situation on world gas markets. Growing shale gas production can help the United States provide enough fuel both for its own consumption and become an exporter of gas. A growing number of liquefied gas terminals are under construction which can deliver gas across the world ocean. Thus, supply can exceed demand on the European gas market and affect prices. Therefore, the search for additional potential sales markets, e.g. in Asia, by the Russian economy which heavily relies on exports of fossil fuels is an appropriate move.
So far the main transit infrastructure mostly goes to Europe. Demand there is on the rise because of the falling gas production in the North Sea. Besides, you have to take into account EU plans to decrease greenhouse gas emission while natural gas is the most environment-friendly and pure fossil fuel. It also plays a key role in balancing power generation at the expense of renewable sources of energy. Therefore I am convinced that Russia and the European Union will continue close energy partnership in future.
The tone of the German discussion of Russia has changed of late. Critical perceptions of our country dominate in the media, among experts and some parliament members. How do they influence the actions of the federal government?
Yes, there are critical voices. They mostly concern some legislative initiatives which have been recently submitted for the consideration of the State Duma and which attracted attention both in Germany and other EU countries. Let’s recall, for example, the law on non-governmental organizations which have to register as “foreign agents”, the new law on “treason”, and the legislative initiative banning the so-called propaganda of homosexuality. Discussions are underway also in Russian civil society as the talk is about the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens. So close partners as we are should have an open discussion of such issues!
Due to immense expenses for overcoming the debt crisis in the EU Germany has to cut defense appropriations which, according to the media, affects the social and economic situation at the local level. At the same time the commitments under article 5 of the Washington Treaty remain a painful issue for some NATO member-states, including Baltic countries. In 2011 Germany patrolled the airspace of the countries for four months. The allied scheme of airspace protection has been predetermined up to 2014. What will happen after that?
The partially effected and partially planned cuts of the federal, provincial and local budgets are related to the debt brake fixed in the Basic Law and are not directly caused by the European debt crisis. All spheres have to contribute to austerity which cannot bypass defense appropriations which are the third in size in the federal budget. However the main reason for Bundeswehr reform is not related to the budget situation. It is mostly determined by the changing environment in security policy and new tasks of peacekeeping missions. It corresponds to demographic framework conditions in Germany and complies with available finances. Due to the reorientation Germany will be able to comply with its commitments in NATO framework in future. Since April 2004 the airspace of three Baltic countries has been patrolled in the framework of the NATO mission called NATO Air Policing. Troops from a total of 14 countries have been engaged in it so far. After 2014 the existing procedure will be preserved on the basis of voluntary contributions of NATO member-states and from 2018 it will be regularly revised.
There is the other side of the coin in the question. Today NATO works hard to link the slogan of collective security to all imaginable and unimaginable threats. How do you believe it is possible to preserve the collective defense provision in case of a change in external threats and in adopted countermeasures to prevent it? Russian concern over European missile defense plans is definitely caused by the absence of NATO answer to the question.
Collective defense means collective protection. Therefore, NATO member-countries want and will continue to jointly defend themselves from potential risks. During the NATO summit in Chicago the countries declared temporary and limited combat ability of the missile defense. Russia which feels itself vulnerable to similar risks was invited to cooperate with NATO.
Despite all expectations caused by the missile defense issue dominating public debate NATO and Russia have launched successful cooperation in many spheres. Take our joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan: the buildup of Afghan national security forces and the fight against drug trafficking.
Ulrich Brandenburg was born on 12 October 1950 in the city of M.nster. He studied Romance an Slavic languages at the universities of M.nster and Paris. He joined the German Foreign Office in 1980. In 1984 he was posted for the first time to the Soviet Union, initially as the deputy consul general in Leningrad and later on as head of the press department of the German Embassy in Moscow. Ulrich Brandenburg occupied leading positions in the German Foreign Ministry and served as Germany’s Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council. In April 2010 he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Russian Federation. He is married with two children.
Germany presided in the Council of the Baltic Sea States in its jubilee year. In July 2012 Russia took over the rotating presidency. Today most attention is paid to acute problems of EU operation, to obstacles and misunderstandings in relations between
NATO and Russia and EU and Russia. Can it all push regional problems to the background? Can regional organizations dilute in Pan-European institutions? What can Germany do to pr event it? What can Russia do?
The EU has no plans to “dilute”, as you said, the Council of the Baltic Sea States in itself. Partnership cooperation of countries responsible for the development of the common space without obligatory membership in all other organizations is a comparable advantage of the Council of the Baltic Sea States which nobody wants to drop. For example, as it has been already stated, not all CBSS member-countries are EU members. The same refers to membership in NATO or the Arctic Council. By the way, cooperation between Russia and Germany in the Council of the Baltic Sea States is truly excellent. We agreed our rotating presidencies (Germany in 2011/2012 and Russia in 2012/2013) in a way to promote a possibility of efficient implementation also of long-term projects, such as the development of the South-Eastern Baltic Area (SEBA).
Can I ask a personal question? Where does the ambassador like to rest? Does he have a beloved place on the Baltic Sea?
I can say that my beloved place (where I have been spending Easter holidays with the family for many years) is the Amrum Island in the North Sea. But I have frequently visited practically all spaces of the Baltic Sea and used all ferry services there. Just a few weeks ago they were Klaipeda-Kiel and Lubeck-St.Petersburg ferries.
Thank you for the interview .
Gennady Kulbitskiy,
ITAR-TASS for Amber Bridge.