The crisis of the European integration project: lessons for everyone and for Baltic countries

Mezhevich Nikolay Maratovich — Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor of the School of International Relations, Head of the International Master’s Program “Baltic and Nordic Studies” at the Saint-Petersburg State University, Chief Researcher at the Institute of the Problems of the Regional Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint-Petersburg.

Sazanovich Liudmila Sergeevna — PhD student of School of International Relations Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg. 

 

Currently, many researchers have noted that the European Union is in crisis. Obviously, at this stage, the original conception of the founders of the EU is no longer relevant: the rapid expansion of the borders, European integration, causing internal political and economic problems, security problems and many other undermine the stability of the Union. The aim of the article is an attempt to analyze the negative factors, influencing the development of the EU, as well as to suggest possible scenarios of its further development. The relevance of this study lies mainly in the fact that it combines the study of political, economic, social and security aspects. To achieve the objectives of the study one has chosen a systematic approach to the study of international relations. It is important to note that for further successful development and existence of the EU it is necessary to resort action in the present time, primarily to stabilize relations with Russia.

 

The European Union is going through a difficult time. Trying to forestall instability on its borders, it becomes a source of turbulence. Less flexible and slower, the EU is increasing the apparatus of bureaucratic pressure, trying to silence the growing dissatisfaction. As if caught in the trap of “bad infinity”, the European Union can not find a solution to internal and external problems, growing like a snowball.

The famous British historian Eric Hobsbawm, with reason, “cut” the twentieth century by 23 years. From his opinion, it began in 1914 with World War I and ended in 1991 after the collapse of USSR.1 This approach is debatable but understandable. The significance of both 1914 and 1991 for the European, and world history is obvious.

The beginning of the European integration is now described in the textbooks – The Schuman Declaration, who on May 9, 1950, being the French Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time , addressed the Government of Germany with a proposal to create a French-German Coal and Steel Community. The importance of the Schuman Declaration rapidly emerged beyond the bilateral relations between France and Germany. The concept of “general framework of economic development, which would be the first step towards the European federation” had such potential that it was enough for the rest of the policies and practices of the European Economic Community – the European Union up to the end of the XX century. Approaches of Schuman – Monnet were simple but revolutionary at that time. Overcoming the old tradition of nationalism by creating a united Europe on the principles of democracy, economic prosperity and social consensus, peace and equal cooperation, the architects of the EU hoped for a long and successful life of the European project in the XX century. The twentieth century of European integration began in 1950 and ended in the early years of the new century.

It seemed that new XXI century of European integration began in advance with the conclusion of the Treaty on European Union, which was signed on February 7, 1992 in the Dutch city of Maastricht and entered into force on 1 November 1993, but this period turned to be surprisingly short. Beneath our eyes, in summer 2015 the European integration project suffered tardy resuscitation and … died. It died in the proper sense of the word: the EU died in the form in which it had been planned by Schumann and Monnet. However, the death of the integration project in the post-shumann model does not mean the collapse of the great European idea, and does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the whole Europe. Europe has been and will be, but it will be different. The current model has as much in common with great European ideas as the ideas of utopian socialists in France and UK with the North Korean practice. Why?

The EU Treaty proclaimed as the key objective the creation of Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the single European currency, which could potentially bring economic integration to a new level. However, at the same time it launched a campaign of large-scale expansion of the European Union. In 1993-2007 the number of EU members doubled. Only the entry of Finland, Sweden and Austria may be regarded as a simple quantitative increase. Extensions in 2004 and 2007 significantly worsened the economic performance of the EU. At the same time Greece, Portugal and Spain faced the problem of financial equilibrium. “Because of the scale of the expansion the European Union faced the problem of “assimilation” and therefore became more focused on its own challenges”.2 A new class of euro wanderers-bureaucrats, even without reading M. Djilas and M. Voslensky, formed precisely in line with their expectations, but not on the Yugoslavian or Soviet base, but in the heart of Europe: Brussels, Strasbourg, Frankfurt am Main, Mons. For them progress on the European career was more important than issues of national economy and analysis of the integration problems. We are seeing the result: the process of European integration has created a supranational bureaucratic monster that subjugated not only local government circles, but also the idea of ​​integration itself. Now the result has gone to the second plan, the most important things are process, operation, reproduction, “sealed” in a closed-loop circulation of bureaucracy.

The more time passes from 2004, the more evidence there is that it was the end of the first era of European integration and the beginning of the second. The first, in fact, was the Western European and successful, the second, with a certain degree of conventionality can be called eastern European and its success is a big question. EU-12 (as of 1995 EU-15) and EU-27 are qualitatively different integration associations. Despite the validity of the new strategic program of expansion and deepening of integration, adopted in the early 1990s, the scale of the consequences of this decision and qualitative changes in the EU were not interpreted as they deserved. They were underestimated, probably for the reason that the political “summit” of EU member states, predominated complete confidence in the value of the European project and the ultimate success.

EU, really achieved a high level of cohesion, could have begun the optimization of achieved, but instead became interested in the policy of expansion, the neighborhood and so on. It had excessively bloated ambitions and virtually no funds for large-scale geopolitical projects, and certainly no adequate political analysis. The fact that the Baltic States were appointed as the major European “progressors” in the framework of “Eastern Partnership” did not require any additional comments. Based on the logic “if the system works, why it should be changed”, they wanted to integrate Ukraine in the same way as Estonia. However, local Ukrainian specificity was not taken into account.

And there is specificity. The economic potential of the Soviet Ukraine was second only to four big European countries. But today’s GDP of Kharkov region, for example, is more than Estonia’s GDP (of course, the earned part, not what is sent from Brussels).

Awareness of the problems in assessing the validity of reality happens in Europe after a long delay. The quote from the analytical report of the Affairs Committee of the House of Lords: “EU and Russia: before and after the Ukrainian crisis” (2015): “The Committee believes that the European Union and therefore Britain are guilty, that they have entered into this crisis, without being aware of what is happening, like a sleepwalker. Lack of strong analytical resources, both in the UK and the EU, in fact has led to a catastrophic misunderstanding of climate on the eve of the crisis”.3

However, the main problem is not the analysis, but that the West, considering itself a global center, strives to new peripheral space, even, in fact, without its sole purpose – to find new markets for its products, to ensure the influx of cheap labour and access to other resources. Along the way, it solves the problem of preserving the attractiveness of the EU as an integration project – it is important in terms of intra-European political process, so it uses any means. Thus, the problem lies not only in adequate quality of evaluation of integration. An ambitious program of “Eastern Partnership”, which implies a de facto extension of the EU’s borders to the Caspian Sea, is not only dead, but did everything to ruin the whole working model of European integration. “The fear and anger of the fathers of EU diplomacy, that Russia is once again becoming too powerful and rich, and therefore dangerous for Europe, led to a fatal error: “Eastern Partnership” from the original project of European integration of post-Soviet space, has become a platform for attempts of political and economic isolation of Russia. It eventually provoked an acute crisis in Ukraine. So current problems of the EU are to a large extent the work of its own hands.4

Problems of European integration are evident today not only to Europeans, but also for the whole world. The former model of European economic and political integration has exhausted itself. Based on modern Greek history, Aeschylus, Aristophanes and Euripides could have created decent work – a comedy, a tragedy and a drama. What looked like a triumph of the EU, caused mixed consequences and obvious failures, and the expansion speed to the new frontiers of European integration seemed to be haste. Of course, the external factor – global financial crisis – has played a huge role in the current misadventures of EU: “Strategies, built on ideas from the past, including problem-solving through the manipulation of competitive exchange rates, are failing”.5

However, the first difficulties arose prior to the crisis, and the root of this “emergency” state of the EU should be found inside it. United Europe is developing much slower than the global economy. In 2015 and in the coming years, the economy of European macro-region will be in a very difficult situation. Europe cannot respond quickly to the changes. Despite the diversity of the structures of European economies, the industrial sector in Europe in the whole is stagnant, so the potential for a return to a sustainable growth is limited. Although the EU remains a key industrial entity, since 2008 the industry cut 3 million jobs, while industrial production fell by 10%.6 At the end of 2014 the total economy of the 18 countries using euro, rose only by 0.9%.7

In 2015, economic recovery of the European Union will be even more uncertain. The weakness of demand is a chronic disease. Germany will remain the driving force of the European economy, but it will not have such power, as two years ago. In France, economic growth will be around 0.7%. Italy must overcome the remains of the crisis, but the euro zone as a whole is unlikely to reach more than 1% growth and will not significantly change the official unemployment rate, which now stands at 11.7%.8

The head of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi stated, that in 2015 the European Union can face the threat of deflation and the risk to maintain low rates of economic growth, but the term “crisis”, according to him, does not currently fit to describe the situation in the economies of eurozone.9 It was said in January, when all economic parameters were approximately the same as in June. So now, in autumn 2015, is it also not a “crisis”? According to forecasts, recently published by IMF, the growth rates in 2015-2016 in the EU will not exceed 1.5-1.6% (assuming that the crisis in relations with Greece will be settled). In the developed world as a whole, they will increase from the current 1.8% to 2.4%.10 Thus, if the situation in the global economy is not ideal, the European is just bad. And M. Draghi’s comment about “no crisis” in this sense, is comparable only to that of the known expression of the hanged and the rope.

Constraining factors also lie outside the economy – in political and socio-cultural spheres. Historical memory, cultural heritage of Antiquity and Christianity, suffered by Europe losses in two world wars influenced the formation of European values ​​to a large extent. It should be noted again: it is not a crisis of the European idea, it is a crisis of specific practice of its implementation in the political sphere. Not the dip of the European Constitution led to the growth of euroscepticism, but euroscepticism, based on an understanding of the ineffectiveness of post-Maastricht model of EU led to the failure of the European Constitution. Errors in internal and external relations, economic failures, consequences of arrogant decisions taken on the basis of geopolitical, “value” and not pragmatic reasons: “The EU from a sample of reasonable foreseeability became, in fact, one of the most obvious sources of global uncertainty”.11 Therefore the destruction of the current model of European integration is inevitable.

The report of Notre Europe, dedicated to the restructuring of the EU-USA relationship, written in 2010, noted: “In the absence of a common foreign policy on major strategic issues, the EU is unable to influence events beyond its borders”.12  Among the authors of the diagnosis are P. Prodi, G.Verhofstadt, Buzek, Y. Fisher and others. Now, in autumn 2015, it should be clarified, if the EU is able to set the agenda in its borders.

At present time there is a discussion about the so-called “realistic European force”, partly written with the American approach to “smart power”. As in the American case, we are talking about a combination of “hard” and “soft security”. However, it is not difficult to notice fundamental differences of the European prerequisite from US realities. Important, however, is not adequate theory, but realistic practice. “American leadership after the Cold War and NATO’s eastward expansion hoped that the Old World would be able to solve at least its own problems, but time after time it turns out – whether Balkans, Middle East, or single currency – that Europe is not in a position to do it”.13 But could it be otherwise?

In Europe there can be no effective «hard security». Is it possible to build an independent foreign policy based on borrowed security from overseas? One should recall the article of the American political scientist Robert Kagan “Power and Weakness,” published in 2002.14 His idea is the following: the US created hothouse conditions for the European Union. America carries on its shoulders the burden of responsibility, and the EU is engaged in chatter and mutual persuasion. Counting on the law, it actually mired in complacency and conformism. Personal and social status of R. Kagan obliges us to be attentive to his estimates.

Patterns of American neocons, unfortunately, are demanded by the European Union. Robert Cooper, director general of the Department for External and Politico-Military Affairs of the Council of the EU, said: “NATO and the US’ military presence in Europe  gave confidence that the US would protect them from the Soviet Union. (…) NATO summed everyone to voluntary dependence on the military power of the United States. NATO managed to establish a system of collective security in the best sense of the word – security requirement, which for centuries separated Europe, now has united it. So it’s how the European Union appeared.15  He calls NATO as the defense against chaos as the key element of “post-balanced” Euro-Atlantic security system (after the reunification of Germany, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union). “And the most logical way to end the chaos is the colonization”.16 Economic toolkit of the EU is derived from military might of NATO forces, controlled by the United States and stationed in Europe. Not Coal and Steel Union, but namely NATO is the backbone of the modern European Union. This is another symptom, confirming not only inevitable death of the European project in the current form17, but also the impossibility of joining the Eurasian and European projects in modern conditions.

Membership in the European Union is no longer the final aim of integration aspirations of a country to the West, but only an intermediate step on its way to the main goal – NATO membership. The signing by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova Association Agreements with the European Union was presented as a purely economic event, but in fact turned out to be one of the hidden ways of NATO expansion: the retraction of the countries in the military-political cooperation with NATO is formally done through rapprochement with the EU.18

This circumstance is one of the main obstacles to expand the process of economic cooperation between Russia and the EU at full – in this tango, apparently, there would be the third party for long. This third is the United States, and through it – NATO.

The assessment of the impact of NATO in the system of foreign policy-making in Europe should be based on the principle of actually used three keys, each of which is sufficient to achieve a decisive influence on the foreign policy of a European state. The first key is direct control over the foreign policy of the state. It works in case of a country within the block, and in relations with formally neutral states outside NATO but participating in affiliate programs of the Alliance. The second key is control through the structure of the NATO. The third key is cooperation through the coordination structures of the European Union focused on foreign policy and defense decisions. The combination of these keys provides the US and NATO control over not only military, but also economic projects in Europe.

One should note the contradiction of political and economic goals of the United States towards Europe. In economic terms, Europe would be consistent with Canada’s status and the nature of economic growth in Europe in such case would depend on the United States to the same extent as it is happening in contemporary Canada. However, from the standpoint of policy, the United States  complies with the rules of the game last few decades: Europe pretends it has foreign policy and the US continues to manage it.

The United States, who has been perceiving Europe only as junior partner for a long time, doesn’t have any illusions about the real situation in the EU. As an example, one can refer to a publication in the prestigious American edition «Foreign policy», where the author proves the existence of five problems of the European Union: 1) excessive expansion; 2) collapse of the Soviet empire; 3) euro crisis; 4) deterioration of the situation in the region; 5) sustainable nationalism.19

Of course, let’s not overlook the fact that the vectors of geopolitical interests of the leading states of the EU are often different.  German policy in the Balkans, French in Africa, do not “overlap” with the policies of other European centers of power. In other cases, the apparent intersection could be noted. A classic example is Ukrainian conflict. Plus in the European Union there are neutral (or trying to be) states: Italy, Austria, Finland, and partly Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, for example. Their voices are quite significant. And a number of new Member States rightly regard foreign policy initiatives of “old” Europe as a threat to subsidies in the address of the European budget.

However, it doesn’t affect general line against Russia and its integration initiatives (other than the “integration of integration” and it is worth recalling the idea of D. Medvedev of a common Euro-Atlantic security system, so categorically rejected by the West). During 2014, EU leaders have repeatedly said they would not change its policy with regard to Russia, instead they planned to change the foreign policy of Russia, even if it affected the economy of Eastern Europe.

In this context, economic suicide of the Baltic states is significant: countries, loudly demanded to “punish Russia,” are suffering now from the sanction war most of all (turnover of the port of Tallinn, “dipped” by 20.7% in the first half of 2015, compared with the same period last year. There are growing problems in Riga and Ventspils. Export to Russia is continuously reducing, Russian tourists are leaving the market of the Baltic states).

Various tools to “punish Russia” can certainly aggravate the efficient development of our country. However, one should keep in mind the warning of two senior experts, recently officials of US State Department: “So far, the West was more aimed at punishing Russia and its leaders … than at solving the problems in the relationship, which brought the parties to a dead end”.20 The practice of realization of the “Eastern Partnership” by West expected work on a well-known principle of “Me – head, you – fool”. Minsk, Yerevan, Baku didn’t agree with this approach. Finally Kiev, put by the European Union in a situation of “either with us or against us”, has been forced to postpone the issue of European integration until 2016. This practice meets huge resistance in Chisinau and Tbilisi. Symptomatic detail: according to the US National Democratic Institute in May 2015 about a third of Georgians supported integration into the Eurasian Union (31%)21, in August 2014 the figure was 20%, and in November 2013 – 11 %.

What are the possible scenarios of European integration? The choice is not rich.

1. The destruction of the current model of European integration. The unification of Europe, at least in its current form, cannot give a synergistic effect and is not able to bring it to a new level of global influence, relevant to the existing potential. Economic policy of the EU is a problem which has no practical solutions. Its current model is operating at full capacity.

2. “Cosmetic” repair of the current model of European integration. Reform of European integration, understood as a limitation of spatial expansion, rejection of the expansion of the eurozone at any cost, removing the UK “outside European integration”, establishment of effective cooperation with all economic partners and, above all, with Russia are the minimum key points of the reform today.

 

List of References:

  1. Hobsbaum E. Epoha krajnostej: Korotkij dvadtcatyj vek (1914—1991). M.: Izdatelstvo Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 2004. 632 s.
  2. Hirdman S. Rol Rossii v Evrope // Moskovskij centr Karnegi. M, 2006. – s.19.
  3. See more: The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine / House of Lords, European Union Committee. 6th Report of Session 2014–2015. London, February 2015. URL: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf
  4. Urbanovich Ia. Voinstvennye strahi Vostochnoj Evropy. 03.04.2015. URL: http://ria.ru/analytics/20150403/1056439589.html
  5. Dixon H. How to counter Europe’s rising populism // International New York Times, November 24, 2014. – P. 22.
  6. Alvaru Santush Pereira, Hose Manuel Soria, Korrado Passera, Arno Montebur, Philipp Resler Novaia industrial`naia politika Evropy // «Ekspert», №7 (839), February, 18 2013.
  7. Manukov S. Hermaniia podtianula evropejskuiu ekonomiku / «Expert Online», February, 14 2015. URL: http://expert.ru/2015/02/14/ne-vse-tak-ploho/
  8. Evropa 2015: god neuverennosti http://euroua.com/europe/eu/3557-evropa-2015 02.01.15
  9. Dragi: ekonomiku ES zhdet zatiazhnoj period slabosti. January, 2 2015. URL: http://dv.ee/novosti/2015/01/02/dragi-jekonomiku-es-zhdet-zatjazhnoj-period-slabosti
  10. Jean-Pierre Robin. Le FMI estime l’Europe en voie de guerison // Le Figaro, 15 avril 2015. – p.23.
  11. Lukjanov F. Oborotnaia storona Gretcii / Rossijskaia gazeta. July, 8 2015. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2015/07/07/kolonka.html July, 8 2015.
  12. Reshaping EU-US Relations: a Concept Paper. Reflection Group: Romano Prodi, Guy Verhofstadt (co-chairs), Jerzy Buzek, Etienne Davignon, Jacques Delors, Joschka Fischer, Paavo Lipponen, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa / Notre Europe, 2010. – p. 12.
  13. Lukjanov F.A. Stabilnost radi vyzhivaniia // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. July, 13 2015. URL: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Stabilnost-radi-vyzhivaniya-17579.
  14. Kagan R. Power and Weakness // Policy Review, № 113, 2002.
  15. Cooper R. The European Union and the Habsburg Monarchy // Transit. Europaische Review, 10.12.2012. URL: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-12-10-cooper-en.html
  16. See more: Cooper R. The breaking of nations: order and chaos in the twenty-first century. New York, 2003.
  17. See more: http://www.format-a3.ru/events/event-212/
  18. Ukraina, Gruziia, Moldaviia: put v NATO cherez Evropejskij soiuz. K sammitu NATO v Uelse September, 4-5 2014 goda. Analiticheskij obzor / Centr mezhdunarodnoj zhurnalistiki i issledovanij «Rossiia Segodnia». 2014 g. 74 s.
  19. Stephen M. Walt, Does Europe Have a Future? // Foreign Policy. July 16, 2015. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/16/does-europe-have-a-future-stephen-walt-testimony-house-foreign-affairs-committee/
  20. Charap S., Shapiro D. Kak izbezhat novoj holodnoj vojny // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. October, 14 2014. URL: www.globalaffairs.ru/ukraine_crysis/Kak-izbezhat-novoi-kholodnoi-voiny-17041
  21. Za ES – 68%, NATO – 65%, Evrazijskij Soiuz – 31% – rezultaty oprosa NDI. 11.05.2015. URL: http://www.apsny.ge/2015/soc/1431371449.php\

List of literature:

  1. HobsbaumE. Epohakrajnostej: Korotkijdvadtcatyjvek (1914—1991). M.: Izdatelstvo Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 2004. 632 s.
  2. Hirdman S. Rol Rossii v Evrope // Moskovskij centr Karnegi. M, 2006. – s.19.
  3. See more: The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine / House of Lords, European Union Committee. 6th Report of Session 2014–2015. London, February 2015. URL: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf
  4. Urbanovich Ia. Voinstvennye strahi Vostochnoj Evropy. 03.04.2015. URL: http://ria.ru/analytics/20150403/1056439589.html
  5. Dixon H. How to counter Europe’s rising populism // International New York Times, November 24, 2014. – P. 22.
  6. Alvaru Santush Pereira, Hose Manuel Soria, Korrado Passera, Arno Montebur, Philipp Resler Novaia industrial`naia politika Evropy // «Ekspert», №7 (839), February, 18 2013.
  7. Manukov S. Hermaniia podtianula evropejskuiu ekonomiku / «Expert Online», February, 14 2015. URL: http://expert.ru/2015/02/14/ne-vse-tak-ploho/
  8. Evropa 2015: god neuverennosti http://euroua.com/europe/eu/3557-evropa-2015 02.01.15
  9. Dragi: ekonomiku ES zhdet zatiazhnoj period slabosti. January, 2 2015. URL: http://dv.ee/novosti/2015/01/02/dragi-jekonomiku-es-zhdet-zatjazhnoj-period-slabosti
  10. Jean-Pierre Robin. Le FMI estime l’Europe en voie de guerison // Le Figaro, 15 avril 2015. – p.23.
  11. Lukjanov F. Oborotnaia storona Gretcii / Rossijskaia gazeta. July, 8 2015. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2015/07/07/kolonka.html July, 8 2015.
  12. Reshaping EU-US Relations: a Concept Paper. Reflection Group: Romano Prodi, Guy Verhofstadt (co-chairs), Jerzy Buzek, Etienne Davignon, Jacques Delors, Joschka Fischer, Paavo Lipponen, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa / Notre Europe, 2010. – p. 12.
  13. Lukjanov F.A. Stabilnost radi vyzhivaniia // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. July, 13 2015. URL: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Stabilnost-radi-vyzhivaniya-17579.
  14. Kagan R. Power and Weakness // Policy Review, № 113, 2002.
  15. Cooper R. The European Union and the Habsburg Monarchy // Transit. Europaische Review, 10.12.2012. URL: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-12-10-cooper-en.html
  16. See more: Cooper R. The breaking of nations: order and chaos in the twenty-first century. New York, 2003.
  17. See more: http://www.format-a3.ru/events/event-212/
  18. Ukraina, Gruziia, Moldaviia: put v NATO cherez Evropejskij soiuz. K sammitu NATO v Uelse September, 4-5 2014 goda. Analiticheskij obzor / Centr mezhdunarodnoj zhurnalistiki i issledovanij «Rossiia Segodnia». 2014 g. 74 s.
  19. Stephen M. Walt, Does Europe Have a Future? // Foreign Policy. July 16, 2015. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/16/does-europe-have-a-future-stephen-walt-testimony-house-foreign-affairs-committee/
  20. Charap S., Shapiro D. Kak izbezhat novoj holodnoj vojny // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. October, 14 2014. URL: www.globalaffairs.ru/ukraine_crysis/Kak-izbezhat-novoi-kholodnoi-voiny-17041
  21. Za ES – 68%, NATO – 65%, Evrazijskij Soiuz – 31% – rezultaty oprosa NDI. 11.05.2015. URL: http://www.apsny.ge/2015/soc/1431371449.php\

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *