Elli Heikkilä — PhD, Research Director of the Finnish Institute of Migration, Adjunct Professor at the University of Oulu and the University of Turku. Main research in- terests are: immigrants in the labour market, intercultural marriage, migration and regional development, and population ageing.
General demographic trends that are causing concern in many countries around the world, i.e. decreasing population and increasing emigration flows, can be also observed in the Baltik Sea region (BSR). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia are a prime example of countries where recent emigration has drawn the attention of policy makers looking to mitigate potential negative impacts of the departure of the young and skilled emigrants as well as to support economic development. For example, over the period of 1992-2010, more than 3.6 million people left Russia. Further, according to the Statistics Lithuania, 0.7 million people have left the country during 1990-2011. This article focuses on migration processes and labour market integration in the BSR covering Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia and their connections to Finland.
Finland has been the main destination for Estonian migrants. The migration flows from Estonia to Finland have increased in size, 600% during 1991-2012. The most remarkable flows of immigration were from Russia to Finland in the 1990’s, when Ingrian Finns received returnee status. In spite of the geographically close location, Finland has not been the most important destination for Latvians and Lithuanians.
The age structure of the immigrants is favourable from the labour market perspective being younger than that of the Finns. What is problematic is that immigrants have many times higher unemployment rate compared to the native population. There are, however, differences according to citizenship in the labour market participation. Immigrants are sometimes ready to take a job not matching to their education, i.e. facing brain waste, over-qualified or overeducation. It is important to empower immigrants with language education. Complementary training is required but it has to be organised in close cooperation with both public and private sector actors.
If the differences in standard of living between Finland and the BSR will decrease, the immigration pressure will decrease. Return migration to the origin country is one important pull effect and option for the BSR immigrants while so-called soft values get more meaning in migration decisions, i.e. roots to origin country. The recommendation is that there should be organised more language education for immigrants, and also specialised courses according to the language skill levels. There should be more easy-connections to the working life and one good practice is to have training and mentoring in different branches of economical life. It is very important to recognise human and cultural capital which all immigrants bring into the destination country.
1. Introduction
Population ageing is the reason for the diminishing supply of labour in developed countries. For example in Finland, there is a remarkable change in population structure when the baby-boom generation after the World War II retires during the current decade. The share of elderly is growing in the dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is an age-population ratio of those typically not in the labour force and those typically in the labour force. Finland is not the only country to struggle with this development trend since quite generally it is said that Europe is ageing and for example Germany, well-known as an attractive country for immigrants, needs more immigrants for its labour markets (Elliott and Kollewe 2011). It is also said that there is a competition of skilled labour between different countries. With current demographic trends many countries will come to rely increasingly on the immigration of foreign labour. Discussions focus mainly on need for skilled workers; however, the future demand for labour will most likely relate to all skill categories (Heikkilä and Pikkarainen 2008; see El-Cherkeh 2009).
This article focuses on migration processes and labour market integration in the BSR (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia) and more closely their connections to Finland. First, an overview of the BSR’s population change and migration on the European level is given. This is showing how diverse regions there are when looking population processes. Secondly, a more detailed analysis of the main international migration flows in the BSR is made. Analysis gives the view where people from the BSR are emigrating and from where people are immigrating to the BSR. After that we look at the BSR countries’ immigration to Finland and also emigration from Finland to the BSR. Immigrants’ integration in the labour market is discussed with an emphasis on Finland. After these analyses, the challenges to future developments are discussed in a wider perspective.
The data consist of published data from Statistics Finland and the BSR official statistics. Also special maps of Nordregio (www.nordregio.se) have been used as graphics.
Figure 1. Population change in the EU Source: Nordregio, Roto 2011.
2. The Baltic Sea region in the European demographic context
According to the EU statistics over 100 million people live in the Baltic Sea region. They constitute some 23% of the EU’s population (Iglebaek 2009).
The BSR is in different position in population change compared, on the European level, for example to Central and Southern Europe: the BSR is facing population decrease, not only in the beginning of the 2000’s but also in the future up to 2020. Figure 1 combines population changes in 2000-2008 and 2008-2020 showing more closely those regions with the decrease in population in both periods. These are mainly found in Central East European countries, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and as well as regions in central Germany. There are also classified those regions which indicate an increase of population both in 2000-2008 and also up to 2020. These are mostly areas in the core of Europe as well as areas close to metropolitan areas. There are separately found areas that have experienced an increase of population in the first period but are expected to lose population up to 2020 and separately regions on the contrary which might expect an increase (Nordregio, Roto 2011).
Figure 2. Net migration in Europe 2000-2008 (annual average net migration per 1000 inhabitants, in the EU NUTS3 regions) Source: Nordregio, Roto 2011.
Indeed the entire BSR shows a slight decline in total population, but on closer inspection it can be seen that continuing overall urban growth goes hand in hand with rural decline, although with contrasting tendencies between the various countries involved. The majority of small and medium-sized cities and towns, and specifically those that are to be found in relatively peripheral situations, are, however, increasingly hampered by population decrease. The key drivers of population change remain in place: strong migration surpluses in the Western part of the BSR and extensive natural losses in the Eastern BSR, with, however, distinctive national and regional variations pertaining (Neubauer and Schmitt 2009). According to Roll (2009), the peripheral border regions are usually located on the EU’s fringes, bordering economically less developed countries. She uses the concept “double peripheries” within a greater European context – distant not only from the dynamic centres of “Core Europe” – but also from prosperous national centres as well. Further she is stating that as new EU Member States have to compete economically with the “old” Member States, this is done at the expense of underdeveloped peripheral, and especially rural areas in the “new states”, entering into the EU in the 2000’s, which do not have for example the skilled personnel and infrastructure that the highly developed centres, usually national capitals, have.
The main reasons for population change are natural population development and migration. In the EU two thirds of the regions had a migration surplus and 40% a natural population increase in the period 2000-2008. In approximately 30% of European regions both of these components were positive. Almost 80% of the regions with positive in-migration also had a total population increase. In 200 EU regions the total population was decreasing even though net migration was positive. These regions are mainly located in Eastern Germany, Greece and Portugal, i.e. in regions with very low birth rates. At a general level a spatial polarisation is visible in relation to net migration, both between Eastern and Western Europe and between the metropolitan and the more rural and peripheral regions. In-migration was highest in some Spanish coastal regions and around Madrid, in 8 of these regions annual in-migration was over 3%. The highest out-migration regions were in Eastern Germany. In Figure 2 it can be seen that the BSR has had remarkable regional differences in net migration with vast regions of negative net migration and some regions, mostly urban areas, getting migration gain in 2000-2008 (Nordregio, Roto 2011).
3. International migration in the Baltic Sea region
The international migrant stock in the world was approximately 232 million people in 2013. This means that the percentage of international migrants among the world population was 3.1 in 2013. There were 195 million international migrants in 2005, which shows that the migration flows are increasing on the global level. In the total volume of the world’s immigration Russia takes the second place after the USA (Heikkilä 2010; Beloborodov 2011; OECD 2013a). The principle of free movement is one of the core principles of the European Union. Migration and labour mobility is viewed as an important way of matching labour demand and supply, and thus increasing employment and competitiveness. While the flows, for example of Nordic-Baltic migration, might be small compared to the rest of the movements within Europe, they have an important role to play in the development of the region and relationships between countries. Next international migration in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia is analysed. The last three countries entered the EU in May 2004. The migration streams between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are very small in numbers: for example emigration from Lithuania to Latvia was only 202 persons and emigration from Estonia to Latvia only 52 persons and to Lithuania 33 persons in 2012.
3.1. Russia
The Russian population has been steadily declining for almost two decades now. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the population of Russia was recorded at 148.5 million. The 2010 census, the results of which were released in late 2011 and early 2012, reports that the official population of Russia was 142.9 million. In 2009 Russia Recorded population growth for the first time in 15 years, with a growth rate of 23,300. Key reasons for the slow current population growth are improving health care, changing fertility patterns among younger women, and nowadays Russia pays child benefits according to the number of children, falling emigration and steady influx of immigrants from the ex-USSR countries. In the 1990’s-2000’s, migrants into Russia were mostly Russian expatriates and their descendants. For example in 2005, 95% of the documented migrants came from the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They were mainly Russians or Russian speakers repatriating from Kazakhstan (29%), Ukraine (17%), Uzbekistan (17%), and Kyrgyzstan (9%). In recent years, most immigrants have come from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Every year, 300,000 immigrants arrive in Russia, of which almost half are ethnic Russians. Most international migration in the Russian Federation is temporary. Temporary labour migration flows are normally at least three times higher than permanenttype flows (see Banjanovic 2007; OECD 2013b; Vishnevsky 2013; World Population Review 2014).
The census, conducted in 2010, counted 11.2 million foreign-born persons, nearly 0.8 million (or 7%) fewer than in the 2002 census. Most of the foreign-born population comes from the former Soviet Union (FSU), led by Ukraine (26%) and Kazakhstan (22%). Between 2002 and 2010, the number of migrants born in countries in Central Asia rose, while the number of those born in Ukraine and Belarus fell. Nationals from the Central Asian countries made up 42% of the foreign population, led by Uzbekistan (19%). Among nationalities from outside the FSU, China (4%) was the main origin country (OECD 2013b).
Over the period of 1992 2010, more than 3.6 million people left Russia. The largest Russian emigration stocks are found in the European Union, with Germany having the largest number, followed by Estonia and Latvia. Other countries which have remarkable Russian emigration stocks are Ukraine, Israel, and the USA. Mostly, emigrants from Russia have been qualified specialists, who reinforced the economically active population as well as the intellectual and reproductive potential of other countries. For example in the early 2000’s, 43% of Russian migrants in OECD countries aged 15 years and over had higher education. Most Russian migrants are women. In Italy they account for more than 80% of Russian citizens living there; in Spain, Germany, Norway, Australia, and France their share varies from 60% to 70%. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that they marry foreigners more often than men do. For example in 2006, marriage accounted for 30% of female immigration from Russia to France, while the corresponding figure for men was just 3.5%. The reproductive losses caused by female emigration from Russia are indirectly estimated at 0.8 million children that will not be born in the nearest 5 years (Beloborodov 2011; Denisenko 2013).
3.2. Estonia
The Estonian population on January 1st 2013 was estimated at 1.29 million, a decline of 5.5% since 2000. About 16% of the resident population were foreigners, the vast majority of whom are longstanding internal migrants who came from other parts of the Soviet Union prior to 1991. The natural increase was negative (-1,378 persons) in 2012. The net migration was also negative, i.e. 6,629 more persons emigrated than immigrated. There were 4,244 immigrants and 10,873 emigrants, which is 4,659 persons more than a year earlier. In immigration, the main origin countries have been Finland (35%) and Russia (24%). EU-27 countries have covered over a half (55%) of the immigration flows in 2012. EU-15 countries have been origin countries among 53% of immigrants which shows that over a half of the immigrants are moving, more closely, from EU-15 to Estonia. Since Estonia’s accession to the European Union in 2004, returning Estonian citizens have accounted for a large proportion of inflows to Estonia. In 2011, this percentage was 55 of all immigrants. Most immigrants come to Estonia to join their spouses and close relatives. In 2011 majority of residence permits have been issued on the grounds of labour and family ties (OECD 2013b; Statistics Estonia 2014).
When looking at emigration from Estonia, the main destination countries have been Finland (59%) and the United Kingdom (13%) in 2012. EU-27 countries have been target countries in 90% of Estonian emigration flows. When looking specifically at EU-15 countries, their proportion was 87% of the emigration flows from Estonia. Emigration flow from Estonia to Russia has been small, 382 persons in 2012. According to the Estonian population census, in early 2012, there were 24,900 Estonians working abroad. 61% of all Estonians working abroad was working in Finland (OECD 2013b; Statistics Estonia 2014).
3.3. Latvia
At the beginning of 2013, Latvia’s population was 2.02 million. Between the 2000 and the 2011 censuses, Latvia’s population had fallen by almost 13%. 63% of this decline was due to net migration, which has been negative throughout the past decade. Latvia’s population has faced also a remarkable natural population loss in 2013 (-8,475).
The international long-term immigration flow was 13,303 persons in 2012. Over a half (55%) of the immigrants to Latvia have moved from the EU-28 countries. More specifically EU-15 has been the origin area for 47% of the immigrants to Latvia in 2012 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2014; OECD 2013b).
The international long-term emigration flow numbered 25,163 persons in 2012. Almost 82% of the emigration was targeted towards the EU-28 countries, and 80% was towards EU-15 countries. After joining the European Union in 2004, Latvia has experienced a considerable wave of labour migration to more prosperous countries, especially to the United Kingdom and Ireland. It has been estimated that approximately 200,000 Latvians have emigrated in search for work after joining the EU. Unemployment climbed from 5% to more than 20%, and remains about 14% in 2012. Migration has also picked up to Germany. In 2010, the second largest emigration flow from Latvia was towards Russia while the United Kingdom was number one and Ireland the third destination country (Latvijas statistika 2014). Recent emigrants have been disproportionately young – 70% between the ages of 18 and 34 – and more educated than those who have remained (OECD 2013b; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2014).
3.4. Lithuania
Lithuania’s population was 2.97 million in 2013. The country has faced a remarkable natural population loss in 2013 (-10,698). Lithuania is a country of emigration and one of the few EU “sending countries”. According to the Statistics Lithuania, over 700,000 people have left the country during 1990-2011. In 2013, the number of immigrants to Lithuania was 23,643 persons but number of emigrants from Lithuania to foreign countries was much higher, 40,391 persons. This means a remarkable population loss in international migration (-16,748 persons) in 2013. Return migration has accounted for nearly 90% of all entries in 2011, mainly from the United Kingdom (41%), Ireland (12%), Norway (8%), Spain (5%), and Germany (5%). Labour emigration to those countries was substantial during their economic boom, and return has occurred with decreased labour demand (OECD 2013a, 2013b; Statistics Lithuania 2014).
The main destination countries in 2011 remained the United Kingdom and Ireland although they drew a smaller share than before the crisis, while Scandinavian countries grew in importance. Prior to the accession to the EU it was the Russian Federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the USA that attracted highest numbers of migrants from Lithuania (International Organization for Migration Mission in Lithuania 2011). Lithuanian emigration predominantly consists of young, single and educated individuals. The 2010 data show that 55% of the emigrants were 20 to 35 years old, 50% had special upper secondary education and 25% completed higher and professional education. Family emigration is also on the rise. Until recently, migrant parents preferred to leave their children with extended family members, a so-called split family phenomenon, or disintegration of families and households (Schmitt et al. 2008), while they were abroad but this trend is changing and now more parents take their children along with them as they leave (International Organization for Migration Mission in Lithuania 2011; OECD 2013b).
4. Immigration to Finland
Immigrants or foreign citizens in Finland numbered 195,511 persons in 2012, representing 3.6% of the total population. Totally, there were 285,471 persons living in Finland who were born abroad in 2012. This represents 5.3% of total population. The largest groups of those born abroad were persons born in Russia or former USSR (62,359; not including Estonia etc.), born in Estonia (34,984), born in Sweden (31,601), and born in Somalia (9,079) in 2012 (Statistics Finland 2014).
Next international migration flows from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia to Finland and vice versa is analysed (Figures 3 and 4). The most noticeable waves of immigration were from Russia to Finland in the 1990’s, when Ingrian Finns received returnee-status. Persons who have Finnish ancestry or otherwise a close connection with Finland can obtain a residence permit in Finland on certain conditions. No other reason, such as employment or study, is required to obtain the permit. Receiving the residence permit depends on the strength and closeness of Finnish ancestry. If ancestry dates back several generations, a residence permit cannot be obtained on this basis (The Finnish Immigration Services 2014). The immigration flow from Russia to Finland was highest in 1991, reaching 5,515 persons. The migration flow has diminished in the long run: there were 3,096 persons moving from Russia to Finland in 2012. Very few people moved from Finland to Russia (333 persons) in 2012. Of this flow, almost 75% were citizens of European countries excluding EU-countries, i.e. this means that many of emigrants might have been return migrants to Russia. 83 persons of emigration flow to Russia were citizens of Finland in 2012.
Estonia has been the most important BSR country from where there has been immigration to Finland during 1991-2012. The immigration flows from Estonia have been increasing: in 1991 1,073 immigrants and in 2012 already 6,422 immigrants. This growth was 600%. Since 1991, a total of around 43,000 individuals have emigrated from Estonia to Finland; and about 8,000 individuals, or 19%, have returned to Estonia. Many Estonians also live and work in Finland on a temporary basis since it is easy and relatively cheap to commute between the countries (Anniste and Tammaru 2014).
Finland has not been the most important destination for Latvians and Lithuanians, in spite of the geographically close location, as can be seen from the size of the immigration flows from these two countries. The largest flows have been in 2012 when Finland received 208 migrants from Latvia and 172 migrants from Lithuania. Emigration from Finland to the BSR has been highest to Estonia but very much smaller in size compared to immigration figures. In 2012, Finland had very positive migration balance with Estonia (Figure 4), gaining almost 5,500 persons, and with Russia (+2,763 persons). In general, motives for moving to Finland have been very much connected to family relations (60-65%) and there are nowadays over 3,700 multicultural marriages in a year in which one of the spouses is a Finnish person and the partner a foreign citizen. According to the Ministry of Labour, work related motives have represented only 5-10% of all motives during the 1990’s and the 2000’s. Other reasons have been for example seeking asylum and return migration (Kyhä 2007, 29). The basis of first residence permits that the Finnish Immigration Service issued to immigrants coming from outside the EU, the European Economic Area, EEA and Switzerland was most common family ties (34%), study (32%) and employment (29%) in 2012 (Ministry of the Interior 2013).
Figure 3. International migration between Finland and the Baltic States and Russia in 1991–2012
Source: Statistics Finland 2014.
Figure 4. International migration between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia and Finland in 2012
Source: Statistics Finland 2014.’
5. Immigrants on the Finnish labour markets
Immigrants’ age structure is favourable from the labour market perspective: there are more 20-44-year-old among Finland’s foreign-born people in relation to the share amongst those who were born in Finland (Figure 5). The percentage of people older than that and especially of pensioners is noticeable lower among the foreign-born population compared to those born in Finland. Russia in this case resembles Finland, since there are more elderly people in its population structure than in other BSR countries. As much as two thirds of those born in Lithuania and Latvia were in the age group 20-44.
The position in the labour market is a central indicator of the social status of immigrants and ethnic groups and employment constitute the foundation for successful integration for immigrants. Both in Finland and in other industrialised countries, it is more difficult for immigrants to find work than for the native population and the result is that the former often have many times higher unemployment rates than the latter (Heikkilä 2005). On the EU level, the unemployment rate is generally higher for foreign citizens thanfor nationals. In 2012, the EU unemployment rate for foreign citizens with a citizenship from another EU country was 12.5% whereas for foreign citizens with a citizenship from outside the EU the rate was almost twice as high, 21.3% (Teichgraber 2013).
The employment rate for immigrants has improved with the economic cycles in Finland. For example, during the deep economic downturn in 1994 the unemployment rate for foreigners was 53% and for the total population 17% in Finland, i.e. a three times higher rate for the former. The unemployment rates of labour force in 2011 were for foreign citizens 22% and for Finnish citizens 9%. There are huge differences in unemployment rates by citizenship in Finland: the unemployment rate for Estonians has been 11%, for Lithuanians and Latvians both 13%, for Russians 33% and for Somalis even 66% in 2011. One explanation for the better integration of Estonians is that the Estonian and Finnish languages are very similar (see Anniste and Tammaru 2014).
In general, immigrants tend to be concentrated in certain branches of activity and immigrant employment sectors show some gender differences in the 2000’s. Trade has been the most important sector to employ both immigrant men and women. Finance, insurance, real estate and business activities -sector has especially employed men. For women, education and research have been important, and also employment in health and social work. For example, nowadays there are around 300 Estonian medical doctors working in Finland. Although there are more and more Estonians in different economical sectors, the construction sector is employing the greatest share of Estonians (Tuohinen 2014). Transport and communication and construction sectors have, thus, been important for immigrant men in general. Industry has employed many men, and manufacture of electrical machinery has been especially important. It is clearly seen that the proportion of the employed has grown with better education among both males and females (Heikkilä and Pikkarainen 2008).
Figure 5. Age structures of population living in Finland by country of birth: born in Finland, all foreign countries,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia and the former USSR (excluding the Baltic States) in 2012
Source: Statistics Finland 2014.
When looking at entrepreneurship, 11% of the employed Finns have been entrepreneurs in 2011 but among Turks it is far more common: 38% of the employed Turks have been entrepreneurs. When looking at the BSR countries in 2011, 7% of the employed Estonians were entrepreneurs, totally in numbers 1,330 entrepreneurs. The numbers of Russian entrepreneurs (929), Latvian entrepreneurs (44) and Lithuanian entrepreneurs (21) are much smaller compared to Estonians in 2011 (Statistics Finland 2014).
6. Future aspects
General demographic trends that are causing concern in many countries around the world – decreasing population and increasing emigration flows – can be also observed in the BSR. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia are a prime example of countries where recent emigration has drawn the attention of policy makers looking to mitigate potential negative impacts of the departure of the young and skilled emigrants as well as to support economic development. The latter two countries in particular saw outflows’ rise after accession to the European Union. For example in Lithuania emigration accounted for approximately 90%of total population decline. These outflows exacerbate a demographic situation in which the Baltic States face a rapidly ageing population and receive few immigrants themselves (OECD 2013a). The shrinking labour force and the safeguarding of public infrastructures, combined with the retention of an acceptable level of public service provision “greying societies” will remain among the most persistent challenges up to the year 2030 and most likely even beyond (Neubauer and Schmitt 2009; OECD 2013a). Also for example, Russia’s population shrinks by 700,000 people each year due to high mortality and low birth rates. Migration could help compensate Russia’s population decline and labour shortage. When looking future scenarios, migration alone cannot make up for the population loss. Russia is trying to attract qualifiend workers and compatriots (Banjanovic 2007).
It is more difficult for immigrants to find work than for the native population and the result is that the former often have many times higher unemployment rates than the latter. It is generally acknowledged that it is difficult for employers to evaluate a person’s qualifications when accredited certification is available. This is because the content of education and degrees differ to such an extent between countries (Kahila et al. 2013). Immigrants are in many cases ready to take a job not corresponding to their education, i.e. facing brain waste and overeducation, just to get the first step to labour markets and through it to integrate into the society. These types of jobs are so-called incoming jobs which include for example jobs in cleaning and restaurant work -sectors. According to Anniste and Tammaru (2014), found their survey data from 2009, around a third of the migrants from Estonia stated that upon arrival in Finland they had to accept a job that was beneath their qualifications.
In Kyhä’s (2011) dissertation, a positive finding was that if higher educated immigrants succeeded in finding employment in Finland, the work was usually completely or partially relevant to their degrees. Further, higher educated immigrants’ career starts in Finland can be categorised into three groups, each of which is further divided into two subgroups so that there are altogether six different types of career starts: 1) stable career and 2) stabilising career corresponding to education, 3) mixed career and 4) declining career partially corresponding to education, as well as 5) entry career, not corresponding to education, and 6) unemployment.
Education is a very important tool and it empowers immigrants. Language education and language learning through for example so-called non-stop language education and through hobbies like sports, sewing groups, preparing food groups etc. are some of those tools. Further education to get qualifications updated for host country standards is important. According to Kahila et al. (2013), complementary training is required in many circumstances but it has to be organized in close co-operation with both public and private sector actors.
Most of the immigrants in the BSR and Finland come from other EU countries: for example over half (52%) of the immigrants moving to Finland were from EU countries in 2012. The competition with other European countries for well-educated migrants and migrants for different types of jobs is severe. If the differences in standard of living between for example Finland and the neighbouring countries will decrease, the immigration pressure will decrease. Temporary migration, circulation and short term employment is expected to increase (see Commission of the European Communities 2006; Heikkilä 2007; Kahila et al. 2013).
The BSR and Finland will need work-based immigrants to compensate for the labour deficit due to the baby-boom generation having left the workforce during this decade. These countries thus need immigrants for a variety of sectors, and compete for them with other ageing societies. According to Kahila et al. (2013), the Central Baltic region faces a labour shortage for example in the health care sector particularly medical doctors, nurses with different specialisations and assistant nurses as well as in the social services. For example Finland has immigrant labour reserves, i.e. unemployed and those outside the labour force, living already in the country which is potential labour force. These numbers alone are, however, too small for compensating the labour deficit in the near future (see Työministeriö 2007).
According to Schmitt et al. (2008), one of the policy implications at the macro-scale is that international companies will analyse where they have access tohighly qualified labour force before they consider setting up new facilities. At the national and regional level (micro-scale) the reality of a shrinking labour force demands that new strategies on how to attract qualified migrants from other countries to compensate for this will be put in place.
There has always been a demand for certain qualification professionals in different industries, especially when business cycles are going up. For this reason, the main task of so-called Central Baltic Job Ferry (www.cbjobferry.eu) has been to promote the mobility of professional and well educated people to ensure that there are enough qualified specialists in those regions and industries which are the most important for the future development of the whole Central Baltic region. This joint project of Finland, Sweden, Latvia and Estonia was completed in summer 2013.
Targeted return policies providing information to emigrants about changing economic and social conditions in the origin country, and allowing employers to reach out to diaspora, may help to promote some returns. There is need to provide general information about the labour market situation in the home country. The average emigrant is young, but there is a wide heterogeneity, and students, professionals and circular migrants all have different needs. For those who return, initiatives for labour market reintegration need to reflect these needs. Diaspora ponds can attract also lower cost capital from emigrants and give them a means to contribute to economic development when they no longer have family to which send remittances (OECD 2013a).
The main elements for example for affecting Estonians to return back to home country are: pay which would guarantee a good standard of living, challenge, work environment, a job with an international dimension, closeness of family and friends, etc. (OECD 2013a). Return migration back to Estonia is widespread. According to the European Social Survey in 2008, eight percent of the adult population of Estonia has worked for at least six months abroad, which is one of the highest rates in Europe (Pungas et al. 2012).
When looking at Estonian immigrants in Finland, the evidence for lifetime strategy explanation stems from the fact that income-migrants have substantially stronger plans to return. These migrants are mostly attracted by the prospects of better earnings and they express elevated intentions to return. Their low attachment to Finland may be enhanced by the possibility of easy commuting between the two countries, as frequent visits help to maintain contacts with relatives and friends living in Estonia (Pungaset al. 2012). The elements, which are affecting to the process of rooting oneself in the new homeland, as Estonians to Finland, are structural integration variables, i.e. Finnish citizenship and homeownership (Anniste and Tammaru 2014).
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