The relations of Russia with the North European countries have a special place in European politics. The atmosphere of these relations has evolved over many centuries, when countries traded and fought with each other, concluded dynastic alliances, explored the Northern sea and shared cultural and scientific achievements with each other. These relations were deep and multifaceted. Their bloom came in the days of the Hanseatic League, among whose participants were many Russian cities ― Novgorod, Pskov, Tikhvin, Belozersk, Tot’ma, Torzhok, Tver, Velikyi Ustyug, Revel and others. However, not only trade relations determined the nature of mutual relations between Russia and the North European countries, as marriage of state also played an important role. A significant mark in Russian history was left by Empress Maria Feodorovna, born Danish Princess Marie Sophie Frederikke Dagmara, who became the wife of Emperor Alexander III and mother of the last Russian Emperor Nikolay II.

Perhaps the most serious test of the relationship took place during the Great Northern War, when Peter the Great “cut the window” into Europe in spite of Sweden and strengthened the military position of Russia on the Baltic Sea. European capitals were not happy about the strengthening of Russia on the Baltic Sea, but after a while Stockholm and Copenhagen admitted the increasing influence of Russia on world politics. A century after Poltava Victory at the beginning of the XIX century, Russia made an enormous contribution to the development of the Finnish state, including it in its membership and granting the broadest autonomy to the Grand Duchy of Finland. Finally, in the XX century, the Soviet Union made a major contribution to the liberation of Europe from fascism; Soviet troops took part in the liberation of North Norway from Nazi troops.

The present stage of this relationship was marked by the “cold war”, when during the confrontation between West and East the policy of restraint and neutrality was used by social democratic governments of Sweden and Finland, what helped to create at that difficult time a climate of trust between the countries, belonging to different military-political blocs. Despite the fact that the level of mutual trust at that time was not always very high, it was fully offset by restraint in military and strategic issues, as well as the desire to preserve regional stability.

As you know, three of five North European countries (Norway, Denmark and Iceland) were fully integrated into the North Atlantic alliance, the first two even worked out plans in case of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, while Sweden and Finland remained neutral. At the same time Finland had a special place in the relations with the West and the Soviet Union. Its sovereignty was partially limited by a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948, in which both countries made a commitment “not to conclude any alliance and not to participate in the coalition directed against another High Contracting Parties”[1].

The disappearance of the USSR and the victory of Western democracy inspired many people to revise previous models of interaction. In the 1990s, the Finnish model was rejected by the supporters of the Euroatlantic choice and new generation of politicians of the North European countries, representing the right-wing conservatists. At the same time due to a misunderstanding were forgotten unique achievements of this model of relationship. Meanwhile, the historical significance of the model “Finlandization” lay in the fact that with the help of it Finland, on one hand, significantly reduced the risk of being involved in a confrontation between East and West, and on the other hand ― it was able to take full advantage of the economic benefits of its geographical location and the Soviet-Finnish border. The model of “Finlandization” opened access to capacious Soviet market for the high-quality Finnish goods and helped our northern neighbour to avoid confrontation with Moscow, didn’t allow to draw The Country of Thousands of Lakes in dubious military and political maneuvers that could have escalated into an armed conflict.

Whatever it was, already at a new historical stage in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the basis of these relations contained the idea of maintaining a sub-regional stability, improving the climate of trust and sustainable development. Thus the development meant not only an increase in turnover, but also the creation of democratic institutions, which would bring together the political systems of Russia and the North European countries. The indicator of progress in this direction was the emergence of subregional organizations (CBSS, BEAC), as well as the attempt to create a common space of development, expressed in the concept of “Northern Dimension”.

This stage of relations between Russia and the North European countries lead to serious contradictions, which had the ideological character. Russia agreed to adopt Western liberal democratic model for the creation and development of the Russian government institutions and local governments, but strongly disagreed with the fact that the Western liberal ideology would completely replace its national identity, abolish religious standards and force Russia to sacrifice its national interests in the nearest countries. For example, the North European countries really did not understand Russia’s reaction to the infringement of the rights of Russians in the Baltic States, believing that the imperial period of Russian history should have stayed in the past.

From its side, Russia did not understand a lot in the politics and actions of the North European countries. It was difficult to realise, for example, the reason for increased military budgets of Sweden and Finland against the significant reduction of the Russian military capacity after the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent reductions in the 1990s. It was hard to understand, why the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Baltic countries was not accompanied with a normalization of relations with Moscow, but instead led to a serious deterioration of relations in almost all important areas ― political, economic and humanitarian. Russia sincerely hoped that the North European countries, which took care of young democracies in the Baltic States, would be able to convince them of the need to ensure the equal rights of Russian-speaking population, especially since similar rights were provided to all national minorities living in the North European countries. Russia did not understand the need of the entry of the Baltic States into NATO, as well as the upsell of the thesis about the “Russian threat” by the leadership of the republics.

Over the past 10-15 years Russia’s relations with the countries of North Europe continued to develop on its special path, alternating the periods of recovery and recession. Significant milestone of this relationship became the restart of the program “Northern Dimension” in 2006. As a result, Russia was proclaimed the main target of this initiative, as originally proposed by the author of the idea of “Northern Dimension” – Finland. The program received a new framework document, identified new joint projects. ND had at its disposal two new partnerships ― in the field of transport and logistics (2008), as well as in the field of culture (2011).

However, two years later relations were spoiled by the events in the Caucasus, where Russia came to the defense of the interests of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Scandinavian countries supported Georgia’s position. Then Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt compared Russia’s actions to protect its citizens with the actions of Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland. After 8 years, he also condemned Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, comparing the policies of the President of Russia with the seizure of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein[2]. The fact that these statements were not a spontaneous and short-term splash of emotions, was confirmed by the events of 2008, when Poland and Sweden became the ideological inspirers of “Eastern Partnership”, the purpose of which was the gradual integration of the former Soviet Union in Western institutions. Anti-Russian orientation of the initiative was read between the lines.

In fact, the crisis in the Caucasus in 2008 and the promotion of the “Eastern Partnership” exacerbated the competition between Russia and the EU for the political dominance in the former Soviet Union, and a very active role in the EU’s eastern policy was played by two countries ― Poland and Sweden. From the point of view of Western countries, it looked as a competition between a neo-imperial project, which was supported by Russia as the center of Orthodox Slavic civilization and Western liberal project, aimed at establishing the economic, ideological and informational control over the European CIS countries, as well as the states of Transcaucasus. In this case, the coexistence of “Northern Dimension” and “Eastern Partnership” did not mean a fundamental difference of opinions between Finland and Sweden.

Preserving a common approach and a common strategy towards Russia, Stockholm and Helsinki disagree on tactics: if the project “Northern Dimension” is supported by Finland and is aimed at the gradual democratization of Russia and rapprochement with the West, the project “Eastern Partnership”, which is backed by Sweden, in fact recognizes that Russia is unlikely to be part of the Western world in the foreseeable future, and aims to establish control over the newly independent states established on the ruins of the Soviet Union.

Political upheaval and civil war in the Ukraine in this sense are not the starting point of the crisis in relations between Russia and the North European countries, but is a new stage of ideological confrontation, which was indicated in the middle of the 2000s. The aforementioned Swedish politician does not hide it as well. According to Carl Bildt, Russia in the 1990s demonstrated commitment to Western values, but with the coming of Vladimir Putin to power Moscow faced tough opposition to the Western policy. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden believes that the contradiction between Russia and the West is of a fundamental ideological character: “The new anti-Western and antidecadent line of Putin is built on deeply conservative orthodox ideas»[3].

It must be noted that the offensive Western policy towards Russia, combined with tough rhetoric of certain Western politicians have almost fully revived the political atmosphere of the “cold war”, and the media of the West has begun to carefully sculpt an “enemy image” from Russia. How long will the new “cold war” be, and how long will be the economic sanctions against Russia? This raises the third question: what is the position of countries on this issue? In particular, what do leaders and leading politicians of the North European countries think about it?

Many years of mutually beneficial cooperation have taught many to conclude that the North of Europe is quite a well-off region and Russia’s relations with the countries of the region seem to be promising and mutually beneficial. And, in fact, there were no open conflicts in the North of Europe with the participation of Russia, except for those systematic violations of the rights of Russians living in the Baltic states, and they mostly boil down to two main problems: failure of Latvia and Estonia to grant citizenship to all residents, who were born there and lived at the time of the declaration of independence of these countries, as well as the denial of the right of these people, and especially ― their children ― to receive education in their native language. In 2010, Russian initiative was to settle the dispute between Russia and Norway regarding the section of the Barents Sea between two countries. Thus, all potential conflicts in the region have been minimized.

However, it did not prevent the Norwegian oil company Statoil from withdrawing from the joint project of developing the Arctic shelf with Russia; Norway declared that its sanctions and EU sanctions against Russia wouls be cancelled only when Russia changed its policy in Ukraine. Explaining the position of the state, Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende recalled that the sanctions against Moscow were introduced after the annexation of the Crimea, as well as other “violations of the international law in the eastern regions of Ukraine[4].

It should be noted that Norway not being a member of the EU, was free on the question of participation in the sanctions, as well as on the issue of the degree of its rigidity and duration. For example, Turkey, which, together with Norway being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, decided not to join the sanctions at all, because it saw it as a threat to its national interests in the Black Sea region.

The fact that Norway did not simply join the sanctions, but chose their toughest variant, signifies either a serious crisis in bilateral relations, or that the foreign policy of Norway on the question of sanctions is completely subordinated to politics of Washington or Brussels. This situation has opened another unpleasant situation for Russia’s foreign policy: the signing of a bilateral agreement between Moscow and Oslo on the delimitation of the disputed waters of the Barents Sea in 2010 and reciprocal steps by President Medvedev had absolutely no effect on improving the climate of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, even in Norway one can hear louder voices of opposition to the current position of the country with regard to Russia. Thus, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre recalled “the millennial experience of a peaceful neighborhood” with Russia.[5].

Thus, the events of the Ukrainian crisis has shown that the most irreconcilable and active critics of Russia’s actions are the North European countries, namely Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Acuity of their position is not inferior to the positions of the United States and Canada, and on the degree of hardness it’s stronger that one of France and Germany. On the contrary, Finland and Iceland at the outset showed much more balanced position, based on considerations of economic pragmatism dominated the political arguments.

Finland’s position from the beginning tended to a compromise, and Prime Minister Alexander Stubb has repeatedly spoken out against imposal, extension and tightening of the sanctions, as the importance of Russia for the Finnish economy is too huge[6]. It can be explained by the fact that among all North European countries, Finland faces the greatest losses from the sanctions regime, as well as the impact from Moscow responses, which imposed a total ban on exports of beef, pork, vegetables and fruit, meat, poultry, fish, cheese, milk and dairy products to Russia.

Denmark and the Danish Board of Agriculture and the Economy also warned on the serious impact of Russian counter-sanctions on its economy. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Denmark, exports to Russia in 2013 amounted to 2.14 billion USD, of which 891 million USD accounted for agricultural exports. At the same time, the share of Russia in the exports of Denmark does not exceed 1.9%, which allows the country’s leaders to insist on the continuation of anti-Russian sanctions. This, in particular, was declared by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt[7].

According to the polls carried out in March 2014 by Taloustutkimus, the majority of Finnish society (60%) is foreign to anti-Russian sentiment, and Russia is not perceived as a threat. Finnish President Sauli Niinistë agrees with the opinion of the Finnish society: “We are neighbours. Unlike other neighbours of Russia, we are not members of NATO. Our relations with Russia are based on bilateral contacts”[8]. The position of Finland is not opportunistic, but consistent and is based on the mood of the majority of Finnish society, which has been recently shown by the events, when the Finnish leadership voted against the supply of arms of Kiev authorities^[9].

Against the balanced and moderate position of Finland Sweden is continuing to demonstrate hardness against Moscow. Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström said that Russia poses a serious threat to the security of Europe, however, along with the pressure on Russia one should continue political dialogue as well[10]. The announcement of Ambassador of Sweden in Russia Veronika Bard Bringus was in similar mode, when she did not exclude the possibility of exit of Swedish companies from the Russian market[11]. The main argument of the Ambassador was the situation with the Swedish concern Oriflame, which was accused by Russian tax authorities of deliberately understating the company’s revenues for the reduction of tax payments to the Russian budget. After losing the lawsuit in the Russian arbitration court, the company announced its intention to appeal to the international investment arbitration.

It should be noted that the current crisis in Russian-Swedish relations is not accidential. Stockholm has long been regarded Russia as a threat to its security, and therefore critically perceives any Russian actions of political or economic nature, aimed at strengthening the security of Russia in the Baltic Sea, whether it’s laying of the pipeline “Nord Stream” or the development of the military infrastructure of the Baltiysk and Kronstadt.

The story of unsuccessful search for “Russian submarine” in Swedish territorial waters in October 2014 recalled a similar story from “cold war”, when in 1981, a Soviet damaged submarine was discovered close to the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. Stockholm reacted to Russia’s actions to ensure security of Abkhazia and South Osetia with obvious disapproval, accusing Moscow of violating the territorial integrity of Georgia. A similar position was taken by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Crimean issue.

Playing the “Russian card” and the spread of the thesis of the “Russian threat” was the brand style for a number of leading Baltic politicians. The toughest position on the Russian question among the Baltic States has traditionally been shown by President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite. In her opinion, three Baltic countries faced “Russian threat” and they should be ready to respond to it during three days at least, until they get assistance from NATO members[12]. However, a different position was shown by Latvian President Andris Berzins, who does not support the imposal of sanctions and calls for their soonest cancellation. His views are shared by Foreign Minister of Latvia Edgar Rinkevich and Ventspils Mayor Aivars Lembergs.

Some political consequences of the deterioration of relations of North European and Baltic countries with Russia within the framework of the Ukrainian crisis followed shortly. In particular, it was reflected with newly resumed talks on accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO, the North European countries and the Baltic States published their plans to deepen cooperation in defense and security. So, the ongoing projects within the North European defense cooperation (Nordic Defence Cooperation ― NORDEFCO) were joined by the Baltic States ― Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia[13].

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Margot Wallström was the initiator and inspirer of the plan; she declared that military cooperation between the North European countries and the Baltic countries would decrease defense expenses and improve cooperation on border security. Russia replied immediately by performing tactical flight exercises in the Barents Sea, which were attended by the crews of fighter-interceptor MiG-31 and tactical bomber Sukhoi Su-24M of Central Military District[14].

Thus, Russia’s relations with the countries of Northern Europe are developing in an unfavorable scenario; however, there is still some potential for a gradual improvement in case of easing policy by the majority of the North European countries in respect of Russia. In this situation, the most pressing question is what position will prevail: the policy of deepening confrontation or a pragmatic and balanced policy aimed at overcoming the sanctions crisis. It seems no one can state the way of further development of relations between Russia and the North European countries, as Brussels and Washington both have a strong impact on the foreign policy of the North European countries. We can only hope for traditional Scandinavian sanity, willingness of all parties to move towards each other and take into account the legitimate interests of Russia.

The list of bibliography:

1.         Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoy pomoshi mezhdu Sojuzom Sovetskikh Socialisticheskikh Respublik i Finljandskoy Respublikoy. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

2.         V Danii opasajutsja posledstviy rossijskikh sankciy URL: http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

3.         Karl Bil’dt. Putin povel sebja kak Saddam URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

4.         Litva pugaet Pribaltiku «rossiyskoy ugrozoj». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm

5.         MID Norvegii: tol’ko izmenenie politiki RF v otnoshenyi Ukrainy privedet k snjatiu sankciy. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/

6.         Nad Barencevym morem proleteli 40 istrebiteley URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

7.         Norvegiya dolzhna prodolzhat’ politiku dobrososedstva s RF. URL: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html

8.         Nosovich, Aleksandr. Baltijskiy kontrast: Finljandiya otkazalas’ otvorachivat’sa ot Rossyi. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/

9.         Posol Shvecyi: v RF sozdajutsja prepjatstviya dlja raboty shvedskihk companiy URL: http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html

10.       Pravoslavie ― glavnaya ugroza dlya Zapadnoy civilizacii: mnenya. URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

11.       Prem’er Finljandiyi: Ukraine ne nuzhna voennay pomoshh’ URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html

12.       Strany Severnoy Evropy I Baltiki dogovorilis’ ukrepit’ voennye svjazi. URL: http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html

13.       Shadrina, Tat’jana. Finljandijaotkazalas’ otsankcij k Rossii URL: http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html.

14.       Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars. URL: http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[1] Договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Финляндской Республикой / Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

[3] Православие – главная угроза для Западной цивилизации: мнения. / Orthodoxy is main threat to Western civilization . opinions / URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

[4]МИД Норвегии: только изменение политики РФ в отношении Украины приведет к снятию санкций. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/ / MFA Norway: only changes of Russia’s policy in respect of Ukraine will lead to cancellation of sanctions

[5] Норвегия должна продолжать политику добрососедства с РФ. URL^: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html. / Norway must continue policy of neighbourliness with Russia.

[6]http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html

[7]http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

[8] Носович, Александр. Балтийский контраст: Финляндия отказалась отворачиваться от России. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/ / Nosovich Alexander. Baltic contrast: Finland refused to turn back from Russia

[9]Премьер Финляндии: Украине не нужна военная помощь URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html / PM of Finland: Ukraine does not need military aid

[10]Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars URL:http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[11]Посол Швеции: в РФ создаются препятствия для работы шведских компаний URL:http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html / Ambassador of Sweden: Russia imposes difficulties for activity of Swedish companies

[12] Литва пугает Прибалтику «российской угрозой». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm / Lithuania threatens Baltics by “Russian threat”

[13]Страны Северной Европы и Балтики договорились укрепить военные связи. URL:http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html / The North European countries and Baltics agreed on strengthening military cooperation

[14]URL:http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

This article argues that there are no common standards of integration, applicable to all countries, regardless of their economic situation’s specificity and level of development as well as of the nature of their commonly agreed objectives they seek to achieve by means of integration. The purpose to create a single internal market in the EU has determined the toolkit of the European integration, the nature and powers of the EU institutions through which it is carried out. The author argues that the construction of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space in general and within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in particular, in the image and likeness of the EU is not only unjustified, but also harmful. The founding treaty of the EAEU does not contain the purpose to construct a single internal market. The article emphasizes the high level of regional integration achieved by the Nordic countries, which has not been affected by the pattern of the EU integration. The Nordic integration began with the formation of a common labor market and creation within its framework of necessary conditions for high labor mobility. The objectives of the integration efforts of the Nordic countries, fundamentally different from the EU, are reflected in the nature of the institutions of regional cooperation and in the methods of their activity as well. The author recommends attentively looking at the Nordic integration experience to use its elements in the post-Soviet space. 

Introduction

Apart from Europe, integration processes cover today also other regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space. Such processes involve states with different levels of economic development, size, demographics, natural resources, quality of human capital, a position in the international division of labor, degree of development of market relations, participation in various international organizations and agreements and other indicators. It would be at least imprudent to assume that states entering integration processes must obey certain universal laws, undergo the same stages of integration, and create similar bodies with identical powers. The content of integration activities to a certain extent depends on the objectives of a particular state.

The European Union without proper justification is considered to be a benchmark of integration, and an example of how integration processes allegedly should unfold in the former Soviet Union. Common theories of integration, based on the experience of the EU, are designed to ascribe versatility and traits of objective law to the EU integration processes. However, copying of the EU integration experience can have very negative consequences for integration processes in the post-Soviet space. It would be advisable to study more closely the integration experience of other countries, particularly the Nordic countries, examine features of their integration model, and the problems that they solve by means of integration.

Trade and economic relations do not automatically evolve into integration. Free trade zones and customs unions can be considered as means of such relations. However, not all the participating countries are willing to develop integration. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) can serve as examples. Negotiations on a free trade area between the EU and NAFTA do not mean that their member countries are eager to take the path of integration.

A transition to conscious actions enabling convergence and merging of economies of states is equivalent to a strategic choice of ways for their further development. When deciding on joining an integration process one should have a clear idea of its long-term common goals so that participating states could use economic, political, legislative, social and other activities for the achievement of these objectives. A long and gradual character of integration requires reliable protection against fluctuations of the political and economic environment. Therefore a contractual basis is employed for this purpose and integration processes are carried out within the established permanent international intergovernmental organizations.

Initially, western European countries were planning to use development of integration processes to put an end toan infinite chainof warsbetween France and Germany that had been shaking Europe for centuries. Combined withthe continued presence of the troopsof the Western Allieson the territoryof the Federal Republic of Germany andinclusion of the latter in the North Atlantic Treaty integration processes were believed to help create realobstacles for therevivalof German militarismand reliablemonitoring toolsfor theeconomic and political developmentof Germanyafter the SecondWorld War.

These initial policy objectives, as they were successfully achieved, gradually began to take second place. The progressive extension of the EEC membership created a need for efficient development of its growing economic space, reduction of costs in cross-border commercial activities, providing conditions for profitable operation of companies in the participating states. As a result, integration processes within the EEC began to focus on the creation of a single internal market of the Community and on ensuring the most favorable conditions for the most competitive economies and companies of the member states not taking into consideration domestic production of each country.

The adoption of the Single European Act and the introduction of free movement of goods, services, capital and persons have determined the main tools for the creation of such a market. Efforts for consolidation of a single EU internal market and expansion of its rules to other states are camouflaged with attractive formulations such as “cohesion policy”, “neighborhood policy”, “Eastern Partnership”, etc. These perform more likely the functions of “soft power” of the EU rather than reflect the true essence of such activities. The European Commission has received the exclusive power to fully protect and improve the single internal market on the so-called “supranational” level, which is the most favorable for the most competitive economies and companies.

Often, the so-called “European idea” seems to be an ideological forerunner of the Western European integration. Some Russian and foreign experts believe that we will soon witness a political union of the member states of the EU capable of becoming a new state formation. Cooperation of the EU member states in the field of foreign policy, security and defense, domestic policy and justice and many other areas should be regarded as a step in this direction. However, the new Head of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said he was not going to create the United States of Europe and that he did not believe that “a united Europe could be constructed in opposition to a nation-state” (9, p.7). In fact, these areas of cooperation serve the practical needs of a single internal market and reinforce international ambitions of the EU by means of foreign policy and security.

Despite the common historical destiny, continued co-living in joint states, their geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic similarities, comparability of sizes, similarity of political cultures and political orders (2, pp.615-617), the Nordic countries do not aim at getting united into one single state. The “European idea”, despite the fact that these countries belong to Europe, has not had a considerable influence on their relationship. Three of the five countries in the region are relatively young independent states. Norway gained independence in 1905, Finland – in 1917, and Iceland finally became an independent state in 1944. That’s why these countries do not allow any attacks on their recently-found sovereignty in integration processes.

However, the Nordic countries have consistently highlighted the importance of regional cooperation for them. In 1939, the Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler said: “The North will be a political reality to the extent to which the nations are convinced that their welfare is provided by the Nordic cooperation and solidarity” (7, p.37). In March 1948, the Danish Prime Minister said in Stockholm: “Whatever happens, our peoples should be together. It would be unfortunate if we parted ways”(10, p.35). “We live in difficult times – the Prime Minister of Norway Einar Gerhardsen said in February 1953 – when the very environment necessitates that small countries that have a lot in common and that are located side by side, hold together” (5, p.217). Although regional cooperation has always enjoyed wide support among the Nordic public, however, as it was acknowledged in February 1953 by the Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft, their cooperation “had been quite irregular and random” for a long time (10, p.98).

To date, the Nordic countries have reached the most advanced and deepest level of regional integration of all known examples, with an integration path that is significantly different from the EU. Studying its features may be of interest to potential participants of integration processes in the post-Soviet space.

“The Road Map” of the Nordic integration

Integration processes in the European North have taken as a base the indisputable fact that the joint efforts of the Nordic countries can better protect their common interests than if they were acting separately. Regarding the Nordic integration processes it is appropriate to cite the Swedish scientist G. Adler-Karlsson: “Instead of looking for guidance in doctrinal theory, we have always preferred to find the best solutions that are practically achievable under given circumstances” (1, p.22).

In the early post-war years, the Nordic countries faced similar economic difficulties. In April 1948, the four Scandinavian countries officially joined the “Marshall Plan”. Within its framework, Denmark, Iceland and Norway received US aid in the form of gifts, Sweden – in the form of loans (7, p.276). As a result, they were able to partially upgrade their fixed capital in industry and agriculture and to restore economic ties among the countries of the region. Sweden, for example, was paying for the US loans with ships for Norway.

This was also encouraged by lower customs duties in comparison to other Western European states, significant devaluation of the Scandinavian currencies in 1949 (exchange rate of the Norwegian and Swedish Krones to the American Dollar fell by 30%, the Danish krone – by 44%), as well as their accession to the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which resulted in a partial reversibility of Scandinavian currencies within the EPU. As a result, the value of exports in each of the Scandinavian countries in 1948-1951 more than doubled (7, pp.276, 277).

Although Finland did not join the “Marshall Plan”, it was also receiving individual loans from its funds, as well as from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and from Sweden. By the end of 1956 the total amount of foreign loans in Finland was more than 68 billion FIM, with the share of loans from the US and Sweden being equal to 85% of that amount (4, p.18). By the beginning of the 1950s, the Nordic countries managed to complete the reimbursement of indirect losses caused by World War II (7, p.278).

In 1950 the North Economic Cooperation Committee that was established in February 1948, recommended that the Nordic countries participating in the “Marshall Plan” should begin creating a Nordic customs union. However, differences between the countries did not allow them to implement either this or any of subsequent attempts to create such a customs union. This gave impetus to the search for other ways of the “Nordic cooperation”.

In the late 1940s, Sweden was experiencing a rapid industrial rise and faced labor shortages. Other Nordic countries had problems with employment. As a result, steps were taken towards a more rational use of labor resources at the level of the Nordic region and towards formation of a common labor market. In 1951, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden concluded a convention that allowed their citizens to be employed in any of the Nordic countries without prior permission from the authorities, and agreed to facilitate moving of citizens from one country to another. In 1954 they created a regional free market for labor, and in 1957 they completed the design of a passport union. In the second half of the 1970s the passport and visa regime and customs checking were abolished for the citizens of the Nordic countries at border crossings. Icelandjoineditin 1982, FaroeIslands – in 1992.

In order to increase labor mobility within the region the Nordic countries took a series of synchronous measures in social policy and social legislation. In accordance with the Convention on Social Security, approved in 1955, citizens of these countries received the same rights, privileges and responsibilities regarding the size of the basic pension, old-age pensions, unemployment, disability, occupational injuries and sick leave, as well as additional payments when moving from one Nordic country to another. They were given an opportunity to enjoy the same social benefits as nationals of the host country.

The first steps in the field of subregional integration in the North of Europe were aimed at ensuring establishment of a general labor market, which were accompanied by adoption of a series of laws and administrative measures aimed at improving mobility and ensuring social rights of migratory workers. The labor market became a vast sphere of common interests of the Nordic countries, which became one of the key areas of their subsequent integration efforts. In the course of its creation, harmonization of legislation became the most important issue, which later evolved into one of the skeletons of the Nordic integration.

Unification of legislation of the Nordic countries began in the 19th century and reached a high level even before the start of integration processes between them. At that moment they had unified legislation on the activities of banks, in the field of property, commercial and civil law, as well as in the field of insurance, property possession, etc. The authors of the book “Scandinavia between East and West”, published in 1950 in the US, noted that “there are far more similarities between the laws of the Nordic countries, than, for example, between the laws of New York and Florida states” (10, p.109). The Northern Commission on cooperation in the field of law continued those efforts.

Within the framework of EFTA, which Denmark, Norway and Sweden joined in 1959 (Finland joined in 1961 and Iceland in 1970), the Nordic countries managed to reduce customs duties and abolish quantitative restrictions in mutual trade in industrial goods. The share of inter-Scandinavian trade, that previously had been 5-6% of the total value of foreign trade in the Nordic countries, significantly increased in the mid-1960s. The import share reached 19.2%, while the share of exports totaled 22.5%. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Scandinavian countries occupied the first place in trade with each other. Their share reached 87.7% of EFTA imports and 63.5% of EFTA exports (11, p.268). Trade between the countries in the region became a significant factor in their development and an another sphere of their common interests.

Despite the differences in the national security doctrines, the Nordic countries continued foreign policy cooperation also in the postwar period. Periodic meetings of the Prime Ministers, regular meetings of foreign ministers and representatives of the countries of the region to the United Nations Organization, permanent official contacts among the foreign ministries at the ambassadorial level and direct personal contacts among Heads of their divisions and departments, weekly meetings of Heads of delegations and daily meetings of delegates and representatives of the Nordic countries in the committees at the sessions of the UN General Assembly became common practice.

At the plenary sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1956 to the beginning of the 1970s, they voted together on international issues in more than 80% of cases. Introduction within EFTA of a duty of 15% on imports of processed goods by Britain in October 1964 had caused solidarity actions the Nordic countries that achieved its abolition in November 1966. At the talks in the “Kennedy Round” (end of 1966 – spring 1967) the Nordic countries, acting jointly, managed to get concessions from the EEC on reductions of tariffs for their trade (11, pp.272-273). Thus, the small Nordic countries received strong indications of the effectiveness of their foreign policy cooperation in ensuring common interests.

After weighing the priorities of their further development, the Nordic countries, while in EFTA, made a strategic choice in favor of regional integration and signed the Cooperation Agreement between Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (“the Helsinki Agreement”) on March 23, 1962, in Helsinki. It became the legal basis document for their further cooperation and a “road map” of their integration efforts (12). This document with account of later amendments is still valid to this day.

Embarking on the path towards integration, the Nordic countries were certainly not striving to unite into a single state, and did not aim at creating a single internal market. Their integration model is initially aimed at strengthening mutually beneficial foreign-policy cooperation of small sovereign and independent states, which, by means that are inherent in integration processes in the economic sphere, purposefully and pragmatically strengthen and extend old areas and create new areas of common or identical interests. This allows to build close and long-term cooperation on the international arena on a firm and constantly expanding basis of fundamental interests of socio-economic development, rather than on a shaky basis of temporary political arrangements and agreements and short-term, transient and situational factors.

A natural outcome of such an integration model is an influential community of states that preserve complete freedom in their economic and political decisions. The ability of such a community to effectively promote and protect common interests on the international arena is constantly growing with a simultaneous increase in the political weight of this community in the world. For a group of small countries such interaction becomes an essential element of national security and independence of each of them. On issues where their positions and interests diverge, they operate as separate and independent sovereign states.

In the Helsinki Agreement the Nordic countries defined top-priority areas of common or similar interests, for further expansion of which they decided to use their integration efforts. This document identified further measures for support and development of a common market of labor. In the sphere of legal cooperation they pledged to facilitate acquisition of citizenship of one Nordic state by nationals of another Nordic state, to seek to achieve maximum uniformity of legislation in the field of private law, as well as rules relating to criminal offenses and punishment. It recorded, in particular, an agreement to provide opportunities to investigate and prosecute crimes, committed in one of the countries in the region, in the other Nordic countries and enforce decisions of courts and other authorities of all states in the region on their territories. These provisions are intended, among other things, to ensure proper compliance with legislation by migrating citizens of Nordic countries.

The “road map” of regional integration includes a wide range of pragmatic measures of cultural interaction, which aims at preventing painful political, economic, social and cultural problems of integration of migrant workers from the other Nordic countries into the social and cultural environment of the recipient countries. It was decided to include in the curricula of Nordic schools studying of language, culture and social conditions of the other states in the region, and to provide an opportunity for students to study and take exams in the other Nordic countries.

The Nordic countries jointly fund committees of the Nordic cooperation in the field of primary, secondary and higher education, as well as adult education, regional programs of mobility for students and university teachers, pupils and school teachers. Their school and university curricula, textbooks and examination systems are standardized. Studying the languages of neighboring peoples is coordinated by the Secretariat of the northern languages and literature courses on the northern languages.

The Nordic countries have decided to ensure mutual recognition of diplomas at all levels of education, to coordinate employment services of the Nordic countries, harmonize qualification requirements for professions and work for the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in all countries of the region. They also agreed to work closely in the field of adult education, to unify the application of national provisions relating to workers’ health, occupational safety, and to develop further exchanges between the countries in the field of literature, painting, music, theater, cinema and other cultural industries. The Nordic Culture Fund, founded in 1966, funds cultural projects within the region. There have been set up and in operation also numerous joint organizations of the Nordic countries in the field of culture and media.

As a result, citizens of the Nordic countries have a privileged position on their labor markets compared to citizens of other EU member states. Article 2 of the Helsinki Agreement contains a provision that “in the development of laws and regulations in any of the Nordic countries, citizens of all the other Nordic countries receive the same rights as citizens of this country”. Moreover, this provision should be applied “to all spheres of jurisdiction affected by the Agreement on cooperation”. In other words, citizens of the other Nordic countries shall not be considered as foreign labor on the labor market of each of these countries.

Having started integration processes with creating a common labor market and providing measures to promote their mobility, the Nordic countries have agreed to extend integration onto other areas. In the area of economic cooperation, they decided to hold consultations on economic policy issues, coordinate the measures they take regarding the impact of external factors on the economic cycle, to provide freedom of movement of capital among countries in the region, stressing that joint decisions in this area should ensure common interests of the Nordic countries in the field of payments and currency, and adhere to the division of labor among countries in matters of production and capital investment, as well as create favorable conditions for direct cooperation between the companies of two or more Nordic countries in these areas.

While regularizing the relations with the European Union, each of the Nordic countries was addressing possible consequences of their decisions for the Nordic cooperation. Supporters of the “People’s Movement against the EEC”, that was founded in 1971, were speaking, for example, of the need to strengthen the Nordic cooperation along with protection of the Danish national identity (6, p.517).

Denmark’s entry into the EEC in 1973 and the subsequent conclusion by the other Nordic countries of agreements with the EEC on the duty-free trade of manufactured goods helped to keep the trading mode, which existed among the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA. Denmark’s membership in the EEC did not cause any specific problems for the Nordic cooperation until the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Its implementation was threatening to cause irreparable damage for the “Nordic cooperation”.

As a consequence, the Danish referendum on the accession of Denmark to the European Union gave a negative result. Ultimately Denmark joined the EU, but on special conditions, and the rest of the EU member states were forced to accept them (6, p.550). Special conditions for joining the EU in the future were also specified by Sweden. One of such conditions was smooth continuation of the “Nordic cooperation” (8, pp.77-79).

As part of the integration efforts the Nordic states began to work closely together in the field of scientific research and coordination of the use of allocated resources with the greatest efficiency, including establishment of joint structures and institutions to combine their academic potentials and financial capabilities.

The Nordic countries conduct numerous joint research projects, coordinate national science and technological programs. The main driving force in this area are joint academic institutions ensuring high standards of research, that are difficult to achieve at the national level. Among them are the Northern Academy of Innovation Research, Northern Institute for Theoretical Physics, Nordic Council for Arctic Medicine Studies, Northern Research and Production Program on Biotechnology, Nordic Volcanological Institute, Northern Arctic Program of Humanitarian Studies and others.

The scope of their integration efforts includes further cancellation of trade barriers among the Nordic countries, coordination of their technical and administrative customs regulations, simplification of customs procedures, development of transport communications and trans-border trade, joint economic development in adjacent areas of two or more Nordic countries, joint efforts to ensure their interests in international trade.

An important area of the Nordic integration, defined by the Helsinki Agreement, was the Nordic cooperation in the field of transport and communications, as well as environment. The Nordic countries hold mandatory consultations for construction of transport and communication networks, which involve two or more Nordic countries, and coordinate efforts to improve road safety. Border passport control has been simplified.

Countries in the region take into account environmental interests of the other Nordic countries on an equal basis with their own interests both in the legislative process and in the practical application of the laws. They harmonize rules for the protection of the environment, agree on standards and define criteria for pollution, coordinate activities aimed at flora and fauna conservation.

Important areas of agreed integration measures also include official statistics, health and medicine, production of alcoholic beverages, mutual recognition of licensing procedures or certification in the field of medical, technical and other security controls, coordination on issues of child and youth policy.

Given the characteristics of the Nordic integration model, special attention is paid to strengthening of the cooperation at the European and international level, designed to provide “opportunities for joint extraction of benefits for citizens and companies of the Nordic countries”. The governments of these countries are held responsible for ensuring mutual interests and values as it is specified by the Helsinki Agreement. Various government authorities of the region can directly communicate regarding issues that do not fall under the exclusive competence of their external relations. They coordinate activities to provide assistance to developing countries, jointly distribute information about the Nordic countries and Nordic cooperation, and provide support for Northern European citizens by diplomatic missions.

The Nordic integration is characterized by pragmatism and focus on solving specific problems. Implementation of the reached agreements dictated by long-term strategic interests of the Nordic states, allows to strengthen their cooperation in international affairs by constantly expanding the range of their common essential interests. As a consequence, the nature, structure, functions and powers of international bodies of the Nordic cooperation significantly differ from those existing in the EU.

The “Nordic cooperation” is performed in the framework of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, at the meetings of Heads of governments, by specialized authorities of the Nordic countries and by special cooperation bodies.

One of the fundamental principles of the “Nordic cooperation” is active participation of the public in discussions and decision-making in this area. Practical implementation of this principle is the Nordic Council established in 1952. It was determined in the Helsinki Agreement as an “elected public assembly of the Nordic countries” and a form of cooperation of their governments. Its Charter has been adopted by each Nordic country as an internal act which has the force of law. This body is not endowed with legislative functions. It is authorized to investigate the main components of the Nordic cooperation, to adopt recommendations, prepare research reports and other documents. The members of the Nordic Council may make inquiries to the governments or to the Nordic Council of Ministers on the issues of the “Nordic cooperation”.

The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) is a body of cooperation among governments. It is responsible for the interaction between them and the Nordic Council on the issues relating to their joint actions. It takes decisions aimed at implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement and the other agreements among the Nordic countries. The overall coordination of the Nordic cooperation rests with Prime Ministers. They are assisted in this by the Ministers responsible for this cooperation, and the Heads of state and government secretariats, that are members of permanent national committees of the Nordic cooperation.

The Chairman of the NCM is responsible for the coordination of the Nordic cooperation and initiatives for related matters. His or her decisions are taken unanimously and are binding. In the case of making decisions on issues requiring parliamentary approval, they will not take effect until the approval of the relevant national parliament. The NCM reports annually to the Nordic Council on the problems and prospects of the Nordic cooperation. At the same time, the Prime Minister of the presiding country shall submit a special report on cooperation among the governments of the Nordic countries regarding European and international affairs.

In other words, effective management of integration processes in Northern Europe are ensured by the northern cooperation bodies not endowed with any exclusive powers, special competences or so-called “supra-national” functions. These are not necessary as unanimous decisions of the Nordic Council of Ministers are binding and enforceable for the Nordic countries.

As a result of the consistent implementation of the Nordic integration model there is constant strengthening of the Nordic cooperation on international issues and convergence of their positions on many international issues. All the five Nordic countries have become members of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Arctic Council. They all participate in the activities of the “Northern Dimension”, despite the fact that some of them are not directly related to some of the regions listed here.

Before Finland and Sweden joined Denmark as members of the EU in 1995, Iceland and Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992. Its terms provided maintenance of the conditions for further practical realization of the integration model for all of the Nordic countries, along with participation in free movement of goods, services, capital and persons across borders with EU member states and joining the Schengen area (3, pp.126-127).

Denmark and Sweden stipulated for themselves special conditions for participation in the EU and Norway and Iceland did the same for the EEA. These conditions provide opportunities for further development of the “Nordic cooperation.” An important step in this direction was concluding of an agreement among the Nordic countries on cooperation in the field of defense (NORDEFCO) on 4 November 2009. This marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of their interaction on international issues and was a direct consequence of the deepening of the Nordic integration. In the EU framework they included clauses regarding their participation in the common EU policy on security and defense.

Integration scenarios for the Eurasian economic union

Integration processes in the post-Soviet space should develop with due regard to the characteristics of the participating countries and specific tasks, which they intend to solve by means of integration. Already at an early stage there should be formulated overall strategic and intermediate goals that member states intend to achieve with the use of integration mechanisms. Depending on the nature of these goals specific mechanisms for achieving them should be identified, as well as the specific role of integration levers, adapted to the economic, political, social and other conditions of the existing economic space.

General wordings of very vague objectives of the EAEU purposes, such as strengthening and modernization of the economies of member states, their convergence, increase of their competitiveness in the global markets, direct integration processes at servicing some of the current needs and improving of the existing situation according to the formula “movement is all, the ultimate goal is nothing”, rather than at achieving more or less distinct strategic objectives.

Such an approach allows little for conscious, focused and consistent creation of long-term legislative, economic, political, social and other conditions that would provide close interaction, interpenetration and fusion of economies of the countries entering the path of integration, as it does not contain any motivation that is crucial for them.

Orientation of the EAEU member states in their integration efforts on the experience of the EU, including institutional experience, would mean that they intend to build on the territory of the former Soviet Union the same single internal market, aimed at serving the needs and creating the best opportunities for extraction of benefits of the most competitive economies and companies of the member states and the EU. For most post-Soviet states, economic conditions of which have not yet recovered and have not acquired the necessary level of development and competitiveness, a rigid imposition of such rules could have a devastating effect on domestic manufacturers and economic independence as it happens with the economies of the East European EU member states. There are serious doubts that exactly this objective is optimal for integration processes in the post-Soviet space because of the large differences between the CIS and the EU as well as among post-Soviet states.

An institutional model of integration reproducing the one in the EU may also be unattractive for them as it envisages delegating of a part of sovereign powers of the member states to some supranational international executive authorities. For many post-Soviet states, that only recently gained their independence and sovereignty, an idea of a new superstate in the future is unattractive, and practical steps in this direction are considered counter-productive. There are also serious doubts that such a development will meet the fundamental interests of Russia and its companies, because overcoming of social and economic underdevelopment in these countries will be largely their duty.

It is obvious that the member states of integration processes in the post-Soviet space and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should identify those areas of common or similar interests that they would like to form with integration mechanisms, and, relating to them, identify specific tools for their practical implementation. Taking into consideration differences among post-Soviet states, discussions on common or similar interests of states and possible areas of their integration efforts can be performed both among all the participants of integration processes, and between different groups of states with regard to their economic specialization. Without this, they are doomed to copy existing integration models, which is currently the case.

It is advisable in this context to determine which of the following is preferable for Russia and other members of the EAEU: (a) creation of a single internal market of the EU-type, or (b) promotion of division of labor between the member countries and development of specialized production industries with the help of selective integration measures in each of the countries, or (c) purposeful formation of areas of common economic, social and other interests of the members states of the EAEU in order to strengthen the foundations of their close cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, security and defense policy, or, finally, (d) flexible combination of these measures with the account of development specifics of each of the post-Soviet states and the whole former Soviet Union. The general philosophic idea of the integration model of the Nordic countries and its individual elements can represent for Russia and other post-Soviet members of the EAEU a certain conceptual and practical interest.

When selecting areas of application of integration mechanisms one should pay attention primarily to those areas that, being inherited from the Soviet past, still remain essential for the economy. This could include, for example, infrastructure links among post-Soviet states. Further development and deepening of such links in the present circumstances with the use of integration mechanisms could be of mutual benefit and could contribute to the formation of common interests in this area.

Efforts related to regulation of labor markets in the post-Soviet space and its social and cultural reinforcements could be of paramount importance for application of integration measures, taking in to account the fact that the dynamics of the demographic situation in various countries of the CIS significantly differs. Cooperation in the field of educational and cultural policy, focused on servicing current and future needs of the labor force market and scientific and technical cooperation, could also become a program of long-term integration efforts of member states of the EAEU.

A specific feature of the new independent post-Soviet states is their continued breakaway from a single legal system of the Soviet Union. Therefore, cooperation in the field of law among them as a whole is unlikely to be successful. It should be selective and primarily related to the areas of interaction that will be identified as priority objects of their integration efforts.

Obviously, one can offer a lot of other areas to coordinate integration efforts in the post-Soviet space both with account of its specificity and experience of other integration groups. However in order to do this, it is necessary to determine what integration model and what strategic objectives potential participants would like to implement. The impression is that this is not completely clear yet.

References:

Antonov A.N. Shveziya: protivorechiviye process razvitiya. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znanie”, 1977

Voronkov L.S. Integrazionniye process na severe Evropy/”Evropeiskya integraziya” pod redakziyei Ol’gi Butorinoi. Moskva, 2011

Voronkov L.S. Obschee economicheskoye prostranstvo mezhdu Rossiyei i ES?/”Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta”, N. 4 (37), 2014

Voronkov L.S., Senyukov Yu. P. Finlandiya – nash severnyi sosed. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znaniye”, 1977

Goloshubov Yu.I. Skandinavia i problem poslevoennoi Evropy. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mysl’”, 1974

Istoriya Danii. Pod redakziyei Stena Buska I Henninga Poulsena. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Ves’ mir”, 2007

Kan A.S. Vneshnyaya politika skandinavskikh stran v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauka”, 1967

Kuliabina L.N. Shezia v sovremennom mire. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauchnaya kniga”, 2005

Novaya komanda v Brussele/”Ekspert”, 3-9 Noyabriya 2014, N. 45 (922)

Prokofiev Vl. Severnaya Evropa i mir. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1966

Pokhlebkin V.V. Skandinaviya: tendenzii sovremennogo razvitiya/ “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya v Zapadnoi Evrope”. Pod redakziyeyi D.E. Melnikova. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1974

Helsinkskyi Dogovor o sotrudnichestve mezhdu Daniyeyei, Finlandiyeyi, Islandiyeyi, Norvegiyeyi I Shveziyeyi (http://eulaw.edu.ru/documents/legislation/eur_int_law/nordic.htm)

What is the villa and who owns it? There are other beautiful and pridefully-rich buildings close to it on the cape. However the villa distinguishes itself. It is the Waldermasunde Palace. It may be quite overstated to call it a palace as Russians have seen a lot of tsarist luxury that is superior to many royal buildings in the world. But in Sweden they call them palaces. Prince Eugen lived and worked in the palace. He was the fourth and the youngest son of King Oscar II and is known in Swedish history by his hobby which was untypical for royals. Do not imagine anything bad as he was simply an artist and one of the central landscape-painters of Swedish fine arts of the late XXI – early XX centuries. He was neither a genius nor an amateur but just a good artist.

There is nothing surprising in his artistic hobby as the education course of royal offsprings included at the time (and likely includes today) a set of esthetic disciplines, including music, dancing, handicraft and drawing. In most cases the training ended in nothing. They learned the course and would only sometimes remember it.

It was different with Prince Eugen who was a genuine artist. He was not the sharpest pencil in the box, by nevertheless. . . We can count only one or two professional artists of royal blood. Besides many paintings, the prince is also known as a patron of arts who did a lot to develop them. He used his money to buy paintings of other artists and had a big collection of them. He built a house on Cape Waldemarsudde and added a gallery to keep the paintings and one sculpture. But all in good time. . .

Between easel and crown

Prince Eugen Napoleon Nicolaus of Sweden and Norway was born on August 1, 1865 in Drottningholm Palace, the royal summer residence near Stockholm. Residents of the capital were informed about the event by a 42-gun salute. The parents were Crown Prince Oscar and Princess Sophia of Nassau.

Eugen was the youngest kid in the family to which only boys were born. In that sense the father and mother should have been happy as they produced more than enough resources for the family to continue and expand. In those times monarchs stuck to the old traditions when the crown was inherited exclusively by males. In 1980 the rule was abolished and current King Carl Gustaf XVI can be succeeded by any of his children – two daughters and a son. The senior one will be the heir .

As Prince Eugen had three elder brothers – Gustaf, Oscar, and Carl – and little chance to take the throne he was calm about it as his place among substitutes was the last. However it did not free him from the feeling of responsibility of a son of a monarch as anything may happen in life.

When Crown Prince Gustaf married Princess Victoria of Baden the second eldest son Oscar fell in love with her maid of honor Ebba Munk, a daughter of a military man. The law on royal succession said that if a prince of the blood marries a common woman he automatically loses the title to the throne. Oscar faced the choice and love took the upper hand. As for the duty to the crown there were two more brothers in the reserve and no major threat to the future of the royal family. As a result of Oscar’s left-handed marriage Carl and Eugen made one step up the succession ladder. Although the family reconciled with headstrong Oscar two other heirs swore not to marry a commoner in any case. And they stood up to the commitment. Carl married Princess Ingeborg of Denmark while Eugen remained single all his life.

As a prince of the blood Eugen had to participate in official life. He did it perfectly and attended numerous ceremonies, receptions, dinners, functions, and travelled abroad to represent the king and visited other monarchs. In 1894 he was in Petersburg as a representative of the Swedish Royal Court to attend the funeral of Alexander III. In the same quality he participated in festivities devoted to the 60th anniversary of the reign of Queen Victoria.

He was the fourth and the youngest son of King Oscar II and is known in Swedish history by his hobby which was untypical for a royals.

There was also military career. A prince is destined to be a military man. Eugen did everything necessary. He was a Hussar officer, wore the uniform when necessary, participated in exercises, but did not enjoy it all. He once wrote to his mother from maneuvers: “It is no pleasure to be a bad officer. To devote much time to military service means to abandon painting.” As a Royal Family member Prince Eugen could not sell his paintings like other artists. He was stripped of a major criteria of assessing works of art – public demand through market purchase- sale. The only thing he could do is to present his paintings to museums and various institutions.

His father Oscar II was also fond of creative activity. Hr wrote verses which were published under the pseudonym Oscar Fredrik. In 1857 at the age of 28 he was even awarded the second prize of the Swedish Academy (today it awards the Nobel Prize in literature) for the poem From Recollections about the Swedish fleet. The full collection of works by the king numbered seven volumes.

Paris universities of Eugen

Eugen early developed interest in drawing. Relatives played a major role in developing his artistic inclinations: uncle Prince Cark painted landscapes, Princess Eugenie wrote novels, composed music, and sculptured. She did a lot to make the prince love drawing and handiwork in the broad sense of the word. In 1886 after two years in the University of Uppsala the prince wrote to his mother that he had decided to study painting and the only place for it was Paris. It was a tumult for the conservative family to hear about Mont-martre which the prince would definitely visit despite his prudence. And how would they treat the prince? Can there be a scandal? It was no royal business for sure. . .

“Paris is dangerous and humiliating today for a prince in contacts with French artistic bohemia,” the king wrote to Kronoberg Governor Gunnar Wennerberg who supervised the prince during studies in Uppsala. Prudent Wennerberg tried to calm down the father-monarch saying idleness and entertainments do not know geographic boundaries. “Délice de Capoue is everywhere, and the prince is resolute to reject “everything vicious, ugly and rude”, he wrote adding there were many worthy teachers in Paris.

The monarch reconciled with his son’s wish in the final end. He confirmed it in a letter to Eugen when he was already in Paris: “My dear boy, much time has passed since you left from the Central railway station. Parents should not be egoists and should better think about their children rather than their own joy!” Sending his son to Paris the king asked his acquaintances, the Selsing couple to move there as well to “give shelter” to his offspring. Naturally the king was worried and wanted for somebody to look after the son. In France Prince Eugen lived under the name of Monsieur Oscarsson. It was a tradition for Royal Family members to change the name when departing from homeland. Travelling incognito also attracted attention. The new name was only logical – father Oscar, his son Eugen and all together it makes Oscarsson. It is noteworthy that the surname of a not distant relative of Eugen, the founder of the royal dynasty to which he belonged, was French. Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte was the name of Napoleonic mrshall who was adopted by childless Carl XIII in 1810 and took the throne under the name of Carl XIV John.

Eugen’s teachers in Paris were artists Leon Bonnat, Pierre Puvis de Chavannes, and Henri Jourdain. The prince studied art and led an active high life, visited museums, concerts, cafes and theaters. In 1888 Eugen was in Theatre Lyrique when a chandellier unexpectedly fell from the ceiling and crashed close to him. The prince was safe and sound.

In April 1988 revanchist General Boulanger revolted against the republic causing unrest in Paris. Eugen was not scared but curious about the developments. He wrote to his mother: “Naturally, I was in the streets and followed the unrest” although Selsing was not very happy about it. However it was a part of the basic education of the prince to experience public disorders himself.

In Paris Monsieur Oscarsson acquainted several Swedish artists – Gustaf Cederstrom, Anders Zorn, Carl Larsson, Rickard Berg, Per Ekstrom, and Dane Peder Severin Kroyer who comprised the zest of Scandinavian art. He naturally got acquainted with French impressionism which produced “a fresh and worthy impression” on him.

The prince was a decent student. During the first “Paris period” he mastered the basics of painting and achieved a certain level of skills. In 1889 two of his pastels were selected for the Swedish pavilion at the World exhibition in Paris which coincided with the centenary of the Great French Revolution. Sweden, as well as Germany, Turkey and Montenegro ignored the festivities.

Landscape – beloved genre of His Majesty

Eugen has been self-critical and soberly assed his abilities since young age. “Even if I do not become distinguished, and I am sufficiently critical of myself to understand that it is true, I will never regret the choice of my path and will be very pleased if I succeed to do honest work free of deception”, he wrote to the father in 1888. Professional career of Prince Eugen began at the time. In 1889 he was elected honorary member of the Swedish Art Academy and next year his pastel with a Stockholm view and The Summer Night in Norway painting were displayed in an art salon in Paris. The Academy included him with two other artists into the state commission in charge of acquiring works of art.

In 1893 Stockholm hosted an exhibition of artist Ernst Josephson, a talented, versatile (also a poet) and unbalanced man (he was sick with schizophrenia and died under the patronage of two noble ladies). It features his main painting Necken (nude young man as a spirit of water playing a harp at a waterfall). Despite all artistic merits the state commission refused to buy the painting. The decision of the National Museum w as also negative.

The prince was indignant at the decision as he could not understand how they failed to “comprehend” the outstanding masterpiece. He bought it himself and the painting was hanging in Waldemarsudde Palace. He ruled it can be removed only in one case – if the whole of the palace is evacuated.

Eugen’s teachers in Paris were artists Leon Bonnat, Pierre Puvis de Chavannes, and Henri Jourdain.

In the first half of the ’90s the prince painted his most distinguished pictures: Old Castle, Last Sun Ray, Both Poplars (1893), Cloud (1895). They all reflect his deep mood and a feeling of internal dignity. They make you think and touch your soul. Before the death the prince left detailed instructions about the burial which also ordered that besides the national flag over the coffin with ducal crown placed in the big hall of the palace gallery there should be also Good Pastor painting by Juakim Skovgaard in the center and the Cloud and the Old Castle on the sides.

The genre of landscape was consonant to the internal world of the prince. Otherwise he would have hardly achieved such results. However I would dare suggest that despite all initial affection to the genre it contained something subconscious related to his duties imposed by origin. In contrast to portraits and genre painting the landscape and still life are devoid of “scandal virus” capable in favorable environment of instigating public opinion, scandalizing the author, and attracting attention of the public which enjoys gossip. Due to seeming neutrality and absence of conflict the genre mostly suited the artist of royal blood who in his creative activity had always to remember what he was, weigh all words and deeds to avoid unintentionally casting an imputation on crowned relatives.

Prince’s friend and genius of Swedish painting Anders Zorn also admired Swedish nature. Forest, water, and cliffs are its main symbols that were excitingly depicted on his canvases. On the background of the beauty the artist liked to place nude bathing peasant women – local beautiful, healthy, naturally tempting females with genuine femininity. The way he painted them produced a hymn to life which could be copied by a royal family member in the same free and reckless manner. Maybe today, but it was unlikely at the time. Noblesse oblige.

They often say that Prince Eugen painted in a manner close to impressionism. I am no art expert and cannot be sure about his style. However training in Paris and acquaintance with impressionists and their works could not but tell on his style and technique. The prince studied the basics of painting like all others – by classical canons. Later he began to search for his personal style and means of expression. It happened in the early ’90s. It is interesting to note that the brush of the prince produced an original painting – The Temple of Happiness in pointillism technique. Designed by the first neo-impressionist Georges Seurat the technique is also called divisionism. In contrast to its native France where it was used by numerous artists including Pissarro father and son the technique was rarely used in Scandinavia. Among the Sweden Anders Zorn seems to have come close to divisionism with his characteristic brushstrokes and love to instantaneous impression.

Color as felling of life

Like all major artists Prince Eugen studied the theory of color, including great Goethe who worked not only in literature and is known as the author of Faust and the Sorrows of Young Werther. The ideas of the prince were based on a symbolic postulate that each color correlates with the human soul and reflects certain feelings or their tints. Feeling, perception, mood. The notions were specifically important for the prince. It can be seen at first glance in his paintings. When you thumb a catalogue the absence of people strikes your eye. There are no people at all in most works. Only the artist and nature, sometimes also buildings and sculptures. Still landscape or landscaped still life. An object for attentive observation.

The prince was interested not only in easel painting. He was also distinguished as artist of monuments. When the construction of a new royal opera house was underway he expressed readiness to participate in painting its interior. His lot was the foyer. Eugen painted the Haga Moods triptych depicting a park with a royal palace in Stockholm. The town hall has his City at Water fresco. Two Stockholm high schools have the Bright Night, Summer, and Sun Over City panel pictures. In Kiruna Church he painted the altar. The concert hall in Goteborg has his wall painting Country of Recollections, while the antechamber of the Caroline hospital – the Copper Serpent alcove fresco. The foyer of the Royal Drama Theater (which staged plays by Ingmar Berger for a long time) welcomes spectators with his refined Frost-dew fresco.

In many cases, specifically when the talk was about decorating educational establishments, the prince participated in the project as an artist and patron of arts. He paid the work of his colleagues without remunerating himself. A son of the Swedish monarch, Eugen was no traditionalist although his origin demanded him to be. He was a self-made man. He lived by his own mind, acted according to his own perceptions of honor and decency, was not afraid of different opinions, including majority opinion and possible gossip, open criticism, and rumors. He was ready to struggle against the stream if it was necessary for his convictions.

I already said what he ordered to do with the painting of Ernest Josephson. The same happened with the Granddad sculpture by Per Hasselberg which depicts a nude boy on the knees of his grandfather. For many people it was insulting and newspapers demanded to move out “indecent rubbish”. However despite negative public attitude the prince defended the bronze sculpture of Hasselberg which currently stands in Humlegarden P ark close to the Roy al Library.

When August Strindberg (whom the prince liked and who was disliked by his royal parents for liberties in relation to crowned highnesses) and his partner August Falck decided to open the Strindberg Intimate Theater they lacked money for that. Eugen provided financial assistance to them and when the writer died came to bid him farewell. However no representative of the Swedish Academy or the Royal Court came to the funeral.

In contrast to many representatives of the right-wing circles in Sweden who advocated the ideas of Pan-Germanism, Prince Eugen rejected Nazism although Germany was perceived as a country of culture at the time. In 1933 he wrote to his friend Garry Fett that he did not want “to look for excuses and explanations of violence and breach of law.” The strict position of a representative of the royal court embarrassed many people.

Distinguished Swedish traveler, ethnographer, writer and public figure Sven Hedin who was a staunch supporter of Pan-Germanism and Hitler publicly asked whether the prince was “engaged in salon Bolshevism out of spite to the king and the foreign ministry.” The prince in the meantime signed an appeal to protect “German refugees” who included numerous Jews and then participated in the creation of the committee to assist refugees. The right-wing circles called the document “a scandalous appeal”. But the prince was not confused by it. He was a genuine free artist!

The prince lived over a half of his life in Waldemarsudde. Initially he came to the place to paint his landscapes and admired its picturesque views and loneliness. He later leased a part of a small yellow house on the cape which was called Old House after the construction of the villa. The house is still there. In 1899 the prince bought it together with the land plot and in 1905 there was a newly-built palace several meters away from it which offered an inexhaustible source of inspiration for Eugen.

It was there that he painted many of his works, big and small, completed and uncompleted, sketches and drawings. It seemed to him that Waldemarsudde was constantly turning a new facet to him and offering new light nuances.

In 1913 the prince added a gallery to the palace which he united with the main building by an underground passage. He displayed his big collection there which included both his own paintings and works by other artists: Anders Zorn, Carl Larsson, Ernest Josephson, Niels Kruger, Eugen Jansson, Bruno Lillieforce. . .

The genre of landscape was consonant to the internal world of the prince. Otherwise he would have hardly achieved such results.

Rodin’s Thinker sits with his back to the water on a steep bank in the park in front of the house. Nike of S a m o t h r a c e spreads the wings at the entrance to the southern facade. Hercules by Antoine Burdelle braces a bow in front of the northern entrance which cannot be seen from water and completely differs from the southern one. Carl Milles is represented best of all. The prince left it all to the people.

Today Waldemarsudde is one of the most beautiful museums in Stockholm. Prince-artist Eugen like they call him in Sweden was buried close to the Old House. His grave is inconspicuous – a small grey regular-shaped stone with a laconic inscription: Prince Eugen. 1865-1947.

Mikhail Busnyuk,

for Amber Bridge

What is Aurora Borealis festival , how did it emerge and how is it related to Aurora Karamzina?

The festival began in 2012 as a continuation of Christmas Candle Meetings project which the Litera studio has been organizing for five years jointly with ITAR-TASS bureau and bringing poets from Russia, Baltic countries and Northern Europe together. All the five years it was only enthusiasm but the project succeeded. In 2012 it was decided to change the format of Christmas Meetings into a festival and unite under its banner not only poets, but also playwrights, scientists, translators, and journalists. The project is implemented with the support of the Fund of Social-Economic Programs and personal support of S. A. Filatov. The organizers of the Aurora Borealis festival comprise the Russian Cultural-Democratic Union, the Russian Center of Science and Culture in Helsinki, the Litera Society, and the Runo bar-studio.

The idea enjoyed support in creative circles of Russia and Finland and has been successfully implemented for two years. In January 2012 our festival was attended by famous poets and writers from Ukraine, Russia, Finland, and Sweden. In 2013, besides winter events, the festival Aurora Borealis with participation of poet and translator E. Ioffe, bilingual writer A. Perttu, poet and translator K. Korto, Editor-in-Chief of Other Shores magazine O. Pussinen, as well as scientist and poet N. Perevezentseva from St. Petersburg held poetic evenings, literary seminars and master classes. Participants included V. Mesyats (Moscow), A. Korovin (Moscow) A. Gritsman (New York), N. Reznik (Colorado), A. Ostudin (Kazan), M. Garber (Luxembourg), A. Melnik (Liege), A. Radashkevich and G. Pogozheva (Paris) and other distinguished writers, translators and scientists form the whole world.

We decided to devote the festival to Aurora Karamzina and called it Aurora Borealis as Polar lights are also called. The name presupposes northern realities and simultaneously associates with Aurora Karamzina, an outstanding beauty of the XIX century to who Pushkin, Baratynsky, and other poets devoted verses. For organizers the role of Aurora Karamzina as public figure is also important. She was a maid of honor at the empress and advocated Finnish interests in the Royal Court and helped Finland join the Russian Empire as a Grand Duchy. She was a woman who did a lot for the country politically and as a charity provider.

We emphasize historic moments related to the history of Sweden, Russia, and Finland in order to deeply study historic processes and better comprehend modern facts.

Does the festival signify the beginning of major and long work?

Yes, we have big plans. On May 24-25 Helsinki will host a seminar of translators, publishers, historians from Russia, Finland, and Sweden. We want to create a network of translators, writers, publishers and historians. We want to promote cultural aspects which will help overcome intercultural stereotypes. It is not only belles letters, but also essays, research, etc.

We need a network of contacts which will help people better understand each other. We plan to plug organizations into the network which are experienced in the sphere, such as the Finnish literature fund (FiLi), Russian publishing houses interested in translations of Russian literature into the Finnish language and vice versa. We would like not only to unite all people engaged in the process but also to act as intermediaries between them and carry out both cultural and educational projects. The Russian side represented by Moscow project coordinator Yevgenya Dobrovoi helps us a lot as it is already launching its own educational programs in Russia and Poland. Our task is to raise the awareness of the Finnish public about modern Russian literature and introduce interesting modern Finnish poetry to Russians. Our days are the time of flourishing poetry in Finland and its golden age.

Still frame: Aurora Charlotta Karamzina (1808-1902, full name — Eva Aurora Charlotta Stjernvall, a daughter of Swedish nobleman Lord Carl Johan Stjernvall and Baroness Eva Gustava von Willebrand, came down in history as public figure and founder and supporter of various charities. She was a granddaughter of the last governor of Finland. From 1836 she had the surname of Demidova and from 1846 – Karamzina. In 1836 Aurora Charlotta became a maid of honor of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. Together with sister Emily and Countess Musina-Pushkina she was considered the first beauty in the Royal Court in Petersburg. As a maid of honor Aurora was very influential and was among those who convinced Alexander III not to make Finland a province of the Russian Empire but preserve autonomy rights with it. Alexander, who as the crown prince stayed in the Finnish mansion of Aurora Charlotta, in the final end adhered to her advice and other supporters of Finnish autonomy and decided to create a commission for the convocation of Finnish Sejm and grant the duchy a wide autonomy and laws to ensure its financial independence.

A warship fighting in the Crimean War was named after her. It was sunk by the English and the name went over to the legendary Aurora cruiser. She had a reputation of femme fatale as her three lovers and the only son Pavel Demidov died. Aurora was the muse of many poets and artists. Pushkin and Baratynsky devoted poems to her and portraits were painted by Brullov and Gau. She was twice married. In 1836 she married one of the richest Russian men – Pavel Demidov, the co-owner of Ural enterprises, actual state counselor, and Royal master of the hunt. Legends claim wedding gifts to Aurora included not only the famous Sancy diamond but also a scarf which belonged to Napoleon’s wife Josephina Bogarne. Demidov died a sudden death in 1840 and left Aurora with a child. She got married again in 1846. The husband was Andrei, the son of distinguished historian Nikolai Karamzin. He was an outstanding officer who was considered a prototype of Mikhail Lermontov’s hero Pechorin. After eight years of a happy life Aurora again became a widow as Colonel Karamzin was killed in the Crimean campaign in 1854. After that she fully devoted herself to charities.

She went down in Finland’s history as a public and charity figure who created nursing homes, orphanages, and hospices. She donated practically all her income from Demidov’s mining enterprises to the poor. In Gelsingforce Aurora Charlotta Karamzina created a permanent nursing service. The Evangelic society of nurses which she founded yet in 1867 still exists. Aurora also opened hospices and hospitals. Children’s Home Street has been preserved in modern Helsinki.

By developing the ties we want to operate not on amateur but professional basis and produce high quality anthologies, as p r o o f – r e a d e r s say – very copy-read anthologies. We include into them only the names which are legends of the poetry of the XX-XXI centuries. We assess the authors by the text and everybody knows we shall reject bad texts.

Our festival is expanding. We now have partners in St. Petersburg and Stockholm. The Swedish friends we got thanks to Yevgenya Dobrovoi asked us to address the Swedish-language cultural center in March. St. Petersburg proposed to join the festival Petersburg Bridges in late May this year. Natalya Perevezentseva, the second Russian coordinator of the project, helps us maintain contacts with colleagues in Petersburg.

The main idea of the festival is to create international cultural space to develop projects related to translation and publishing. It also promotes preservation of the Russian language and literature abroad.

Interviewed by Yulia Andreeva,

for Amber Bridge

The conference moderator, Professor Heiko Droste, talks about how past and present connect on the Baltic coast.

Political changes since the early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe resulted in a renewed interest in the Baltic Sea region, both as an important trade zone and as a historical region with a certain Baltic Sea culture. This culture, however, is not easy to define. Historians like to perceive the Baltic Sea in itself as a node and infrastructure, which for centuries enabled migration and encounters. The history of these encounters, however, is in many parts still to be written. We have pieces of a puzzle, but the cross-national and cross-cultural perspective does not come easily. On the contrary, after centuries of migration movements and encounters, the mental map of historians and societes alike is still shaped by the nation state. These nations are usually perceived as rather stable entities with homogeneous cultures and clear borders. Migration and cultural encounters have therefore mostly been discussed as disturbing and problematic. Two Swedish examples might illustrate this mental map.

Three years ago, the Swedish historians’ conference met in Gothenburg to discuss the guild’s understanding of its relation to the Swedish nation: ”Bound by the nation?” The question was rather rhetorical as the evident answer was: yes. Only few Swedish historians deal with non-Swedish subjects. Fewer still work on those foreign provinces and colonies that Sweden had during the so called great power era. There was also a debate on today’s historians’ language skills as a prerequisite to international and cross-border studies. There is a clear trend to a bilingual research culture, where English is not only the foremost foreign language in almost all countries. It tends to be the only one, due to a growing focus on other, more ”labour market” oriented subjects at school. This is by no way an exclusively Swedish trend.

In early April, Sweden was shook by a political scandal. The Social democratic party congress voted for a well known muslim, Omar Mustafa, to become a member in the party leadership. Omar Mustafa had just everything that made his entry meaningful from the party’s perspective. He was a young and successful immigrant; he had a long lasting engagement in public life and a background in the muslim community. Just a few days later, this election exploded right into the face of the very same party. It turned out that Mustafa not only was a muslim, he was religious. He was also less than clear in certain discussions concerning the equal rights for men and women, equal rights for homosexuals and the question of his alleged antisemitism. Mustafa explained himself poorly. However, the major problem seems to have been his engagement in a muslim community that did not concur with all those values and positions that the ethnic Swedish party organization deemed crucial. There was simply too much otherness, it would have meant too much trouble for the party to stand up for the right of immigrants in Sweden to disagree with the majority society’s values. The party was obviously washed with antimuslim sentiments both from within and outside of the party. A media hype had its share in a campaign that resulted in Mustafa’s forced retreat.

This case demonstrates that diversity even in modern democracies is not self-evident. On the contrary, the framework for what lies within the approved public discourse seems to be getting ever more tight. Several of the antisemites that Mustafa had invited for discussions and that were turned against him had previously been invited by other Swedish politicians, without causing a public uproar .

Whereas we often perceive cultural encounters as beneficial, part of migration movements diversity is often considered as a threat to prevailing ideas of national and cultural homogeneity in nation states.

The Baltic Sea region has since its historical beginnings been shaped by migration movements and cultural encounters. Some of its aspects have been understood as beneficial, not the least the trade in and out of the Baltic Sea region. Other aspects concerning cultural and political hegemonies, be it the Teutonic order and its heathen mission, which resulted in a predominant Baltic German culture for centuries, be it Danish, Swedish and Russian hegemonial positions due to warfare and oppression, are mostly deemed negative (with some interesting exceptions).

Our conference focuses on migration and cultural encounters in a long-term perspective with a starting-point in the middle ages. Historians from a range of different countries gather at Södertörn University in order to discuss different topics. Although most lectures clearly focus on specific subjects, they all open up for comparison. And comparison is needed, not the least as our mental maps seem to be hard to shake.

This conference is also part of a long series of Russian-Swedish historical conferences. The previous conference in Moscow in June 2011 opened this bilateral conferences for participants from other Baltic countries. The conference in Stockholm in 2013 took an even further step in this direction. The participants originate from Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Germany, the United States of America, Canada, and the not the least Russia and Sweden.

The Baltic Sea history is clearly in need of many studies on the perception of migration and cultural encounters. The political and economic aspects of this history are well analysed for the most part. What seems to be needed now is to examine, how societies reacted to change, how migrants and their culture were incorporated, transformed or rejected. The reactions to change often came from within society, with a limited influence from the part of the government. We also need more studies concerning the obvious fact that the national cultures we are used to think of are a conglomerate of different cultures. They, too, can be an expression for a majority culture that denigrated or neglected other, socially inferior cultures. The Finnish, Estonian and Livonian peasant societies of the early modern period are clear examples for that. There are many more.

The conference also showed that different perspectives are useful, combining economic, political, social and cultural aspects. The different lectures were often based on conflicts or forms of a cultural hegemony that in itself could be seen as an expression for political claims. In this respect, similarities and cross references between different lectures were obvious. Maybe, historians focus too much on conflicts – due to the simple fact that conflicts produce our source material. However, this focus possibly mirrors the prevalent negative perception of change in societies that tend to see themselves as stable.

A common Baltic Sea culture or ”identity” is not easy to grasp and shows itself most of all in the region’s important role for trade and commerce. Here, the Baltic Sea truely is a node, an infrastructure that connects. In cultural aspects, the Baltic Sea is probably more of a barrier. Communication s are often land – bound . In these matters, however, we need many more studies. We also need more conferences to gather and discuss these matters. I hope that this conference will be just one in a long line of discussions and meetings. We need to meet each other outside of our national communities, in order to experience those cultural encounters that shaped the Baltic Sea region in its long history. That these conferences most likely will have to be held in English – the modern lingua franca – might be perceived as ironic, with regard to the rather subordinate role of this language for the Baltic Sea countries until recently. It might also give all the participants a feeling for the problems of cultural encounters in previous societies. There was never just one language that all members of the society understood as its own.