The project of Kaliningrad nuclear power plant, if of much greater capacity than conceivable needs of the oblast, will necessarily influence plans and feasibility of the nuclear power plants intended and/or planned in the Baltic Sea region. Complexity

of the nuclear situation in the region is greatly enhanced by diverging concepts and imaginations about the nuclear-for-electricity as energy generation technology. In the region, there are countries that do not intend to have nuclear electricity capacity (Denmark), or that want to get rid of it (Germany). But there are also those that firmly rely on nuclear electricity generation (Finland), or those that seem to agree to

it because of its climate action preferences (Sweden). At the same time, there are those that signal their intention of building one or two nuclear power plants (Poland), or those that want to return to their nuclear generation past (Lithuania).

The situation is complex also because the former Soviet electricity system that used

to embrace all the former Soviet Union count­ries (including now firmly again independent Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), as well as Poland as a part of former com­munist bloc, still operate in the Baltic states. That makes for a awkward situation when an important part of the European Union (the Baltic states), potentially an indispensible connection north-south from Scandinavia to the European mainland in Poland, cannot contribute to making of the common electri­city system of the EU. Conversely, if they fi­nally switch over to the European electricity standard, they will make the Kaliningrad ob­last an electricity island within the EU, much as it stands in all other areas. A possibility of the Kaliningrad region switching to the EU’s electricity standard together with other three Baltic states would naturally reverse the logic and would separate – in electricity terms – the Kaliningrad oblast from the Russia mainland.

Fig 1. Planned Kaliningrad NPP capacity versus total electricity consumption of

the Kaliningrad oblast and the Baltic states (TWh/year)

Source: Own calculations, data on total electricity consumption from the World Factbook, 2013-14.

Here is where the local nuclear power plant plays a huge role. Its capacity greater than the needs of the local Kaliningrad market means that the Russian authorities play on the logical assumption of either the Baltic states remaining firmly in the post-Soviet electricity system, or the Kaliningrad oblast joining the EU standard. If the capacity is to be greater than the needs of Kaliningrad and Lithuania combined, as intended in the first project, than its feasibility may rely on export oppor­tunities to the EU standard neighbours, mainly Poland, perhaps Sweden, or even Germany.

This seems possible only if Kaliningrad oblast switches to EU electricity standard.

The Kaliningrad nuclear power plant project

The Russian Federation is planning a significant strengthening of their nuclear sector as a way to increase its share in electricity production. According to the adopted plans, by 2030 the nuclear share will grow to about 25-30% of the global electricity production and then to 45-50% after the next two decades1. The aim is to achieve three objectives that seem crucial for the Russian economy. The first is to make available a significant amount of gas for exports. Approximately 70% of Russian annual gas production is consumed by the domestic market2. The second reason, most obvious, is to secure increasing energy needs in next two or three decades. Last but not least is to make Russian nuclear technology more competitive on the international market. In order to meet the above tasks, the process of lifetime exten­sion of existing reactors is in progress. More than 35 new reactors are under construction, or planned3. With exception of the most advanced investments, the future of the suggested, new nuclear power plants is uncertain.

In the context of ambitious Moscow plans, the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) (Kaliningrad) has got a very special status. The first proposal to erect a new nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad province has been announced by InterRAO UES in 2008. The construction agreement with the Kaliningrad authority was signed in April 2008 and the future installation located in the town of Neman near the Lithua­nian border4. The initial plans assumed building a twin AES-92 plant with two VVER-1000 reactors5. It was supposed to be the first nuclear installation in Russian Federation with its output destined for export. Energy needs of Kaliningrad were of secondary importance. The energy security of the town is currently guaranteed by its thermal power plant (Kalinin­gradskaya Thermal Power Plant 2 – 875MWe)6.

The nuclear power plant is expected to be the first case in the history of nuclear industry of Russian Federation to have the anticipated foreign equity share (albeit no more than 49%)7. Part of the main plant modules is to be developed in cooperation with foreign industry. The contract signed in February 2012 by the Alstom-Atomenergomash (AAEM) company provides, among the other things, that Alstom would deliver steam turbines ARABELLE and moisture separator re-heaters, power generators and other auxiliary equipment. The contract is estimated at 875 million euro8.

According to a more recent project, the new nuclear power plant would be based on the larger and more modern AES-2006 design with two pressurized water reactors (PWR) VVER- 12009. Each VVER-1200(V491) reactor has the thermal capacity of 3200MWth and electrical capacity of 1170MWe gross. The design is the common project of OKB ”Gidropress” and “Atomenergoproekt” with the scientific supervision of Kurchatov Institute from Moscow10.

The Russian VVER-1000/1200 family are equi­valent of the Western PWR reactors (genera­tion III and III+). VVER-1200(V-491) based on AES-2006 design, are classified as generation III+ with an expected service life of 60 years. It would probably be the most modern project of the Russian nuclear industry until the beginning of the next decade. As many as 17 of similar VVER-1200 reactors are expected to be commissioned in other locations in the Russian Federation by 202011. It’s also an export success. The identical project is planned in Turkey (Akkuyu nuclear power plant). The Turkey-Russia agreement of May 2010 provides for the construction of four VVER-1200 reactors around 2020-23. The total electrical capacity of the Akkuyu will be about 4800MWe12. The contract value is about 20 billion dollars.

The doubts about nuclear safety raised in con­nection with the Kaliningrad nuclear power plant investment, can be referred to all the latest-generation reactors. There might be problems, as in case of all III/III+ generation projects, with the reliability of the most important modules in assumed long-standing service life13. The VVER-1200 reactors are based on many-year-experience with operating of earlier generations of VVER family. There are about 50 VVER-440 and VVER-1000 operating units in Russian Federation and abroad. They are more reliable in comparison to other Soviet designs (RBMK reactors in particular). According to the official information, the VVER-1200 reactors that are currently under construction contain extensive passive and active safety systems with the increased share of the passive one. It comprises, inter alia, a passive heat removal system and a passive reactor scram system, as well as a passive hydrogen removal system and a secondary system of passive heat removal via steam generators14. In the opinion of the Russian specialists, the concept of the safety system is comparable to the western designs of PWR reactors of the III and III+ generation.

The preparatory work of the project in Kaliningrad has begun in February 201015. The first elements of concrete were poured two years later. According to the plan, the first reactor should be in commercial service by 2017. The cost of the project is estimated at 6-8 billion euro.

Due to the electricity exports objectives of the project, there are several conditions to be fulfilled, before it gets operational. The first one was to attract foreign investors and loans to finance the project. The second one was to attract the real interest for future foreign customers. Only a small part of planned output (2300MWe) may be consumed by energy needs of Kaliningrad. The long-term contracts from foreign partners are necessary to ensure the economic side of the investment. Last but not least, there are grid connection requirements. The Russian enclave has got a limited capacity transmission line with Lithuania and no connec­tion to Poland. This situation makes a future export of electricity impossible, unless funda­mentally changed. Project of such a big nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad Province, if not fully connected of to the EU grid system, is not really arguable in economic terms.

In the course of last five years none of the conditions mentioned above was fulfilled.

There is no long-term contract for future supplies of electricity, although the proposal

has aroused some interest. The project seems to be in direct contradiction with energy strategies of neighbouring countries, all of which are very much interested in raising their energy independence ratio.

The latest news from Kaliningrad indicate a possible change in the schedule of the project’s implementation. This could mean, at least, a significant delay of the works, if not abandoning of the project altogether. A possible scenarios assumes that the VVER- 1200 reactors could be replaced by a smaller design, thus better corresponding to the real energy needs of the region itself, and less relying on the external markets.16

Poland still uncertain

In Poland, until now with no nuclear generated electricity, in November 2008 the government took decision to explore possibilities for building two nuclear power plants that should be operational by 2023-24. It therefore created a special purpose company, that is a consortium of mostly state owned electricity utility companies PGE, Tauron and Enea, together with the KGHM, a copper mining conglomerate. So far, the three possible locations were all considered at the Baltic  Sea shore in either Gąski,  Choczewo, and/or Żarnowiec, as seen from the West to the East.

However, the Polish public opinion remains divided on the issue. On one side, the nuclear generated electricity could enhance the country energy security, so far – for electricity generation – largely (by 90%) based on coal and lignite. It would also significantly contribute to lowering the country’s CO2 emissions, thus contributing to the EU’s driven climate change action. Yet, when things got to local, things turned bad. In a local referendum in Gąski (February 2012), an overwhelming majority of 95% of 50% turnout voted against any new nuclear power plant built in vicinity. Although, there was no public awareness campaign before, and the local population was not familiarized with the benefits of such an option, still the results were considered straightforward in saying ‘no’.

In politics, two parliamentary left wing parties, Ruch Palikota and SLD, with one fringe right wing party Solidarity Poland, are all against, while all major mainstream parties of both the government and the opposition are favourable for building a nuclear electricity generating capacity in Poland. In short, over three quarters

of the current parliament is in favour of the nuclear power plants in the country.

Fig 2. Polish parliament split on nuclear electricity generation, 2013

Source: own analysis of party platforms. Those bolded are against, or rather against nuclear power plants;

L = left; R = right; C = centre; (-) and (–) = against nuclear; (+) and (++) = for nuclear; (-/+) = split.

It plays a role, that Poland is in fact currently surrounded by the nuclear producing countries: Germany, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Belarus, and Sweden with Finland across the Baltics. There are several well known exceptions to that picture that do and will play a role. Germany has announced its Energiewende, the energy transition that presupposes also closing their nuclear power plants by 2022. Lithuania used to be a strong player on the local market thanks to its Ignalina nuclear power plant, but this was closed at the end of 2009 as a part of their accession deal with the EU, the installations there considered not secure enough. The Kaliningrad oblast, although Russian territory, does not produce nuclear based electricity for now. And Denmark, again across the Baltics, has decided already in 1985 not to produce nuclear energy at all. Even if it imports electricity from Sweden and Germany, thus partially imports the nuclear derived elec-tricity, it was able to successfully exert pressure on the Swedish public opinion. Consequently, the Swedes closed two Barsebäck units, what ultimately happened in 1999 and 2005 respec­tively.17 Finns apparently managed to solve the nuclear waste problem, and seem to pro­ceed to the final stage with their European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) at Olkiluoto 3. The EPR there, although much delayed now (from 2008), is expected to go operational in 2016, with almost tripled costs of now estimated 8.5 bn EUR18. This, along with the French Flamanville project and the British one, could contribute to the possible implementation of the European nuclear energy design EPR.

Lithuania going for and hesitating

An interesting project, from the point of view of the Baltic Sea nuclear situation is the

Lithuanian concept of Visaginas, the new nuclear power plant. It has been construed as one not only to replace the closed Ignalina, but also to provide a backbone to the long needed and awaited north-south connection from the Scandinavian Finland and Sweden, via the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to Poland in the south. The region suffered long from incompatible inheritance of the Soviet times when it was largely connected east-west, to the USSR as a pole and source of energy and dependence. The Visaginas project started in 2007 with participation of companies from Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland, which subsequently withdrew in 2011. The main technology provider, and strategic investor would be Hitachi GE, which should start to build a single 1350 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor in 2015, intended to be opera­tional as of 2021. It is estimated to cost almost 5 bn EUR. Still, the project has been over-shadowed by the national referendum in Lithuania, which in October 2012 proved negative sentiment by a large margin of almost 65%.

Although non-binding, the referendum might indicate problems with the project at a later stage.19

The Visaginas has been planned to be the cornerstone of the new Baltic Energy Market Interconnector Plan (BEMIP), which is intended to link Poland with Finland and Sweden, via the three Baltic States. It gets support of the European Union which funds seve­ral of its parts: LitPolLink (Lithuania-Poland), Estlink-1 and Estlink-2 (Estonia-Finland), NordBalt (Lithuania-Sweden). The links as the interconnectors should effectively reverse the situation when, now, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are still parts of the Russian controlled IPS/UPS electricity system. With the three Baltics states connected to the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO), the Kaliningrad oblast would get isolated from the mainland Russia. Apparently, the Russians recognize this situation and Rosatom proposed to build a link between Poland and Kaliningrad that would effectively forge the Kaliningrad electricity system with that of the EU. This prospect would eventually facilitate greatly any Kaliningrad nuclear generated electricity exports to the EU, either Poland, or Lithuania, or even all the eastern and southern Baltic states.20

Eventually, Poland would add one or two of its own nuclear power plants, if the government’s plans are going to materialize. The decision on the technology, the reactors and design, has not been taken, however. With the Swedish 10 nuclear reactors, and their public opinion strongly backing them as a viable strategy for climate action, the Baltic Sea nuclear prospects seem a bit diversified. But there are interesting patterns emerging where the Kaliningrad nuclear power stations or the Polish nuclear power plants may play important roles. Particularly, if we take into account the Germans going the Danish road to abandoning the nuclear electricity generation, with their Energiewende. This way, the west of the Baltics would be free from nuclear energy capacity, while there would be strong production sites in the north, south and east of it.

The situation in the north and east of the Baltic Sea seems clear: both the Swedes and

especially the Finns are seemed prone to rely heavily on nuclear for their electricity

generation. Their capacities are construed. Specifically, the Finnish seem to generate

electricity from nuclear fission – based their cooperative concept of ownership of the nuclear capacities – for domestic purposes, and not really intended for serious exportation.

Sweden nuclear, but…

The current status of Sweden’s nuclear industry is a result of the decades of develop­ment, beginning with the top secret nuclear weapon program for advanced nuclear

industry. As far as today more than 40 percent of Swedish electric power comes from ten nuclear reactors at three nuclear power plants. Four of them entered commercial

service in the 1970s (Oskarshamn 1,2 and Ringhals 1,2) and six began to operate in 1980’s. As mentioned, the Barsebäck nuclear power plants were ultimately closed in 2005.

Interestingly, for more than 30 recent years, the Swedish nuclear power plants have under­gone consistent process of expanding nuclear capacity as well as their operational lifetimes. In case of the Ringhals nuclear power plant it has meant an increase of about 337 MWe21 to 450 MWe by 2012.22  This action, despite the closure of the Barsebäck has allowed to maintain the st­rong position of nuclear energy in the Swedish electricity mix and to add about 1050MWe to the ten working reactors by the end of 2008.23 Further investments of this kind are planned.

Sweden has one of the most advanced pro­grams of nuclear waste management. The Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund is administrated by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and will cover costs associated with the decommis­sioning of nuclear reactors and waste storage. The fund is financed from the fees of nuclear power operators.

According to the plans of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB, the ultimate repository for used fuel from Swedish NPP will be located in Söderviken, close to the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant. The repository will be placed at the depth of approximately 500 m in geologically stable granite bedrock. The beginning of the construction is planned for 2019 and the investment will be completed about 2025. The repository will be in use until about 2070 and at that time it will have 60 km of tunnels and about 4 square kilometers of underground storage surface. Its total capacity is expected at 12000 tons and it will be able to store as many as 6000 iron, copper-cast canisters containing used fuel.24 The canisters will be stored in the holes bored in the tunnel floor. Each canister will be surrounded by bentonite clay to isolate it form the bedrock and to absorb water. That is to help to stop a corrosion process of the copper canister. In case of leakage or other damage of a canister the clay insulators of the granite bedrock would delay radioactive materials from reaching the surface.25

This kind of storage is known as the KBS method. The technology should isolate radio­active material from people and living nature for at least 100 thousand years. Given the time-span of the storage project, the speed of corrosion of the copper containers seems to be a crucial safety problem. The bentonite clay as well as the repository environment are both intended to help to stop the corrosion process of copper, but there are still controversies over the safety issues of the technology. The newest report of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority indicated that the corrosion had occurred on the surface of the copper elements during the last tests. The issue would require further research to solve the contro­versy.26 In the last three decades Sweden went through ambivalent nuclear ”phase out” policy. The US Three Mile Island catastrophe of 1979 was the reason for the Swedes to organize a referendum about future of the Swedish nuclear energy. In 1980 a majority of Swedes voted for not developing the next generation of nuclear power plants after having ended lives of those plants already operational or under-construction. Conse-quently, the Swedish parliament took a decision to close all twelve nuclear power plant by 2010. For economical reasons and under a strong pressure from industry and labor unions, the Swedish political elite has not made a serious attempt to implement this decision and the 2010 target was subse-quently abandoned.27 In 2010, in spite of resistance from the political opposition and ecological movements, the Swedish govern­ment adopted a new plan of replacement of all ten nuclear reactors by new ones, and passed it through the parliament. The plan is strictly limited and assumes replacements only. The number of reactors is not allowed to exceed ten, and all of them must be built at the same site of as currently existing nuclear plants.28

According to the plan, the first new nuclear reactor would be required after 2025.

Today, it is difficult to foresee future of nuclear energy in Sweden. Still, taking into account the public opinion shift in favor of continuing of the nuclear power program and ambitious government’s plans, atom seems to be an important part of the Swedish climate policy. Together with renewable energy sources, nuclear plants will contribute towards environ-mental goals and will help to impose further limits on the fossils fuel share in the Swedish energy mix.

Finland firmly nuclear

The nuclear industry in Finland is providing nearly 30% of the electricity. The first genera­tions of nuclear power plants, like in Sweden, were completed from 1977 to 1980. All four nuclear power reactors built at the time, are currently in use. Unlike Sweden, Finland has not developed its own nuclear technology capacity. Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are based on the Swedish technology, and Loviisa 1 and 2 on the Russian one. In spite of this, an average lifetime capacity factor is one of the highest in the world – over 85%. Moreover, as in the case of the Swedish nuclear power plants, the nominal capacity of the Finnish reactors have been uprated ever since they were built. In case of the Olkiluoto, the nominal capacity of each reactor has increased from 658 MWe to 880 MWe.29

The decision about the future of the nuclear industry in Finland has been taken in 2002. For economical reasons, in May 2002 the Finnish parliament approved a proposition to build fifth nuclear reactor.30 According to the ini­tial investment plan, developed together with French Areva (EPR reactor EPR reactor, 1600 MWe), it should have been in commercial service in 2013. Unfortunately, due to the sophistication of the project, serious technical problems and delays have been encountered. The budget exceeded more than twice by now, and today its commercial operation is planned for 2016.31

All these problems have not stopped the Finnish intentions to further expand its nuclear power industry. Of two new projects, the first one – Olkiluoto 4 – is intended to be one of the modern western designs, whi­le the other one – Hanhikivi 1 NPP, led by the new consortium in the nuclear power industry: Fennovoima Oy – would most likely get partnered with the Rusatom Overseas to develop the AES-2006 design based on the VVER-1200 reactor.32 In July 2010 the Finnish parliament approved construction of the new reactors.

Finland’s nuclear waste management program was initiated in 1983, and is in general similar to the Swedish one. The key player is Posiva Oi, company responsible for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The company is owned by two Finnish nuclear power plants operators: TVO – 60% and Fortum – 40%.33 The final repository and waste encapsulation plant will be placed at Olkiluoto up to 450 meters underground in the stable bedrock. Disposal will be based on the Swedish SKB-3 concept with the copper canister and bentonite clay as the second barrier.34 The planned capacity of the deposit is 9000 tons and will allow to dispose of all spent fuel from the four existing reactors as well as the new Olkiluoto 3 and 4 units. The future of the spent fuel from Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant is still unclear.35

The cost connected with the final disposal and decommissioning of nuclear power plants will be covered by the state owned Nuclear Waste Management Fund. The fund is financed from the charges on the generated electricity which amounts to about 10% of the total electricity production cost. According the Ministry of Employment and Economy, at the end of 2012 the Fund has amassed about 2.16 billion Euro.36 This amount of money seems sufficient to cover all the costs of management of current nuclear waste stockpile as well as decommissi­oning of the existing power plants.

In Finland the nuclear energy is perceived as a reliable and safe source of electric power. The Finnish public is among the strongest supporters of the nuclear energy in Europe. Successful finishing of Olkiluoto3 and the two planned projects will extend a nuclear horizon far beyond 2050 and will root nuclear power deeply in the Finnish climate and energy stra­tegy. The future of nuclear energy in Finland seems to be stable and certain.

Conclusion

To sum up, the nuclear electricity generation on the south and east side of the Baltic Sea remains mixed. There are several reasons for that, with perhaps the most important one being social and political uncertainty about the projects and their public perceptions among nations and locally. External developments, with Fukushima disaster, German Energiewende, and pressures from the non governmental organizations, which in many cases do not recognize nuclear electricity generation as beneficial for climate action and they still press for the development of renewable resources.

The other very important reason is an apparent competition between three major concepts: Kaliningrad power station, Visaginas project in Lithuania and Poland’s plan for two major power plants, all of them intended to be nuclear and located in the north of the country. It seems either – or. With serious inroads of the renewable resources into the electricity mixes and consumption needs, there seem not to be place for more than one project regionally.

Moreover, their business chances are interlinked – any increased possibility of advancing and implementing of one of them does and will indeed influence chances of financing and building the others. Clearly, capacity of the projects to raise money and loans are inter-linked as all investors and banks would naturally look into the externalities of each project.

Finally, neither of them have yet crossed their respective points of no return. While the Kaliningrad project seemed most advanced, it got stilled. The Visaginas has been clouded by the Lithuanian public opinion referendum. And the Polish plans are still far from being stable.

Interestingly, the European Union does not play any important role in these cases. As only natural with energy projects, especially of this magnitude of investment needs, the na­tional authorities are the key players. Even if the case of local cooperation across and along the Baltics would normally call for somewhat closer cooperation on the issue, this is not the case. The European Commission might get in­terested in the issues, especially with its inter­est for the single energy market, but it has not been noted as an important player among the parties here. Its role is marked in pressing for making of the north-south energy and tran­sportation connectivity, but not on the choice of ways of electricity production. While this being national prerogative, Brussels would still seem only a natural point of meeting and coor­dinating of regional plans, a helping hand to be.

List of References:

1. Nuclear Power in Russia, World Nuclear Association,

http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ Countries-O-S/Russia–Nuclear-Power/#.

UkseEb7wFRA (accessed: 27.09.2013).

2. Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, BP June 2013,

http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/ statistical- review/statistical_review_of_world_ energy_2013.pdf (accessed: 22.09.2013).

3. Nuclear Power in Russia, World Nuclear Association,

http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ Countries-O-S/Russia–Nuclear-Power/#. UkseEb7wFRA (accessed: 27.09.2013).

4. Kaliningrad plan for Baltic States market, “World Nuclear News”, 17 April 2008, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NNKaliningrad_plan_for_Baltic_States_market_ 1704086.html (accessed: 30.09.2013).
5. Ibidem.
6. Kaliningradskaya Thermal Power Plant 2, JSC INTER RAO — Electric Power Plants website, http://irao-generation.com/en/stations/kalinigradg/ (accessed: 30.09.2013).
7. Baltic NPP Project, Rosatom website, http://www.rosatom.ru/en/investmentstrategy/ projects/ (accessed: 27.09.2013).
8. Russian joint venture of State Corporation Rosatom and Alstom will supply the turbine island to the Baltic nuclear power plant, Alstom, 2 February 2012,

http://www.alstom.com/Global/Group/Resources/Documents/Investors%20document/Regulated%20 Information/Russian%20joint%20venture%20of%20 State%20Corporation%20Rosatom%20and%20 Alstom%20will%20supply%20the%20turbine%20island%20to%20the%20Baltic%20nuclear%20power%20 plant.pdf (accessed: 27.09.2013).

9. Baltic nuclear plant brought forward, “World Nuclear News”, 27 August 2008

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Baltic_ nuclear_plant_brought_forward_2708083.html (accessed: 27.09.2013).

10. IAEA Status report 108 – VVER-1200 (V-491) (VVER- 1200 (V-491)), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2011,

http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/ aris/2013/36.VVER-1200(V-491).pdf (accessed: 30.09.2013).

11. Mark J. Harper, Advanced Reactor Technology Development for Near Term Deployment, Nuclear Energy Management School Tokai Mura, Japan June 2012,

http://www.iaea.org/nuclearenergy/ nuclearknowledge/schools/NEM-school/2012/Japan/ PDFs/week1/5-1_HARPER_Current_LWR_Technology_ NEMSchool.pdf (accessed: 29.09.2013).

12. Akkuyu NPP JSC website

http://www.akkunpp.com/index.php?lang=en (accessed: 29.09.2013).

13. Jozef Mišák, Evolution of safety assessment appro-aches for Gen III systems and implications for future systems, INPRO Dialogue Forum on Nuclear Energy Innovations 1-4 February 2010, IAEA, Vienna http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/1st_Dialogue_Forum/ 22-Misak.pdf (accessed: 29.09.2013).

14. Status and perspectives of VVER nuclear power plants, Meeting of the TWG-LWR IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 26 -28 July 2011, http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/ Technology/meetings/2011-Jul-26-28-TWG-LWR-HWR/Session-I/21.TWG-LWR-Russia.pdf (accessed: 29.09.2013).

15. Baltic site works, “World Nuclear News”, 27 August 2010,

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Baltic_ site_works_2708101.html (accessed: 19.09.2013).

16. Grid concerns for Baltic project, “World Nuclear News”, 11 June 2013,

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Grid_ concerns_for_Baltic_project_1106131.html (accessed: 19.09.2013).

17. Barsebäck nuclear power plant own website:

http://www.barsebackkraft.se/index.sp?ItemID=1291 (accessed: 25.08.2013).

18. Sonja van Renssen, New nuclear power in Europe – will Finland show the way?, “European Energy Review”, EER Monthly, February 2013.

19. Results of the referendum from the Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania,

http://www.vrk.lt/2012_seimo_rinkimai/output_ en/referendumas/referendumas.html

(accessed: 13.09.2013).

20. Nuclear Power in Lithuania, World Nuclear Association,

http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ Countries-G-N/Lithuania/#.UkiVbdK-1vI (accessed: 1.09.2013).

21. Own calculations, data on the Ringhals NPP reactors from PRISM – Power Reactor Information System, IAEA, 30 September 2013, http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=SE

(accessed: 01.10.2013).

22. Nuclear Power in Sweden, World Nuclear Association

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country- Profiles/Countries-O-S/Sweden/#.Ukqqwr7wFRA (accessed: 15.09.2013).

23. Ibidem.

24. A repository for nuclear fuel in 1.9 billion year old bedrock, SKB – The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, 4 April, 2010,

http://www.skb.se/Templates/Standard____28848. aspx (accessed: 30.09.2013).

25. Harold Feiveson, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and Frank von Hippel, Managing Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors, Experience and Lessons from Around the World, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), p. 78 92, September 2011,

http://fissilematerials.org/library/rr10.pdf (accessed: 30.09.2013).

26. Barbro Plogander, Sweden’s Planned Nuclear Waste Storage Faces Problems, The Epoch Times, 12 February 2013,

http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/ swedens-planned-nuclear-waste-storage-faces-problems-346787.html (accessed: 25.09.2013).

See also: Nuclear Waste State-of-the-Art Report 2013 – Final repository application under review: supplementary information and alternative futures, Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste, Stock-holm 2013,

http://www.karnavfallsradet.se/sites/default/files/ sou_2013_11_eng_vers.pdf (accessed: 01.10.2013).

27. Johan Bergenas, Nuclear power in Sweden, The Stimson Center, 15 April 2011,

http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/nuclear-power-in-sweden/ (accessed: 15.09.2013).

28. Sweden to replace existing nuclear plants with new ones, “BBC News”, 18 June 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10347187 (accessed: 05.09.2013).

29. Nuclear power plant units Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO), January 2008,

http://www.tvo.fi/uploads/File/nuclear-power-plant-units.pdf (accessed: 30.09.2013). See also: OLKILUOTO-1, PRISM – Power Reactor Information System, IAEA, 30 September 2013,

http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ ReactorDetails.aspx?current=159 (accessed: 01.10.2013).

30. Finland opts for new nuclear reactor, “BBC News”, 24 May 2002

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2006191.stm (accessed: 01.10.2013).

31. Dome in place at Flamanville EPR, “World Nuclear News”, 16 July 2013,

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Dome_in_ place_at_Flamanville_EPR-1607134.html (accessed: 26.09.2013).

32. Hanhikivi contract by year end, “World Nuclear News”, 3 September 2013

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Hanhikivi_ contract_by_year_end-0309137.html (accessed: 26.09.2013).

33. Posiva Oy, Posiva Oy website, http://www.posiva.fi/en/posiva (accessed: 28.09.2013) .

34. The Principles for Final Disposal, Posiva Oy website, http://www.posiva.fi/en/final_disposal/the_ principles_for_final_disposal/ (accessed: 28.09.2013).

35. No room at the repository, “World Nuclear News”, 9 march 2012,

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-No_ room_at_the_repository-0903127.html (accessed: 28.09.2013).

36. Finnish waste fund continues to grow, “World Nuclear News”, 26 March 2013,

http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/wr-finnish_ waste_fund_continues_to_grow-2603134.html (accessed: 22.09.2013).

Source: BSR Policy Briefing 4/2013, Centrum Balticum, www.centrumbalticum.org

How to build safe Europe?

Mr. Malgin, one of the fundamental problems in relations between Russia and Poland lies in different perceptions of the optimal architecture of international relations and security in Europe and of the role of Central and East European countries in it. How deep are the contradictions?

They manifested themselves at the threshold of the ’90s when the Polish leadership worked to accelerate to the maximum the withdrawal of Soviet (Russian) troops and to decide anew the security issue in the region after the disbanding on June 1, 1991 of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It is characteristic that during subsequent many-year discussion about the eastward enlargement of the North Atlantic alliance Russian diplomats sent their arguments mostly to western countries while Poland was perceived as an instrument of geopolitical rivalry.

Due to geopolitical changes on the threshold of the ’90s Russia and Poland unexpectedly acquired new neighbors some of which were common for Moscow and Warsaw – Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania. For Poland the new neighbors immediately developed into an instrument of diversified foreign policy and an additional range for foreign policy maneuvers and enhanced positions in European affairs. For Russia they expanded the range of obligations and encumbrances related to a broad range of issues of succession from the former USSR to newly-independent states. The post-Soviet space swallowed up immense endurance, diplomatic and other resources of Russia in the first half of the 1990s. It does the same even today to a certain extent.

At the change of the epochs Russia and Poland chose western guideline as the general direction of public, economic, and foreign policy development. Each country followed most general parameters of western experience but reformed its own life like it deemed it necessary.

In 1991-1993 many people in Moscow thought the universal movement to a single development paradigm would drop all interstate and international contradictions. They were wrong as nobody has abolished national interests and they began to manifest themselves when the policy of new states became more detailed.

The difference in potentials in Russian-Polish relations inevitably   results in asymmetry in reciprocal attention and mutual interest.

For the first time in modern history Russia attempted to formulate strategic international priorities in the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept. It became clear that the European guideline and European institutions occupied an important place in foreign policy values and tasks. The professional diplomatic community in Moscow made several principle steps while breaking through a web of tactical problems and tasks. They determined the vector in European policy which we are following at present.

The second wave of discussions of European institutional and political landscape emerged in 2004-2005 and determined to various extent the agenda of Russian-Polish relations up to now. The talk is about the interpretation of the deployment in Poland of missile defense elements which Polish and American authorities began to unofficially speak about yet in 2001. Poland viewed the agreement with the United States not only as enhancing the union with “the only surviving s u p e r p o w e r ” which will strengthen security in the region also from Russia, but as a possibility to receive additional assistance from the United States in reforming the Polish armed forces. Subsequent refusal of the Obama administration to build a large-scale missile shield triggered a wave of skeptical moods in the Polish elite regarding military cooperation with Washington.

Bilateral relations: economy or politics?

The scope of economic cooperation between Russia and Poland was considerable even in the years when interstate relations left much to be desired. There was an illusion that politics did not influence economy on the track. What does reality comprise?

A constant factor in modern relations between Poland and Russia is the ongoing difference in potentials determined by Russian supremacy in territorial, natural, military, and demographic resources.

However Poland is a member of a close integration entity – the European Union which surpasses Russia by all parameters except the military one. Therefore, it can mobilize EU capabilities in a critical moment.

Still the difference in potentials in Russian-Polish relations inevitably results in asymmetry in reciprocal attention and mutual interest. Poland spends on Russia a third or may be a half of all foreign policy efforts and concerns. In Russian foreign policy Poland will hardly ever get the same weight even for a short period of time.

Modern Poland and Russia are similar countries from the point of view of historic and foreign policy self-conscience and self-perception.

The classical bilateral relations which dominated for centuries between our countries disappeared in 1991 together with the loss of most of the common border. The Kaliningrad section of the border will never compensate for it. Modern bilateral relations will be increasingly based on a common (by the set of items) international agenda for both countries and mostly by the European agenda. Small Kaliningrad and sea border sections can serve as a litmus paper and a catalyst for relations in the framework of the “big agenda”.

In the 1990s Poland learned to use the “geopolitical rent”. The resource created yet in Soviet times began to operate. The first line of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline was constructed and Polish oil pipelines were used for the transit of Russian crude. As a result, 30% of Russian oil and 16% of Russian gas go through Poland. At that time Polish transportation companies became and remain the biggest road carriers delivering goods and food from Western Europe to Russia. It is necessary to remember that old infrastructure was mostly operated in the first decade of the market economy. The only exception were the new and old but reequipped border checkpoints.

Today we forget that in the 1990s, up to October 1, 2003, there was a visa-free regime between Russia and Poland. Everyone who has ever received a Schengen or American visa understands the level of freedom and openness which existed in relations between our countries at the grass-root level.

Warsaw succeeded in transmitting contradictions in bilateral relations to the European level. The policy paramount in May 2007 when Angela Merkel and Jose Manuel Barroso confirmed at the Russia-EU summit that the problem of Russian “meat embargo” was considered by the European Union as a problem of Russia- EU relations. Only an early election in Poland and the rise to power of the centrist team of Donald Tusk eased the situation. “The meat conflict” helped rethink mutual perceptions of each other. The German reaction helped many people in Warsaw comprehend the potential of the European component in the Polish policy towards Russia. The seemingly mystical “European solidarity” did work. The Russian elite realized, in its turn, the cost of bad relations with such a country, as Poland.

Today when a series of political problems in bilateral relations lost their acuteness a major problem in economic relations is non-organized Polish business that operates in Russia. There are no efficient bilateral structures for business cooperation. Polish businessmen often prefer to work in Russia under “an alien flag” and register their companies as German, Austrian, but not Polish. Except for energy sphere Polish authorities failed to create in Russia a viable system of promoting and insuring their businesses, as well as stable relations with government and public counterparts.

The situation with Russian economic presence in Poland is alike. Only energy companies properly operate there as they are satisfied with the minimum stability, feel the general political situation, and successfully place business projects which emerge in communications with Polish counterparts on the political agenda. Non-energy business is poorly organized on the Polish avenue. It is discrete and intentionally distanced from the general context of Polish-Russian relations and therefore cannot play a major stabilizing role in them. As a result, it often falls victim to the uneven and still emotional character of the relations.

Emotions on historic background

My personal experience in communicating with the Poles, also when I was a post-graduate student in the Moscow State University, allows me to state complete mutual understanding and the absence of problems. However it is not correct to extend people-to-people contacts to interstate relations.. .

Modern Poland and Russia are similar countries from the point of view of historic and foreign policy self-conscience and self-perception. The similarity results from stable ideologemes borrowed from history and stubbornly implemented in modern policy with an art worthy of a better course. Both in home and foreign policy. It also concerns bilateral relations.

The ideologemes determining similarity of Poland and Russia include: overstated perception of the own role in international affairs, perception of neighbors as countries demanding and thirsty for the patronage of Moscow or Warsaw, excessive and superlative use of such notions, as morality, spirituality, suffering, martyrdom, and heroism in relation to ourselves.

There are also deep-rooted historic myths-concepts similar in both countries which are only partially based on reality but definitely determine it. Among them is the concept of Sarmatism which explained to the Poles and Russians the necessity to develop “lost” lands and the presence of public and everyday customs and habits which are alien to other parts of Europe. There is also the concept of a bridge between the East and the West, and naturally the historic pride for the salvation of Europe from Tatar invasion. I would like to stress – all the ideologemes are common and equally important and even popular in historic self-conscience.

This is ancient history. What about difficult problems of the XX century?

To be brief, they have been dropped from the big policy agenda although the problem of Katyn has been a painful issue in bilateral relations for a decade.

“Historic policy” is not only a Polish phenomenon. However only in Poland it became for some time a part of the official political doctrine of the ruling party.

In general, Russia and Poland, as young states in their current life, are inclined to view history with the eyes of the state and explain various current actions by quoting a matching historic fact or historic interpretation.

Somebody can be skeptical about my assessments and would describe them as extremely straight interpretation of national conscience and grotesque which has nothing to do with the official position. But unfortunately, the grotesque and the absence of critical attitude to imposed historic stereotypes dominated relations between Russia and Poland for over a decade. Both parties were to blame for it in turn. In such periods similarities between Russia and Poland did not help rapprochement but promoted standoff like it happens between same particles. Paradoxically, the vanishing of (post) Soviet historic paradigm which interpreted Polish revolts through the prism of class and national liberation struggle by an oppressed nation diminished the objective pro-Polish stance of the Russian historic indoctrination and returned it to historic paradigms of purely “statehood” character. The Russian public opinion automatically returned to the previous perception of Poland which existed in tsarist Russia in the XIX century. The perception which was clearly unacceptable for the Polish political class also contained sentiments and cliches characteristic of Socialist Poland which in the opinion of modern Poland are operationally useless.

The most negative elements were clumsy propaganda attempts to pose Poland as an enemy in 2005-2007.

It is also to be stressed that the rejection by the Polish political class of the Socialist Poland (“unnumbered” Rzeczpospolita) gives nothing good for historic and foreign policy self-conscience of modern Poland. Such rejection deletes a whole historic layer and automatically turns Poland into a heir of faulty foreign policy concepts of the 1920-30s. People may object and say public thought of the post-war Polish emigration organically interlaces into modern conscience. However any objective observer can see that the mainstream mentality of the political class of Poland is unfortunately much more monochrome than the legacy of Jerzy Giedroyc or collective wisdom of Paris “Culture”. As emigrant thought returned to Poland in the difficult reform period of early 1990s it hardly won many supporters outside intelligentsia of the middle and older generations.

All the abovementioned added to the growing popularity in Poland of the “historic foreign policy” which flourished during the first two years of the political tenure of late Lech Kaczynski. In relation to Russia the “historic policy” mobilized all negative stereotypes that formed in decades or even centuries.

“Historic policy” is not only a Polish phenomenon. However only in Poland it became for some time a part of the official political doctrine of the ruling party and developed into “historically substantiated foreign policy”.

I want to repeat the situation has been overcome at present and history was returned to the hands of historians, or least has partially returned to them.

Can we say that after April 7, 2010 we dropped the problem of Katyn and all historic issues from the political agenda of bilateral relations?

Yes, if we take into attention the emotional and sincere gestures and words which have evidently demanded major spiritual effort from Vladimir Putin at the memorial in Katyn.

Yes, if we proceed from the fact that the prime minister of modern Russia reiterated the words of his predecessors, but did it brighter and more expressively .

Yes, if we proceed from the fact that two prime ministers were together at the memorial ceremony and confirmed an absolutely identical approach to the understanding who the victim is and who the criminal is.

Yes, if we investigate a broader rather than only the Polish aspect of the anti-Stalin pathos in the speech of Vladimir Putin.

Yes, because a Polish Catholic priest was present at the foundation laying ceremony of an Orthodox Church in Katyn.

Yes, because a ceremonial unit of the Polish Army participated in the Red Square parade in Moscow on May 9, 2010 and thus reminded to everyone that our countries were allies in the fight against common enemy.

The new tragedy near Smolensk – the air crash on April 10, 2010 that killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski and several dozen state and public figures of the country – shocked Russia. Public attitude to Poland and the Poles included compassion, sympathy, a feeling of solidarity and brotherhood in grief.

It seems nothing in twenty years has caused such good feelings of Russians to the Poles. However without the words of truth voiced by the two leaders who joined each other in common memory for the victims in Katyn on April 7 the reaction to the air crash on the 10th could be different.

Alexander Chechevishnikov,

for Amber Bridge

It is true the wording is not easy and purely legal. All is simple regarding state property management. The talk is not about the property of the agency as a state organization. This property is very modest. But we manage our main resource – centers of science and culture abroad. They number 59 at present plus 8 affiliates. There are also representatives in 18 countries. Thus we have footholds in 77 countries of the world. We inherited some of the centers from the Soviet Union. They were created as part of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and survived the difficult ’90s when many of them were axed. The survivors and the newly created ones are operating successfully to that or another extent today.

I say “that or another extent” because not everything we plan and design can be implemented in the modest framework of our capabilities. Naturally we would like our centers to be equipped up-to-date and constantly feature in cultural event posters in their respective cities so that they are popular and in demand.

It is not the wish only of our agency. I will quote Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev who said at the traditional meeting of Rossotrudnichestvo representatives and heads of science and culture centers last September in Moscow: ” you have first to think about the contents of your work and its new forms – make the centers modern, multi-functional and useful for various social and age groups and for everyone who is interested in Russia. Efficiency criteria shall be concrete and practical indicators, such as the number of people studying Russian language and involved in cultural exchanges, the number of courses, the quality of information resources and Internet sites”.

It all demands both attention and intensive work in the center and on-site and finances to hire Russian language teachers on a long-term basis, send high-quality artistic groups and exhibitions, integrate the centers to the maximum into new realities of the information epoch. u nfortunately, so far we have sometimes to admit that we lack money even for the renovation of the centers. Perception of our performance also depends on the exterior. The theater begins from the wardrobe, they say. It is a pity that Russian “cultural embassies” sometimes look poorly in contrast to modern centers of other countries. Russia has a lot what to boast of in the cultural sphere. We have only to properly cut and illuminate the diamond.

We hope that today when the image of Russia abroad and its “soft force” enjoys much high-level attention there will be progress on the avenue. It is pleasing that in many countries people want to study the Russian language, visit our exhibitions, applaud our actors, communicate, study, read and watch. It means our efforts will not be futile.

These are the services which our agency provides. They are the services to the state in promoting its image and culture. The services can be also used by everyone abroad who is interested in Russia and naturally by our compatriots. For them it is an important and necessary possibility to maintain live contacts with the cultural environment in which they grew up and which most of them want to preserve for their children.

The work of Rossotrudnichestvo in the Baltic Sea region and in the North of Europe differs in intensity. Somewhere it is everyday effort while in other places it is ad hoc. What would you list as an achievement in the region and what do you think has to be improved?

In the Baltic Sea region and the European north we have permanent footholds in Germany, Poland, Denmark, Finland where our science and culture centers operate. They hold exhibitions (only in Helsinki there were 39 exhibitions in 2012) and performances of Russian actors, as well as master classes, Russian language courses, cinema shows (say, in Gdansk Russian and Soviet movies are shown four times a month). Unfortunately, we still do not have an office in Sweden and Norway and in Baltic countries. The reason is not only insufficient efforts of Rossotrudnichestvo. On the contrary, our center in Copenhagen tries to cover neighboring Scandinavian countries. It held events last year in Malmo and Gothenburg, as well as in the Norwegian capital city.

In some cases problems with our presence in the country are caused by a lack of funds, but in some cases – by clear and unconcealed rejection by local authorities of Russian cultural centers.

As the talk is exclusively about cultural offices in countries with big Russian-speaking communities we cannot but view such rejection as a politically motivated and unfriendly act of authorities in corresponding countries aimed not only against Russia, but their own people as well.

The fifty-nine countries where our centers operate can confirm they pose no risk to national statehood, but the mutual benefit from cultural presence (as it always builds on reciprocity) is evident. I am confident that time will put everything in place and Russian centers of science and culture will open in all countries of the region because an additional channel of bilateral cultural dialogue is necessary not only for Russia and Rossotrudnichestvo but mostly to our people who should not suffer from prejudice and phobias of various politicians.

Russia currently presides in the Council of the Baltic Sea States. It is common knowledge that the CBSS is one of the most successful institutions of regional cooperation. They said the best is the enemy of the good. How can the format become more efficient?

Rossotrudnichestvo is not engaged on the platform, and it is a pity. Cultural dimension of regional cooperation provides additional possibilities for involving a maximum number of people in various countries into dialogue projects.

The Council of the Baltic Sea States is definitely an example of successful regional cooperation and I see good prospects of its growth and development on various guidelines. I do not believe the best is the enemy of the good in this case. Any project should be adapted, firstly, to the realities of the information epoch and the emergence of new communication platforms and formals, and, secondly, to the changing needs of the people. For example, enhanced economic cooperation between countries often results in increased demand for the study of corresponding languages – we noted a growth in the number of those wishing to study the Russian language in Baltic countries and we deem it necessary to react to the trends by launching new specialized courses and providing other opportunities.

In April 2013 in the framework of Russian CBSS presidency St. Petersburg will host a forum of non-governmental organizations of the Baltic Sea region. Human rights will be a major issue. The Russian Federation has begun to pay more attention of late to the protection of the rights of its citizens who live or stay abroad. Which problems does Rossotrudnichestvo resolve in this aspect?

Protection of the rights of Russian citizens abroad is a priority task of the Russian foreign ministry as the talk is about decisions lying in the sphere of the state policy. The Fund to support and protect compatriots abroad began to operate last year. Its task is to provide assistance in resolving legal issues faced by compatriots in other countries.

The mission of Rossotrudnichestvo is to satisfy cultural needs of Russians and representatives of other peoples of Russia abroad. Therefore, our centers are in constant contact with associations of compatriots and sometimes even act as a kind of cultural or family clubs for them. They hold meetings, children’s parties, and amateur concerts. Maybe the work lacks the necessary scale which we can boast of in performance reports. But for many people outside Russia it is important to have such places of communication and leisure and therefore we shall continue to develop them and upgrade the quality of the format.

The so-called cross-year of Russia in Germany and Germany in Russia is taking place in the same chronological framework as the Russian presidency in the CBSS. One of the recent issues of the Amber Bridge carried an interview with British historian Dominic Lieven who said that “out of all European nations the Germans are most balanced about their history.” Experts noted disappointment over German-Russian relations circulating in German society. What can Russia bring to the relations in order to add a positive and optimistic mood to them?

Cross-years of Russia with other countries are truly large-scale and popular events which allow to hold a massive presentation of the country abroad. Rossotrudnichestvo is actively engaged in such projects. In particular, last year we prepared and held the International children’s forum It Is Our World in Bonn, the national culture festival Russian Constellation in Berlin, and the 3rd international student forum in the German capital in October in the framework of the year of Russia in Germany. In 2013 we shall participate in the year of Russia in the Netherlands and we hope the level of events will not be lower than in Germany.

I believe that despite all possibilities provided by social networks and new means of communication such big “live” events continue to be vital as they provide a possibility to a big number of people to dive into the immense cultural space of Russia without leaving their home country.

It is very important and fruitful in periods when there is a feeling of a certain cooling in relations or mutual interest. We can speak about some disappointment in German society regarding Russia, but it is mostly conditioned by the tone of the media coverage of domestic Russian developments. It is based on assessments of a narrow circle of people from Russian political and public life.

It is like in Soviet times when our people learned news about the West through assessments of the Communist party leaders. As a result, it boiled down to endless large-scale protests, strikes and sufferings of the working people. Definitely all the mentioned events took place but like in the coverage of modern Russian realities abroad it was not the whole truth. It is saddening because it is the reason for opinions and prejudice.

We also like to lament and paint everything in darker colors than it is in reality. It is our national trait. We have to see more good things as the authors of the private project http://www.sdelanounas.ru are doing. Every day they say what has been built, opened or produced in Russia. It is important not only for foreigners but for us as well.

Outside perception is not always based on fair assessments of Russia. You can differ on what the girls from Pussy Riot band did and on subsequent court verdict and sentence. But when everybody speaks about it emotionally and does not even recall over three million Russians who queued several nights to touch the Christian relic – the Virgin Mary’s Belt – I believe it is an information bias. Those indignant at the sentence speak in each European newspaper.

Those indignant at the punk-prayer are not heard or seen although they definitely include a majority of the mentioned three million Russians. There is an important justice principle – аudiatur et altera pars (let the other side speak out). I believe there should be a balance in the media and then we shall be able to speak about objectivity and the absence of bias.

To avoid prejudice and positions based on secondary sources we have to create as many as possible direct forms of public dialogue. In contrast to the USSR which tried to hide its realities from a foreign eye and resorted to propaganda modern Russia wants to have its developments covered objectively to the maximum. The Russian image abroad is currently worse that the true situation in the country. We want people to see our life themselves without beautification and distortions and make conclusions based on personal impressions. Therefore Russia has been insisting for decades on visa-free travel with EU countries. So far we have not received a positive answer from our partners. Besides, some Baltic countries deliberately impede the exchange of cultural centers and erect obstacles to Russian language studies. It is not Russia which creates barriers for intercultural and public dialogue. That cannot but cause concern.

The best remedy for disappointment for Germans and any other societies is in increased communications. Come, meet, and listen not only to those who say habitual things for your ear. Open various Russia for yourself and you will have less disappointments and more benefits for all. Any difficult dialogue is better than two monologues.

Many countries, including most influential and wealthy, use national and territorial branding technologies to build up and enhance the image of the country. There are numerous disputes about the technologies, there are pro and con arguments. What is the Russian position?

Today the image of any country comprises an important asset in international affairs. It is sometimes weightier than political and economic weight. Therefore, I believe nobody is still deciding whether to promote the image or not. Everyone is working to position himself in the best way before other countries. All that is the so-called “soft force” of a country – to acquire supporters abroad through attractiveness, not force.

Whether it is necessary to resort to branding technologies or act differently (e.g. by advocating your ideolog y and values, spreading your language and mass culture products, etc.) shall be decided by each country independently proceeding from its resources. Most countries have their national brands which promote their image. Everybody knows Italian fashion and design, French wines, Swiss watches, German quality, English football, and Chinese cuisine. The Russians have discovered Turkish resorts. They bring major benefits to that country which is also interested in maintaining good relations with Russia. It is a two-way traffic.

There is nothing bad if Russia reminds the others about its ballet, music, and literature (Anna Karenina is screened with success today). If our country continues to be associated with the Kremlin and St. Basil’s Cathedral, high-quality vodka and outstanding musicians, and immense territory for tourism it will be only good for it. The task is to expand the range of associations. Let new names of writers and film directors appear in it, as well as new geographic names – Sochi, Skolkovo, Russky Island, and new faces in all spheres – e.g. Buranovo Grannies.

It is not the main issue how the Russian branding (or re-branding) be technically implemented. We naturally have what to show and tell to the world. Besides, there are up to 30 million Russian-speaking compatriots abroad. Over 250 million people speak Russian in the world (by the number of people in Europe – from the Atlantic to the Urals – who say Russian is their native language it is the number one with a major lead). Russia occupies the biggest territory on the planet and I believe it will never lack attention. But we would like to have a benevolent attention aimed at dialogue and friendship. The public and the state have to take effort for that. They have to work together, not only the government and Rossotrudnichestvo. We have to remember that each of us carries the image of the country when he communicate with foreigners, goes on holidays or to study abroad.

Each Monday the Voice of Russian radio station airs the Talk with Konstantin Kosachev program. It is a strange role for a high-ranking official. Do you have any feedback?

It may be a strange role for a government official, but it does not mean the mission is wrong. Firstly, I always considered myself to be a public politician, not just an official or apparatchik. Major experience of communicating with my voters in Chuvashia from where I was thrice elected to the State Duma which I know well and love helped me a lot. Secondly, radio offers a good format from messaging your ideas to a big number of people and getting acquainted with interesting interlocutors. May be I am abusing office to a certain extent as I use my position to inviting valuable and respected guests to the broadcast. I am sincerely happy every time when I succeed and when I hear positive response to the program.

Naturally, the response is not always positive. You cannot avoid criticism (but if people disagree it means they listen to you which is also important) because people have different views. What is clear for me may be seen by another person completely differently. It is also important to look at clear things from a different point of view.

Radio, TV and printed media are the so-called non-contact formats. They are definitely necessary however the future (and likely the present) is with contact formats and platforms where live communication goes. We sometimes lack interactivity and do not always involve in the circle of sympathizers of our country abroad as many people as possible.

Rossotrudnichestvo annually implements a program of trips to Russia by young scientists, journalists, politicians, and public figures – those who we call young public opinion leaders (last year 500 people visited our country and this year we hope to raise the number to 650). We work to arrange interesting meetings and acquaintances for the guests, discussions and visits, and we are pleased to hear and read their response confirming how much their opinion of Russia has changed under the impression of what they saw with their own eyes, of their personal communication. So far it may be a drop in the sea, but an important drop.

Last year the Russian Historic Society was reestablished. Academic ties of scholars in various countries intensify, including the Baltic Sea region. International educational projects expand. The Baltic Civilization Institute at the Amber Bridge Fund contributes to the processes. What do you think are the most vital tasks in the sphere?

First and foremost, it is rapprochement of positions of scholars and experts and the public of various countries in their attitude to the past of the region and Europe in general. Unfortunately, in the past decades we witnessed the renaissance of politicized historic issues which in many countries were involved in the political and ideological context. As a result, various reciprocal claims emerged, the renaissance of old hard feelings was artificially encouraged under the cover of new chauvinistic self-conscience, the opinion of minorities was ignored, and explicit nationalists came to power.

Leave history to historians – the task is important not for governments, but for societies. Schoolbooks which our children study are also important. It is horrifying to read numerous things which children are taught in neighboring countries when the talk is about the role of Russia and Russians in their history. The surviving obsessions of parents look from the pages of the schoolbooks rather than real history. They will hardly teach their children to love their native land through provoking hatred to other peoples. This is weakness, not strength, according to me. I believe rapprochement of curricula in schools and institutes can constitute important mission for all of us as we can lay the foundation for relationship between future generations by that.

A personal question in the end. You have many ties with Sweden. According to available information in Internet, had it not been for the Soviet rules you would have been born in Stockholm. How do you perceive Sweden and Nordic countries in general?

It is true that in different political realities I could have been born in Sweden. Nevertheless I partially feel myself a Scandinavian as my childhood passed there as well as my first professional steps. The region will be always close to me no matter what government position I occupy.

I perceive it as a region of highly intellectual, original and self-sufficient people who, like Russians, are not pampered by much sun and other southern life bonuses, but succeeded to build up life on their peninsula to the envy of others – both politically, economically and socially which is confirmed by top places in international ratings.

Scandinavia for me is a region which surprisingly resembles Russia. The space, forests, exciting beauty of the North – everything is present in Russia and in Scandinavian countries. I believe we have what to borrow from the experience of our northwestern neighbors in how to preserve the wealth and treasure what nature gave us. It would be good for the Russians to acquire some Scandinavian mentality. It would be also good for Scandinavians to have some Russian one.

Thank you for the interview.