In December 2014 Denmark filed a claim with the United Nations to expand the boundaries of its continental shelf in the Arctic, and Russia is going to present its new claim in 2015. It seems impossible to elicit the meaning of the ongoing process of the Arctic continental shelf delimitation without specifying its legal and geopolitical aspects. This article is intended to systematize the international legal mechanism of the continental shelf delimitation and to highlight the actual positions of the claimant states as well as the prospects of the boundary delimitation in the Arctic continental shelf.

In December 2014 Denmark filed an application to the United Nations for extension of its continental shelf in the Arctic to 350 nautical miles, which caused numerous comments in official circles of various countries, politicians, experts and observers. Some of them saw in this step the desire of Denmark to implement its geopolitical ambitions, achieve some political goals, join the battle for resources in the Arctic, or provoke military confrontation in the region and a new “cold war”[1].

Some experts, on the basis of the thesis of economic hopelessness of central areas of the continental shelf in the Arctic (according to the US Geological Survey (USGS) «Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle», about 84% of the hydrocarbon resources of the continental shelf is already within the areas of national jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states), tend to see in the actions of Denmark the logic of the “big geopolitical game”. How justified are these estimates and what actually is it all about?

The international legal regime of the Arctic shelf is governed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to Article 76, the continental shelf of a coastal state “includes the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines… where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance”. It is important to note that the baselines – borders of inland seas – are often a subject of controversy. Due to the fact that the United States are not currently a member of the Convention, they are guided by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, according to which the continental shelf is defined as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas”[2].

Figure 1. Scheme of the international legal status of the continental margin and its superjacent waters in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The illustration is made based on the US Navy materials: The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Digital resource. URL: https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-0defea93325c/.

Five countries have a continental shelf in the Arctic: Russia, Canada, USA, Denmark (Greenland) and Norway. Activity on the Arctic shelf, over which sovereignty has not been recognized by any of the states, is regulated by the International Seabed Authority located in Kingston, Jamaica^[3].

In accordance with Article 4 of Annex II of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal State intending to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles must submit an application (presentation) to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) within 10 years after the ratification of the Convention. Therefore, the application made by Denmark for extension of its Arctic shelf is in full compliance with the provisions of the Convention. This application was expected, and it is not dramatic and cannot give evidence about any “secret geopolitical intentions” of the Kingdom of Denmark. Russia, claiming expansion of its Arctic shelf up to 350 nautical miles, also exercises its rights granted by the 1982 Convention.

When applying for extension of a continental shelf applicant countries have the right to go by various reasons, including political arguments, but their consideration by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf must completely rule out political motives. The Commission’s decisions must be based on objective and independent scientific assessment of the structure of the seabed.

The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is a purely technical body composed of 21 experts in the field of marine geology, geophysics and hydrography who serve in their personal capacities (Article 2.1 of Annex II of the Convention). Members of the Commission shall be elected for a term of 5 years, and can be re-elected at the meetings of States Parties of the 1982 Convention, which shall be convened by the United Nations Secretary General, as necessary, in accordance with Paragraph 2 (e) of Article 319 of the 1982 Convention.

The main requirement for the composition of the Commission is to ensure equitable geographical representation: at least three members shall be elected from each geographical region. Quorum for a meeting is 2/3 of the total number of participants in the 1982 Convention. 2/3 votes of the states that are present and participate in the voting process is needed for the election of members of the Commission. It is important to note that, as the first Chairman Yu. B. Kazmin pointed out, the Commission remains an independent body, officially non-accountable to the Meeting[4]. The fourth and the latest Commission waselectedatthe 22^nd Meetingin 2012. ThisCommission hastheauthorityuntilJune 15, 2017.

Inaccordance with Article 76of the 1982 ConventionandArticles3and 6of Annex IIthereto, the Commission shall perform the followingfunctions:

1) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles;

2) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during the preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (1);

3) to provide recommendations to the coastal States on the demarcation of the outer limits of their continental shelf.

At the same time, we should note that the Commission’s recommendations are not a final and binding decision. First, according to Article 8 of Annex II of the 1982 Convention, “in the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new submission to the Commission”[5]. Second, already here we shall draw attention to the fact that international negotiations obligatorily have the decision function in the process of delimitation of the shelf.

The key criterion in determining the outer limit of the continental margin of the coastal state beyond the 200-mile zone is natural prolongation of the continental shelf. The application submitted to the Commission should contain relevant scientific evidence. Bathymetry (i.e. maps of the seabed with depth marks) and geological criteria are used to determine whether the underwater structures comply with the specified criterion.

The bathymetric criterion (i.e. associated with the assessment of the depth of the sea) involves determining the position of the foot of the continental slope (see Fig. 1) by the maximum change in the gradient, taking into account the 2,500 meter isobath (i.e. an imaginary line connecting all points along the coast where the depth is equal to 2500 meters). The assessment process for the compliance with the geological criteria is even more complex. These criteria include information on the structure and thickness of the sedimentary cover (deposits covering the shelf), the nature of the crust on the continental shelf and geological and geophysical evidence of the location of the continental foot. Sedimentary layers within the outer edge of the continental margin should be 1% (or more) of the shortest distance from the foot of the continental slope. If the data is not available on the sedimentary cover, the limit of the shelf can be marked along a line separated from the foot of the slope by no more than 60 miles.

The restrictive edge of the outer limit of the shelf is a line of 350 miles from the coast of the mainland or islands, and 100 miles from the isobath of 2500 m. However, these restrictions do not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin. These crustal blocks in the Arctic, with the nature of a mainland and almost inseparable from the continents, go deep into the ocean (i.e. the Mendeleev Elevation) or cross it from Eurasia to the Greenland-Ellesmerian Depression (the Lomonosov Ridge), separating the Arctic Ocean into two different structures – Eurasian (in which, for example, Svalbard and Franz Josef Land are located) and Amerasian (the Canadian Arctic Archipelagoes and Wrangel Island are located here). It is these circumstances that cause the mutual territorial “overlapping” of a number of applications.

Some experts – especially non-Arctic states – see some provocations in the applications for extension of the Arctic continental shelf by Arctic coastal states. For example, the analysts of the British newspaper “Financial Times” explain the desire of the Arctic coastal countries to justify their right to expand the boundaries of the continental shelf in the Arctic by the logic of the “geopolitical game”. The main prize of this game would be the North Pole, the control of which, supposedly, is a symbol of the “geopolitical victory” and leadership in the Arctic region and control over it^[6]. A number of researchers even argue that the areas claimed by Denmark, Canada and Russia, are economically future-less, as well pointing at the thickness and consistency of the ice cover over the central part of the shelf, the “minor” share of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic, concentrated in this part of the shelf .

Meanwhile, according to the research by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) «Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle», the Arctic contains about 22% of the world’s conventional oil and gas reserves (or about 29.9 billion tons of oil equivalent), with about 84% of the hydrocarbon resources of the continental shelf located at depths up to 500 m^[7]. According to some representatives of the Arctic coastal states, from 94 to 97% of offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic is already within the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states. These data were presented, for example, by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. These figures are also indicated in the Arctic strategy of Denmark for the period of 2011 – 2020[8]. The same estimates have been given by the experts of the University of the Arctic in Rovaniemi (Finland)[9].

However, we should bear in mind the very low level of exploration of the Arctic shelf, especially in high latitudes, and current prediction-like estimates of oil and gas. There is a good chance that the Arctic shelf hydrocarbon deposits outside of the 200-mile border can be much richer than expected. According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, potential hydrocarbon reserves of the central areas of the continental shelf in the Arctic are about 5 billion tons of oil equivalent, whereas the Minister S.E. Donskoy considers these estimates to be minimal[10].

If we consider that the forecast figure in exports of fuel and energy resources of the Russian Federation in 2020, according to the Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030, should reach 0.8 billion tons of oil equivalent[11], then fossil fuel resources of the central parts of the Arctic shelf may be comparable with the volume of five years of the Russian oil and gas exports at the current level. Speaking about the resource potential of the central areas of the continental shelf, it is important to stress the probability of detection of mineral resources in the central part of the Arctic shelf.

In addition, the sovereignty over the shelf gives a country the right to monitor any activity on it, including, for example, the construction of pipelines. It also assumes responsibility for the country’s environmental protection in the territory. Uncontrolled economic activity outside the areas of national jurisdiction in the area of the “common heritage of mankind” may pose a threat to the environment at the regional and global scale. Therefore, expansion of monitoring of the human activities in the Arctic shelf by the Arctic coastal States, as well as responsibility of those countries for the consequences of such actions can significantly contribute to sustainable development. Under the current circumstances of the non-alignment of the United States to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the zone of the “common heritage of mankind” in the Arctic is not feasible^[12]. However, this leaves the question of the legal status of a number of sections of the shelf unresolved, and therefore it defines only a transient, temporary state of affairs.

Given these considerations, identification of the outer limits of the jurisdiction of the coastal states of the Arctic continental shelf is a priority task of the Russian foreign policy, as defined in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation on February 12, 2013[13].

Let’s consider the claims of the Arctic coastal countries for the continental shelf in the Arctic:

Russia ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea by the Federal Law #30-FZ dated February 26, 1998. Russia filed its first application in 2001. However, the Commission considered the data provided insufficient and decided that for unambiguous classification of each of the deep-water bottom uplifts in the Amerasian sub-basin (see Fig. 2), Russia should submit experiment-backed evidence of their continental nature and their structural belonging to the continental margin of the north-eastern Eurasia, as well as develop a consistent model of the evolution of the Arctic, which explains the geological nature of these bottom uplifts[14].

In the absence of these data, the outer limit of the continental shelf in the Amerasian sub-basin cannot be farther than 350 nautical miles from the baselines, i.e. the area, which Russia can claim in the region, will not exceed 400000 km². At the same time, the use of the second criterion of the limitation of the legal shelf (100 nautical miles from the isobath of 2500 m), which applies only to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, will allow to extend the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in the Amerasian subbasin much farther. In this case,the acquired areaof theextended continental shelfof Russia will be1.2 millionsquare km^[15]. To date, according to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, a new version of the application to be submitted, according to the plan, in 2015, is at the final stage of the preparation^[16].

1. The maximumUS claimsin the Arctic Ocean are the Chukchi Cap and the seabed areas adjacent to it to the north andeast, not reachingthe North Pole^[17]. In the US a Specialinteragencycoordinating bodyhas been created to substantiate the outer limit ofthe continental shelf- The US Extended Continental Shelf Task Force.More than a dozenAmericanministries,services and agencies take part in its work^[18].

Denmark ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on November 16, 2004. The claims by Denmark apply to a part of the Lomonosov Ridge, which lies to the right of an imaginary line of the equidistance with Canada and further to the north up to the North Pole, and further, to the Russian side of the Arctic, which thus overlaps with the claims of the Russian application of 2001. Denmark submitted its application for extension of its shelf in December 2014. It also claims for the western part of the Western Nansen Basin and in the place of the East Greenland Ridge^[19]. It is important to note that in the field of shelf delimitation Denmark has close research collaboration with Canada. In 2005, these two states announced plans to jointly explore water areas of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to their territories and process the received data, which resulted in the signing of a memorandum on cooperation in Ottawa. Denmark has scientific cooperation with all the Arctic coastal states, including Russia.

Canada ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on November 7, 2003. So far, the country has not applied for extension of its continental shelf. In the “preliminary information”, delivered by Canada to the United Nations on December 6, 2013, only some vague scope of potential Canadian claims is specified: the continental margin of the continental shelf in the Canadian basin, Amundsen basin, on the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha Ridge. It is specified that on the Alpha and Lomonosov Ridges Canadian claims concern areas that are located farther than 350 nautical miles from the baselines. It is expected that Canada may acquire approximately 1.5 million km² of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines. In the “preliminary information” it is indicated that Canada is going to submit a partial application, the timeline is indicated vaguely[20].

Norway ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on June 24, 1996. It submitted its application in November 2006, claiming for the shelf of the Western part of the Nansen Basin – the same site, which is also claimed by Denmark in its application in 2014[21].

Thus, underwater elevations, which are natural components of the continental margin, belong to the shelf that is claimed in applications of several countries at the same time. The largest of these elevations is the Lomonosov Ridge (in the scientific community there is almost no dispute that the Lomonosov Ridge and other disputed areas of the shelf have a continental origin; scientists’ opinions differ on where exactly these elevations join the mainland^[22]). There is a chance that the United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea recognizes the controversial underwater elevations as a natural component of several continental margins, and, therefore, the right to sovereignty over them by two or three Arctic coastal states at the same time. However, even in this scenario, there is no potential for conflict.

Figure 2. Location of the maingeological structuresandsections of the bottom of theArctic Ocean^[23]..

Information note: The Lomonosov Ridge was discovered by Soviet scientists in 1948. It stretches over 1500 – 1700 km and connects the Eurasian continent in the area of the New Siberian Islands (Russia) with the North American continent in the area of Ellesmere Island (Canada) and Greenland (Denmark), effectively dividing the Arctic Ocean into 2 parts – the Pacific and Atlantic (see Fig. 2). In the Pacific part there is the Mendeleev Ridge (Ellesmere – Wrangel Islands). In the central part of the ridge there was found a break. Another name for the ridge is “Alpha”. Also in the Pacific part there is the Chukchi Cap. In the Atlantic part there is the Gakkel Ridge, which is an extension of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. The Lomonosov Ridge and the Gakkel Ridge form two basins in the Atlantic part: the Amundsen basin and the Nansen basin.

From the above it follows that the so-called “control” over the North Pole by an Arctic country with the shelf in the Arctic Ocean may be solely the result of consideration of applications of the countries concerned by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf based on scientific evidence that these countries will collect and present in support of their applications. And the “prize” will be “awarded” to the country that will perform this task in the most compelling and scientific way – unless otherwise stipulated in mutual agreements by scientifically recognized claimant countries.

With regard to the thesis of the “militarization” of the Arctic region, the reason for making such estimates is attributed to the overlapping of applications, that is, due to the intersection of shelf territories claimed by coastal Arctic states (see Fig. 3). If the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf recognizes that such claims are justified, these countries will have to hold diplomatic negotiations on the delimitation of the shelf on the basis of existing norms of the international maritime law. It is impossible to militarily impose a particular solution to the problem. This is the only possible approach and the only possible vision of the claimant states for resolving disputes, which is reflected in the Ilulissat Declaration of May 28, 2008^[24].

It is important to note that in the 2013 Kiruna Declaration of the Arctic Council all the Arctic countries (including the US) have committed themselves to act in accordance with the international law, including the law of the sea^[25]. It is significant that it was the potential for the use of international legal mechanisms of delimitation of the disputed territories of the Arctic shelf that the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed in its official commentary published in connection with the Danish application for the continental shelf in 2014^[26].

Figure 3. Scheme of the Arctic shelf: 200-mile zone and the territorial claims of countries, including the application of Denmark in 2014.

Source: Denmark challenges Russia and Canada over the North Pole // BBC News Europe. Digital resource. URL:  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30481309

2,000 km

1,000 miles

Alaska (USA), Russia, Norway, Greenland (Denmark), Canada

The North Pole, the Lomonosov Ridge

Applications/claims:

Danish application: 2014.

Russia

Canada

USA

200-miles line

It should be noted that there are two main principles of possible delimitation of maritime areas and the Arctic shelf between states. According to the “median line method”, delimitation is done based on the principle of the equidistance of the boundary line from the shoreline (or base points of the coastline) of the neighboring states. According to another method – “sectoral” – the pole is seen as a point from which straight lines are drawn along longitudes. The specific method of drawing dividing lines between the neighboring countries is not specified by the Convention on the Law of the Sea, except for referring to the principle of mutual consent and justice^[27].

Currently, the Russian Federation already has positive experience in the field of contractual delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic (namely in the eastern part of the Western Nansen Basin). On 15 September 2010, Russia signed an agreement with Norway “On Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean”.

Summarizing the above, it should be emphasized that allegations of futility, politicization and high conflict potential of the international process of delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic are incorrect and unfounded. On the contrary, we should talk about the strategic importance of this issue for all Arctic coastal countries, as well as about the effective mechanism for its solution embedded in the international law which is based on objective and impartial scientific assessment of the seabed, as well as openness of the Arctic coastal countries for a dialogue, their willingness to cooperate and find mutually beneficial solutions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Martin Lidegaard) in connection with the Danish application to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, said: “This is not an act of aggression. This is an attempt to fairly and accurately provide data of the geological expertise. We hope for constructive cooperation with experts from the United Nations and the subsequent bilateral negotiations with neighboring countries”[28].

The delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic is quite complicated and can take a long time. However, objectively and fairly established boundaries may for centuries provide the basis for efficient studying and development of the region, as well as for strengthening of the close partnership among the Arctic coastal states.

Bibliography

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[1]“A new cold war: Denmark gets aggressive, stakes huge claim in Race for the Arctic” // National Post. Электронныйресурс. URL: http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/12/15/a-new-cold-war-denmark-gets-aggressive-stakes-huge-claim-in-race-for-the-arctic/; “Denmark challenges Russia with the Arctic claim” // PRIO Blogs. Digital resource. URL: http://blogs.prio.org/ArcticPolitics/2014/12/denmark-challenges-russia-with-the-arctic-claim/; “Canada sparks Cold War over Arctic” // The Chronicle Gerald. Digital resource. URL: [http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1175277-canada-sparks-cold-war-over-arctic].

[2]1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.conventions.ru/view_base.php?id=34]. (Accessed 19.12.2014).

[3] Konyshev, V.N., A.A. Sergunin. The Arctic in the international politics: cooperation or competition? The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Moscow, 2011. URL: [http://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/01/1269302651/%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%A2%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%90_%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%98.pdf]. (Accessed 19.12.2014). P. 42.

[4]Doc. SPLOS/73. 14 June 2001. P.10. Para. 61.

[5] Gudev P.A. Challenges and threats to oil and gas production in the Arctic. // Ecologichesky vestnik Rossii, #2 (15). Pp. 34-35.

[6] “Denmark lays formal claim to North Pole” // Financial Times. URL: [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b7e66b1c-8442-11e4-8cc5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QCY2ciY1]. (Accessed 15.01.2015).

[7]Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. Digital resource. URL: [http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf].

^[8] Kongeriget Danmarks Strategi for Arktis 2011–2020. // Danish Embassy in Canada, official website. [Digital resource]. URL:[http://canada.um.dk/da/~/media/Canada/Documents/Other/Arktis_Rapport_DA.pdf] P. 24. (Accessed 15.12.2014).

[9] Canada claimed for the Lomonosov Ridge. Article. Digital resource. URL: [http://pro-arctic.ru/06/12/2013/press/6010]. (Accessed: 15.12.2014).

[10]“The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment: the Russian Federation will submit an application to the United Nations for expansion of the limits of the Arctic shelf in spring 2015” // ITAR-TASS. Digital resource. URL: [http://itar-tass.com/politika/1540165]. (Accessed 15.01.2015).

[11]The energy strategy of Russia till 2030. The Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, official website. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.minenergo.gov.ru/activity/energostrategy/]. (Accessed 15.01.2015).

[12] Vylegzhanin A.N. Non-participation in the Convention on the Law of the Sea gives advantages to the USA. // RIA Novosti. Digital resource. URL: [http://ria.ru/arctic_news/20120719/704132667-print.html]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[13] The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on February 12, 2013. Subparagraphs 31, 38, 73. The official website of the President of the Russian Federation. URL: [http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf]. Accessed: [15.12.2014].

[14] Konyshev, V.N., A.A. Sergunin. The Arctic in the international politics: cooperation or competition? The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Moscow, 2011. URL: http://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/01/1269302651/%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%A2%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%90_%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%98.pdf. (Accessed: 19.12.2014). P. 44.

[15]Same. Pp. 44-45.

[16] «The Russian application for the Arctic shelf will be ready by the end of the year». // Rossiyskaya gazeta. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/30/reg-szfo/arktika.html. (Accessed: 19.12.2014). P. 44.

[17] Gubanov A.I. Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf: international law problems and perspectives. Monograph. – M.: IKD “Zerzalo-M”, 2015. P 244.

[18]The Extended Continental Shelf Project. Information from the website: www.continentalshelf.gov URL: http://continentalshelf.gov/about.html. (Accessed: 19.12.2014).

[19] Gubanov A.I. Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf: international law problems and perspectives. Monograph. – M.: IKD “Zerzalo-M”, 2015. PP. 244-247.

[20]Same. PP. 247-248.

[21]Same, PP. 248 – 249.

[22] Evdokimov Yu. Hot Arctic //Battle on the Ice: the Arctic shelf in the world politics and economics of the 21^st century / Eds: V. Andrianov, N. Vasiliev, B.M. Golkin, 2009. P. 37.

[23] Gubanov A.I. Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf: international law problems and perspectives. Monograph. – M.: IKD “Zerzalo-M”, 2015. P. 308.

[24]The Ilulissat Declaration. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[25] Voronkov L.S. The Arctic for 8. Evolution of the role of the NATO in the Arctic. // Russia in global politics. Digital resource. URL: [http://globalaffairs.ru/number/Arktika-na-vosmerykh-16045]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[26] The commentary by the Information and Press Department of the MFA on the Danish application for the Arctic continental shelf. MFA of the Russian Federation, official website. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/C4533848E85A09A0C3257DB00053569C]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[27] Konyshev, V.N., A.A. Sergunin. The Arctic in the international politics: cooperation or competition? The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Moscow, 2011. URL: [http://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/01/1269302651/%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%A2%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%90_%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%98.pdf]. (Accessed: 19.12.2014). P. 43.

[28] Regeringen og Grønlands selvstyre indgiver i dag krav på kontinentalsoklen nord for Grønland. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official website. Digital resource. URL: [http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/udenrigspolitiske-nyheder/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=7d92317d-823e-4412-8bd4-5cbcadccb45e]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

This article argues that there are no common standards of integration, applicable to all countries, regardless of their economic situation’s specificity and level of development as well as of the nature of their commonly agreed objectives they seek to achieve by means of integration. The purpose to create a single internal market in the EU has determined the toolkit of the European integration, the nature and powers of the EU institutions through which it is carried out. The author argues that the construction of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space in general and within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in particular, in the image and likeness of the EU is not only unjustified, but also harmful. The founding treaty of the EAEU does not contain the purpose to construct a single internal market. The article emphasizes the high level of regional integration achieved by the Nordic countries, which has not been affected by the pattern of the EU integration. The Nordic integration began with the formation of a common labor market and creation within its framework of necessary conditions for high labor mobility. The objectives of the integration efforts of the Nordic countries, fundamentally different from the EU, are reflected in the nature of the institutions of regional cooperation and in the methods of their activity as well. The author recommends attentively looking at the Nordic integration experience to use its elements in the post-Soviet space. 

Introduction

Apart from Europe, integration processes cover today also other regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space. Such processes involve states with different levels of economic development, size, demographics, natural resources, quality of human capital, a position in the international division of labor, degree of development of market relations, participation in various international organizations and agreements and other indicators. It would be at least imprudent to assume that states entering integration processes must obey certain universal laws, undergo the same stages of integration, and create similar bodies with identical powers. The content of integration activities to a certain extent depends on the objectives of a particular state.

The European Union without proper justification is considered to be a benchmark of integration, and an example of how integration processes allegedly should unfold in the former Soviet Union. Common theories of integration, based on the experience of the EU, are designed to ascribe versatility and traits of objective law to the EU integration processes. However, copying of the EU integration experience can have very negative consequences for integration processes in the post-Soviet space. It would be advisable to study more closely the integration experience of other countries, particularly the Nordic countries, examine features of their integration model, and the problems that they solve by means of integration.

Trade and economic relations do not automatically evolve into integration. Free trade zones and customs unions can be considered as means of such relations. However, not all the participating countries are willing to develop integration. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) can serve as examples. Negotiations on a free trade area between the EU and NAFTA do not mean that their member countries are eager to take the path of integration.

A transition to conscious actions enabling convergence and merging of economies of states is equivalent to a strategic choice of ways for their further development. When deciding on joining an integration process one should have a clear idea of its long-term common goals so that participating states could use economic, political, legislative, social and other activities for the achievement of these objectives. A long and gradual character of integration requires reliable protection against fluctuations of the political and economic environment. Therefore a contractual basis is employed for this purpose and integration processes are carried out within the established permanent international intergovernmental organizations.

Initially, western European countries were planning to use development of integration processes to put an end toan infinite chainof warsbetween France and Germany that had been shaking Europe for centuries. Combined withthe continued presence of the troopsof the Western Allieson the territoryof the Federal Republic of Germany andinclusion of the latter in the North Atlantic Treaty integration processes were believed to help create realobstacles for therevivalof German militarismand reliablemonitoring toolsfor theeconomic and political developmentof Germanyafter the SecondWorld War.

These initial policy objectives, as they were successfully achieved, gradually began to take second place. The progressive extension of the EEC membership created a need for efficient development of its growing economic space, reduction of costs in cross-border commercial activities, providing conditions for profitable operation of companies in the participating states. As a result, integration processes within the EEC began to focus on the creation of a single internal market of the Community and on ensuring the most favorable conditions for the most competitive economies and companies of the member states not taking into consideration domestic production of each country.

The adoption of the Single European Act and the introduction of free movement of goods, services, capital and persons have determined the main tools for the creation of such a market. Efforts for consolidation of a single EU internal market and expansion of its rules to other states are camouflaged with attractive formulations such as “cohesion policy”, “neighborhood policy”, “Eastern Partnership”, etc. These perform more likely the functions of “soft power” of the EU rather than reflect the true essence of such activities. The European Commission has received the exclusive power to fully protect and improve the single internal market on the so-called “supranational” level, which is the most favorable for the most competitive economies and companies.

Often, the so-called “European idea” seems to be an ideological forerunner of the Western European integration. Some Russian and foreign experts believe that we will soon witness a political union of the member states of the EU capable of becoming a new state formation. Cooperation of the EU member states in the field of foreign policy, security and defense, domestic policy and justice and many other areas should be regarded as a step in this direction. However, the new Head of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said he was not going to create the United States of Europe and that he did not believe that “a united Europe could be constructed in opposition to a nation-state” (9, p.7). In fact, these areas of cooperation serve the practical needs of a single internal market and reinforce international ambitions of the EU by means of foreign policy and security.

Despite the common historical destiny, continued co-living in joint states, their geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic similarities, comparability of sizes, similarity of political cultures and political orders (2, pp.615-617), the Nordic countries do not aim at getting united into one single state. The “European idea”, despite the fact that these countries belong to Europe, has not had a considerable influence on their relationship. Three of the five countries in the region are relatively young independent states. Norway gained independence in 1905, Finland – in 1917, and Iceland finally became an independent state in 1944. That’s why these countries do not allow any attacks on their recently-found sovereignty in integration processes.

However, the Nordic countries have consistently highlighted the importance of regional cooperation for them. In 1939, the Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler said: “The North will be a political reality to the extent to which the nations are convinced that their welfare is provided by the Nordic cooperation and solidarity” (7, p.37). In March 1948, the Danish Prime Minister said in Stockholm: “Whatever happens, our peoples should be together. It would be unfortunate if we parted ways”(10, p.35). “We live in difficult times – the Prime Minister of Norway Einar Gerhardsen said in February 1953 – when the very environment necessitates that small countries that have a lot in common and that are located side by side, hold together” (5, p.217). Although regional cooperation has always enjoyed wide support among the Nordic public, however, as it was acknowledged in February 1953 by the Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft, their cooperation “had been quite irregular and random” for a long time (10, p.98).

To date, the Nordic countries have reached the most advanced and deepest level of regional integration of all known examples, with an integration path that is significantly different from the EU. Studying its features may be of interest to potential participants of integration processes in the post-Soviet space.

“The Road Map” of the Nordic integration

Integration processes in the European North have taken as a base the indisputable fact that the joint efforts of the Nordic countries can better protect their common interests than if they were acting separately. Regarding the Nordic integration processes it is appropriate to cite the Swedish scientist G. Adler-Karlsson: “Instead of looking for guidance in doctrinal theory, we have always preferred to find the best solutions that are practically achievable under given circumstances” (1, p.22).

In the early post-war years, the Nordic countries faced similar economic difficulties. In April 1948, the four Scandinavian countries officially joined the “Marshall Plan”. Within its framework, Denmark, Iceland and Norway received US aid in the form of gifts, Sweden – in the form of loans (7, p.276). As a result, they were able to partially upgrade their fixed capital in industry and agriculture and to restore economic ties among the countries of the region. Sweden, for example, was paying for the US loans with ships for Norway.

This was also encouraged by lower customs duties in comparison to other Western European states, significant devaluation of the Scandinavian currencies in 1949 (exchange rate of the Norwegian and Swedish Krones to the American Dollar fell by 30%, the Danish krone – by 44%), as well as their accession to the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which resulted in a partial reversibility of Scandinavian currencies within the EPU. As a result, the value of exports in each of the Scandinavian countries in 1948-1951 more than doubled (7, pp.276, 277).

Although Finland did not join the “Marshall Plan”, it was also receiving individual loans from its funds, as well as from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and from Sweden. By the end of 1956 the total amount of foreign loans in Finland was more than 68 billion FIM, with the share of loans from the US and Sweden being equal to 85% of that amount (4, p.18). By the beginning of the 1950s, the Nordic countries managed to complete the reimbursement of indirect losses caused by World War II (7, p.278).

In 1950 the North Economic Cooperation Committee that was established in February 1948, recommended that the Nordic countries participating in the “Marshall Plan” should begin creating a Nordic customs union. However, differences between the countries did not allow them to implement either this or any of subsequent attempts to create such a customs union. This gave impetus to the search for other ways of the “Nordic cooperation”.

In the late 1940s, Sweden was experiencing a rapid industrial rise and faced labor shortages. Other Nordic countries had problems with employment. As a result, steps were taken towards a more rational use of labor resources at the level of the Nordic region and towards formation of a common labor market. In 1951, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden concluded a convention that allowed their citizens to be employed in any of the Nordic countries without prior permission from the authorities, and agreed to facilitate moving of citizens from one country to another. In 1954 they created a regional free market for labor, and in 1957 they completed the design of a passport union. In the second half of the 1970s the passport and visa regime and customs checking were abolished for the citizens of the Nordic countries at border crossings. Icelandjoineditin 1982, FaroeIslands – in 1992.

In order to increase labor mobility within the region the Nordic countries took a series of synchronous measures in social policy and social legislation. In accordance with the Convention on Social Security, approved in 1955, citizens of these countries received the same rights, privileges and responsibilities regarding the size of the basic pension, old-age pensions, unemployment, disability, occupational injuries and sick leave, as well as additional payments when moving from one Nordic country to another. They were given an opportunity to enjoy the same social benefits as nationals of the host country.

The first steps in the field of subregional integration in the North of Europe were aimed at ensuring establishment of a general labor market, which were accompanied by adoption of a series of laws and administrative measures aimed at improving mobility and ensuring social rights of migratory workers. The labor market became a vast sphere of common interests of the Nordic countries, which became one of the key areas of their subsequent integration efforts. In the course of its creation, harmonization of legislation became the most important issue, which later evolved into one of the skeletons of the Nordic integration.

Unification of legislation of the Nordic countries began in the 19th century and reached a high level even before the start of integration processes between them. At that moment they had unified legislation on the activities of banks, in the field of property, commercial and civil law, as well as in the field of insurance, property possession, etc. The authors of the book “Scandinavia between East and West”, published in 1950 in the US, noted that “there are far more similarities between the laws of the Nordic countries, than, for example, between the laws of New York and Florida states” (10, p.109). The Northern Commission on cooperation in the field of law continued those efforts.

Within the framework of EFTA, which Denmark, Norway and Sweden joined in 1959 (Finland joined in 1961 and Iceland in 1970), the Nordic countries managed to reduce customs duties and abolish quantitative restrictions in mutual trade in industrial goods. The share of inter-Scandinavian trade, that previously had been 5-6% of the total value of foreign trade in the Nordic countries, significantly increased in the mid-1960s. The import share reached 19.2%, while the share of exports totaled 22.5%. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Scandinavian countries occupied the first place in trade with each other. Their share reached 87.7% of EFTA imports and 63.5% of EFTA exports (11, p.268). Trade between the countries in the region became a significant factor in their development and an another sphere of their common interests.

Despite the differences in the national security doctrines, the Nordic countries continued foreign policy cooperation also in the postwar period. Periodic meetings of the Prime Ministers, regular meetings of foreign ministers and representatives of the countries of the region to the United Nations Organization, permanent official contacts among the foreign ministries at the ambassadorial level and direct personal contacts among Heads of their divisions and departments, weekly meetings of Heads of delegations and daily meetings of delegates and representatives of the Nordic countries in the committees at the sessions of the UN General Assembly became common practice.

At the plenary sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1956 to the beginning of the 1970s, they voted together on international issues in more than 80% of cases. Introduction within EFTA of a duty of 15% on imports of processed goods by Britain in October 1964 had caused solidarity actions the Nordic countries that achieved its abolition in November 1966. At the talks in the “Kennedy Round” (end of 1966 – spring 1967) the Nordic countries, acting jointly, managed to get concessions from the EEC on reductions of tariffs for their trade (11, pp.272-273). Thus, the small Nordic countries received strong indications of the effectiveness of their foreign policy cooperation in ensuring common interests.

After weighing the priorities of their further development, the Nordic countries, while in EFTA, made a strategic choice in favor of regional integration and signed the Cooperation Agreement between Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (“the Helsinki Agreement”) on March 23, 1962, in Helsinki. It became the legal basis document for their further cooperation and a “road map” of their integration efforts (12). This document with account of later amendments is still valid to this day.

Embarking on the path towards integration, the Nordic countries were certainly not striving to unite into a single state, and did not aim at creating a single internal market. Their integration model is initially aimed at strengthening mutually beneficial foreign-policy cooperation of small sovereign and independent states, which, by means that are inherent in integration processes in the economic sphere, purposefully and pragmatically strengthen and extend old areas and create new areas of common or identical interests. This allows to build close and long-term cooperation on the international arena on a firm and constantly expanding basis of fundamental interests of socio-economic development, rather than on a shaky basis of temporary political arrangements and agreements and short-term, transient and situational factors.

A natural outcome of such an integration model is an influential community of states that preserve complete freedom in their economic and political decisions. The ability of such a community to effectively promote and protect common interests on the international arena is constantly growing with a simultaneous increase in the political weight of this community in the world. For a group of small countries such interaction becomes an essential element of national security and independence of each of them. On issues where their positions and interests diverge, they operate as separate and independent sovereign states.

In the Helsinki Agreement the Nordic countries defined top-priority areas of common or similar interests, for further expansion of which they decided to use their integration efforts. This document identified further measures for support and development of a common market of labor. In the sphere of legal cooperation they pledged to facilitate acquisition of citizenship of one Nordic state by nationals of another Nordic state, to seek to achieve maximum uniformity of legislation in the field of private law, as well as rules relating to criminal offenses and punishment. It recorded, in particular, an agreement to provide opportunities to investigate and prosecute crimes, committed in one of the countries in the region, in the other Nordic countries and enforce decisions of courts and other authorities of all states in the region on their territories. These provisions are intended, among other things, to ensure proper compliance with legislation by migrating citizens of Nordic countries.

The “road map” of regional integration includes a wide range of pragmatic measures of cultural interaction, which aims at preventing painful political, economic, social and cultural problems of integration of migrant workers from the other Nordic countries into the social and cultural environment of the recipient countries. It was decided to include in the curricula of Nordic schools studying of language, culture and social conditions of the other states in the region, and to provide an opportunity for students to study and take exams in the other Nordic countries.

The Nordic countries jointly fund committees of the Nordic cooperation in the field of primary, secondary and higher education, as well as adult education, regional programs of mobility for students and university teachers, pupils and school teachers. Their school and university curricula, textbooks and examination systems are standardized. Studying the languages of neighboring peoples is coordinated by the Secretariat of the northern languages and literature courses on the northern languages.

The Nordic countries have decided to ensure mutual recognition of diplomas at all levels of education, to coordinate employment services of the Nordic countries, harmonize qualification requirements for professions and work for the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in all countries of the region. They also agreed to work closely in the field of adult education, to unify the application of national provisions relating to workers’ health, occupational safety, and to develop further exchanges between the countries in the field of literature, painting, music, theater, cinema and other cultural industries. The Nordic Culture Fund, founded in 1966, funds cultural projects within the region. There have been set up and in operation also numerous joint organizations of the Nordic countries in the field of culture and media.

As a result, citizens of the Nordic countries have a privileged position on their labor markets compared to citizens of other EU member states. Article 2 of the Helsinki Agreement contains a provision that “in the development of laws and regulations in any of the Nordic countries, citizens of all the other Nordic countries receive the same rights as citizens of this country”. Moreover, this provision should be applied “to all spheres of jurisdiction affected by the Agreement on cooperation”. In other words, citizens of the other Nordic countries shall not be considered as foreign labor on the labor market of each of these countries.

Having started integration processes with creating a common labor market and providing measures to promote their mobility, the Nordic countries have agreed to extend integration onto other areas. In the area of economic cooperation, they decided to hold consultations on economic policy issues, coordinate the measures they take regarding the impact of external factors on the economic cycle, to provide freedom of movement of capital among countries in the region, stressing that joint decisions in this area should ensure common interests of the Nordic countries in the field of payments and currency, and adhere to the division of labor among countries in matters of production and capital investment, as well as create favorable conditions for direct cooperation between the companies of two or more Nordic countries in these areas.

While regularizing the relations with the European Union, each of the Nordic countries was addressing possible consequences of their decisions for the Nordic cooperation. Supporters of the “People’s Movement against the EEC”, that was founded in 1971, were speaking, for example, of the need to strengthen the Nordic cooperation along with protection of the Danish national identity (6, p.517).

Denmark’s entry into the EEC in 1973 and the subsequent conclusion by the other Nordic countries of agreements with the EEC on the duty-free trade of manufactured goods helped to keep the trading mode, which existed among the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA. Denmark’s membership in the EEC did not cause any specific problems for the Nordic cooperation until the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Its implementation was threatening to cause irreparable damage for the “Nordic cooperation”.

As a consequence, the Danish referendum on the accession of Denmark to the European Union gave a negative result. Ultimately Denmark joined the EU, but on special conditions, and the rest of the EU member states were forced to accept them (6, p.550). Special conditions for joining the EU in the future were also specified by Sweden. One of such conditions was smooth continuation of the “Nordic cooperation” (8, pp.77-79).

As part of the integration efforts the Nordic states began to work closely together in the field of scientific research and coordination of the use of allocated resources with the greatest efficiency, including establishment of joint structures and institutions to combine their academic potentials and financial capabilities.

The Nordic countries conduct numerous joint research projects, coordinate national science and technological programs. The main driving force in this area are joint academic institutions ensuring high standards of research, that are difficult to achieve at the national level. Among them are the Northern Academy of Innovation Research, Northern Institute for Theoretical Physics, Nordic Council for Arctic Medicine Studies, Northern Research and Production Program on Biotechnology, Nordic Volcanological Institute, Northern Arctic Program of Humanitarian Studies and others.

The scope of their integration efforts includes further cancellation of trade barriers among the Nordic countries, coordination of their technical and administrative customs regulations, simplification of customs procedures, development of transport communications and trans-border trade, joint economic development in adjacent areas of two or more Nordic countries, joint efforts to ensure their interests in international trade.

An important area of the Nordic integration, defined by the Helsinki Agreement, was the Nordic cooperation in the field of transport and communications, as well as environment. The Nordic countries hold mandatory consultations for construction of transport and communication networks, which involve two or more Nordic countries, and coordinate efforts to improve road safety. Border passport control has been simplified.

Countries in the region take into account environmental interests of the other Nordic countries on an equal basis with their own interests both in the legislative process and in the practical application of the laws. They harmonize rules for the protection of the environment, agree on standards and define criteria for pollution, coordinate activities aimed at flora and fauna conservation.

Important areas of agreed integration measures also include official statistics, health and medicine, production of alcoholic beverages, mutual recognition of licensing procedures or certification in the field of medical, technical and other security controls, coordination on issues of child and youth policy.

Given the characteristics of the Nordic integration model, special attention is paid to strengthening of the cooperation at the European and international level, designed to provide “opportunities for joint extraction of benefits for citizens and companies of the Nordic countries”. The governments of these countries are held responsible for ensuring mutual interests and values as it is specified by the Helsinki Agreement. Various government authorities of the region can directly communicate regarding issues that do not fall under the exclusive competence of their external relations. They coordinate activities to provide assistance to developing countries, jointly distribute information about the Nordic countries and Nordic cooperation, and provide support for Northern European citizens by diplomatic missions.

The Nordic integration is characterized by pragmatism and focus on solving specific problems. Implementation of the reached agreements dictated by long-term strategic interests of the Nordic states, allows to strengthen their cooperation in international affairs by constantly expanding the range of their common essential interests. As a consequence, the nature, structure, functions and powers of international bodies of the Nordic cooperation significantly differ from those existing in the EU.

The “Nordic cooperation” is performed in the framework of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, at the meetings of Heads of governments, by specialized authorities of the Nordic countries and by special cooperation bodies.

One of the fundamental principles of the “Nordic cooperation” is active participation of the public in discussions and decision-making in this area. Practical implementation of this principle is the Nordic Council established in 1952. It was determined in the Helsinki Agreement as an “elected public assembly of the Nordic countries” and a form of cooperation of their governments. Its Charter has been adopted by each Nordic country as an internal act which has the force of law. This body is not endowed with legislative functions. It is authorized to investigate the main components of the Nordic cooperation, to adopt recommendations, prepare research reports and other documents. The members of the Nordic Council may make inquiries to the governments or to the Nordic Council of Ministers on the issues of the “Nordic cooperation”.

The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) is a body of cooperation among governments. It is responsible for the interaction between them and the Nordic Council on the issues relating to their joint actions. It takes decisions aimed at implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement and the other agreements among the Nordic countries. The overall coordination of the Nordic cooperation rests with Prime Ministers. They are assisted in this by the Ministers responsible for this cooperation, and the Heads of state and government secretariats, that are members of permanent national committees of the Nordic cooperation.

The Chairman of the NCM is responsible for the coordination of the Nordic cooperation and initiatives for related matters. His or her decisions are taken unanimously and are binding. In the case of making decisions on issues requiring parliamentary approval, they will not take effect until the approval of the relevant national parliament. The NCM reports annually to the Nordic Council on the problems and prospects of the Nordic cooperation. At the same time, the Prime Minister of the presiding country shall submit a special report on cooperation among the governments of the Nordic countries regarding European and international affairs.

In other words, effective management of integration processes in Northern Europe are ensured by the northern cooperation bodies not endowed with any exclusive powers, special competences or so-called “supra-national” functions. These are not necessary as unanimous decisions of the Nordic Council of Ministers are binding and enforceable for the Nordic countries.

As a result of the consistent implementation of the Nordic integration model there is constant strengthening of the Nordic cooperation on international issues and convergence of their positions on many international issues. All the five Nordic countries have become members of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Arctic Council. They all participate in the activities of the “Northern Dimension”, despite the fact that some of them are not directly related to some of the regions listed here.

Before Finland and Sweden joined Denmark as members of the EU in 1995, Iceland and Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992. Its terms provided maintenance of the conditions for further practical realization of the integration model for all of the Nordic countries, along with participation in free movement of goods, services, capital and persons across borders with EU member states and joining the Schengen area (3, pp.126-127).

Denmark and Sweden stipulated for themselves special conditions for participation in the EU and Norway and Iceland did the same for the EEA. These conditions provide opportunities for further development of the “Nordic cooperation.” An important step in this direction was concluding of an agreement among the Nordic countries on cooperation in the field of defense (NORDEFCO) on 4 November 2009. This marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of their interaction on international issues and was a direct consequence of the deepening of the Nordic integration. In the EU framework they included clauses regarding their participation in the common EU policy on security and defense.

Integration scenarios for the Eurasian economic union

Integration processes in the post-Soviet space should develop with due regard to the characteristics of the participating countries and specific tasks, which they intend to solve by means of integration. Already at an early stage there should be formulated overall strategic and intermediate goals that member states intend to achieve with the use of integration mechanisms. Depending on the nature of these goals specific mechanisms for achieving them should be identified, as well as the specific role of integration levers, adapted to the economic, political, social and other conditions of the existing economic space.

General wordings of very vague objectives of the EAEU purposes, such as strengthening and modernization of the economies of member states, their convergence, increase of their competitiveness in the global markets, direct integration processes at servicing some of the current needs and improving of the existing situation according to the formula “movement is all, the ultimate goal is nothing”, rather than at achieving more or less distinct strategic objectives.

Such an approach allows little for conscious, focused and consistent creation of long-term legislative, economic, political, social and other conditions that would provide close interaction, interpenetration and fusion of economies of the countries entering the path of integration, as it does not contain any motivation that is crucial for them.

Orientation of the EAEU member states in their integration efforts on the experience of the EU, including institutional experience, would mean that they intend to build on the territory of the former Soviet Union the same single internal market, aimed at serving the needs and creating the best opportunities for extraction of benefits of the most competitive economies and companies of the member states and the EU. For most post-Soviet states, economic conditions of which have not yet recovered and have not acquired the necessary level of development and competitiveness, a rigid imposition of such rules could have a devastating effect on domestic manufacturers and economic independence as it happens with the economies of the East European EU member states. There are serious doubts that exactly this objective is optimal for integration processes in the post-Soviet space because of the large differences between the CIS and the EU as well as among post-Soviet states.

An institutional model of integration reproducing the one in the EU may also be unattractive for them as it envisages delegating of a part of sovereign powers of the member states to some supranational international executive authorities. For many post-Soviet states, that only recently gained their independence and sovereignty, an idea of a new superstate in the future is unattractive, and practical steps in this direction are considered counter-productive. There are also serious doubts that such a development will meet the fundamental interests of Russia and its companies, because overcoming of social and economic underdevelopment in these countries will be largely their duty.

It is obvious that the member states of integration processes in the post-Soviet space and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should identify those areas of common or similar interests that they would like to form with integration mechanisms, and, relating to them, identify specific tools for their practical implementation. Taking into consideration differences among post-Soviet states, discussions on common or similar interests of states and possible areas of their integration efforts can be performed both among all the participants of integration processes, and between different groups of states with regard to their economic specialization. Without this, they are doomed to copy existing integration models, which is currently the case.

It is advisable in this context to determine which of the following is preferable for Russia and other members of the EAEU: (a) creation of a single internal market of the EU-type, or (b) promotion of division of labor between the member countries and development of specialized production industries with the help of selective integration measures in each of the countries, or (c) purposeful formation of areas of common economic, social and other interests of the members states of the EAEU in order to strengthen the foundations of their close cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, security and defense policy, or, finally, (d) flexible combination of these measures with the account of development specifics of each of the post-Soviet states and the whole former Soviet Union. The general philosophic idea of the integration model of the Nordic countries and its individual elements can represent for Russia and other post-Soviet members of the EAEU a certain conceptual and practical interest.

When selecting areas of application of integration mechanisms one should pay attention primarily to those areas that, being inherited from the Soviet past, still remain essential for the economy. This could include, for example, infrastructure links among post-Soviet states. Further development and deepening of such links in the present circumstances with the use of integration mechanisms could be of mutual benefit and could contribute to the formation of common interests in this area.

Efforts related to regulation of labor markets in the post-Soviet space and its social and cultural reinforcements could be of paramount importance for application of integration measures, taking in to account the fact that the dynamics of the demographic situation in various countries of the CIS significantly differs. Cooperation in the field of educational and cultural policy, focused on servicing current and future needs of the labor force market and scientific and technical cooperation, could also become a program of long-term integration efforts of member states of the EAEU.

A specific feature of the new independent post-Soviet states is their continued breakaway from a single legal system of the Soviet Union. Therefore, cooperation in the field of law among them as a whole is unlikely to be successful. It should be selective and primarily related to the areas of interaction that will be identified as priority objects of their integration efforts.

Obviously, one can offer a lot of other areas to coordinate integration efforts in the post-Soviet space both with account of its specificity and experience of other integration groups. However in order to do this, it is necessary to determine what integration model and what strategic objectives potential participants would like to implement. The impression is that this is not completely clear yet.

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KARI MYKLEBOST

SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW

UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ

VLADISLAV GOLDIN

PROFESSOR, NORTHERN (ARCTIC)

FEDERAL UNIVERSITY

The University of Tromse is the northernmost in the world. Arkhangelsk is located a little bit to the south. Both regions maintain long-standing relationship. Long distance from capital cities and location on remote borders of national markets encouraged “direct ties” mostly between Russian traders and fishermen from northern Norway.

A specific language even emerged – Russenorsk. In Soviet times the ties were disrupted and resumed only in the end of the 1980s. Episodic contacts between Norwegian and Russian historians became regular at the time. Kari Myklebost and Vladislav Goldin told Amber Bridge how academic cooperation is developing

Arkhangelsk was closed for foreigners when a Norwegian delegation arrived to attend a regular conference on Scandinavia. How did cooperation between Russian and Norwegian historians develop?

Cooperation between Arkhangelsk historians and Norwegian colleagues began on August 10, 1986 when the Pauline yacht docked at the Red wharf of Arkhangelsk with a group of historians and museum staff from northern Norway. The yacht sailed along the same route as Pomor vessels used to. To allow entry to the closed port of Arkhangelsk a special permission had to be obtained from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Historian and Director of then Arkhangelsk Pedagogical Institute and later the head of the Lomonosov Pomor Institute Vladimir Bulatov contributed a lot to the development of Russian-Norwegian academic relationship.

The first collection of articles headlined Historic Ties of the Russian North with Norway (devoted to the bicentenary of the town of Varde) came out in 1989 while The Arkhangelsk Pedagogical Institute hosted the XI Pan-Soviet conference to study Scandinavian countries and Finland in which Norwegian scholars participated.

A cooperation agreement between the Pomor University and the University of Tromse promoted the holding in November 1992 of the scientific conference Norwegian-Russian Relations in 1814-1917. At the same time in Tromse a special issue of the Otar museum magazine came out under the title Norway and Russia in the North with articles by Arkhangelsk and Norwegian colleagues. Later Norwegian historians arrived in Arkhangelsk to present their publication Pomor. Gyldendal Norsk Forlag,

1992 in the local university. It was devoted to relations between northern Norway and northern Russia and edited by University of Tromse Professor Einar Niemi. Russian-Norwegian relations were broadly represented in the first volume of Pomor Encyclopedia (History of Arkhangelsk north) which came out in Arkhangelsk in 2001.

The Arkhangelsk school of Scandinavian and Nordic research developed in close cooperation with Norwegian historians and leading Russian research centers, including The General History Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences headed by Academician Alexander Chubaryan and the Center for History of Northern Europe and Baltic Region under the leadership of Alexey Komarov. In close contact with the institute the Pomor University in Arkhangelsk held the XIV and XVI conferences on Scandinavian countries and Finland in 2001 and 2008. Alexander Chubaryan jointly with Norwegian Professor Olav Riste were initiators and co-chairs of the editorial board of the fundamental documentary Russian-Norwegian publication Soviet-Norwegian Relations in 1917-1955 which was a sample model of such publications.

The Kirkenes Declaration on cooperation in the Barents Sea will marked the 20th anniversary in January 2013. How did cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region promote academic ties?

Myklebost. The emergence of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region created a completely new atmosphere and trans-border contacts in the north. The BEAR ideology worked to revive and expand international ties of four countries in the northwestern corner of Europe. It is implemented both in the cultural-economic and regional-administrative aspects. Academic cooperation is clearly on the rise. In 1990-2000 historians from the University of Tromse cooperated with colleagues in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk in a series of research and publication projects and student exchanges. Other faculties and desks of the University of Tromse were also involved.

Major allocations have been provided for that since 1993 by the BEAR Secretariat in Kirkenes, the Norwegian foreign ministry and other national institutions. The main ground for cooperation was the declared will to develop trans-border contacts.

Research by historians helped form the region not only as a functional one due to political and business interests, but also as a historic based on millennium-long good relations between Norway and Russia and century-old traditions of Norwegian-Pomor trade.

In June 1993 Arkhangelsk hosted the first international scientific conference devoted to BEAR development prospects – Barents Sea Region: Cooperation in Education and Science. A chartered Tu-134 aircraft brought a big Norwegian delegation from Tromse to Arkhangelsk. It included representatives of science, education, and politicians. During the visit Foreign Ministers of Norway and Russia Johan Jorgen and Andrei Kozyrev opened on the basis of the Pomor University a Norwegian- Pomor Center which played a major role in the development of relations between the two countries. The Barents-Center information office was later opened.

In 1993 after the BEAR creation I made my first two trips to the University of Tromse. Two important projects were initiated at the time. The first one resulted in the publication in Archangelsk (in 1996 in Norwegian and in 1997 in Russian language) of a collection of articles by Russian and Norwegian historians Fears and Expectations. Russia and Norway in the XX Century. Its authors and editors were Jens Peter Nilsen and me. Also in 1993 a conference in Tromse initiated an international scientific project of northern universities in Barents Sea region called State, Religion, Ethnos in the North. 700-1990.

In 2001 when I was deputy director for scientific work in the Pomor University I began to publish an international historic and archive and public-political Barents-Journal (founded by the Pomor University and the University of Tromse with the support of BEAR Secretariat). The magazine was a place to discuss historic and modern problems in BEAR, including Russian-Norwegian relations. Besides, Vladimir Bulatov co-authored with head of the Barents information center Andrei Shalev a manual Barents Euro-Atlantic Region and Arkhangelsk Region: International Cooperation and Barents Euro-Atlantic Region: History and Modern Times. The Pomor University has created successfully operating research centers, such as the Center for comparative religious and ethno-semiotic studies of the peoples of the Barents Sea, the Training Center Ethnocultural and Humanitarian Geography of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic, the Center for traditional culture of the European North, the Gender Research Center, the Scientific and Education Center for fundamental problems of the history of cooperation and rivalry in the Arctic.

Research and publishing activities intensify as jubilees approach. They include the centenary of independence of the Kingdom of Norway (which the Russian Empire was the first to recognize) and the bicentennial of Napoleonic wars which resulted in major changes in Northern Europe. The bicentennial of the Norwegian Constitution is not far off.

First and foremost, it is necessary to remember the cultural-historic exhibition Russia-Norway. Through Centuries and Borders which was devoted to the centenary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Norway. Arkhangelsk historians participated in the project. A catalogue of the same name was prepared for publication with 500 pages explaining the main historic and modern problems in Russian-Norwegian relations.

The project was initiated by the Norwegian foreign ministry and the ministry of culture and mass communications of Russia. The exhibition was prepared for five years. We had to select, restore and receive a big number of exhibits from museums and other organizations of Norway and Russia. The e x h i b i t i o n opened in 2004 in the Folk Museum in Oslo. In 2005 it moved to the Ethnographic Museum in St. Petersburg. Exhibits demonstrated the history of versatile m i l l e n n i u m – long relations between Norway and Russia and what was more important the rapidly developing relations of the past 25 years. The project resulted in new initiatives – seminars, publications, and exchange of exhibitions. The exhibition and the catalogue undoubtedly promoted a better understanding of historic relations between Norway and Russia.

The positive experience is used today to prepare two-volume publication devoted to Russian-Norwegian relations which is to come out by the bicentennial of the Kingdom of Norway in 2014. The project was initiated in 2007 and called Asymmetric Neighborhood. Norway and Russia in 1914- 2014. In September 2008 at the XVI conference to study Scandinavian countries Arkhangelsk held a detailed discussion of the concept and contents of the first volume. In June 2012 the authors met again in Oslo.

The project involves close to 25 Norwegian and Russian scholars. They studied various dimensions of relations between the two countries in the past two centuries. The richly illustrated two volumes will tell the reader about interstate relations and people-to-people contacts. The publication will contribute to festive events in 2014. Until now there has been no full-fledged research of Norwegian-Russian relations in the last two centuries. The historic work will be useful not only for academic circles but for all Norwegians and Russians participating in bilateral cooperation. It pays specific attention to northern areas which is only natural as Norwegian-Russian relations were most intensive there both in history and nowadays.

The Asymmetric Neighborhood concept has two complementing and intercrossing perspectives. The first and most clear one is the role of Russia as a great power in contrast to the role of Norway as a small country which was the decisive factor for Norwegian choice of the security vector. If we move from interstate relations to civil society the picture will be quite the opposite: Russia was weak while Norway for historic reasons had a stronger grass-root organization of society and a more even distribution of social benefits.

In the XIX century the Norwegian-Russian border was the only place where Russia directly contacted Western Europe. During the Cold War it was the only place where the Soviet Union directly contacted a European NATO country without any buffer zone. The main intercrossing question is why long-term Norwegian-Russian stability could exist despite the double asymmetry?

The research also provides another guideline for reciprocal perceptions of each other. Russia as a great power bordering on Norway in the north played a major role in the development of Norwegian nation in the XIX century, but mostly a negative role. In Russia perceptions of the small country of Norway were peripheral in public discussion although we know that in some liberal circles of Russia Norway was considered a vibrant democracy which could serve as an example. In the second half of the XIX century the Finnmark province was considered to be an example to follow for the north on the Russian side of the border. After the Bolshevik revolution the wind changed and many Norwegians began to consider Soviet socialism as an example for Norway.

The project was headed by the history and religion faculty of the University of Tromse in Norway. It involved scholars from the institutes in Oslo, Bergen, Kirkenes, Moscow, St.Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and Petrozavodsk. The project thus balanced the central and regional perspectives. The Universities of Tromse and Arkhangelsk are the regional institutions of the North, while the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo and the General History Institute in Moscow are central organizations.

The main aim of the project was to raise awareness about the significance of the historic past for the development of modern relations between Norway and Russia. Besides the two-volume publication the project is implemented also in several specialized publications. We have already published two collections of articles: Norway and Russia in the Arctic and Cautiousness and Benevolence. Russian-Norwegian Diplomatic Relations in 1814-2014.

In May 2012 the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund and the Norwegian Research  Council signed an agreement. Which cooperation prospects does it open?

As a researcher and expert of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (RGNF) I can say the experience of such international projects stipulates joint academic activity. I hope research, publishing and other projects of Russian authors and joint projects with Norwegians colleagues would emerge and enjoy support of the RGNF. They will be devoted to the history and modern times of Norway, Russian-Norwegian relations, and the Barents Sea region. I can only welcome them.

The Norwegian side enthusiastically welcomed the agreement as it will simplify the launch of projects in which both parties participate on an equal basis. On behalf of my colleagues and me I can say that historic research is a tiresome process which demands long-term perspective. It takes much time to get access to foreign archives. It concerns both Norwegian scholars working in Russia and Russian scientists in Norwegian archives. The reciprocal research of sources is very fruitful. Detailed knowledge of Russian history helps Russian researchers find documents in Norwegian archives and systemize them in the correct context which helps evaluate their significance.

In recent years several collections on Norwegian-Russian relations came out, for example, the above mentioned book Soviet-Norwegian Relations in 1917-1955. New

collections are being prepared. The publications are of a vital importance for future research. They simplify access to primary sources of information about relations between Norway and Russia. It is necessary to implement the agreement on cooperation of archives. We hope the agreement between RGNF and the Norwegian Research Council will promote such initiatives.

In 2015 the town of Jinan will host a new world congress of historians. In September the assembly of the International committee for history science discussed its program in Budapest. Kari Myklebost represented Norwegian historians at the assembly. Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region are often called exemplary regions of the world. Can we hope North European historians and their works will be as convincing?

The University of Tromse works to deepen cooperation of North European historians, as well as historians from the Barents Sea area. The University plans to develop relations with the University in Umea (Sweden) and Arkhangelsk (Russia) and also establish contacts with institutes in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Murmansk and cities in Sweden and Finland. Thus, our University hopes to implement an ambitious plan of expanded research of the North in the North. Various faculties of the University of Tromse are designing a master plan of multi-faceted research of northern regions. An important part is to lecture history of northern regions.

Historians from the Barents Sea region have a common professional interest and so far we have only touched some archive materials of mutual interest. It gives hope for future academic cooperation. The same concerns the positive experience of the Asymmetric Neighborhood.

The last question is about personal creative plans.

There are over ten books in the plan, as well as a series of articles some of which are close to completion. The issues are different: history of Russia and international relations in the XX century, Russian military abroad, science studies. The conference held in Arkhangelsk in October completed the major international project which I headed – 1917-1922 in the Fate of Russia and the World.

The mentioned conference in Arkhangelsk created the Association of Russian Civil War Researchers and I was elected its chairman which adds duties, as well as the work in the Academic Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on social reform, movements and revolutions in which I head the northwestern section. In the Asymmetric Neighborhood project I am in the editorial group that prepares the two-volume publication which is also a major responsibility.

In Asymmetric Neighborhood we progressed to the final stage of preparation – the manuscript will be submitted to the publishing house. Some project participants are engaged in a new and more specialized project – on academic relations of northern countries, including Finland with Russia and the Soviet Union in the past two centuries. The working name of the project is Science History in Extreme North. In involves historians from Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. We are currently in the embryo state and are looking for financing.

The joint record of academic cooperation, specifically in Arctic research of the XIX and XX centuries, is one of the topics of Asymmetric Neighborhood. Work with archives revealed that much has to be researched yet. In Scandinavia and Russia Arctic research was a national business and in the time of the Cold War it was also a secret national security guideline. Available literature offers numerous descriptions of rivalry between states in Arctic research and expeditions which enjoyed general respect.

However it is only a part of the general picture. Review of personal archives of distinguished Arctic researchers, such as Fridtjof Nansen, Harald Ulrik Sverdrup, Leonid Breitfus, and Vladimir Vise demonstrate a variety of personal approaches regardless of ethnic or national origin. There is no doubt that distinguished Arctic researchers from Norway, Russia and the Soviet Union believed in late XIX century up to the 1930s that they worked for the benefit of the science rather than national interests. Fridtjof Nansen corresponded with many Russian colleagues and exchanged experience and scientific data with them, provided and received advice and even logistical support in planning expeditions. The same relations existed between Arctic researchers of Sweden, Finland, and Russia. It is a part of Polar research which has not been paid sufficient attention so far as it demands the knowledge of languages and an understanding of the essence of Polar research during work in archives. Nansen, Breitfus and their contemporaries corresponded in various languages (English, German, French, Russian) on very specialized issues.

In the framework of the Science History in Extreme North project we discovered a multi-language network of historians who are keen in the history of Polar research. We hope to find financing. We want to describe cooperation history in natural sciences and in the sphere of culture, including transnational research of the Saami culture and border population of Fennoscandia and the Russian North.

Relations between Russian and Norwegian historians developed very favorably in the past twenty years. The main results of the cooperation are, firstly, the volume of archive documents Soviet- Norwegian Relations in 1917-1955 which triggered a major response. Secondly, it is a big cultural-historic exhibition Russia- Norway – Through Centuries and Borders and its unique catalogue. Cooperation with the Institute of History and Religion of the University of Tromse and the Institute of Defense Studies in Oslo is hard to overestimate. Thirdly, I want to recall the conference on Afghanistan organized by the Norwegian Nobel Committee in which Russians, Norwegians, and Americans participated. They all lay a solid basis for future Russian-Norwegian cooperation which forms a major part of our cooperation with countries of Northern Europe.

Academician

Alexander Chubaryan