Mezhevich Nikolay Maratovich — Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor of the School of International Relations, Head of the International Master’s Program “Baltic and Nordic Studies” at the Saint-Petersburg State University, Chief Researcher at the Institute of the Problems of the Regional Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Saint-Petersburg.

Sazanovich Liudmila Sergeevna — PhD student of School of International Relations Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg. 

 

Currently, many researchers have noted that the European Union is in crisis. Obviously, at this stage, the original conception of the founders of the EU is no longer relevant: the rapid expansion of the borders, European integration, causing internal political and economic problems, security problems and many other undermine the stability of the Union. The aim of the article is an attempt to analyze the negative factors, influencing the development of the EU, as well as to suggest possible scenarios of its further development. The relevance of this study lies mainly in the fact that it combines the study of political, economic, social and security aspects. To achieve the objectives of the study one has chosen a systematic approach to the study of international relations. It is important to note that for further successful development and existence of the EU it is necessary to resort action in the present time, primarily to stabilize relations with Russia.

 

The European Union is going through a difficult time. Trying to forestall instability on its borders, it becomes a source of turbulence. Less flexible and slower, the EU is increasing the apparatus of bureaucratic pressure, trying to silence the growing dissatisfaction. As if caught in the trap of “bad infinity”, the European Union can not find a solution to internal and external problems, growing like a snowball.

The famous British historian Eric Hobsbawm, with reason, “cut” the twentieth century by 23 years. From his opinion, it began in 1914 with World War I and ended in 1991 after the collapse of USSR.¹ This approach is debatable but understandable. The significance of both 1914 and 1991 for the European, and world history is obvious.

The beginning of the European integration is now described in the textbooks – The Schuman Declaration, who on May 9, 1950, being the French Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time , addressed the Government of Germany with a proposal to create a French-German Coal and Steel Community. The importance of the Schuman Declaration rapidly emerged beyond the bilateral relations between France and Germany. The concept of “general framework of economic development, which would be the first step towards the European federation” had such potential that it was enough for the rest of the policies and practices of the European Economic Community – the European Union up to the end of the XX century. Approaches of Schuman – Monnet were simple but revolutionary at that time. Overcoming the old tradition of nationalism by creating a united Europe on the principles of democracy, economic prosperity and social consensus, peace and equal cooperation, the architects of the EU hoped for a long and successful life of the European project in the XX century. The twentieth century of European integration began in 1950 and ended in the early years of the new century.

It seemed that new XXI century of European integration began in advance with the conclusion of the Treaty on European Union, which was signed on February 7, 1992 in the Dutch city of Maastricht and entered into force on 1 November 1993, but this period turned to be surprisingly short. Beneath our eyes, in summer 2015 the European integration project suffered tardy resuscitation and … died. It died in the proper sense of the word: the EU died in the form in which it had been planned by Schumann and Monnet. However, the death of the integration project in the post-shumann model does not mean the collapse of the great European idea, and does not necessarily lead to the collapse of the whole Europe. Europe has been and will be, but it will be different. The current model has as much in common with great European ideas as the ideas of utopian socialists in France and UK with the North Korean practice. Why?

The EU Treaty proclaimed as the key objective the creation of Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the single European currency, which could potentially bring economic integration to a new level. However, at the same time it launched a campaign of large-scale expansion of the European Union. In 1993-2007 the number of EU members doubled. Only the entry of Finland, Sweden and Austria may be regarded as a simple quantitative increase. Extensions in 2004 and 2007 significantly worsened the economic performance of the EU. At the same time Greece, Portugal and Spain faced the problem of financial equilibrium. “Because of the scale of the expansion the European Union faced the problem of “assimilation” and therefore became more focused on its own challenges”.² A new class of euro wanderers-bureaucrats, even without reading M. Djilas and M. Voslensky, formed precisely in line with their expectations, but not on the Yugoslavian or Soviet base, but in the heart of Europe: Brussels, Strasbourg, Frankfurt am Main, Mons. For them progress on the European career was more important than issues of national economy and analysis of the integration problems. We are seeing the result: the process of European integration has created a supranational bureaucratic monster that subjugated not only local government circles, but also the idea of ​​integration itself. Now the result has gone to the second plan, the most important things are process, operation, reproduction, “sealed” in a closed-loop circulation of bureaucracy.

The more time passes from 2004, the more evidence there is that it was the end of the first era of European integration and the beginning of the second. The first, in fact, was the Western European and successful, the second, with a certain degree of conventionality can be called eastern European and its success is a big question. EU-12 (as of 1995 EU-15) and EU-27 are qualitatively different integration associations. Despite the validity of the new strategic program of expansion and deepening of integration, adopted in the early 1990s, the scale of the consequences of this decision and qualitative changes in the EU were not interpreted as they deserved. They were underestimated, probably for the reason that the political “summit” of EU member states, predominated complete confidence in the value of the European project and the ultimate success.

EU, really achieved a high level of cohesion, could have begun the optimization of achieved, but instead became interested in the policy of expansion, the neighborhood and so on. It had excessively bloated ambitions and virtually no funds for large-scale geopolitical projects, and certainly no adequate political analysis. The fact that the Baltic States were appointed as the major European “progressors” in the framework of “Eastern Partnership” did not require any additional comments. Based on the logic “if the system works, why it should be changed”, they wanted to integrate Ukraine in the same way as Estonia. However, local Ukrainian specificity was not taken into account.

And there is specificity. The economic potential of the Soviet Ukraine was second only to four big European countries. But today’s GDP of Kharkov region, for example, is more than Estonia’s GDP (of course, the earned part, not what is sent from Brussels).

Awareness of the problems in assessing the validity of reality happens in Europe after a long delay. The quote from the analytical report of the Affairs Committee of the House of Lords: “EU and Russia: before and after the Ukrainian crisis” (2015): “The Committee believes that the European Union and therefore Britain are guilty, that they have entered into this crisis, without being aware of what is happening, like a sleepwalker. Lack of strong analytical resources, both in the UK and the EU, in fact has led to a catastrophic misunderstanding of climate on the eve of the crisis”.³

However, the main problem is not the analysis, but that the West, considering itself a global center, strives to new peripheral space, even, in fact, without its sole purpose – to find new markets for its products, to ensure the influx of cheap labour and access to other resources. Along the way, it solves the problem of preserving the attractiveness of the EU as an integration project – it is important in terms of intra-European political process, so it uses any means. Thus, the problem lies not only in adequate quality of evaluation of integration. An ambitious program of “Eastern Partnership”, which implies a de facto extension of the EU’s borders to the Caspian Sea, is not only dead, but did everything to ruin the whole working model of European integration. “The fear and anger of the fathers of EU diplomacy, that Russia is once again becoming too powerful and rich, and therefore dangerous for Europe, led to a fatal error: “Eastern Partnership” from the original project of European integration of post-Soviet space, has become a platform for attempts of political and economic isolation of Russia. It eventually provoked an acute crisis in Ukraine. So current problems of the EU are to a large extent the work of its own hands.⁴

Problems of European integration are evident today not only to Europeans, but also for the whole world. The former model of European economic and political integration has exhausted itself. Based on modern Greek history, Aeschylus, Aristophanes and Euripides could have created decent work – a comedy, a tragedy and a drama. What looked like a triumph of the EU, caused mixed consequences and obvious failures, and the expansion speed to the new frontiers of European integration seemed to be haste. Of course, the external factor – global financial crisis – has played a huge role in the current misadventures of EU: “Strategies, built on ideas from the past, including problem-solving through the manipulation of competitive exchange rates, are failing”.⁵

However, the first difficulties arose prior to the crisis, and the root of this “emergency” state of the EU should be found inside it. United Europe is developing much slower than the global economy. In 2015 and in the coming years, the economy of European macro-region will be in a very difficult situation. Europe cannot respond quickly to the changes. Despite the diversity of the structures of European economies, the industrial sector in Europe in the whole is stagnant, so the potential for a return to a sustainable growth is limited. Although the EU remains a key industrial entity, since 2008 the industry cut 3 million jobs, while industrial production fell by 10%.⁶ At the end of 2014 the total economy of the 18 countries using euro, rose only by 0.9%.⁷

In 2015, economic recovery of the European Union will be even more uncertain. The weakness of demand is a chronic disease. Germany will remain the driving force of the European economy, but it will not have such power, as two years ago. In France, economic growth will be around 0.7%. Italy must overcome the remains of the crisis, but the euro zone as a whole is unlikely to reach more than 1% growth and will not significantly change the official unemployment rate, which now stands at 11.7%.⁸

The head of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi stated, that in 2015 the European Union can face the threat of deflation and the risk to maintain low rates of economic growth, but the term “crisis”, according to him, does not currently fit to describe the situation in the economies of eurozone.⁹ It was said in January, when all economic parameters were approximately the same as in June. So now, in autumn 2015, is it also not a “crisis”? According to forecasts, recently published by IMF, the growth rates in 2015-2016 in the EU will not exceed 1.5-1.6% (assuming that the crisis in relations with Greece will be settled). In the developed world as a whole, they will increase from the current 1.8% to 2.4%.¹⁰ Thus, if the situation in the global economy is not ideal, the European is just bad. And M. Draghi’s comment about “no crisis” in this sense, is comparable only to that of the known expression of the hanged and the rope.

Constraining factors also lie outside the economy – in political and socio-cultural spheres. Historical memory, cultural heritage of Antiquity and Christianity, suffered by Europe losses in two world wars influenced the formation of European values ​​to a large extent. It should be noted again: it is not a crisis of the European idea, it is a crisis of specific practice of its implementation in the political sphere. Not the dip of the European Constitution led to the growth of euroscepticism, but euroscepticism, based on an understanding of the ineffectiveness of post-Maastricht model of EU led to the failure of the European Constitution. Errors in internal and external relations, economic failures, consequences of arrogant decisions taken on the basis of geopolitical, “value” and not pragmatic reasons: “The EU from a sample of reasonable foreseeability became, in fact, one of the most obvious sources of global uncertainty”.¹¹ Therefore the destruction of the current model of European integration is inevitable.

The report of Notre Europe, dedicated to the restructuring of the EU-USA relationship, written in 2010, noted: “In the absence of a common foreign policy on major strategic issues, the EU is unable to influence events beyond its borders”.¹²  Among the authors of the diagnosis are P. Prodi, G.Verhofstadt, Buzek, Y. Fisher and others. Now, in autumn 2015, it should be clarified, if the EU is able to set the agenda in its borders.

At present time there is a discussion about the so-called “realistic European force”, partly written with the American approach to “smart power”. As in the American case, we are talking about a combination of “hard” and “soft security”. However, it is not difficult to notice fundamental differences of the European prerequisite from US realities. Important, however, is not adequate theory, but realistic practice. “American leadership after the Cold War and NATO’s eastward expansion hoped that the Old World would be able to solve at least its own problems, but time after time it turns out – whether Balkans, Middle East, or single currency – that Europe is not in a position to do it”.¹³ But could it be otherwise?

In Europe there can be no effective «hard security». Is it possible to build an independent foreign policy based on borrowed security from overseas? One should recall the article of the American political scientist Robert Kagan “Power and Weakness,” published in 2002.¹⁴ His idea is the following: the US created hothouse conditions for the European Union. America carries on its shoulders the burden of responsibility, and the EU is engaged in chatter and mutual persuasion. Counting on the law, it actually mired in complacency and conformism. Personal and social status of R. Kagan obliges us to be attentive to his estimates.

Patterns of American neocons, unfortunately, are demanded by the European Union. Robert Cooper, director general of the Department for External and Politico-Military Affairs of the Council of the EU, said: “NATO and the US’ military presence in Europe  gave confidence that the US would protect them from the Soviet Union. (…) NATO summed everyone to voluntary dependence on the military power of the United States. NATO managed to establish a system of collective security in the best sense of the word – security requirement, which for centuries separated Europe, now has united it. So it’s how the European Union appeared.¹⁵  He calls NATO as the defense against chaos as the key element of “post-balanced” Euro-Atlantic security system (after the reunification of Germany, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union). “And the most logical way to end the chaos is the colonization”.¹⁶ Economic toolkit of the EU is derived from military might of NATO forces, controlled by the United States and stationed in Europe. Not Coal and Steel Union, but namely NATO is the backbone of the modern European Union. This is another symptom, confirming not only inevitable death of the European project in the current form¹⁷, but also the impossibility of joining the Eurasian and European projects in modern conditions.

Membership in the European Union is no longer the final aim of integration aspirations of a country to the West, but only an intermediate step on its way to the main goal – NATO membership. The signing by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova Association Agreements with the European Union was presented as a purely economic event, but in fact turned out to be one of the hidden ways of NATO expansion: the retraction of the countries in the military-political cooperation with NATO is formally done through rapprochement with the EU.¹⁸

This circumstance is one of the main obstacles to expand the process of economic cooperation between Russia and the EU at full – in this tango, apparently, there would be the third party for long. This third is the United States, and through it – NATO.

The assessment of the impact of NATO in the system of foreign policy-making in Europe should be based on the principle of actually used three keys, each of which is sufficient to achieve a decisive influence on the foreign policy of a European state. The first key is direct control over the foreign policy of the state. It works in case of a country within the block, and in relations with formally neutral states outside NATO but participating in affiliate programs of the Alliance. The second key is control through the structure of the NATO. The third key is cooperation through the coordination structures of the European Union focused on foreign policy and defense decisions. The combination of these keys provides the US and NATO control over not only military, but also economic projects in Europe.

One should note the contradiction of political and economic goals of the United States towards Europe. In economic terms, Europe would be consistent with Canada’s status and the nature of economic growth in Europe in such case would depend on the United States to the same extent as it is happening in contemporary Canada. However, from the standpoint of policy, the United States  complies with the rules of the game last few decades: Europe pretends it has foreign policy and the US continues to manage it.

The United States, who has been perceiving Europe only as junior partner for a long time, doesn’t have any illusions about the real situation in the EU. As an example, one can refer to a publication in the prestigious American edition «Foreign policy», where the author proves the existence of five problems of the European Union: 1) excessive expansion; 2) collapse of the Soviet empire; 3) euro crisis; 4) deterioration of the situation in the region; 5) sustainable nationalism.¹⁹

Of course, let’s not overlook the fact that the vectors of geopolitical interests of the leading states of the EU are often different.  German policy in the Balkans, French in Africa, do not “overlap” with the policies of other European centers of power. In other cases, the apparent intersection could be noted. A classic example is Ukrainian conflict. Plus in the European Union there are neutral (or trying to be) states: Italy, Austria, Finland, and partly Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, for example. Their voices are quite significant. And a number of new Member States rightly regard foreign policy initiatives of “old” Europe as a threat to subsidies in the address of the European budget.

However, it doesn’t affect general line against Russia and its integration initiatives (other than the “integration of integration” and it is worth recalling the idea of D. Medvedev of a common Euro-Atlantic security system, so categorically rejected by the West). During 2014, EU leaders have repeatedly said they would not change its policy with regard to Russia, instead they planned to change the foreign policy of Russia, even if it affected the economy of Eastern Europe.

In this context, economic suicide of the Baltic states is significant: countries, loudly demanded to “punish Russia,” are suffering now from the sanction war most of all (turnover of the port of Tallinn, “dipped” by 20.7% in the first half of 2015, compared with the same period last year. There are growing problems in Riga and Ventspils. Export to Russia is continuously reducing, Russian tourists are leaving the market of the Baltic states).

Various tools to “punish Russia” can certainly aggravate the efficient development of our country. However, one should keep in mind the warning of two senior experts, recently officials of US State Department: “So far, the West was more aimed at punishing Russia and its leaders … than at solving the problems in the relationship, which brought the parties to a dead end”.²⁰ The practice of realization of the “Eastern Partnership” by West expected work on a well-known principle of “Me – head, you – fool”. Minsk, Yerevan, Baku didn’t agree with this approach. Finally Kiev, put by the European Union in a situation of “either with us or against us”, has been forced to postpone the issue of European integration until 2016. This practice meets huge resistance in Chisinau and Tbilisi. Symptomatic detail: according to the US National Democratic Institute in May 2015 about a third of Georgians supported integration into the Eurasian Union (31%)²¹, in August 2014 the figure was 20%, and in November 2013 – 11 %.

What are the possible scenarios of European integration? The choice is not rich.

1. The destruction of the current model of European integration. The unification of Europe, at least in its current form, cannot give a synergistic effect and is not able to bring it to a new level of global influence, relevant to the existing potential. Economic policy of the EU is a problem which has no practical solutions. Its current model is operating at full capacity.

2. “Cosmetic” repair of the current model of European integration. Reform of European integration, understood as a limitation of spatial expansion, rejection of the expansion of the eurozone at any cost, removing the UK “outside European integration”, establishment of effective cooperation with all economic partners and, above all, with Russia are the minimum key points of the reform today.

 

List of References:

1. Hobsbaum E. Epoha krajnostej: Korotkij dvadtcatyj vek (1914—1991). M.: Izdatelstvo Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 2004. 632 s.
2. Hirdman S. Rol Rossii v Evrope // Moskovskij centr Karnegi. M, 2006. – s.19.
3. See more: The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine / House of Lords, European Union Committee. 6th Report of Session 2014–2015. London, February 2015. URL: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf
4. Urbanovich Ia. Voinstvennye strahi Vostochnoj Evropy. 03.04.2015. URL: http://ria.ru/analytics/20150403/1056439589.html
5. Dixon H. How to counter Europe’s rising populism // International New York Times, November 24, 2014. – P. 22.
6. Alvaru Santush Pereira, Hose Manuel Soria, Korrado Passera, Arno Montebur, Philipp Resler Novaia industrial`naia politika Evropy // «Ekspert», №7 (839), February, 18 2013.
7. Manukov S. Hermaniia podtianula evropejskuiu ekonomiku / «Expert Online», February, 14 2015. URL: http://expert.ru/2015/02/14/ne-vse-tak-ploho/
8. Evropa 2015: god neuverennosti http://euroua.com/europe/eu/3557-evropa-2015 02.01.15
9. Dragi: ekonomiku ES zhdet zatiazhnoj period slabosti. January, 2 2015. URL: http://dv.ee/novosti/2015/01/02/dragi-jekonomiku-es-zhdet-zatjazhnoj-period-slabosti
10. Jean-Pierre Robin. Le FMI estime l’Europe en voie de guerison // Le Figaro, 15 avril 2015. – p.23.
11. Lukjanov F. Oborotnaia storona Gretcii / Rossijskaia gazeta. July, 8 2015. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2015/07/07/kolonka.html July, 8 2015.
12. Reshaping EU-US Relations: a Concept Paper. Reflection Group: Romano Prodi, Guy Verhofstadt (co-chairs), Jerzy Buzek, Etienne Davignon, Jacques Delors, Joschka Fischer, Paavo Lipponen, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa / Notre Europe, 2010. – p. 12.
13. Lukjanov F.A. Stabilnost radi vyzhivaniia // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. July, 13 2015. URL: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Stabilnost-radi-vyzhivaniya-17579.
14. Kagan R. Power and Weakness // Policy Review, № 113, 2002.
15. Cooper R. The European Union and the Habsburg Monarchy // Transit. Europaische Review, 10.12.2012. URL: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-12-10-cooper-en.html
16. See more: Cooper R. The breaking of nations: order and chaos in the twenty-first century. New York, 2003.
17. See more: http://www.format-a3.ru/events/event-212/
18. Ukraina, Gruziia, Moldaviia: put v NATO cherez Evropejskij soiuz. K sammitu NATO v Uelse September, 4-5 2014 goda. Analiticheskij obzor / Centr mezhdunarodnoj zhurnalistiki i issledovanij «Rossiia Segodnia». 2014 g. 74 s.
19. Stephen M. Walt, Does Europe Have a Future? // Foreign Policy. July 16, 2015. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/16/does-europe-have-a-future-stephen-walt-testimony-house-foreign-affairs-committee/
20. Charap S., Shapiro D. Kak izbezhat novoj holodnoj vojny // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. October, 14 2014. URL: www.globalaffairs.ru/ukraine_crysis/Kak-izbezhat-novoi-kholodnoi-voiny-17041
21. Za ES – 68%, NATO – 65%, Evrazijskij Soiuz – 31% – rezultaty oprosa NDI. 11.05.2015. URL: http://www.apsny.ge/2015/soc/1431371449.php\

List of literature:

1. HobsbaumE. Epohakrajnostej: Korotkijdvadtcatyjvek (1914—1991). M.: Izdatelstvo Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 2004. 632 s.
2. Hirdman S. Rol Rossii v Evrope // Moskovskij centr Karnegi. M, 2006. – s.19.
3. See more: The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine / House of Lords, European Union Committee. 6th Report of Session 2014–2015. London, February 2015. URL: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf
4. Urbanovich Ia. Voinstvennye strahi Vostochnoj Evropy. 03.04.2015. URL: http://ria.ru/analytics/20150403/1056439589.html
5. Dixon H. How to counter Europe’s rising populism // International New York Times, November 24, 2014. – P. 22.
6. Alvaru Santush Pereira, Hose Manuel Soria, Korrado Passera, Arno Montebur, Philipp Resler Novaia industrial`naia politika Evropy // «Ekspert», №7 (839), February, 18 2013.
7. Manukov S. Hermaniia podtianula evropejskuiu ekonomiku / «Expert Online», February, 14 2015. URL: http://expert.ru/2015/02/14/ne-vse-tak-ploho/
8. Evropa 2015: god neuverennosti http://euroua.com/europe/eu/3557-evropa-2015 02.01.15
9. Dragi: ekonomiku ES zhdet zatiazhnoj period slabosti. January, 2 2015. URL: http://dv.ee/novosti/2015/01/02/dragi-jekonomiku-es-zhdet-zatjazhnoj-period-slabosti
10. Jean-Pierre Robin. Le FMI estime l’Europe en voie de guerison // Le Figaro, 15 avril 2015. – p.23.
11. Lukjanov F. Oborotnaia storona Gretcii / Rossijskaia gazeta. July, 8 2015. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2015/07/07/kolonka.html July, 8 2015.
12. Reshaping EU-US Relations: a Concept Paper. Reflection Group: Romano Prodi, Guy Verhofstadt (co-chairs), Jerzy Buzek, Etienne Davignon, Jacques Delors, Joschka Fischer, Paavo Lipponen, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa / Notre Europe, 2010. – p. 12.
13. Lukjanov F.A. Stabilnost radi vyzhivaniia // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. July, 13 2015. URL: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Stabilnost-radi-vyzhivaniya-17579.
14. Kagan R. Power and Weakness // Policy Review, № 113, 2002.
15. Cooper R. The European Union and the Habsburg Monarchy // Transit. Europaische Review, 10.12.2012. URL: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2012-12-10-cooper-en.html
16. See more: Cooper R. The breaking of nations: order and chaos in the twenty-first century. New York, 2003.
17. See more: http://www.format-a3.ru/events/event-212/
18. Ukraina, Gruziia, Moldaviia: put v NATO cherez Evropejskij soiuz. K sammitu NATO v Uelse September, 4-5 2014 goda. Analiticheskij obzor / Centr mezhdunarodnoj zhurnalistiki i issledovanij «Rossiia Segodnia». 2014 g. 74 s.
19. Stephen M. Walt, Does Europe Have a Future? // Foreign Policy. July 16, 2015. URL: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/16/does-europe-have-a-future-stephen-walt-testimony-house-foreign-affairs-committee/
20. Charap S., Shapiro D. Kak izbezhat novoj holodnoj vojny // Rossiia v globalnoj politike. October, 14 2014. URL: www.globalaffairs.ru/ukraine_crysis/Kak-izbezhat-novoi-kholodnoi-voiny-17041
21. Za ES – 68%, NATO – 65%, Evrazijskij Soiuz – 31% – rezultaty oprosa NDI. 11.05.2015. URL: http://www.apsny.ge/2015/soc/1431371449.php\

Vyatkin Kirill Sergeyevich — Ph.D., Amber Bridge Fund, Head of the Berlin office. 

Recently Germany has been more clearly indicating growing interest towards the Arctic region. It is determined by a number of political and economic processes in the modern world, occurring against lack of study of the dynamics of climate changes on the planet. The article analyzes the most important factors specifying the interests of Germany in the Arctic; it examines the potential opportunities and a set of tools at the disposal of German policy to achieve its goals; it assesses the nature and degree of involvement of Germany in the process of international cooperation in the Arctic area. Special attention is given to forecasts of further development of Germany in the Arctic project, including international development.

 

As it is known, Germany is among the countries that do not have direct access to the coast of the Arctic Ocean and, therefore, does not have legal rights to the independent development of the Arctic shelf. Its location is not close to the Arctic Circle and doesn’t have sovereign territories in the Arctic[1].

However, in November 2013, Federal Republic of Germany adopted a document entitled “Guidelines for German policy in the Arctic” [4], which largely explains the renewed interest of Germany to the region.

ARCTIC “MAGNIT” OR GERMAN INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC

First of all, like most other countries outside the region, the Arctic attracts Germany with its immense hydrocarbon reserves. According to some foreign estimates (which, however, generally refer to the US Geological Survey data [6]), it may contain about a quarter of undiscovered deposits of hydrocarbons in the world. While the proportion of the Arctic in global oil resources is relatively small (less than 7 percent), the amount of gas resources is considered to be much more significant – about 25 percent or more[2].

As an alternative to nuclear power (and the trip of the last reactor is scheduled to 2022) Germany today is focusing on priority development of the so-called “renewable” energy sources – solar, wind, biological and so on. So far, however, even optimistic adherents of “green energy” provide long-term forecasts. So it seems clear that in the short and medium term Germany is likely to increase the consumption of traditional energy resources – oil, gas and coal. Therefore no wonder that the Arctic hydrocarbon reserves and the ways of its transportation are in the center of attention of political Berlin.

Secondly, the Arctic region possesses (again, mostly presumably) considerable reserves of rare metals, minerals, ores and other raw materials of strategic importance. This category, in particular, includes estimated deposit apatite, nickel, cobalt, copper, tungsten, titanium, chromium, manganese, platinum group metals, tin, mercury, gold, silver, diamond and so on. An important feature of a number of known nickel deposits is integrated ore composition, allowing – in the presence of appropriate technology, that Germany has – simultaneously remove additional amount of copper, platinum group of metals, gold, silver, selenium and tellurium. It dramatically increases the value of the ore, despite the high cost of extraction and production in the Arctic Circle [1, Volume 1, p. 126].

Thirdly, the Arctic attracts Germany, as well as other European countries, with its biological resources. The Arctic Ocean is the habitat to more than four hundred unique species of fish and animals. It is home of important species for European fisheries, namely, herring, cod, salmon, flatfish and others.

Fourthly, the Arctic is the area of ​​emerging international transport corridors. In case positive forecasts are right (what happens sometimes), one can expect a lot of new opportunities for further development. When it comes to sea routes, one obviously means the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs near the Arctic coast of Russia, and the so-called Northwest Passage, located along the northern coast of Canada. Assuming the continuation of melting ice NSR is likely to become a major transport artery of world importance that will significantly reduce the shipping routes between Europe and Asia-Pacific region[3].

Finally, fifthly, Germany, and many other countries of the world are concerned about global climate change, which is believed to have a direct impact on the environment, economic activities, public health. That is why the monitoring of the climatic situation in the Arctic is of primary importance for the scientific community of Germany. For these purposes the country has already created and successfully launched a number of institutions involved in research in polar regions, including environmental monitoring in the Arctic and Antarctica.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The mechanism of the formation and implementation of the Arctic policy in Germany is quite efficient. Traditionally, the main coordinating role in this important political direction is done by the Office of the Federal Chancellor. Four departments – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education and Research and Ministry of Economy and Energy are responsible for practical implementation of the basic provisions of the above-mentioned political strategy.

The lead operator for the preparation and conduct of research studies in various regions, including the Arctic region, is the Federal Agency for Geosciences and Mineral Resources (BGR), which is subordinated to the Ministry of Economy and Energy.

One of the main activities of the agency in the Arctic is the study of geodynamic processes in the coastal regions of the Arctic water areas. In this regard, since 1992 the agency has been implementing a multi-year international program CASE (Circum-Arctic Structural Events) [7]. During the reporting period over 15 major research (with a focus on geological and geophysical surveys) expeditions to Svalbard, northern Greenland, the Canadian Arctic and polar regions of Siberia were organized within the program[4].

Since all lands in the Arctic area (ie located to the north of the 66th latitude), as well as adjacent offshore areas are under the territorial sovereignty of well-known five states – members of the Arctic Council, German authorities strictly and consistently adhere to the principle of prior consultation with the countries concerning their programs of scientific and practical studies, which are usually held on the terms of cooperation.

Thus, BGR works on Svalbard are conducted in cooperation with the Norwegian Polar Institute. With respect to Greenland, which is under the sovereignty of Denmark, BGR cooperates with the Geological Service of Greenland in Copenhagen. Project in Canada is implemented within a multi-year program of scientific and technical cooperation (WTZ) between two countries. The main partners from the Canadian side are the Geological Service of Canada and the University of Laval / Quebec. The partners of BGR in the Urals in the frame of the same program[5]are institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow and Syktyvkar (Komi Republic).

“Siberian” part of the project is a priority for BGR. Among its most important exploratory tasks in the Arctic region, in particular, are:

-              a range of issues related to the possible continental extension and access mid-ocean ridge of the Arctic Ocean on the mainland of Siberia;

-              potential of Laptev Sea bed in terms of mineral (especially hydrocarbon) resources;

-              potential of polar Urals in terms of chromite and platinum group elements[6];

-              the phenomenon of permafrost and its resource potential; dynamics in this sector and its impact on the processes of climate change on the planet[7].

Thus, in 2001-2003 in the framework of the aforementioned program for scientific and technical cooperation (WTZ) with Russian Federation BGR implemented the project PURE (Polar Urals Expedition), by carrying out three geological expeditions to polar Urals. Long-awaited expedition to New Siberian islands[8] organized in 2011 as part of the program CASE-13 was considered a great success of BGR. The first phase associated with marine geophysical work in Laptev Sea, was finished in the mid-1990s (in cooperation with Murmansk Institute Sevmorneftegeofizika).

The next stage (project CASE-3, 1998), aimed at carrying out complementary geological studies on land, ended in a relative failure. It is essential that the year of default was not the best for polar research in Russia. Extremely unfavorable weather conditions in that year, huge problems in logistics, supply and financial support caused the premature cessation of work.

The subsequent adjustment of the political and economic course of our country, fundamental change in approach towards the Arctic allowed to provide favorable conditions for mutually beneficial international cooperation. The result of intensive and fruitful cooperation between BGR and a number of Russian institutions (the main partner – A.P. Karpinsky Russian Geological Research Institute in St. Petersburg) was the success of obtaining unique scientific data during the international expedition CASE-13 in 2011. Scientists not only from Russia and Germany, but also from France, Britain, Italy and Sweden took part in that project.

Starting from 2015 German Ministry for Education and Research is implementing the third framework program “Research for Sustainable Development» (FONA-3). The Arctic region is one of the key regions of the studies held in the framework of this program. Annually the Ministry allocates an average of about 20 million euros to support research projects in the Arctic. In general, Germany invests around 200 million euros per year in polar and marine research [8].

Among the research institutions of Germany dealing with Arctic issues, the main is undoubtedly Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (AWI), located in the north of Germany in Bremerhaven town. The Institute is one of 18 major research centers united in the Helmholtz Society. It has about 780 employees, including 450 scientists, employed on a permanent basis, what means a lot for the German standards. The annual budget of the institute amounts to 60 million euros. 90% of the funding comes from the Ministry of Education and Research.

AWI Institute has three departments:

-              Research Center in Potsdam

-              Biological Institute Helgoland[9]

-              Wadden Seastation Sylt [10]

In 1992 in accordance with the recommendations of the Scientific Council of the federal government, a research unit of the Institute AWI was opened in Potsdam in order to preserve the practices and scientific potential of the former GDR in geophysics and polar research. Today its main activities are focused on geophysical surveys in regions of permafrost, as well as experimental studies of atmospheric processes in the polar regions (primarily in areas of permafrost in Siberia and Svalbard). Scientists from “climate science»[11] department explore physical and chemical processes in the system “ocean – ice – atmosphere” and its importance for the development of the global climate. Working groups are engaged in studies of regional and large-scale circulation system and physical and chemical processes in the atmosphere. Current research in this area covers various topics, including influence of clouds and sea ice in the energy exchange between the ocean and the atmosphere, circulation of water masses in polar regions, study of natural climate change and modeling of atmospheric circulation in the Arctic.

A distinctive feature of the Research Center in Potsdam is a close scientific and practical cooperation with the university centers in Brandenburg state, and a number of other federal states. Well-organized system of scientific exchange and cooperation with partners in the universities of Berlin (Technical, Free, Humboldt), Potsdam (University of Brandenburg), Erlangen (Bavaria), Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel (Schleswig-Holstein), Trier (North Rhine-Westphalia) is designed to stimulate the flow of new knowledge and to ensure continuity, including personnel, in the area of ​​polar research.

The Research Center is focused also on two research areas – «Earth Science» and «Biological sciences». Within «Earth Science» scientists reconstruct changes that have taken place in the past. Scientists from Bremerhaven, Potsdam and Sylt study the effect of occurring earlier processes on the climate development. They study the structure of oceanic sediments, surface deposits, polar ice caps. In particular, they analyze composition and distribution of marine sediments, material and energy flows in areas of permafrost and changes in the structure of the crust and polar ice sheets.

«Biological sciences» (which is the main focus of research scientists from Biological Institute Helgoland) cover environmental, physiological and ecotoxicological issues. Particular attention is paid to the study of processes in offshore and coastal zone of the North Sea. Research subjects include reaction of cells, organisms, populations and communities to external influence and organization and dynamics of populations, communities and ecosystems.

Scientists from AWI Institute often conduct research in the high seas or directly in the ice of Arctic and Antarctica. They have stations AWIPEV[12]  (Svalbard, 79 ° N) and “Samoylovsky” (island Samoylovsky in the delta of the Lena River, 72 ° N).

As of 1998 island Samoylovsky locates a base for field research. In 2013 it was completely renovated to become a modern well-equipped Arctic research station. Initially the main organizers were AWI Institute from German side and Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute of Roshydromet (at the federal level) and Melnikov Permafrost Institute of the Siberian Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences (at regional level) from Russian side. Currently the station is on the balance of the Institute of Petroleum-Gas Geology and Geophysics of the Siberian Branch of the RAS (Novosibirsk) and is a part of the Arctic Centre, specially created in the institute. It should be emphasized that the whole station was built and equipped with Russian assets, the German side only finances the work of their representatives.

«Experimental Station on island Samoylovsky» is one of three projects (two others – «Global change in the seas of Eurasian Arctic shelf: frontal zones and polynyas in the Laptev Sea» and «Otto Schmidt Laboratory for Polar and Marine Research (OSHL)»), which are part of a large-scale Russian-German program «Laptev Sea System». In turn, the project «Laptev Sea System» is a branch of the Russian-German program «Trans-system of the Arctic Ocean» (Transdrift) and can rightly be regarded as «longevity» and one of the most successful ventures in the history of Russian-German joint research in high latitudes of Arctic.

In addition, Institute AWI incorporates year-round functioning German station Neumayer-3 (71 ° S) as well as Kohnen Station (75 ° S) and laboratory Dallman (68 ° S) in Antarctica. The stations in Arctic and Antarctic carry out meteorological and geophysical measurements all year round.

The main mobile research platform is icebreaker «Polarstern» («Polar Star», in fact being the only icebreaker in Germany)[13]. At the same time it carries out a close international cooperation – about a quarter of the members of the expedition on «Polarstern» are traditionally foreign researchers. In addition, the Institute operates five research vessels to work in temperate latitudes, and two polar aircrafts Polar 5 and Polar 6.

In addition to fundamental and applied scientific research institute AWI also provides coordination and advisory services. Particular attention is paid to biological monitoring, science and technology, infrastructure and logistics support for polar research in Germany, as well as advising the Government of Germany.

In April 2015 a delegation of German politicians and scientists led by the Minister for Education and Research Johanna Vank visited Svalbard. The program of the visit included a visit of a number of German and international research centers.

One of the aims of the visit was a visit to the Norwegian settlement of Ny-Alesund, which is the world’s most northern permanent public settlement. Here is located the world’s most northern permanent civil research station. Researchers from Norway (who has administrative control over then territory), Germany, France and China permanently work there. On a temporary basis the station is visited by scientists from Italy, Britain, Netherlands and Japan. In addition, the politicians got acquainted with the activities of the research station of the Institute AWI, which now operates in a joint German-French-format (AWIPEV).

In general we can say that polar research in Germany is based on an extensive network of public and private institutions that coordinate financial, scientific and practical activities in this area. Ministry of Economy and Energy and Ministry of Education and Research provide primarily institutional support. In addition, Ministry of Education and Research conducts targeted support of research projects in the Arctic.

Since the beginning of the 1990s the German Research Foundation (DFG)[14]actively supports polar research. In 1992 the Presidium of the company established the Special Committee SCAR / IASC (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research / International Arctic Science Committee), whose tasks include planning and coordination of scientific and practical activities of German universities and university centers with institute AWI and relevant government departments in the field of polar research. Currently, with the support of DFG on the basis of a number of German universities functions an interdisciplinary program of comparative research in Antarctica and Arctic (in 2012 the program has been extended until 2018).

Some more specialized projects for the Arctic are conducted with the participation of the institutions of Max Planck Society, Leibniz Association. Finally, the most important instrument in terms of interdisciplinary coordination and cooperation is the German Society of Polar Research (DGP) that brings together representatives of various scientific disciplines.

POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Obviously, in the foreseeable future Germany will continue the policy of further strengthening of “indirect voting rights” in its Arctic affairs, primarily relying on their undoubted achievements in the field of research and scientific practice. With good expertise in qualified scientific works, as well as solid financial, technical and technological potential for further development, Germany intends to use expert assessments to influence political decision-making, relating to the Arctic.

In this regard, Germany, for example, appreciates the opportunities for cooperation in the framework of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). Secretariat of the Committee is based in the branch of the Institute AWI in Potsdam, and the Executive Secretary of it is the authoritative German expert on Arctic F. Rahold. IASC members are national scientific organizations. Germany is represented by the aforementioned German Research Foundation DFG.

Executive Director of the International Association on permafrost (IPA) is held by a German (an employee of the Institute AWI K. Schollen). At the same time, Germany has been active in the European Polar Board (European Polar Board). As a division of the European Science Foundation (European Science Foundation, ESF), it is an important platform for the coordination of polar research between interested countries – EU members. The German experience in the field of polar research has formed the basis of the relevant areas within the next 8-th EU program for research, covering the period 2014-2020.[15]

The specificity of the German Arctic strategy lies in the emphasis on the environmental consequences of industrial development in the Arctic. If desired, one can discern the intention of the international community to form a negative attitude towards any attempt to operate Arctic resources without the use of special “green” technologies. In an effort to ensure high standards of environmental safety as international standards, Berlin, obviously is trying to secure for its own (and European) companies more favorable conditions for the promotion to the Arctic.

At the same time it should be noted, that Germany is quite realistic regarding its competitive opportunities in several areas. For example, Germany so far has only one relatively large oil and gas company operating on an international scale – Wintershall. Concerning the Arctic, its strategic focus is the development of offshore fields in Norway.

However, the company has been recently gradually consolidating its position as one of the largest producers of gas on the Norwegian continental shelf. A subsidiary of the BASF concern has successfully established itself as an integrated enterprise in the field of exploration and production. One of the backgrounds of its growth is its rich portfolio of licenses. Wintershall is one of the largest license holders on the Norwegian continental shelf: it has about 50 licenses, over half of which endows it with the rights of the operator works. Most recently, in January 2015, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of Norway issued the company 8 new licenses, giving great prospects. Yet it must be acknowledged that the scope of its activities is not up to a level comparable with world known giants of oil and gas industry.

Obviously, in the foreseeable future Germany will stop its Arctic ambitions by concentrating on production of renewable resources (fish and seafood) as well as on the exploitation of the Northern Sea Route[16]. In this regard, it would be appropriate to recall that Germany has the largest fleet of containerships in the world, therefore it should be interested in the development of new transport communications. Besides, it is an additional opportunity for the development of the national shipbuilding industry. Thus, in December 2012, the Federal Agency of Sea and River Transport of Russia and the German company «Nordic Yards» signed a state contract for the construction of two multipurpose salvage vessels with capacity of 7 MW, designed to work in the Russian Arctic. The total amount of orders amounted to 150 mln Eur. The ships were transferred to the Russian side in time and became part of its fleet at the beginning of the year[17].

Germany is likely to leave the development of the access to the region’s energy resources to its partners – Norway and Russia. Berlin is satisfied with the role of the distributor of Russian raw materials on the world market.

Most of German experts are rather skeptic regarding the thesis that the “Arctic is growing potential conflict,” and that predicted by some researchers conflicts in the Arctic will be conflicts over access to hydrocarbon resources. [2] The extent of the reserves in the region, mostly widespread in pseudo-scientific circles, is greatly exaggerated. German experts (in particular, from BGR) are more careful about such estimations. According to them, data on stocks, which are now provided by different sources, are very approximate – primarily due to poor knowledge of the region. For the time being it’s mostly forecasts. Proved reserves are significantly low[18].

It is also noted that in order to assess the potential for conflict in the northern polar regions it is important, that almost all estimated hydrocarbon reserves of the Arctic are concentrated in the exclusive economic zones of coastal States, ie within their undisputed jurisdiction. The central part of the Arctic Ocean, which could theoretically meet claims of coastal states over the continental shelf, is of little promise in search for hydrocarbon resources[19].

In other words, there is simply no reason for the emergence of a new «arms race» in the region[20]. It is significant that the participants of the last annual Security Conference in Munich (February 2015) did not discuss the current situation and its development in the Arctic – apparently due to lack of reasonable forecast expectations for the foreseeable future acute conflict situations in the region.

It entirely corresponds to the estimates from defense authorities of Germany. For example, published in July 2014 analytical study «Climate Change and Security in the Arctic after 2014″ prepared by planning department of Bundeswehr concludes that a widespread and military interstate conflict in the Far North is unlikely to happen. Even in the context of the ongoing melting of ice the Arctic will remain quite stable region for Germany, having nevertheless increasing economic and environmental value. In light of this, German security policy will primarily face the task of a comprehensive and long-term-oriented monitoring of the situation in the region [3, S.24]. For the process to be monitored and analysed one can attribute, for example, political dynamics associated with the autonomy of Greenland (which, in turn, could lead to the transformation of the «Arctic» status of Denmark), or increased political activity in the Arctic Council of «observers» among Asian countries (mainly China and Japan).

Sharing the opinion of the majority of Russian, Norwegian, Canadian experts, German experts say that today the military are able to fully ensure the safety and protection for civilian use such a wayward region as Arctic. However, they note that there is currently no need for additional support of Arctic forces of German partners in NATO with forces and means of Bundeswehr. Improving capacity and operational capabilities of German armed forces in Arctic is neither today nor in foreseeable future a priority of the development [3, S.25].

 

 

List of References

1. Аrkticheskij region: problemy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva. Khrestomatiya v 3-х tt. Izdatelstvo RSMD. М., 2013.
2. Corinna Röver, Katrin Ridder-Strolis, «Nachhaltigkeit in der Arktis: Prämissen, Probleme und Potentiale». Länderberichte der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Oktober 2014.
3. Klimawandel und Sicherheit in der Arktis nach 2014. Hat die friedliche und kooperative internationale Arktispolitik eine langfristige Zukunft? Planungsamt der Bundeswehr, Dezernat Zukunftsanalyse. Juli 2014.
4. Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik. Verantwortung übernehmen, Chancen nutzen. Auswärtiges Amt, November 2013.
5. Nichtstaatliche Konflikte in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Planungsamt der Bundeswehr, Dezernat Zukunftsanalyse. Future Study 2012.
6. United States Geological Survey. URL: http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.VWRhOEa8xip
7. Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe. URL: http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Polarforschung/Arktis/Expeditionen/expeditionen_node.html

Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung. URL: http://www.bmbf.de/de/26677.php

 

[1] Perhaps Svalbard archipelago may be a specific exception, the territory of which is under sovereignty of Norway. Since 1925 Germany is a party to the Paris Treaty on Spitsbergen of 1920, which provides that parties equal rights to exploit natural resources of Svalbard and its territorial waters

[2]See f.e.: http://polpred.com/?ns=1&ns_id=1159650&searchtext= or

http://www.zeit.de/wissen/2015-05/arktis-klimawandel-erderwaermung-eisschmelze-rohstoffe

 

[3] With a relatively favorable ice and weather conditions taking NSR from the German Hamburg to Japanese Yokohama could make only about 6,600 nautical miles, while through Suez Canal – 11 400 miles. Accordingly, the transportation time of cargo could be reduced to 40%. [5,S.26].

[4] Indeed, regions (and hence organizations) of United States are not present in this list.

[5] It is based on an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (WTZ), which was signed by Germany and Soviet Union in 1987, subsequently was subject to repeated amendments and additions, in particular, during German-Russian intergovernmental consultations in July 2009.

[6] This area is of particular interest to Russia because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it lost access to the largest in the USSR deposits of chrome ore in Kazakhstan.

[7] In this case, the Germans seem to be “engaged” in a very promising process. The fact is that as long as the Americans are developing shale gas, the world begins to develop a much more substantial reserves of “blue fuel”, which, in compressed form – so-called gas hydrates – are stored in the permafrost on the seabed and on land. According to the Russian Ministry of Energy (2013), reserves of gas hydrates are more than twice of the total reserves of shale and conventional natural gas. Russia has large deposits of natural hydrates found in areas of permafrost in Yakutia and West Siberia. Large reserves are discovered on the Sakhalin shelf in the Okhotskoye Sea (in particular in the area of ​​the east coast), and the Kuril Islands (which, by the way, is so eager to get Japan).

[8] New Siberian Islands – Russian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean, located between the Laptev Sea and East Siberian Sea.

[9] Helgoland – German-owned archipelago located in the Bay of Heligoland in the south-east of the North Sea.

[10] Sylt – Germany’s largest island in the North Sea, which is part of the waters of the Wadden Sea; since 1927 the island connected to the mainland by a causeway.

[11] This area is part of one of the six areas of basic research, on which Helmholtz Societyis concentrated: Energy, Earth and Environment, Health, Aeronautics, Space and Transport, Key Technologies, Structure of Matter.

[12] The base is named after Carl Koldewey, in honour of the head of the first German polar expedition in 1868. It was founded in Germany in August 1991 as a base of the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI), and in 2003 it merged with the base of the French Institute Paul Emile Victor (IPEV).

[13]The construction of the new multi-polar vessel, which should replace the current ship carrying “scientific watch” since 1983 is planned by the end of 2019.

[14] The Foundation is the central organization for promotion of research in Germany. It operates on the principles of self-government and is organized on the basis of civil law. Its main task is research funding of universities and public research institutions of Germany. The Foundation itself is financed mainly at the expense of federal and state governments.

[15]http://www3.uni-bonn.de/forschung/euroconsult/8.-frp

[16] It should, however, added that in these areas Germany prefers cautious forecasts. For example, regarding the NSR it is noted that severe weather conditions and unpredictable ice conditions will remain for the foreseeable future dependence of marine transportation vessels of icebreakers and, most importantly, trained personnel, what in financial terms largely eliminates the possible gains from reducing the distance and travel time. Therefore transarctic container transport (especially those which are carried out on an urgent basis “just-in-time”) are not a short thing of the future.

Equally uncertain (and in fact, simply unexplored) remain assessments as to whether the result of the temporary exemption of ocean space from ice is to expand commercial fish habitat and thus will lead to an increase in their populations.

[17]Being a class of Icebreaker 6, the vessels may conduct rescue operations in difficult conditions. They can be used for icebreaking operations in port and at sea in the thickness of the ice up to 1 meter, extinguish fires on floating objects and coastal oil spill.

[18]F.e., opinion of expert of BGRG.Elsner in: http://www.zeit.de/wissen/2015-05/arktis-klimawandel-erderwaermung-eisschmelze-rohstoffe/seite-2

[19]Expert BGRK. Reihert, the same source.

[20] In particular, experts of authoritative German Foundation for Science and Policy, acting as a leading consulting center for the government of Germany, followed in their assessments this line. See: http://www.swp-berlin.org/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/arktische-kooperation-trotz-europaeischen-frosts.html