The natural development of an economic model for the Baltic countries is an integrated process that is determined by political rather that economic reality. A quarter of a century after these countries gained economic independence (which existed long before August 1991), we can put Baltic economic developments into perspective.

Russian and foreign analysts always hit a wall when trying to view the economic development of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from both neo-Keynesian and neoclassical standpoints. Why? Because after 1991, the economy of the Baltics was harshly dictated by political reasons. The basis for the Baltic economic model were separatism and nationalism rather than balance and efficiency.[1]In reality. this European-looking model is not what it seems.

Prior to Perestroyka, the economic situation of the Baltic nations within the Soviet Union used to be as follows: in 1986, the fixed asset value was 5875 rubles for every Soviet citizen. This figure had noticeable disproportion throughout the country: on one hand, it made 8007 rubles in Estonia, 6923 rubles in Latvia, 6111 rubles in Lithuania; on the other hand, there was as low as 5500 rubles per citizen in Belorussia, 4500 rubles in Moldavia, 3823 rubles in Azerbaijan and 2291 rubles in Tajikistan.

The republics found themselves to be divided by a growing salary gap. In 1940, workers and employees’ salaries in different republics saw a maximum dispersion of 10 rubles. Then it reached 21 rubles in 1960, 33 rubles in 1970, and as high as 78 rubles in 1988. The contrasts looked even more striking in agriculture, with the difference between the top and bottom kolkhoz members’ salaries making 74 rubles in 1970 and 159  rubles in 1989.[2]It is worth noting that the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Soviet Republics were holding the lead.

“Production reconstruction and enhancement process in the Baltic countries showed a faster rate than elsewhere in the Soviet Union, mainly due to the fact the Latvia and Estonia were reserves of qualified workforce for the whole Soviet state.  Moreover, infrastructure in the Baltic region was almost intact during the war».[3]

The share of Baltic population with over 300 rubles of total income was the biggest in 1990. The national average for the whole USSR equaled 8.8 percent while reaching 19.8 percent in Estonia, 14.5 percent in Latvia and 13.8 percent in Lithuania. The poverty rate in these republics was also among the lowest, people with 75-ruble income making 1 percent of the whole Estonian and Latvian population and 1.2 percent of Lithuanians, whereas it was republics with the highest poverty headcount that developed into the severest autocracies in post-Soviet era.[4]

Since this region was the most efficient from the investment point of view, Moscow sought to allocate new industrial facilities here.  Compared to other regions, it took less time to master production in the Baltics.

The share of new fixed assets in the Baltic republics was higher that the USSR average, with more up-to-date and less obsolete facilities and technology. Agriculture showed a similar picture: kolkhozes and sovkhozes were distributed fertilizers, machinery, forage, imported elite breeding cattle, etc. on more favorable terms.

In the early 1990s, Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn provided much similar models of economic development in the form of regional cost-accounting plans. The Baltic nations, yet Soviet at the time, viewed the future reforms  based on their nostalgic, and sometimes inadequate, ideas and memories of what the so-called ‘first republics’ used to be. The mythology of their past played a key role in their denial of the present life within the USSR. It was as early as 1991 when we used to point out the importance of the Soviet heritage in the later economic development of the countries.[5] Later this idea was multiply referred to and developed in a number of academic papers.[6]L. Grigoriev and his fellow contributors believe that ‘the Baltic countries boasted the best starting conditions (compared to other post-Soviet states) for building a market economy, with huge innovational potential was accumulated there. The region was more like a laboratory where improved Soviet economic models were tested. The Baltic republics always enjoyed a privileged status among others, as seen from the investment figures of 1970–1980: the investment volume per capita was the highest.‘

The leaders of the Baltic ‘people’s fronts’ were not experts in market laws and could not estimate the real value of the national resources since they all were previously living in a centralized state-controlled planned economy, where one single center was busy allocating funds as well as distributing the product.

After having seized power, the newly formed elite had to deal with the opposition which was all concentrated around key Soviet industrial facilities. Such factories and plants as Latvian VEF, RAF, Alfa or Estonian Dvigatel, Eesti Kabel, Kreenholm comprised the core and the basis of the opposition. Disrupting these would put an end to opposition. Low competitiveness of these firms was another pretext for de-industrialization. This process would also result in weaker trade union movement and potentially less social packages. However, Estonian and Latvian reformers (and their congenial Russian counterparts) acted in a different way, saying that “the destruction of what is unsustainable is not an argument against, but in support of the transformation”.[7]

Despite these facts, the biggest companies in the Baltics states were still those of the Soviet heritage as late as in 1997.

Table 1.  The Biggest Latvian Industrial Companies (according to the number of employed)[8]

Table 2. The Biggest Lithuanian Industrial Companies (according to the number of employed).

Table 3. The Biggest Estonain Industrial Companies (according to the number of employed).

The privatization of the Soviet heritage was greatly positive for the Baltic economies, encouraging progressive growth all through the most troublesome period of early 1990s.

At that very time, financial and monetary reforms took place in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. A strong and stable national currency safeguards a nation’s independence and economic stability. In the Baltic nations, deficit-free budget has become the strategic goal one was desperately trying to achieve. This cost the countries a lot, with serious budget limitations introduced especially affecting the social sphere. Borrowing was not even taken to account as a possible solution, until in recent years. By this time, however, the national financial systems have de jure seized to exist. One fact is worth noting in relation to this circumstances: when visiting Vilnius on Jan 14, 2015, Donald Tusk, Chairman of the European Council (Poland’s ex-Prime Minister) called euro adoption in Latvia ‘a historic moment’[9]. No one was curious then, though,  why Mr. Tusk had done his best in his country for this ‘historic moment’ to be avoided there.

The fact is that joining the European Union had a relatively narrow effect on Baltic nations, since these countries already had the right to sell 60- to 65 percent of its commodities on a duty-free basis while being associated partners of the EU. Moreover, since 2001 industrial commodity trade there has been totally duty-free.[10]

Liberalism can be called the second cornerstone of the Estonian economic policy, meaning renunciation of protectionism, free and toll-free trade with neighbors (alcohol, tobacco and some other goods excluded), and relatively low taxes (business tax rate is 26%). This kind of approach encourages saturation of inner market and comparatively low prices, as well as foreign investment and cargo flow growth, which are per capita higher than in Russia. However, this approach creates certain obstacles. Taking into account the protectionist and discriminating fee policy currently maintained by other countries, the inner market stays vulnerable as Estonian-made goods are not competitive enough. This leads to the domination of imported goods, making it harder for its own producers to develop, especially in agriculture.

The third important point is fast, successful reforms in agrarian and  municipal sphere, as well as housing and utilities.

The economic recession during the transformation crisis was deep in the Baltic nations: the economy fell –35% in Estonia, –49% in Lithuania and –52% in Latvia. IEstonia was the first to cope with its consequences in 2001 and reach the pre-crisis level of 1989. The result was its GDP growing 158 percent of this base. Economic progress of Latvia and Lithuania was not that impressive: 115 and 111% respectively.[11]

The comprehension of the complicated development processes and the acknowledgement of initial mistakes in reforming become (though still not frequently) the subject for discussions among the economists in the Baltic counries.[12]Before 2008, such discussions were yet not acceptable in the ‘Baltic tiger’ countries that showed 7 to 9 percent growth each year. There was not much talk of the 12 to 19 percent decrease at the time. Instead, the fact that the country survived the 2008-2009 crisis was treated as a true success story.[13]

Table 4. GDP Growth, %.

The Baltic countries’ dependency on Russian oil and gas and energy supply was a serious challenge for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as well as the fact that the three were included in the Soviet-era cargo transportation system in which cargo flows from their sea ports were eastbound. The result was that the Baltic region obtained a predominant status of a  transitional, by-pass cargo hub. Russia is Latvia’s third largest trade partner, with 10 percent of its trade operations, and Estonia’s fourth biggest trade partner (with 8.4%). Speaking of Lithuania, Russia is number one partner for the country, holding 25% of all trade volume, which is three times higher than with Lithuania’s second biggest partner, Germany (8.4%).[17]However, a shrinking trade volume with Russia has also tended to cause macroeconomic decrease. Unlike in 2013, in 2014 Estonia was the third among the Baltic states as far as GDP growth is concerned. Annual GDP growth was 2.4% in Latvia, 2,9% in Lithuania and 1,8% in Estonia[18]. These figures may look optimistic in present-day Europe, but they will never allow, as people used to say in the USSR, ‘to catch up and overtake’ any other EU country – except for Greece, perhaps.

Expert say that the total exports from the Baltic countries to Russia may fall 18 to 25 percent in 2015, resulting in $780 million deficit for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, however, their growth is expected to lose 1.3 to 1.7 percent less that last year. In terms of money, the countries are about to lose $1.58 billion[19]. Isthissum critical? Let’s see: the estimated budget revenue in 2015 is about 7.25 billion euros for Latvia[20], same for Estonia and a little more for Lithuania. Apparently, 250 million euros for each country is big money.

To summarize the above, the economic model that was built in the Baltic countries is economically viable, at least on the mid-term horizon. IF the outer conditions are relatively stable, one can predict a 1.5 to 2.0 GDP growth. In case military and infrastructural expenditures grow, the real income growth will be close to zero. Stagnation of exports and decrease in transit will contribute to destabilization of the economies in the region.

However, the real problem lies elsewhere. The fact that real historical problems of the past are constantly emphasized helps to preserve anti-Russian sentiments on the level of the elite, that tends to capitalize, politically and even financially while encouraging and practicing Russophobic rhetoric. The window of opportunities for co-operation with Russia is constantly shrinking. The Baltic elites preferred to stay away from consistent solution-seeking process and take part in political, rather than economic, discussions. One of the reasons for this (which has never mentioned before, nor will be in the foreseeable future) is that no elite in the Baltics is free to choose its political agenda. In this context, the Baltic countries are quite similar to Belarus rather than Poland or Russia.

There is an opinion that is often heard in the economist community, that European economic development has been derailed. In the past, we knew that politics and economy interact dialectically; nowadays, economy simply becomes a tool for policy to achieve its goals. The golden age of the European economy that lasted from the 1950s till about 2007, has come to an end. European growth will no longer be 3-5 percent, and this situation will take place until the whole political and economic paradigm is changed.

The brilliant success of European integration is obvious. Europeanist ideas that resurrected after WWII have proved to be robust and viable. However, new challenges of 2008-2015 put an end to the  model of development which our European home had. This is true for the Baltic nations which are fully dependent on both European and their own model of development.

[1] Шадрин А. Экономический фактор политики сепаратизма в республиках Советской Прибалтики // КМЦ Прикладной этнографии Института этнологии и антропологии РАН Москва, 1996.

[2] Агафонов Н.Т, Литовка О.П, Исляев Р.А. Государственная стратегия регионального развития России: смена парадигмы территориальной организации общества СПб 1998 с.39

[3]Misiunas R. Taagepera R. The Baltic States: Year of dependence 1940-1980 L. 1983 р.104

[4] Гареева Н. Э.,  Шкель С. Н. Теория модернизации и социально-экономические факторы демократизации в контексте политических трансформаций на постсоветском пространстве
http://gisap.eu/ru/teoriya-modernizatsii-i-sotsialno-ekonomicheskie-faktory-demokratizatsii-v-kontekste-politicheskikh

[5] Межевич Н.М. Геополитическое положение Эстонской ССР: мифы и реальность // Политическая география и современность. Региональные и прикладные аспекты: Л.ЛГУ, 1991

[6] Самонис В. Трансформация литовской экономики: от Москвы к Вильнюсу и от плана

к рынку. Варшава: CASE, 1995; Григорьев, Л.М. Конкуренция и сотрудничество: экономические перспективы Восточной Балтики Москва 2005.

[7] Путь в Европу // Под. общ. ред. И. М. Клямкина и Л. Ф. Шевцовой. М.: Новое издательство. 2008. С. 39.

[8] Берзиньш Ингус Они дают нам работу[8] http://www.baltic-course.com/archive/rus/13/reyting.htm Дата обращения 11.03.2015

[9] Руководство ЕС приветствовало вступление Литвы в еврозону http://dw.de/p/1EKhU

15.01.2015

[10] Бройсс Ф. Макроэкономические последствия расширения ЕС для его старых и новых членов // Проблемы теории и практики управления. 2003. № 5. С. 29.

[11] Актуальные вопросы мировой экономики: 2010 – 2012. Под общей редакцией Григорьева Л.М., Иващенко А.С. Балтийский форум 2012 с.53

[12]Grigas A., Kasekamp A., Maslauskaite K., Zorgenfreija L., “The Baltic states in the EU: yesterday, today and tomorrow” // Studies & Reports No 98, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, July 2013.

[13]Dudzińska Kinga  The Baltic States’ Success Story in Combating the Economic Crisis: Consequences for Regional Cooperation within the EU and with Russia // POLICY PAPER

No. 6 (54), POLSKI INSTYTUT SPRAW MIEDZYNARODOWYCH March 2013

[14] RAA012: SISEMAJANDUSE KOGUPRODUKT JA KOGURAHVATULU (KVARTALID) // Eesti Statistika andmebaas. URL: http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/dialog/varval.asp?ma=RAA012&ti=SISEMAJANDUSE+KOGUPRODUKT+JA+KOGURAHVATULU+%28KVARTALID%29&path=../database/Majandus/15Rahvamajanduse_arvepidamine/06Sisemajanduse_koguprodukt_%28SKP%29/02Pehilised_rahvamajanduse_arvepidamise_naitajad/&search=SISEMAJANDUSE+KOGUPRODUKT+JA+KOGURAHVATULU&lang=2. Дата обновления: 11.03.2013.

[15]Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115

[16] Statistical Yearbook of Lithuania, 2012 http://web.stat.gov.lt/uploads/metrastis/1_LSM_2012.pdf

[17] Зельценберг В. Легче застрелиться: страны Балтии подсчитывают убытки от девальвации рубля http://bb.lv/rinki-i-kompanii/item/9160776-legche-zastrelitsya-strany-baltii-podschityvayut-ubytki-ot-devalvatsii-rublya  22.12.2014

[18] По росту ВВП Эстония заметно отстает от остальных стран Балтии http://rup.ee/rus/novosti/ekonomika-i-biznes/po-rostu-vvp-estoniia-zametno-otstaet-ot-ostalnykh-stran-baltii 27.03.2015

[19] Как российский кризис скажется на экономиках стран Балтии http://rup.ee/rus/novosti/mirovaia-ekonomika/kak-rossiiskii-krizis-skazhetsia-na-ekonomikakh-stran-baltii 25.03.2015

[20] Доходы госбюджета Латвии в 2015 году составят 7,25 млрд. евро http://www.baltic-course.com/rus/finansi/?doc=99880 БК, Рига, 09.12.2014.

The relations of Russia with the North European countries have a special place in European politics. The atmosphere of these relations has evolved over many centuries, when countries traded and fought with each other, concluded dynastic alliances, explored the Northern sea and shared cultural and scientific achievements with each other. These relations were deep and multifaceted. Their bloom came in the days of the Hanseatic League, among whose participants were many Russian cities ― Novgorod, Pskov, Tikhvin, Belozersk, Tot’ma, Torzhok, Tver, Velikyi Ustyug, Revel and others. However, not only trade relations determined the nature of mutual relations between Russia and the North European countries, as marriage of state also played an important role. A significant mark in Russian history was left by Empress Maria Feodorovna, born Danish Princess Marie Sophie Frederikke Dagmara, who became the wife of Emperor Alexander III and mother of the last Russian Emperor Nikolay II.

Perhaps the most serious test of the relationship took place during the Great Northern War, when Peter the Great “cut the window” into Europe in spite of Sweden and strengthened the military position of Russia on the Baltic Sea. European capitals were not happy about the strengthening of Russia on the Baltic Sea, but after a while Stockholm and Copenhagen admitted the increasing influence of Russia on world politics. A century after Poltava Victory at the beginning of the XIX century, Russia made an enormous contribution to the development of the Finnish state, including it in its membership and granting the broadest autonomy to the Grand Duchy of Finland. Finally, in the XX century, the Soviet Union made a major contribution to the liberation of Europe from fascism; Soviet troops took part in the liberation of North Norway from Nazi troops.

The present stage of this relationship was marked by the “cold war”, when during the confrontation between West and East the policy of restraint and neutrality was used by social democratic governments of Sweden and Finland, what helped to create at that difficult time a climate of trust between the countries, belonging to different military-political blocs. Despite the fact that the level of mutual trust at that time was not always very high, it was fully offset by restraint in military and strategic issues, as well as the desire to preserve regional stability.

As you know, three of five North European countries (Norway, Denmark and Iceland) were fully integrated into the North Atlantic alliance, the first two even worked out plans in case of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, while Sweden and Finland remained neutral. At the same time Finland had a special place in the relations with the West and the Soviet Union. Its sovereignty was partially limited by a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948, in which both countries made a commitment “not to conclude any alliance and not to participate in the coalition directed against another High Contracting Parties”[1].

The disappearance of the USSR and the victory of Western democracy inspired many people to revise previous models of interaction. In the 1990s, the Finnish model was rejected by the supporters of the Euroatlantic choice and new generation of politicians of the North European countries, representing the right-wing conservatists. At the same time due to a misunderstanding were forgotten unique achievements of this model of relationship. Meanwhile, the historical significance of the model “Finlandization” lay in the fact that with the help of it Finland, on one hand, significantly reduced the risk of being involved in a confrontation between East and West, and on the other hand ― it was able to take full advantage of the economic benefits of its geographical location and the Soviet-Finnish border. The model of “Finlandization” opened access to capacious Soviet market for the high-quality Finnish goods and helped our northern neighbour to avoid confrontation with Moscow, didn’t allow to draw The Country of Thousands of Lakes in dubious military and political maneuvers that could have escalated into an armed conflict.

Whatever it was, already at a new historical stage in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the basis of these relations contained the idea of maintaining a sub-regional stability, improving the climate of trust and sustainable development. Thus the development meant not only an increase in turnover, but also the creation of democratic institutions, which would bring together the political systems of Russia and the North European countries. The indicator of progress in this direction was the emergence of subregional organizations (CBSS, BEAC), as well as the attempt to create a common space of development, expressed in the concept of “Northern Dimension”.

This stage of relations between Russia and the North European countries lead to serious contradictions, which had the ideological character. Russia agreed to adopt Western liberal democratic model for the creation and development of the Russian government institutions and local governments, but strongly disagreed with the fact that the Western liberal ideology would completely replace its national identity, abolish religious standards and force Russia to sacrifice its national interests in the nearest countries. For example, the North European countries really did not understand Russia’s reaction to the infringement of the rights of Russians in the Baltic States, believing that the imperial period of Russian history should have stayed in the past.

From its side, Russia did not understand a lot in the politics and actions of the North European countries. It was difficult to realise, for example, the reason for increased military budgets of Sweden and Finland against the significant reduction of the Russian military capacity after the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent reductions in the 1990s. It was hard to understand, why the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Baltic countries was not accompanied with a normalization of relations with Moscow, but instead led to a serious deterioration of relations in almost all important areas ― political, economic and humanitarian. Russia sincerely hoped that the North European countries, which took care of young democracies in the Baltic States, would be able to convince them of the need to ensure the equal rights of Russian-speaking population, especially since similar rights were provided to all national minorities living in the North European countries. Russia did not understand the need of the entry of the Baltic States into NATO, as well as the upsell of the thesis about the “Russian threat” by the leadership of the republics.

Over the past 10-15 years Russia’s relations with the countries of North Europe continued to develop on its special path, alternating the periods of recovery and recession. Significant milestone of this relationship became the restart of the program “Northern Dimension” in 2006. As a result, Russia was proclaimed the main target of this initiative, as originally proposed by the author of the idea of “Northern Dimension” – Finland. The program received a new framework document, identified new joint projects. ND had at its disposal two new partnerships ― in the field of transport and logistics (2008), as well as in the field of culture (2011).

However, two years later relations were spoiled by the events in the Caucasus, where Russia came to the defense of the interests of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Scandinavian countries supported Georgia’s position. Then Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt compared Russia’s actions to protect its citizens with the actions of Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland. After 8 years, he also condemned Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, comparing the policies of the President of Russia with the seizure of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein[2]. The fact that these statements were not a spontaneous and short-term splash of emotions, was confirmed by the events of 2008, when Poland and Sweden became the ideological inspirers of “Eastern Partnership”, the purpose of which was the gradual integration of the former Soviet Union in Western institutions. Anti-Russian orientation of the initiative was read between the lines.

In fact, the crisis in the Caucasus in 2008 and the promotion of the “Eastern Partnership” exacerbated the competition between Russia and the EU for the political dominance in the former Soviet Union, and a very active role in the EU’s eastern policy was played by two countries ― Poland and Sweden. From the point of view of Western countries, it looked as a competition between a neo-imperial project, which was supported by Russia as the center of Orthodox Slavic civilization and Western liberal project, aimed at establishing the economic, ideological and informational control over the European CIS countries, as well as the states of Transcaucasus. In this case, the coexistence of “Northern Dimension” and “Eastern Partnership” did not mean a fundamental difference of opinions between Finland and Sweden.

Preserving a common approach and a common strategy towards Russia, Stockholm and Helsinki disagree on tactics: if the project “Northern Dimension” is supported by Finland and is aimed at the gradual democratization of Russia and rapprochement with the West, the project “Eastern Partnership”, which is backed by Sweden, in fact recognizes that Russia is unlikely to be part of the Western world in the foreseeable future, and aims to establish control over the newly independent states established on the ruins of the Soviet Union.

Political upheaval and civil war in the Ukraine in this sense are not the starting point of the crisis in relations between Russia and the North European countries, but is a new stage of ideological confrontation, which was indicated in the middle of the 2000s. The aforementioned Swedish politician does not hide it as well. According to Carl Bildt, Russia in the 1990s demonstrated commitment to Western values, but with the coming of Vladimir Putin to power Moscow faced tough opposition to the Western policy. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden believes that the contradiction between Russia and the West is of a fundamental ideological character: “The new anti-Western and antidecadent line of Putin is built on deeply conservative orthodox ideas»[3].

It must be noted that the offensive Western policy towards Russia, combined with tough rhetoric of certain Western politicians have almost fully revived the political atmosphere of the “cold war”, and the media of the West has begun to carefully sculpt an “enemy image” from Russia. How long will the new “cold war” be, and how long will be the economic sanctions against Russia? This raises the third question: what is the position of countries on this issue? In particular, what do leaders and leading politicians of the North European countries think about it?

Many years of mutually beneficial cooperation have taught many to conclude that the North of Europe is quite a well-off region and Russia’s relations with the countries of the region seem to be promising and mutually beneficial. And, in fact, there were no open conflicts in the North of Europe with the participation of Russia, except for those systematic violations of the rights of Russians living in the Baltic states, and they mostly boil down to two main problems: failure of Latvia and Estonia to grant citizenship to all residents, who were born there and lived at the time of the declaration of independence of these countries, as well as the denial of the right of these people, and especially ― their children ― to receive education in their native language. In 2010, Russian initiative was to settle the dispute between Russia and Norway regarding the section of the Barents Sea between two countries. Thus, all potential conflicts in the region have been minimized.

However, it did not prevent the Norwegian oil company Statoil from withdrawing from the joint project of developing the Arctic shelf with Russia; Norway declared that its sanctions and EU sanctions against Russia wouls be cancelled only when Russia changed its policy in Ukraine. Explaining the position of the state, Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende recalled that the sanctions against Moscow were introduced after the annexation of the Crimea, as well as other “violations of the international law in the eastern regions of Ukraine[4].

It should be noted that Norway not being a member of the EU, was free on the question of participation in the sanctions, as well as on the issue of the degree of its rigidity and duration. For example, Turkey, which, together with Norway being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, decided not to join the sanctions at all, because it saw it as a threat to its national interests in the Black Sea region.

The fact that Norway did not simply join the sanctions, but chose their toughest variant, signifies either a serious crisis in bilateral relations, or that the foreign policy of Norway on the question of sanctions is completely subordinated to politics of Washington or Brussels. This situation has opened another unpleasant situation for Russia’s foreign policy: the signing of a bilateral agreement between Moscow and Oslo on the delimitation of the disputed waters of the Barents Sea in 2010 and reciprocal steps by President Medvedev had absolutely no effect on improving the climate of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, even in Norway one can hear louder voices of opposition to the current position of the country with regard to Russia. Thus, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre recalled “the millennial experience of a peaceful neighborhood” with Russia.[5].

Thus, the events of the Ukrainian crisis has shown that the most irreconcilable and active critics of Russia’s actions are the North European countries, namely Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Acuity of their position is not inferior to the positions of the United States and Canada, and on the degree of hardness it’s stronger that one of France and Germany. On the contrary, Finland and Iceland at the outset showed much more balanced position, based on considerations of economic pragmatism dominated the political arguments.

Finland’s position from the beginning tended to a compromise, and Prime Minister Alexander Stubb has repeatedly spoken out against imposal, extension and tightening of the sanctions, as the importance of Russia for the Finnish economy is too huge[6]. It can be explained by the fact that among all North European countries, Finland faces the greatest losses from the sanctions regime, as well as the impact from Moscow responses, which imposed a total ban on exports of beef, pork, vegetables and fruit, meat, poultry, fish, cheese, milk and dairy products to Russia.

Denmark and the Danish Board of Agriculture and the Economy also warned on the serious impact of Russian counter-sanctions on its economy. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Denmark, exports to Russia in 2013 amounted to 2.14 billion USD, of which 891 million USD accounted for agricultural exports. At the same time, the share of Russia in the exports of Denmark does not exceed 1.9%, which allows the country’s leaders to insist on the continuation of anti-Russian sanctions. This, in particular, was declared by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt[7].

According to the polls carried out in March 2014 by Taloustutkimus, the majority of Finnish society (60%) is foreign to anti-Russian sentiment, and Russia is not perceived as a threat. Finnish President Sauli Niinistë agrees with the opinion of the Finnish society: “We are neighbours. Unlike other neighbours of Russia, we are not members of NATO. Our relations with Russia are based on bilateral contacts”[8]. The position of Finland is not opportunistic, but consistent and is based on the mood of the majority of Finnish society, which has been recently shown by the events, when the Finnish leadership voted against the supply of arms of Kiev authorities^[9].

Against the balanced and moderate position of Finland Sweden is continuing to demonstrate hardness against Moscow. Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström said that Russia poses a serious threat to the security of Europe, however, along with the pressure on Russia one should continue political dialogue as well[10]. The announcement of Ambassador of Sweden in Russia Veronika Bard Bringus was in similar mode, when she did not exclude the possibility of exit of Swedish companies from the Russian market[11]. The main argument of the Ambassador was the situation with the Swedish concern Oriflame, which was accused by Russian tax authorities of deliberately understating the company’s revenues for the reduction of tax payments to the Russian budget. After losing the lawsuit in the Russian arbitration court, the company announced its intention to appeal to the international investment arbitration.

It should be noted that the current crisis in Russian-Swedish relations is not accidential. Stockholm has long been regarded Russia as a threat to its security, and therefore critically perceives any Russian actions of political or economic nature, aimed at strengthening the security of Russia in the Baltic Sea, whether it’s laying of the pipeline “Nord Stream” or the development of the military infrastructure of the Baltiysk and Kronstadt.

The story of unsuccessful search for “Russian submarine” in Swedish territorial waters in October 2014 recalled a similar story from “cold war”, when in 1981, a Soviet damaged submarine was discovered close to the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. Stockholm reacted to Russia’s actions to ensure security of Abkhazia and South Osetia with obvious disapproval, accusing Moscow of violating the territorial integrity of Georgia. A similar position was taken by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Crimean issue.

Playing the “Russian card” and the spread of the thesis of the “Russian threat” was the brand style for a number of leading Baltic politicians. The toughest position on the Russian question among the Baltic States has traditionally been shown by President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite. In her opinion, three Baltic countries faced “Russian threat” and they should be ready to respond to it during three days at least, until they get assistance from NATO members[12]. However, a different position was shown by Latvian President Andris Berzins, who does not support the imposal of sanctions and calls for their soonest cancellation. His views are shared by Foreign Minister of Latvia Edgar Rinkevich and Ventspils Mayor Aivars Lembergs.

Some political consequences of the deterioration of relations of North European and Baltic countries with Russia within the framework of the Ukrainian crisis followed shortly. In particular, it was reflected with newly resumed talks on accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO, the North European countries and the Baltic States published their plans to deepen cooperation in defense and security. So, the ongoing projects within the North European defense cooperation (Nordic Defence Cooperation ― NORDEFCO) were joined by the Baltic States ― Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia[13].

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Margot Wallström was the initiator and inspirer of the plan; she declared that military cooperation between the North European countries and the Baltic countries would decrease defense expenses and improve cooperation on border security. Russia replied immediately by performing tactical flight exercises in the Barents Sea, which were attended by the crews of fighter-interceptor MiG-31 and tactical bomber Sukhoi Su-24M of Central Military District[14].

Thus, Russia’s relations with the countries of Northern Europe are developing in an unfavorable scenario; however, there is still some potential for a gradual improvement in case of easing policy by the majority of the North European countries in respect of Russia. In this situation, the most pressing question is what position will prevail: the policy of deepening confrontation or a pragmatic and balanced policy aimed at overcoming the sanctions crisis. It seems no one can state the way of further development of relations between Russia and the North European countries, as Brussels and Washington both have a strong impact on the foreign policy of the North European countries. We can only hope for traditional Scandinavian sanity, willingness of all parties to move towards each other and take into account the legitimate interests of Russia.

The list of bibliography:

1.         Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoy pomoshi mezhdu Sojuzom Sovetskikh Socialisticheskikh Respublik i Finljandskoy Respublikoy. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

2.         V Danii opasajutsja posledstviy rossijskikh sankciy URL: http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

3.         Karl Bil’dt. Putin povel sebja kak Saddam URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

4.         Litva pugaet Pribaltiku «rossiyskoy ugrozoj». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm

5.         MID Norvegii: tol’ko izmenenie politiki RF v otnoshenyi Ukrainy privedet k snjatiu sankciy. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/

6.         Nad Barencevym morem proleteli 40 istrebiteley URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

7.         Norvegiya dolzhna prodolzhat’ politiku dobrososedstva s RF. URL: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html

8.         Nosovich, Aleksandr. Baltijskiy kontrast: Finljandiya otkazalas’ otvorachivat’sa ot Rossyi. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/

9.         Posol Shvecyi: v RF sozdajutsja prepjatstviya dlja raboty shvedskihk companiy URL: http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html

10.       Pravoslavie ― glavnaya ugroza dlya Zapadnoy civilizacii: mnenya. URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

11.       Prem’er Finljandiyi: Ukraine ne nuzhna voennay pomoshh’ URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html

12.       Strany Severnoy Evropy I Baltiki dogovorilis’ ukrepit’ voennye svjazi. URL: http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html

13.       Shadrina, Tat’jana. Finljandijaotkazalas’ otsankcij k Rossii URL: http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html.

14.       Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars. URL: http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[1] Договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Финляндской Республикой / Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

[3] Православие – главная угроза для Западной цивилизации: мнения. / Orthodoxy is main threat to Western civilization . opinions / URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

[4]МИД Норвегии: только изменение политики РФ в отношении Украины приведет к снятию санкций. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/ / MFA Norway: only changes of Russia’s policy in respect of Ukraine will lead to cancellation of sanctions

[5] Норвегия должна продолжать политику добрососедства с РФ. URL^: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html. / Norway must continue policy of neighbourliness with Russia.

[6]http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html

[7]http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

[8] Носович, Александр. Балтийский контраст: Финляндия отказалась отворачиваться от России. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/ / Nosovich Alexander. Baltic contrast: Finland refused to turn back from Russia

[9]Премьер Финляндии: Украине не нужна военная помощь URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html / PM of Finland: Ukraine does not need military aid

[10]Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars URL:http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[11]Посол Швеции: в РФ создаются препятствия для работы шведских компаний URL:http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html / Ambassador of Sweden: Russia imposes difficulties for activity of Swedish companies

[12] Литва пугает Прибалтику «российской угрозой». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm / Lithuania threatens Baltics by “Russian threat”

[13]Страны Северной Европы и Балтики договорились укрепить военные связи. URL:http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html / The North European countries and Baltics agreed on strengthening military cooperation

[14]URL:http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

At present the mechanism of the CBSS which unites eleven countries of the region and the European Commission operates better than a Swiss watch. It is well-oiled and partners are quick on the uptake in most issues. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov provided most exact description of the understanding in an exclusive interview with the Amber Bridge. He said in 20 years of activities the Council of the Baltic Sea States fully justified its initial idea, developed into a full-fledge cooperation forum, and demonstrated an ability to upgrade.

It is easy to understand why environment is on the agenda. The problem is a kind of a wellbeing camertone and is vital for all Baltic littoral countries. Statistics cause concern of most people in the unique region who attentively follow the situation in the sea. The last world war dumped a lot of “surprises” in the Baltic Sea which threaten it with major environmental catastrophes. The talk is about hundreds of thousands of tons of shells and mines buried on the seabed, but periodically washed ashore. There are also bombs with toxic agents. If their hulls are destroyed they can kill fauna and flora on a major scale.

Scientists have already discovered mutant fish in the Baltic Sea and explain the growing numbers by a possible leak in shells with toxic agents. Experts said the problem was discussed rather than handled for a long time. Complex joint effort was taken during the construction of the Russian-German Nord Stream underwater gas pipeline. Russia and other countries possess technologies that can efficiently defuse the deadly cargo on the Baltic seabed.

Now back to the April conference in St. Petersburg. There is no doubt it will be a landmark in the laborious but urgent joint work of scientists and scholars of Northern Europe. If we turn back several pages of the latest history we shall see that when the CBSS was founded in 1992 few people believed the institution was viable. If Germany, Denmark, Norway, Finland and other western countries initially treated Russia as an equal and valuable partner, some neighbors in the east of Europe continued to display increased caution towards it.

But time always puts everything in place. “Seabed sediments” were gradually washed out of politics while the work of the CBSS becomes more substantial and productive with years. The substantive portfolio of vital solutions for the region is constantly augmented. Joint efforts of regional leaders promote efficient cooperation in economy, science, environment, healthcare, culture, and in the fight against organized crime…

I lived in Lithuania for thirty years and worked as a correspondent of a central newspaper. I still have many Lithuanian friends there. They often visit me in Moscow and I often go to Vilnius. They love their country and are upset by mistakes in the home and foreign policy while I feel all developments in Russia with my heart. It is only logical as each of us is a patriot of his country. But we are also patriots of our unique region. The world is a tiny place while the Baltic Sea coast is a small golden dune on its surface.

Naturally, partnership among Baltic Sea countries presupposes a broader cooperation level and integration in resolving common regional problems. That is taking place. The flow of time convinces us there is no alternative to partnership. All CBSS members are sure of it.

Alexey Morgun,

Editor-in-Chief, Amber Bridge

Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius (sixteenth head of government in 21 years of national independence) has been for long overshadowed by such bright Social-Democratic leaders as Brazauskas, Kirkilas, and Jursenas. Observers believe the convincing victory of Social-Democrats under Butkevicius leadership to the Saeima last autumn was predetermined by the election program of the party rather than by the charisma of its leader.

The Social-Democrats listed energy reform, the fight against unemployment and mass emigration, and elimination of the gap between the rich and the poor as their home policy priorities. The first decision of the new government fulfilled its election promise and raised the minimum wage to 1000 lits (close to 300 euro). It pledged to better consult society on all key issues and promote public consensus.

Butkevicius numerously said that when the taskforce discussing energy sector reform (with a new nuclear power plant or without it) provides conclusions they will be definitely submitted for public discussion. There will no longer be non-transparent decisions characteristic of the Conservative government.

In a brief time as the prime minister Butkevicius approved himself as an experienced and prudent politician. So far he succeeded to reconcile contradictions in the ruling coalition and softly but resolutely resist the attempts of President Dalia Grybauskaite to push her decisions through.

Lithuanian voters were attracted by election promises of the current government which offered a “reset” in relations with Russia. The prime minister numerously said Lithuania will promote mutual trust and build up cooperation based on future rather than the past. Opposition claims that new authorities turn their back on the West and betray their main strategic partner, the United States, by looking at the East were rebuked by Butkevicius who said the country should not turn its back either on Russia or the USA. We asked the head of government how Lithuania plans to build up relations with neighbors.

Mr. Butkevicius, The government program envisages and you also numerously stressed the necessity to “reset” relations with Russia. What should politicians do to thaw bilateral relations with neighbor s?

First of all, I have to say it bluntly that I am a supporter of constructive dialogue. I hope for the same position of the Russian side. I stand for enhanced mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia, specifically in economic relations. Trade turnover between our countries is big at present, but it should continue to grow. Favorable business conditions and the initiative of entrepreneurs from both sides are necessary for that.

The comprehensive agreements between the European Union and Russia which are being designed at present have to give a new impetus to bilateral cooperation. Political, economic, and cultural relations between the two countries shall be based on mutual respect and understanding.

Lithuanian relations with Poland and Latvia have not been smooth of late. You have already paid official visits to the countries. Have you agreed with the Latvians on energy issues (construction of a nuclear power plant and a liquefied gas terminal) and with the Poles on problems r elated to national minorities?

Relations between Lithuania and neighboring Latvia and Poland are very close and productive. There are numerous big and strategic projects in trade and investments which confirm it. We are united by the commitments in the framework of the European Union and NATO and we jointly fulfill them. We are members of one family. Naturally, there may be different opinions on various issues, but we always listen to the arguments of the other party. I was convinced in it again during my first

foreign trips to Riga, Tallinn, and Warsaw. Together with the prime ministers of Estonia and Latvia we reiterated our resolute intention to develop cooperation of the Baltic troika and more intensively promote the Baltic trademark which has already been recognized in the world.

We are united by common interests in the energy sphere, including energy independence and efficiency and the common internal market in the EU context. Latvia and Estonia continue to declare their interest in the construction of the Vysaginas nuclear power plant. They are currently waiting for Lithuania to complete the feasibility study of the project.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said relations between Lithuania and Poland are good. Poland would be glad to maintain such relations with other countries, but they should be the best with Lithuania. We shall join effort to achieve them. The position was confirmed by Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski who visited Vilnius on February 16 to celebrate the day of Lithuanian Independence together with us. Our concrete projects have shaped out already: the agreement has been signed to build LitPolLink energy bridge and we shall jointly apply to the European Commission for financing the gas bridge between Lithuania and Poland. Both countries will unite efforts in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership program of the European Union.

As for national minorities, the problems should be resolved by each country at home. They are resolvable. We have nothing to conceal from close neighbors and we shall not reject fruitful experience and advice.

Will there be a similar meeting with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in the near future? Which steps are being made to implement your idea of closer cooperation at the diplomatic level?

I accepted the invitation of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to participate in the conference of heads of government of the Baltic Sea countries which is to be held in St. Petersburg this spring (in the framework of the Russian presidency in the CBSS – ed.). It will be my first meeting with the chairman of the Russian government. No doubt one meeting and one talk are not enough. We have to expand opportunities for consistent and fruitful cooperation.

R e p r e s e n t a – tives of the rightwing forces, mostly Conservatives, blame authorities for readiness “to cede to Moscow” in exchange for cheap gas. What would you say?

In a democratic society there is usually a healthy tension between the government and the opposition and discussions are underway on all issues. It is important not to lose the guideline of national interests. I would like also to stress that my government will work for solutions that are beneficial for all residents of Lithuania, but not at the expense of energy or national security. Our priorities include the drive towards increased energy independence through implementation of the provisions of the Third Energy Package of the EU (which contains proposals to liberalize the energy market, calls to unbundle vertically integrated energy companies, and regulates ownership and use of gas pipelines by handing over transportation networks to independent operators – ed.), construction of a liquefied gas terminal, increased energy efficiency due to active renovation of multi-apartment houses, as well as development of renewable energy. We shall also look for solutions that allow to decrease gas prices and consequently heating tariffs for ordinary consumers.

Don’t you fear bitter criticism from the rightists if the government works for rapprochement with Russia?

Russia is our neighbor which maintains with Lithuania not only close energy ties and historic experience, but also has a common European agenda. No party and no group of people enjoy a monopoly in relations with Russia or any other country. Lithuania is a democratic country and a member of the European Union. Decisions are adopted publicly and transparently and take into account public interest and long-tem national development prospects. I do not doubt there is a place for Russia in the strategy: friendly, economically strong, and democratic state.

Radicals accuse new authorities of “betraying national interests”. What would you say about it?

I have not heard such accusations and have nothing to comment.

According to official statements, the current main task of Lithuania is to win energy independence from Gazprom. Is it possible in the current situation and what did you mean by expressing hope that Gazprom would behave “like a gentleman”?

The national energy independence means, inter alia, the right to choose energy suppliers. There is no such possibility in the gas sector at present but it will emerge after the implementation of Third Energy Package which stipulates liberalization of the market. Gazprom will have to take into account the laws of the European Union and Lithuania and restructure the Lietuvos dujos gas distribution company which it partially owns. I hope Gazprom will behave “like a gentleman” and will carry out the necessary changes in cooperation with the government of Lithuania. Practical work to ensure energy independence is already underway. In 2014 the construction of a liquefied gas terminal in Klaipeda will be completed. It will allow gas supplies from any country of the world. It will definitely influence the pricing policy of traditional gas suppliers in favor of Lithuanian consumers.

Does Gazprom advance any demands which are unacceptable for Lithuania?

Constructive talks are currently underway however the Lithuanian position at the negotiations is clear enough: the implementation of the Third Energy Package and decreased prices for ordinary consumers.The citizens of the country opposed the construction of a new NPP at a consultative referendum. You used to be also against the agreement signed with Hitachi. Did you change your mind?

The new government will avoid unbalanced and hasty decisions on the Vysaginas nuclear power plant. It is clear today the plant can go on only as a regional project and we shall take all effort to make it regional in reality. I have instructed to create a taskforce to discuss the issue which is to submit its proposals in late spring.

The agreement with Hitachi was signed in complete secrecy. Will you stand up to the commitment and inform the public which way Lithuania should go in the sphere of energy?

As soon as the abovementioned taskforce provides proposals the Saeima and the public will be immediately informed.

The Lithuanian shale gas prospecting and production project causes many public claims as well. It turned out the agreement with the American Chevron has already been signed. What can you say about it?

Shale gas prospecting and production is one of the guidelines for energy security in the region. The contract with the company envisages only prospecting. The public will be informed about the progress and results of prospecting for shale gas.

Despite reserved official relations between Lithuania and Belarus, Lithuania and Russia businessmen and ordinary people actively cooperate. How can we simplify people-to-people contacts? What is the progress in visa-free regime in border areas?

As for the visa-free regime, Lithuania has invested a lot into upgraded infrastructure of Lithuanian-Russian and Lithuanian- Belarussian checkpoints and border zone. We informed Belarus about our readiness to implement the agreement reached by the governments of the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Belarus on border-crossing trips by residents of border areas of Lithuania and Belarus. We are waiting for a confirmation from Minsk that it is also ready to implement the agreement.

Some people in Lithuania are dissatisfied with the fact that Russian actors come to perform in the country, Russian movies are shown on TV and in cinema halls.

They view it as expansionist policy of the neighboring country. What do you think about it?

I believe no borders exist for the arts and the tours of Russian performers in Lithuania can be only welcomed. Genuine art always finds its listeners and viewers without any advice from authorities. I would like to hope that Lithuanian actors will also find their admirers on the immense space of Russia.

Algirdas Butkevicius was born in 1958 in the village of Paezeriai in Padviliskis district. He graduated as engineer-economist from the Vilnius Engineering and Construction Institute, studied in the Lithuanian Governance Academy and underwent traineeship in the United States. He joined the Social-Democratic Party in 1992 and was elected its chair in 2009. From 2004 to 2008 he was finance minister and then transport and communications minister in the Social-Democratic government of Algirdas Brazauskas and then Gediminas Kirkilas.

In the 2012 parliamentary election the Social-Democrats headed by Butkevicius received most of the votes. They created a coalition with the Labor Party, the Order and Justice, and the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania to form the constitutional majority in parliament and a coalition government. In November the Saeima approved Butkevicius as the Lithuanian prime minister. Lithuanian residents hope the new government will improve the economic situation in the country, as well as good-neighborly relations with Russia. Public opinion polls show Butkevicius is ahead of Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in popularity ratings.

Thank you for the interview .

Galina Afanasyeva,

for Amber Bridge

The museum was launched by distinguished Lithuanian artist Antanas Zmudzinavicius who enjoyed number 13, the devil’s dozen, and always respected the characters that not always were human enemies.

Number 13 played a specific role in the life of Zmudzinavicius. His name-day was on the 13th, he met his future wife on the 13th, and his only daughter was born on the 13th. The artist said he made friends with the devils in childhood. He collected 260 exhibits (20 devil’s dozens) and decided to display the collection to the public. Zmudzinavicius said he promised to the first devil he met in Samogitija to shelter his brothers in his home and show them to people in exchange for good health and long life. The artist lived 90 years and presented his house with the museum to the city one year before passing away in 1966. But after his death devils continued to arrive and arrive from all over the world. In 1982 the house had to be expanded to accommodate all devils.

Today the museum collection numbers over three thousand exhibits of various forms and colors, with horns, tails, hooves, wooden, ceramic, metallic, and even woven on carpets. They are all gifts. Some are household items, e.g. walking-sticks, door handles, glasses, plates, and openers. Others pose for musicians, dandies or politicians. The third took on the image of donkeys, dogs or pigs. Like any evil spirit they can acquire any image. The collection is constantly growing due to new and often unexpected gifts. This year which is also the 13th the museum received a clock with a devil from South Korean musicians.

Devils occupy a major place in both Slavic and Lithuanian folklore. The latter has over five thousand fairy tales and stories related to the important character in folk conscience. Close to 400 places are named after him. Scientists say even the main Lithuanian natural site, the famous Puntukas stone, was pushed to its current place by the devil in the Ice Age. He wanted to crash with it a nearby church under construction but dropped the stone when he heard cockerel sing and thus the divine house remained intact.

In contrast to Slavic ethnography, the Lithuanian one does not always depict the devil (Velnias in Lithuanian) as a bad guy who wants to harm humans and seduce them out of the right way. He helped the spirit of ancestors (veles) maintain contact with those living. Sometimes he helped the poor and did it selflessly by showing treasures and hidden wealth to them. It is related to pagan perceptions about underground spirits that keep buried treasures and protect the poor and honest people and punish greedy and brutal. With the advent of Christianity the devils were moved to a team of evil servants of Satan. However popular conscience preserved a dual attitude to them.

In public conscience the devil was not always a bad guy who wants to harm humans and seduce them out of the right way.

Courageous girls even married them (suffice it to recall popular Lithuanian musical Devil’s Mill) and various deals were concluded with devils. They often appeared at various male parties and liked to visit village gatherings. Girls were even warned by strict mothers: if she liked a stranger dancer at a party she had to step on his foot to check whether it is a hoof. Lithuanian devils worked hard, got tired, and fell in love. Anyway, nothing human was alien to them.

Lithuania was the last in Europe to adopt Christianity and had no rich traditions of religious arts and medieval sculpture. Craftsmen expressed their religious feelings as they could. They cut saints and divine protectors from wood according to established canons. But they gave rein to their imagination in depicting devils and all types of evil force. Some characters were fearful, others were funny and the third resembled outstanding personalities. Zmudzinavicius himself experienced it as his friends-art artists liked to depict him as a good devil.

Gradually the devils acquired yet another trait in folk art. All human vice were attributed to them, mostly smoking and alcohol consumption (they invented hebon), lasciviousness, greed, and acquisitiveness. The dark forces personified by devils in modern popular conscience are thus accentuating the bright sides of life. The more devils the brighter the light.

Unfortunately, as demonology experts claim, the number of devils decreased by early XXI century, their power vanished, and Satan ousted them. Their place was occupied by people who better cope with the duties of a devil . May be it is the reason why the world of non-fearful devils who lost their power and settled down in Kaunas is visited both by adults and children of different age. The museum offers various educational programs for them which tell the history of each exhibit and describe witch parties, teach dances, magic deeds and whistling in order to call a marshland or forest devil.

Lithuanian folklore has over five thousand fairy tales and stories related to devils and close to 400 places are named after them.

However they rarely come today. Therefore, it is important to visit the museum where devils found their last shelter and where nobody can offend them any longer .

Galina Afanasyeva,

for Amber Bridge

A big part of Lithuanian society views the concessions to ethnic minorities, first and foremost the Poles, as a threat to the very existence of the state. Rallies were staged in the country under the motto “No to Polonization of Vilnius Region!”, “Protect the land of ancestors, the state language, and integrity of the land!”. But experts insist there is no threat to the Lithuanian language as there is no problem of integrating national minorities into Lithuanian society. Young people from non-Lithuanian families experience no communication problems and successfully enter local institutes. After joining the European home Lithuanian citizens have to tolerantly comprehend the processes undergoing in the EU.

Language as economic factor

The education, science and culture committee of Lithuania and the European information bureau in Lithuanian Saeima have recently initiated a discussion on whether the European Union pays sufficient attention to the implementation of the multilingualism policy. Much of the discussion directly relates to national minorities in Lithuania, as well as to millions of other Europeans whose native language does not correspond to the state language of their countries of residence. Experts say such people comprise a majority in modern Europe.

The discussion was started by Agne Kazlauskaite, language and translation coordinator of the Lithuanian mission to the European Commission. “Multilingualism is the wealth of Europe,” she said adding that yet in 1958 the founding documents of the European Union stressed the importance of preserving various languages and cultures on its territory. Since then all important EU documents have been translated into all official languages of EU member-countries (23 at present and Croatian is to become the 24th) and billions of euro are allocated to advocate multilingualism. Kazlauskaite said besides official languages EU countries speak over 60 regional and national minority languages. A special European charter has been designed to regulate their preservation and use (Lithuania has not inked it so far). It gives grounds to state that multilingualism is an integral part of the EU legal system while the right to speak the native language is the basic freedom of modern Europeans. Kazlauskaite said the aim of the European multilingualism policy is to preserve the current language wealth and use it for efficient de velopment.

It has been calculated that EU enterprises annually lose up to 11 percent of profit simply because they cannot properly agree with potential partners. The vital task today is to make as many as possible EU citizens speak their native and one-two other languages since childhood. To advocate the idea the European Language Day has been widely celebrated on September 26 since 2001. There are so many important and interesting events that celebrations usually last for a week. To intensify foreign language studies by various Europeans – students, teachers, scientists, professionals in various spheres, and senior citizens international programs Socrates, Erasmus, Leonardo Da Vinci, and others have been designed and successfully operate. Kazlauskaite said the language sector of the European economy which is not always visible to outside observers accounts for 8.4 billion euro. Oral and written translation of all EU speeches and documents into 23 official languages costs a lot! Although the European Commission plans this summer to begin introducing machine translation the demand for skilled interpreters keeps growing.

Discussion participants who already had experience in dealing with machine translation said its efficiency for Roman languages reaches 89-90 percent while for Lithuanian language it is 65 percent so far. Kazlauskaite recalled that each spring various countries, including Lithuania, hold competitions for 17- year old beginning translators who fluently speak two or more languages. Success in such a contest offers the shortest way to a prestigious employment in EU institutions.

Director of the Lithuanian Language Institute Iolanta Zaborskaite calculated that two euro are allocated for translation each year per every EU citizen. It is clear the total result is considerable. There were calls to stop translating EU documents in all official languages and save money by translating them into three-four most popular languages – English, German, French, and Spanish, for example. “Genuine democracy cannot be cheap”, supporters of true European integration objected. “It is specifically important for a relatively small number of Lithuanianspeakers. Besides, we have a strong argument as Lithuanian language is the oldest of all living languages in modern Europe which is an attractive trademark for its preservation and use”, said Zaborskaite.

Europe in search of treasure

Senior research fellow of the Institute of Social Research Julija Moskvina and Chairwoman of the State Language Commission Daiva Vaisniene presented at the discussion the first stage of the project Language Treasures of Europe which in 2009-2012 was held in 19 countries by the British Council jointly with other European partners and national institutes of culture. The project mostly aimed at researching local language policies and practices in order to reveal “language treasures” buried in each European country. The state of all languages in a determined area was studied – both official, foreign, regional, national minority and immigrant. Researchers believe the obtained result should encourage politicians, scientists, and public leaders who formulate and implement the European multilingualism policy to actively cooperate with each other along the guideline and promote benevolent and viable cultural and language exchanges in schools, universities, and society in general.

Experts say Lithuania should study Polish, Russian, Belarussian, or Latvian as the first foreign language rather than English.

Conclusions of scientists made on the basis of the results of the first stage of the Language Treasures of Europe project look unexpected at first sight. For example, although all European Union countries focus on the studies of English as the first (and often obligatory) foreign language and it absolutely dominates in this capacity the European Commission recommends to gradually sidetrack from the practice. Experts say languages of close neighbors should be studied as the first foreign language and English should come second. It means in Germany the first foreign language should be French, Polish or Czech, in Lithuania – Polish, Russian, Belarussian, and Latvian.

The European Commission insists that for preserving and developing European multilingualism it is extremely important to support educational establishments of all levels – from kindergartens to universities where they speak national minority languages. It is also necessary to stop dubbing foreign movies and TV shows, there should be captions instead so that spectators can hear the original language.

Lithuanian Education and Science Minister Dainius Pavalkis expressed caution regarding the recommendations and called not to interpret them literally as “such laws can make us recognize the Polish language as the second official like Greeks have actually to do regarding the Turkish language.” The minister explained why not all European recommendations should be followed: “Relations between countries are a very sensitive issue.” For interaction within EU and in order to avoid mistakes Pavalkis called to use English as lingua franca because “the most active and educated residents of Lithuania are ready for that.”

Socio-linguistic map of lithuania

How is multilingualism developing in Lithuania? The question was answered during the discussion by Professor of Russian philology desk of Vilnius University Ala Lichaceva and her colleague, lecturer at the Polish Studies Center of the University Kinga Geben who have recently completed a special research called Socio- Linguistic Map of Lithuania: Cities and Towns.

Is the traditional multilingual situation changing in various regions of Lithuania due to massive emigration and considerable decrease in population? How are the multinational composition of population in various regions and their languages interlaced? Does multinational Lithuania remain multilingual? Which languages do they speak in our cities? And what are language preferences of Lithuanian residents depending on their nationality, age, and education? The researchers tried to provide exact answers and under the leadership of Vilnius University Professor Meilute Ramoniene summed up the data of the Cities and Languages project carried out in 2007-2009 in Vilnius, Klaipeda, and Kaunas and compared them with fresh results of the Socio-Linguistic Map of Lithuania project held in 2010-2012. The latter project polled 2660 respondents in 67 cities and towns (with a population above 3000). The total number of respondents in both projects was 4697.

What do the results of the project show ?

First of all, they showed that representatives of 154 nationalities live in Lithuania today. It is natural that big cities are mostly multilingual – Vilnius and Klaipeda. But there are also relatively multilingual regions. In Jurbarkas, Kalvarija , Silute, Seduva they mostly speak Lithuanian. Eisiskes, Nememcine, Salcinikai and other southeastern towns mostly speak Polish. Visaginas, Ignalina, and Zarasai speak Russian. In general the language repertoire of Lithuania is broad enough and continues to expand. Schoolchildren named 37 languages when asked which language they speak at home.

Naturally, the Lithuanian language occupies the strongest positions. It is native for 81.22 percent of respondents and practically all those polled said it was a language which they know most of all. Among foreign languages 94.57 percent said they speak Russian, 51.97 percent – English, 34.96 percent – Polish, 21.67 percent – German, and 5.26 percent – French. Good knowledge of Russian and Polish depends on the nationality of respondents most of who live in big cities and in the southeast of the country. French is spoken where it is possible to study it in school. Young Lithuanians mostly speak English, German or French, older people – Russian and Polish. All respondents clearly demonstrated that native language is the most beautiful for representatives of all nationalities. The Lithuanian language sounds better for residents of small towns, while Russian, French and English are most attractive for residents of big cities.

The most necessary language for Lithuania was naturally Lithuanian. It was named by 65.7 percent of respondents. The second necessary language was English (52.69%). Russian was the third (21.42%) followed by German (3.66%), Polish (1.64%), and French (1.58%). Priorities directly depend on the age of respondents: young people are loyal to English and the elderly prefer Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish.

In general the language repertoire of Lithuania is broad enough and continues to expand. Schoolchildren named 37 languages when asked which language they speak at home.

Dialects complement linguistic variety in Lithuania. Their preservation and use is very important for residents of homogenous ethnic regions – northern Samogitija, northern and central Aukstaitija, southern Dzukija, and western Suvalkija, and less important for ethnically motley southeast of Lithuania. Lichacheva and Geben arrived to the following conclusions. Firstly, territorial and social multilingualism is clear in Lithuania as even in one and the same family people often speak various languages or dialects. Secondly, major cities in the country begin to resemble megacities of the world where multilingualism is common in business, culture, and higher education. Thirdly, the evident expansion of the English language poses no threat to the official Lithuanian language as its positions are very strong in the country .

At the same time experts believe the increasing number of studied foreign languages and migration-triggered changes in the ethnic palette of Lithuania should strengthen linguistic variety in the country and public tolerance to it. Therefore, to promote the policy of multilingualism it is specifically important to encourage the preservation and spread of native languages of all strata of society, promote positive spoken forms of residents and use the existing linguistic situation to design methods and ways of stimulating multilingualism.

Tatyana Yasinskaya,

for Amber Bridge

The Lithuanian scientific community has recently marked the centenary of the birth of Leo Vladimirov (1912-1999), a scholar, historian and book expert whose effort helped return 20 thousand rare and valuable book collections to the library of the Vilnius University. They used to belong to it, but were withdrawn after the closure of the university in 1832. The Vilnius University and the library prepared an exhibition of the rare restituted publications which will be open up to the middle of this year. Thanks to Professor Vladimirov the most valuable for Lithuanians book – Catechism by Martynas Mazvydas – returned back home. The first book in the Lithuanian language was published in Konigsberg in 1547 and besides the basics of religion comprised also the Lithuanian alphabet. Thus it laid the basis for Lithuanian script and for the formation of national conscience. .

Only the restitution of lost treasures would be sufficient for the inclusion of Vladimirov into the list of personalities who greatly influenced the cultural development of the country. He was also the founder of a new guideline in library work. He initiated the creation of a library and scientific information desk in the Vilnius University which trained librarians while all institutes in Lithuania got a course of information basics and prepared a concept of computerized system of scientific and technical information. Today it will hardly surprise anyone. But Leo Vladimirov introduced the new course over 40 years ago as if he foresaw the advent of the era of computers with their major possibilities. The foundation he created (Vladimirov quit the desk at the age of 78 in 1990) was used by the Vilnius University to launch a year later a faculty of communications which united the bibliography, information systems, and communications theory desks.

He is the author of scientific works about printing pioneers – Francis Skaryna who published the book Apostle in Vilno in 1525 according to the sign on the front page, and Ivan Fedorov, as well as about the role of Vilno (as Vilnius was called in the Middle Age) in the emergence of book printing in Eastern Europe.

He said his main work was the General Book History. Its first part that covered a period from the ancient world to the XVII century initially came out in the Lithuanian and then (in 1988) in the Russian language. The second part has never come out as publishers changed priorities. In preparations for the birth centenary of Vladimirov the Vilnius University jointly with its library published a beautiful catalogue of restituted books – Vetera reducta. The proceeds are to be used for the publication of the second part of the book by the professor .

A brilliant intellectual and erudite who was awarded medals and other decorations by the United Nations, Vatican, the Lithuanian Gediminas Order III degree, the Belarussian Francis Skaryna medal, and the Red Star military order, Vladimirov enjoyed love and respect of the people in Lithuania who call him selfless patriot of the country.

At first there was the Book

Speaking about his teacher the academic secretary of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, Domas Kaunas, was confused whether Vladimirov was a Russian, Lithuanian, or a citizen of the world. He called him “a European”. In reality Vladimirov was a third-generation citizen of Lithuania but always called himself a representative and heir of the Russian culture. That becomes clear from the role of books in his life.

His grandfather Ivan Vladimirov graduated from a medical college and was invited to work as a doctor in a small Lithuanian town of Telsai. He founded the first hospital in the province and was awarded the title of honorable citizen for that. His family preserved the traditions of Russian intelligentsia of the time: they read books out loud in the evenings, both classical and new ones. The home library had five thousand books. There was a cult of Leo Tolstoy with who Ivan Vladimirov corresponded. It was he who insisted that his first grandson be called Leo. As the First World War broke out the grandfather was enlisted into the army and served as a colonel in command of a division field hospital. As the German troops advanced his family left the native place and resettled to Ukraine from where they came back home in 1920. Ivan Vladimirov was the first to return. He was shocked to see that the library was burnt down by the Germans. The most valued relic – a letter from Leo Tolstoy – was also destroyed. Ivan Vladimirov died in 1921 after all the hardships he experienced, as well as typhoid at the front.

Children and grandchildren of Ivan Vladimirov returned back to a ruined home. Everything was looted. Leo’s father Ivan, a graduate from the St. Petersburg Technological Institute was an engineer by profession. Together with his cousin he invented and patented a substance to clean steam boilers from lime deposits. When the family came back to Lithuania he could not find employment. His wife Stefanija Daujotaite, a descendant of the ancient Lithuanian Daujotaite family, could not resume her medical practice either. She was the first woman from Lithuania who received higher medical education first in Switzerland and then in Tartu University where she qualified as a dentist. Her dentist’s office was also looted.

The Vladimirovs did not surrender on the brink of misery. They moved to Siauliai and in 1926 opened there a commercial library-shop with subscriptions and also signed a deal with Kaunas publishers where they received all the latest publications. The library had a bookbinding and restoration workshop. By the ’40s the business began to yield modest proceeds. Leo Vladimirov recalled that since the age of 12 he enjoyed helping the mother with compiling the catalogue. At that time he studied in a German boarding school in Silute. It was a deliberate choice as the only Russian school was far away in Kaunas while the German one won was famous for the quality of education. The parents reasonably believed the knowledge of yet another language would be good for the son who spoke Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish. Besides, it was important that it was a boarding school where children were fed and looked after for a modest pay. Coming back home on Saturdays and Sundays and later for holidays as a student of the Anglo-German desk of the humanitarian faculty of the Kaunas University Vladimirov worked in the home library-shop, delivered books, accepted orders, and registered new book arrivals. However he did not knew at the time that library would become his life-work.

Vladimirov met his future wife Irina Reingard, the daughter of a Russian Navy officer and captain second rank, in Kaunas University. Upon graduation he was already married but could not find employment by profession and began his career in an insurance company.

Deliberate choice

When World War Two broke out Ivan Vladimirov with sons Leo and Andrei joined the retreating Red Army to fight the Nazis. They were in Belarus and in one town saw children rescuing books from a burning school and handing them out to Red Army soldiers. One of them gave a book to Leo Vladimirov. It was the second volume of War and Peace by Leo Tolstoy.

The book became a mascot for him and he learned many of its parts by memory. Leo Vladimirov fought in the war in the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division. He was wounded several times and suffered concussions but survived and returned back home in the rank of a captain. On his way back home via liberated Belarus he presented the book to the first school he saw on his way. He joined the Communist Party at the front. It was a difficult but deliberate choice. He was sure it was the omnipotent political force that routed Nazis who he considered criminals destroying everything valued by a person educated by the ideas and behests of great Russian humanists.

In the XX century the fates of Russian people deprived of historic Motherland interlaced into curious patterns. While Leo fought in the Red Army his wife Irina together with small daughter Natasha found refuge from the war in the house of her father Fedor Reingard, a convinced monarchist who hated the Soviet power. His name went down in big letters into the history of pre-war Lithuania.

The noble Reingard family settled down in Lithuania in the early 18th century in the time of Rzeczpospolita near the town of Ukmerge where the they owned spacious land. All male representatives of the family were professional military men. They were Russian Germans loyal to Russia and the emperor. Fedor Reingard, a graduate from the Navy Academy in St. Petersburg, was no exception.

His life offers a script for an exciting novel about time and people. He fought in the Russian-Japanese war and was taken prisoner in Port Arthur although, according to peace treaty terms, he could have avoided captivity as an officer had he sworn to never fight against the Japanese. However he decided to share the fate of ordinary sailors. Fedor Reingard described his adventures in memoirs Short Life – Much Experience. Impressions of a Young Officer about War and Captivity which are valuable for Navy historians. He later served in the Baltic and Northern fleets.

A convinced monarchist he rejected the Bolshevik revolution, quit the command of a battleship and resigned. He said he witnessed “a complete collapse of the country in which I do not want to participate” He was insulted by the new rules in the Navy, senseless deaths of sailors and outrageous reprisals against officers. He wrote in his memoirs: “The Russian fleet participated in numerous battles and I saw many ships sink, but I do not remember a single case when an officer would rescue himself before all sailors were safe. The revolutionaries failed to stain the honor of Navy officers.”

He was naturally arrested for his convictions and had to be executed, but sailors who admired their commander saved him. He took his family to Ukraine from where he proceeded to Crimea together with the Volunteer Army of the White Guards. When Crimea fell to the Red Army he organized evacuation of the military and their families to Turkey aboard the Kronstadt transport ship.

In Turkey he made a boat to earn a living by fishing and transportation. In 1922 the Reingards returned to Lithuania and settled in Kaunas. Their natives land near Ukmerge was nationalized by the time. As an experienced professional Fedor was recruited into the Lithuanian army in the rank of lieutenant-colonel. He lectured Navy skills in Kaunas Technical School and later founded a joint-stock company engaged in cargo sea transportation. It was the first merchant marine in Lithuania which had two vessels. In the summer of 1940 the Soviet troops occupied Lithuania and Fedor Reingard was arrested and placed in custody in the 9th Kaunas fort where he again was waiting for execution. The offensive of German troops saved him and he found himself at large. The German occupation authorities proposed to him to head a Kaunas factory if he adopts German citizenship, but he refused. Educated in the best traditions of Russian army officers he remained honest and decent to himself in any situation. He did not understand and rejected both the Soviet power and Nazi order .

In the summer of 1944 the Soviet army liberated Lithuania and Fedor Reingard realized he would be definitely executed this time. He left the country alone (the family refused to leave) and died of a heart attack in 1947 in Bavaria. According to his will, he was buried at an Orthodox cemetery. He described the horrors of the civil war and the tragic turns of his life in memoirs. The manuscript was brought to Lithuania by a Lithuanian captain and a part of the book is kept in the Maritime Museum in Klaipeda. In 2000 some of the chapters were translated into the Lithuanian language. They were published under the title Navyman, Officer, Condemned Man.

Granddaughter Natalya of Fedor Reingard was born on the eve of the war and recollected the war life in the house of her granddad by the maternity line:

— I was very little at the time. When the war broke out the father went to Russia to fight the Germans. He participated in the Kursk and Oryol battles in the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division and liberated Klaipeda region where he was several times wounded. But we did not know anything about him and lived with the granddad and grandma in a spacious house near Kaunas which the granddad built. We had a picturesque big garden planted by the granddad. Fedor Fedorovich was a strict man, but also a reasonable house master and a do-all man. I did not know what huger was during the war as the fruit and vegetable gardens fed us and not only us. The granddad lived on the upper floor and pretended not to interfere into female affairs. The mother and grandma sheltered several Jewish families in the basement. There were also Soviet soldiers who hid in the house from time to time. One of them, a Georgian, loved to play with me and said I resembled his sister. Many years later I received a present from Georgia: a silver spoon with To Natasha inscription. I also remember how together with the grandma we went through the fields to a POW camp. The grandma gave me a basket with bread. I came close to the barbed wire and put pieces of bread into stretched out hands. Naturally, there was not enough for all.

— As far as I understand, there were deep political contradictions in the family. Did they impede the life of the family?

— The granddad by maternity line was a convinced monarchist. The old-school grandma was from St. Petersburg where she received education and lived according to her outlooks. All her numerous brothers and sisters died in the Civil war between White Guards and the Red Army. The mother was not excited by the Soviet power, to put it mildly. The father joined the Communist Party during the war and responded to all mother’s remarks: “I made a deliberate decision and have no right to reject it.” In all other aspects the parents understood each other well and refrained from fanning conflicts because of personal convictions which every person has the right to have.

Affection turned into profession

After the war Leo Vladimirov worked in the republican planning committee which opened major career prospects for him. However one telephone call from the director of the Vilnius University who invited him to head the library of the institution changed everything. He immediately quit the well-paid job and headed the ineligible business. There were close to 30 confused staff who did not know what to begin with in a building with broken ceilings and ruined book stock by the Germans. The new director focused on training top quality librarians and bibliographers for the republic. Upon his initiative the university launched first a desk and in several years a department of librarians, the first in the USSR. Vladimirov compiled a training plan, gathered a team of lecturers, and himself lectured several courses in theory and history of library organization.

His main task was to restore and replenish library stock. The fate of the library of the Vilnius University which was closed by the tsar in 1832 after the 1830 Polish uprising was miserable. Most valuable books were transferred to educational establishments in Moscow, Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa. Various circumstances brought many books to Poland and Germany. Vladimirov wanted most of all to return to Vilnius the publications that belonged to the university and were kept in the Soviet Union. It was necessary to compile a preliminary list of withdrawn books for that and determine search directions. He made titanic effort and used his charm and diplomatic skills to fulfill his plans and convince those in power in Vilnius and Moscow to help.

Then Lithuanian Communist leader Antanas Sneckus supported the effort and the valuable Catechism by Martynas Mazvydas printed in 1547 was exchanged and returned from Odessa University to Lithuania. In the ’50s of the last century the family did not practically see Vladimirov as he constantly traveled to find books from Lithuania and have them returned back. It is only natural that no book keeper would voluntarily part with his stock. Vladimirov was often barred from libraries as their directors knew it was sufficient for him to just have a look at the cover page to determine the origin of the book. Thanks to his effort the Lenin library in Moscow returned such rare publications as Catechism by Mikalojus Dauksa (printed in 1595) and the only surviving copy of Francis Skaryna’s Apostle printed in Vilnius in 1525. Under Vladimirov the university book stock increased by one million printed publications. He was the first librarian who launched exchange with European countries without a single ruble from the budget.

A lesson to America

In 1964 the United Nations announced a contest to hire the director of its new library in New York. There were 18 contenders from the United States, Canada, Japan, Hungary, and other countries. The chances of Vladimirov, a Russian from Lithuania and a Communist, were slim. The requirements were strict. However Vladimirov won not only because he was fluent in six languages but mostly due to his superior professional qualities. Professional circles in the world were well aware of his noble cause of returning lost treasures back home and called him “book catcher from Vilnius”.

He worked as the director of the UN library in New York from 1964 to 1970. He began with computerizing (!) the stock and replacing manual information processing by mathematical. Even in America not everyone understood at the time the necessity of using computers for search purposes. Vladimirov was convinced electronic library search had to provide access to all those wishing not only to the source of information (references to books and magazines) but directly to the information. Many library-goers complained that it took too much time to find a reference while librarians had to sort several thousand cards a day. Besides, affiliates of the library were scattered around the world and each of them had its own book registration system. Vladimirov developed the New York library into a guiding center of all UN libraries with a single computerized information system.

After his innovations the biggest in the world Library of the US Congress got an electronic catalogue and thus became accessible for everyone. In New York Vladimirov wrote a book about pioneer printer Francis Skaryna and held an exhibition in the library devoted to the outstanding personality of Belarussian culture. He prepared essays on the history of books and libraries in Lithuania from the 15th century up to 1917 which comprised the basis of his scientific thesis. He also considered it to be his duty to develop cultural ties with Lithuanian emigrants and constantly lectured in various American universities about cultural life in Lithuania.

Back in Lithuania he found out that the post of the director of the university library was occupied. Vladimirov was offered a similar post in Moscow in the Foreign Literature Library, as well as in Minsk. But he preferred to stay in Vilnius where for many years he headed the university desk of library organization and scientific information. He modestly called himself “only a librarian” but could foresee the possibilities and horizons provided by computer technologies.

His creative legacy comprises close to 400 works in various languages and fundamental works about pioneer printers Francis Skaryna and Ivan Fedorov. In 1988 his monumental work General Book History came out. Only the first volume was printed and he worked on the second one up to the end of his life. His heirs have the manuscript but unfortunately cannot have it published because of financial problems. Several Moscow publishing houses initially agreed however later postponed the publication for unclear reasons.

He was not afraid of anything

Natalya Vladimirova recalled that her father was a fearless man and always said the truth and advocated his opinion. He told his children: “Do not be ever afraid of anything. Let others be afraid and think you have some backup”.

She remembers that the father spent all the time at his working desk and children were strictly prohibited from interfering. He was a taciturn, but joyful and witty man. If the mother complained about naughty children and jokingly suggested to lash her madcap son Yuri he always responded: “I cannot do it today. I am kind today”. In general he entrusted the mother with upbringing of two daughters and the son. There was a deep spiritual relationship and full mutual understanding between the couple.

Sometimes he teased the wife by reading Mayakovsky verses which she disliked. When he saw she was angry he switched to Pushkin. But he was very attentive to her. When his wife was hospitalized he every day told her about a new episode of Santa Barbara soap opera which was aired on TV at that time. The mother passed away five years before the father died in 1999. He could not cope with the less. It seemed to the children he continued to live with his spouse and she was always present in his undertakings and work.

It is inspiring that Leo’s grandchildren continued his cause. They grew up in international families with a mixture of Lithuanian, Russian, and Jewish blood. Natalya’s daughter Nina works in the Russian literature department of the Martynas Mazvidas Library. Other grandchildren are software engineers and experts in information which is also close to the grandfather. Under his leadership over two dozen most talented students defended their theses. At a seminar devoted to Leo Vladimirov one of his students and the head of the rare book department of the university library Ina Kazuro admitted sadly there are no people of Vladimirov’s scope, true patriots of Lithuania in the modern history of the country. It remains to wait and see. . .

Galina Afanasyeva,

for Amber Bridge

The energy situation in three post-Soviet Baltic countries differs from each other. Latvia has fully exhausted the resources of the major Daugava River in the region as nothing can be added to the existing cascade of hydropower plants there. Estonia generates power at Narva hydropower plant and heat plants and also receives electricity from Finland. Experts call for the construction of a liquefied gas terminal. Lithuania shut down the Sovietbuilt nuclear power plant and there is talk about the construction of a new one. It seems Lithuania lags behind the cherished dream of energy independence most of all.

How can the goal be achieved?

Green, but unprofitable

“Green” energy and co-generation (combined production of electricity and heat) are the most promising types of energy. It is disappointing that the “green” energy support system, say in Latvia, is branded as “political business”.

The country remembers the recent story of the construction of small hydropower plants which “accidentally” got into the hands of the wives of high-ranking state officials. Today any production of bio energy is also linked in Latvia to businessmen who are close to authorities. One cannot but agree with Economy Minister Daniels Pavluts who called for reforms and transparent energy management system.

The economy ministry submitted to the government its initiatives aimed at introducing new transparent and efficient standards of support to renewable sources of energy and cogeneration. The EU works to increase the share of renewable energy in the total power end-use to decrease reliance on fossil fuel. Latvia has pledged to achieve 40% of renewable energy in the total balance by 2020. “I am convinced it is an important goal and we have to support alternative energy producers. However economic growth possibilities and improved wellbeing of people cannot be sacrificed for the sake of statistical indicators. We cannot allow Latvia to preserve inefficient and nontransparent system under the cover of movement towards the conditional EU goal. The system has already created a new elite of green speculators at the expense of the taxpayer,” the economy minister said.

The obligatory purchase principle is currently in force in Latvia to support “green” energy producers: Latvenergo utility has to pay for renewable energy and co-generation much more than the market price. The difference is paid by all end-users, i.e. by every resident of the country.

What is to be done in the situation?

Naturally, cost efficiency of production has to be improved and the policy of endless subsidies has to be gradually abandoned. Lithuania and Denmark guarantee support to electricity producers for ten years, Hungary – 8, Estonia provides its current 7-year discounted tariff to the plants operating with biomass and hydro energy. There is no other country in the EU besides Latvia that provides unlimited support to renew able energy.

“I hope that in 2020 when we assess the implementation of the National development plan we shall state that the dream about green, economically feasible and competitive Latvia has come true and was no disappointment,” said optimistic Daniels Pavluts.

Vysaginas sword

There is also atomic power besides alternative energy sources. The construction of the Vysaginas NPP is on the Lithuanian agenda. Initially it was planned to engage neighboring countries in the construction but Poland and Estonia delicately refused. The Latvian position remains unclear.

Visaginas is said to be very lucrative for Latvia, however nobody has provided any convincing evidence. Politicians and their close businessmen claim the co-ownership of the plant will provide cheap electricity to Latvian consumers. However nobody explains how it is possible to buy electricity below market prices. There is no answer how the used nuclear fuel will be disposed of. Who and where will keep it? The hypothetic Latvian billion euro suggested for investment into Vysaginas NPP can be used for other guidelines.

“Latvia has to invest a billion euro not into Lithuanian economy and the construction of Vysaginas NPP, but into its own economy,” said President of the gas company Itera Latvija Juris Savickis. Although he represents competing industry he supports not only the construction of Vysaginas NPP but also the nuclear power plants in Belarus and Kaliningrad enclave of Russia. But he insists Latvia has to limit itself by bids for partial assignments in the Vysaginas projec which will be fully controlled by Lithuania and the strategic partner – the Japanese Hitachi Corporation.

The nuclear project in Vysaginas is not just a power plant. It is a major and profitable project for Lithuania which will push the ailing economy from the deadlock. ” I know the neighbors and have no doubt that most orders for the NPP will remain in Lithuania and that Lithuanians will win the tenders. Everything which Lithuania is capable of producing for the NPP will be made in the country. Naturally, Lithuanians cannot make the turbine while uranium will be supplied by Americans who cooperate with Hitachi,” Savickis said. Who will control the whole project? Lithuanians and Hitachi. However Vilnius is interested in getting the Latvian billion euro. . .

What can Latvia build with the billion? For example, a big gas storage in Dobele and its own liquefied gas terminal. It is an expensive project but it will be owned by Latvia. The billion can be invested into “green” power. Besides power engineering there are related industries which need investments.

It is also important that Lithuanians did not support the NPP project at a consultative referendum held together with parliamentary election. The NPP was backed by 34.09 percent of voters while 62.68 were against.

Gas puzzle

Baltic countries have no commercial gas reserves and buy the fuel in Russia. In seven months of 2012 Latvia imported natural gas worth 400 million dollars which is a 24.5 percent increase against the same period in 2011, the central statistics service of the country said.

Gas to Latvia is imported by the Latvijas gāze Company which pumps it into the Incukalns storage and then delivers it to Latvian, Estonian, Russian, and Lithuanian consumers. Gas to Latvia is supplied by Gazprom and Itera Latvija which is a part of the international Itera Group. In 2011 the supplies were worth over 200 million dollars or 52.2 percent above the 2011 figure. Profit exceeded 16 million dollars and was 60.9 percent above previous indicators, according to the financial statement of the company.

Lithuanian Energy Minister Jaroslav Neverovic said his country wants to ensure competitive gas prices at talks with Gazprom. Key to the aim is the construction of a liquefied gas terminal. Lithuania wants to build it in Klaipeda in order to supply also Latvia and Estonia. Latvian experts believe it is more profitable to build the terminal in Latvia as it already has developed infrastructure and an underground storage in Incukalns. There is also a good site for a new storage on the border with Lithuania. According to research, the storage can decrease Baltic reliance on Gazprom from 100% to 59%.

There are alternative points of view in the dispute about the liquefied gas terminal. Thus, the Booz&Company consultancy believes it is more profitable to build it in Estonia or Finland rather than in Lithuania or Latvia.

Shale gas

The basic technology of shale gas production was borrowed by the Americans from Nazi Germany which had no oil and had to learn how to produce synthetic petrol from coal.

In Europe shale gas resources in-place are estimated between 19.4 and 91.4 trillion cubic meters. Extractable reserves are estimated at 15 trillion cubic meters. The U.S. Energy Information Administration puts the figure at 22.6 trillion.

The main shale gas deposits are located in northern Germany, France, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Ukraine, and Baltic countries while extractable reserves of the shale gas, according to the estimates of the U.S. administration, are accumulated in Poland (6.6 trillion cubic meters), France (6.4), Norway (2.9), Ukraine (1.5), Sweden (1.4), Denmark (0.8), and Great Britain (0.7 trillion cubic meters).

Main shale gas, gas and coalbed methane basins in Europe.

The estimates made over 40 countries prospect for shale gas in Europe close to consumption areas which minimizes transportation costs. They include Shell, Chevron, Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips, OMV, Halliburton and other giants. Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Spain, France, and England are experiencing a genuine shale gas boom triggered by the hope to repeat American shale gas revolution.

However there are skeptical voices as well.

Head of the British energy regulator Office of Gas and Electricity Markets Alister Buchanan said shale gas production was unlikely to begin in Europe earlier than 2025 and production volume can reach 15 billion cubic meters by 2030. BP estimated total European production of all nontraditional gas (shale, coalbed methane, etc) at 50 billion cubic meters by 2030. Therefore, imported gas will continue to play a major role in supplies for a long time. BP estimated it will account for 75 percent of gas consumption in the EU by 2030. Over a half (nearly 60%) will be supplied by pipelines.

Latvian scientists are in general skeptical about shale gas production in the country. However some politicians promise “to liberate” Europe from Russian natural gas at the expense of Latvian shale gas.

Latvian geologist Lyudmila Kartunova said Latvia is rich in all elements of the Mendeleev table. However, the entrails, like in most European countries, differ in structure from North America. It might be cheaper to fly to the Moon for some natural resources than produce them at home.

No sensations

Latvia plans to have a half of renewable energy in its balance by 2030. “At present Latvia produces first-generation biofuel from rape and grain. Production will continue for some time however the products do not satisfy durability criteria. Transition to second or even third generation of biofuel is expected by 2030. In 2017 Latvia may get a refinery to produce biofuel from wood,” said State Secretary of the Latvian economy ministry Juris Putse.

Properly purified rape seed oil used to produce biofuel is also suitable for food consumption although it depends on personal taste. Unfortunately, over a half of all fields in Latvia continue to grow the beautiful but very harmful plant for agriculture.

What do Baltic countries have to do to ensure energy independence? Anyway they shall not expect sensational solutions.

For example, Latvenergo plans to reconstruct the cascade of Daugava hydroelectric power plants by 2021 and replace all 21 turbines to increase their capacity. By now eight out of ten turbines of the Plavinas hydropower plant and four out of seven turbines of Keguma plant have been reconstructed. Investments exceeded 200 million dollars but will generously repay.

Prospects to reduce prices are offered by the planned construction of three nuclear power plants which is too many for the small region.

Wind turbines are promising on the sea coast.

What else? There are forests and marshes, wood and peat. However firewood would hardly keep the region warm.

Valery Zaitsev,

Valery Gorbov,

for Amber Bridge