General demographic trends that are causing concern in many countries around the world, i.e. decreasing population and increasing emigration flows, can be also observed in the Baltik Sea region (BSR). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia are a prime example of countries where recent emigration has drawn the attention of policy makers looking to mitigate potential negative impacts of the departure of the young and skilled emigrants as well as to support economic development. For example, over the period of 1992-2010, more than 3.6 million people left Russia. Further, according to the Statistics Lithuania, 0.7 million people have left the country during 1990-2011. This article focuses on migration processes and labour market integration in the BSR covering Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia and their connections to Finland.

Finland has been the main destination for Estonian migrants. The migration flows from Estonia to Finland have increased in size, 600% during 1991-2012. The most remarkable flows of immigration were from Russia to Finland in the 1990’s, when Ingrian Finns received returnee status. In spite of the geographically close location, Finland has not been the most important destination for Latvians and Lithuanians.

The age structure of the immigrants is favourable from the labour market perspective being younger than that of the Finns. What is problematic is that immigrants have many times higher unemployment rate compared to the native population. There are, however, differences according to citizenship in the labour market participation. Immigrants are sometimes ready to take a job not matching to their education, i.e. facing brain waste, over-qualified or overeducation. It is important to empower immigrants with language education. Complementary training is required but it has to be organised in close cooperation with both public and private sector actors.

If the differences in standard of living between Finland and the BSR will decrease, the immigration pressure will decrease. Return migration to the origin country is one important pull effect and option for the BSR immigrants while so-called soft values get more meaning in migration decisions, i.e. roots to origin country. The recommendation is that there should be organised more language education for immigrants, and also specialised courses according to the language skill levels. There should be more easy-connections to the working life and one good practice is to have training and mentoring in different branches of economical life. It is very important to recognise human and cultural capital which all immigrants bring into the destination country.

1. Introduction

Population ageing is the reason for the diminishing supply of labour in developed countries. For example in Finland, there is a remarkable change in population structure when the baby-boom generation after the World War II retires during the current decade. The share of elderly is growing in the dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is an age-population ratio of those typically not in the labour force and those typically in the labour force. Finland is not the only country to struggle with this development trend since quite generally it is said that Europe is ageing and for example Germany, well-known as an attractive country for immigrants, needs more immigrants for its labour markets (Elliott and Kollewe 2011). It is also said that there is a competition of skilled labour between different countries. With current demographic trends many countries will come to rely increasingly on the immigration of foreign labour. Discussions focus mainly on need for skilled workers; however, the future demand for labour will most likely relate to all skill categories (Heikkilä and Pikkarainen 2008; see El-Cherkeh 2009).

This article focuses on migration processes and labour market integration in the BSR (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia) and more closely their connections to Finland. First, an overview of the BSR’s population change and migration on the European level is given. This is showing how diverse regions there are when looking population processes. Secondly, a more detailed analysis of the main international migration flows in the BSR is made. Analysis gives the view where people from the BSR are emigrating and from where people are immigrating to the BSR. After that we look at the BSR countries’ immigration to Finland and also emigration from Finland to the BSR. Immigrants’ integration in the labour market is discussed with an emphasis on Finland. After these analyses, the challenges to future developments are discussed in a wider perspective.

The data consist of published data from Statistics Finland and the BSR official statistics. Also special maps of Nordregio (www.nordregio.se) have been used as graphics.

Figure 1. Population change in the EU Source: Nordregio, Roto 2011.

2. The Baltic Sea region in the European demographic context

According to the EU statistics over 100 million people live in the Baltic Sea region. They constitute some 23% of the EU’s population (Iglebaek 2009).

The BSR is in different position in population change compared, on the European level, for example to Central and Southern Europe: the BSR is facing population decrease, not only in the beginning of the 2000’s but also in the future up to 2020. Figure 1 combines population changes in 2000-2008 and 2008-2020 showing more closely those regions with the decrease in population in both periods. These are mainly found in Central East European countries, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and as well as regions in central Germany. There are also classified those regions which indicate an increase of population both in 2000-2008 and also up to 2020. These are mostly areas in the core of Europe as well as areas close to metropolitan areas. There are separately found areas that have experienced an increase of population in the first period but are expected to lose population up to 2020 and separately regions on the contrary which might expect an increase (Nordregio, Roto 2011).

Figure 2. Net migration in Europe 2000-2008 (annual average net migration per 1000 inhabitants, in the EU NUTS3 regions)  Source: Nordregio, Roto 2011.

Indeed the entire BSR shows a slight decline in total population, but on closer inspection it can be seen that continuing overall urban growth goes hand in hand with rural decline, although with contrasting tendencies between the various countries involved. The majority of small and medium-sized cities and towns, and specifically those that are to be found in relatively peripheral situations, are, however, increasingly hampered by population decrease. The key drivers of population change remain in place: strong migration surpluses in the Western part of the BSR and extensive natural losses in the Eastern BSR, with, however, distinctive national and regional variations pertaining (Neubauer and Schmitt 2009). According to Roll (2009), the peripheral border regions are usually located on the EU’s fringes, bordering economically less developed countries. She uses the concept “double peripheries” within a greater European context – distant not only from the dynamic centres of “Core Europe” – but also from prosperous national centres as well. Further she is stating that as new EU Member States have to compete economically with the “old” Member States, this is done at the expense of underdeveloped peripheral, and especially rural areas in the “new states”, entering into the EU in the 2000’s, which do not have for example the skilled personnel and infrastructure that the highly developed centres, usually national capitals, have.

The main reasons for population change are natural population development and migration. In the EU two thirds of the regions had a migration surplus and 40% a natural population increase in the period 2000-2008. In approximately 30% of European regions both of these components were positive. Almost 80% of the regions with positive in-migration also had a total population increase. In 200 EU regions the total population was decreasing even though net migration was positive. These regions are mainly located in Eastern Germany, Greece and Portugal, i.e. in regions with very low birth rates. At a general level a spatial polarisation is visible in relation to net migration, both between Eastern and Western Europe and between the metropolitan and the more rural and peripheral regions. In-migration was highest in some Spanish coastal regions and around Madrid, in 8 of these regions annual in-migration was over 3%. The highest out-migration regions were in Eastern Germany. In Figure 2 it can be seen that the BSR has had remarkable regional differences in net migration with vast regions of negative net migration and some regions, mostly urban areas, getting migration gain in 2000-2008 (Nordregio, Roto 2011).

3. International migration in the Baltic Sea region

The international migrant stock in the world was approximately 232 million people in 2013. This means that the percentage of international migrants among the world population was 3.1 in 2013. There were 195 million international migrants in 2005, which shows that the migration flows are increasing on the global level. In the total volume of the world’s immigration Russia takes the second place after the USA (Heikkilä 2010; Beloborodov 2011; OECD 2013a). The principle of free movement is one of the core principles of the European Union. Migration and  labour mobility is viewed as an important way of matching labour demand and supply, and thus increasing employment and competitiveness. While the flows, for example of Nordic-Baltic migration, might be small compared to the rest of the movements within Europe, they have an important role to play in the development of the region and relationships between countries. Next international migration in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia is analysed. The last three countries entered the EU in May 2004. The migration streams between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are very small in numbers: for example emigration from Lithuania to Latvia was only 202 persons and emigration from Estonia to Latvia only 52 persons and to Lithuania 33 persons in 2012.

3.1. Russia

The Russian population has been steadily declining for almost two decades now. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the population of Russia was recorded at 148.5 million. The 2010 census, the results of which were released in late 2011 and early 2012, reports that the official population of Russia was 142.9 million. In 2009 Russia Recorded population growth for the first time in 15 years, with a growth rate of 23,300. Key reasons for the slow current population growth are improving health care, changing fertility patterns among younger women, and nowadays Russia pays child benefits according to the number of children, falling emigration and steady influx of immigrants from the ex-USSR countries. In the 1990’s-2000’s, migrants into Russia were mostly Russian expatriates and their descendants. For example in 2005, 95% of the documented migrants came from the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They were mainly Russians or Russian speakers  repatriating from Kazakhstan (29%), Ukraine (17%), Uzbekistan (17%), and Kyrgyzstan (9%). In recent years, most immigrants have come from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Every year, 300,000 immigrants arrive in Russia, of which almost half are ethnic Russians. Most international migration in the Russian Federation is temporary. Temporary labour migration flows are normally at least three times higher than permanenttype flows (see Banjanovic 2007; OECD 2013b; Vishnevsky 2013; World Population Review 2014).

The census, conducted in 2010, counted 11.2 million foreign-born persons, nearly 0.8 million (or 7%) fewer than in the 2002 census. Most of the foreign-born population comes from the former Soviet Union (FSU), led by Ukraine (26%) and Kazakhstan (22%). Between 2002 and 2010, the number of migrants born in countries in Central Asia rose, while the number of those born in Ukraine and Belarus fell. Nationals from the Central Asian countries made up 42% of the foreign population, led by Uzbekistan (19%). Among nationalities from outside the FSU, China (4%) was the main origin country (OECD 2013b).

Over the period of 1992 2010, more than 3.6 million people left Russia. The largest Russian emigration stocks are found in the European Union, with Germany having the largest number, followed by Estonia and Latvia. Other countries which have remarkable Russian emigration stocks are Ukraine, Israel, and the USA. Mostly, emigrants from Russia have been qualified specialists, who reinforced the economically active population as well as the intellectual and reproductive potential of other countries. For example in the early 2000’s, 43% of Russian migrants in OECD countries aged 15 years and over had higher education. Most Russian migrants are women. In Italy they account for more than 80% of Russian citizens living there; in Spain, Germany, Norway, Australia, and France their share varies from 60% to 70%. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that they marry foreigners more often than men do. For example in 2006, marriage accounted for 30% of female immigration from Russia to France, while the corresponding figure for men was just 3.5%. The reproductive losses caused by female emigration from Russia are indirectly estimated at 0.8 million children that will not be born in the nearest 5 years (Beloborodov 2011; Denisenko 2013).

3.2. Estonia

The Estonian population on January 1st 2013 was estimated at 1.29 million, a decline of 5.5% since 2000. About 16% of the resident population were foreigners, the vast majority of whom are longstanding internal migrants who came from other parts of the Soviet Union prior to 1991. The natural increase was negative (-1,378 persons) in 2012. The net migration was also negative, i.e. 6,629 more persons emigrated than immigrated. There were 4,244 immigrants and 10,873 emigrants, which is 4,659 persons more than a year earlier. In immigration, the main origin countries have been Finland (35%) and Russia (24%). EU-27 countries have covered over a half (55%) of the immigration flows in 2012. EU-15 countries have been origin countries among 53% of immigrants which shows that over a half of the immigrants are moving, more closely, from EU-15 to Estonia. Since Estonia’s accession to the European Union in 2004, returning Estonian citizens have accounted for a large proportion of inflows to Estonia. In 2011, this percentage was 55 of all immigrants. Most immigrants come to Estonia to join their spouses and close relatives. In 2011 majority of residence permits have been issued on the grounds of labour and family ties (OECD 2013b; Statistics Estonia 2014).

When looking at emigration from Estonia, the main destination countries have been Finland (59%) and the United Kingdom (13%) in 2012. EU-27 countries have been target countries in 90% of Estonian emigration flows. When looking specifically at EU-15 countries, their proportion was 87% of the emigration flows from Estonia. Emigration flow from Estonia to Russia has been small, 382 persons in 2012. According to the Estonian population census, in early 2012, there were 24,900 Estonians working abroad. 61% of all Estonians working abroad was working in Finland (OECD 2013b; Statistics Estonia 2014).

3.3. Latvia

At the beginning of 2013, Latvia’s population was 2.02 million. Between the 2000 and the 2011 censuses, Latvia’s population had fallen by almost 13%. 63% of this decline was due to net migration, which has been negative throughout the past decade. Latvia’s population has faced also a remarkable natural population loss in 2013 (-8,475).

The international long-term immigration flow was 13,303 persons in 2012. Over a half (55%) of the immigrants to Latvia have moved from the EU-28 countries. More specifically EU-15 has been the origin area for 47% of the immigrants to Latvia in 2012 (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2014; OECD 2013b).

The international long-term emigration flow numbered 25,163 persons in 2012. Almost 82% of the emigration was targeted towards the EU-28 countries, and 80% was towards EU-15 countries. After joining the European Union in 2004, Latvia has experienced a considerable wave of labour migration to more prosperous countries, especially to the United Kingdom and Ireland. It has been estimated that approximately 200,000 Latvians have emigrated in search for work after joining the EU. Unemployment climbed from 5% to more than 20%, and remains about 14% in 2012. Migration has also picked up to Germany. In 2010, the second largest emigration flow from Latvia was towards Russia while the United Kingdom was number one and Ireland the third destination country (Latvijas statistika 2014). Recent emigrants have been disproportionately young – 70% between the ages of 18 and 34 – and more educated than those who have remained (OECD 2013b; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2014).

3.4. Lithuania

Lithuania’s population was 2.97 million in 2013. The country has faced a remarkable natural population loss in 2013 (-10,698). Lithuania is a country of emigration and one of the few EU “sending countries”. According to the Statistics Lithuania, over 700,000 people have left the country during 1990-2011. In 2013, the number of immigrants to Lithuania was 23,643 persons but number of emigrants from Lithuania to foreign countries was much higher, 40,391 persons. This means a remarkable population loss in international migration (-16,748 persons) in 2013. Return migration has accounted for nearly 90% of all entries in 2011, mainly from the United Kingdom (41%), Ireland (12%), Norway (8%), Spain (5%), and Germany (5%). Labour emigration to those countries was substantial during their economic boom, and return has occurred with decreased labour demand (OECD 2013a, 2013b; Statistics Lithuania 2014).

The main destination countries in 2011 remained the United Kingdom and Ireland although they drew a smaller share than before the crisis, while Scandinavian countries grew in importance. Prior to the accession to the EU it was the Russian Federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the USA that attracted highest numbers of migrants from Lithuania (International Organization for Migration Mission in Lithuania 2011). Lithuanian emigration predominantly consists of young, single and educated individuals. The 2010 data show that 55% of the emigrants were 20 to 35 years old, 50% had special upper secondary education and 25% completed higher and professional education. Family emigration is also on the rise. Until recently, migrant parents preferred to leave their children with extended family members, a so-called split family phenomenon, or disintegration of families and households (Schmitt et al. 2008), while they were abroad but this trend is changing and now more parents take their children along with them as they leave (International Organization for Migration Mission in Lithuania 2011; OECD 2013b).

4. Immigration to Finland

Immigrants or foreign citizens in Finland numbered 195,511 persons in 2012, representing 3.6% of the total population. Totally, there were 285,471 persons living in Finland who were born abroad in 2012. This represents 5.3% of total population. The largest groups of those born abroad were persons born in Russia or former USSR (62,359; not including Estonia etc.), born in Estonia (34,984), born in Sweden (31,601), and born in Somalia (9,079) in 2012 (Statistics Finland 2014).

Next international migration flows from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia to Finland and vice versa is analysed (Figures 3 and 4). The most noticeable waves of immigration were from Russia to Finland in the 1990’s, when Ingrian Finns received returnee-status. Persons who have Finnish ancestry or otherwise a close connection with Finland can obtain a residence permit in Finland on certain conditions. No other reason, such as employment or study, is required to obtain the permit. Receiving the residence permit depends on the strength and closeness of Finnish ancestry. If ancestry dates back several generations, a residence permit cannot be obtained on this basis (The Finnish Immigration Services 2014). The immigration flow from Russia to Finland was highest in 1991, reaching 5,515 persons. The migration flow has diminished in the long run: there were 3,096 persons moving from Russia to Finland in 2012. Very few people moved from Finland to Russia (333 persons) in 2012. Of this flow, almost 75% were citizens of European countries excluding EU-countries, i.e. this means that many of emigrants might have been return migrants to Russia. 83 persons of emigration flow to Russia were citizens of Finland in 2012.

Estonia has been the most important BSR country from where there has been immigration to Finland during 1991-2012. The immigration flows from Estonia have been increasing: in 1991 1,073 immigrants and in 2012 already 6,422 immigrants. This growth was 600%. Since 1991, a total of around 43,000 individuals have emigrated from Estonia to Finland; and about 8,000 individuals, or 19%, have returned to Estonia. Many Estonians also live and work in Finland on a temporary basis since it is easy and relatively cheap to commute between the countries (Anniste and Tammaru 2014).

Finland has not been the most important destination for Latvians and Lithuanians, in spite of the geographically close location, as can be seen from the size of the immigration flows from these two countries. The largest flows have been in 2012 when Finland received 208 migrants from Latvia and 172 migrants from Lithuania. Emigration from Finland to the BSR has been highest to Estonia but very much smaller in size compared to immigration figures. In 2012, Finland had very positive migration balance with Estonia (Figure 4), gaining almost 5,500 persons, and with Russia (+2,763 persons). In general, motives for moving to Finland have been very much connected to family relations (60-65%) and there are nowadays over 3,700 multicultural marriages in a year in which one of the spouses is a Finnish person and the partner a foreign citizen. According to the Ministry of Labour, work related motives have represented only 5-10% of all motives during the 1990’s and the 2000’s. Other reasons have been for example seeking asylum and return migration (Kyhä 2007, 29). The basis of first residence permits that the Finnish Immigration Service issued to immigrants coming from outside the EU, the European Economic Area, EEA and Switzerland was most common family ties (34%), study (32%) and employment (29%) in 2012 (Ministry of the Interior 2013).

Figure 3. International migration between Finland and the Baltic States and Russia in 1991–2012

Source: Statistics Finland 2014.

Figure 4. International migration between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia and Finland in 2012

Source: Statistics Finland 2014.’

5. Immigrants on the Finnish labour markets

Immigrants’ age structure is favourable from the labour market perspective: there are more 20-44-year-old among Finland’s foreign-born people in relation to the share amongst those who were born in Finland (Figure 5). The percentage of people older than that and especially of pensioners is noticeable lower among the foreign-born population compared to those born in Finland. Russia in this case resembles Finland, since there are more elderly people in its population structure than in other BSR countries. As much as two thirds of those born in Lithuania and Latvia were in the age group 20-44.

The position in the labour market is a central indicator of the social status of immigrants and ethnic groups and employment constitute the foundation for successful integration for immigrants. Both in Finland and in other industrialised countries, it is more difficult for immigrants to find work than for the native population and the result is that the former often have many times higher unemployment rates than the latter (Heikkilä 2005). On the EU level, the unemployment rate is generally higher for foreign citizens thanfor nationals. In 2012, the EU unemployment rate for foreign citizens with a citizenship from another EU country was 12.5% whereas for foreign citizens with a citizenship from outside the EU the rate was almost twice as high, 21.3% (Teichgraber 2013).

The employment rate for immigrants has improved with the economic cycles in Finland. For example, during the deep economic downturn in 1994 the unemployment rate for foreigners was 53% and for the total population 17% in Finland, i.e. a three times higher rate for the former. The unemployment rates of labour force in 2011 were for foreign citizens 22% and for Finnish citizens 9%. There are huge differences in unemployment rates by citizenship in Finland: the unemployment rate for Estonians has been 11%, for Lithuanians and Latvians both 13%, for Russians 33% and for Somalis even 66% in 2011. One explanation for the better integration of Estonians is that the Estonian and Finnish languages are very similar (see Anniste and Tammaru 2014).

In general, immigrants tend to be concentrated in certain branches of activity and immigrant employment sectors show some gender differences in the 2000’s. Trade has been the most important sector to employ both immigrant men and women. Finance, insurance, real estate and business activities -sector has especially employed men. For women, education and research have been important, and also employment in health and social work. For example, nowadays there are around 300 Estonian medical doctors working in Finland. Although there are more and more Estonians in different economical sectors, the construction sector is employing the greatest share of Estonians (Tuohinen 2014). Transport and communication and construction sectors have, thus, been important for immigrant men in general. Industry has employed many men, and manufacture of electrical machinery has been especially important. It is clearly seen that the proportion of the employed has grown with better education among both males and females (Heikkilä and Pikkarainen 2008).

Figure 5. Age structures of population living in Finland by country of birth: born in Finland, all foreign countries,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia and the former USSR (excluding the Baltic States) in 2012

Source: Statistics Finland 2014.

When looking at entrepreneurship, 11% of the employed Finns have been entrepreneurs in 2011 but among Turks it is far more common: 38% of the employed Turks have been entrepreneurs. When looking at the BSR countries in 2011, 7% of the employed Estonians were entrepreneurs, totally in numbers 1,330 entrepreneurs. The numbers of Russian entrepreneurs (929), Latvian entrepreneurs (44) and Lithuanian entrepreneurs (21) are much smaller compared to Estonians in 2011 (Statistics Finland 2014).

6. Future aspects

General demographic trends that are causing concern in many countries around the world – decreasing population and increasing emigration flows – can be also observed in the BSR. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Russia are a prime example of countries where recent emigration has drawn the attention of policy makers looking to mitigate potential negative impacts of the departure of the young and skilled emigrants as well as to support economic development. The latter two countries in particular saw outflows’ rise after accession to the European Union. For example in Lithuania emigration accounted for approximately 90%of total population decline. These outflows exacerbate a demographic situation in which the Baltic States face a rapidly ageing population and receive few immigrants themselves (OECD 2013a). The shrinking labour force and the safeguarding of public infrastructures, combined with the retention of an acceptable level of public service provision “greying societies” will remain among the most persistent challenges up to the year 2030 and most likely even beyond (Neubauer and Schmitt 2009; OECD 2013a). Also for example, Russia’s population shrinks by 700,000 people each year due to high mortality and low birth rates. Migration could help compensate Russia’s population decline and labour shortage. When looking future scenarios, migration alone cannot make up for the population loss. Russia is trying to attract qualifiend workers and compatriots (Banjanovic 2007).

It is more difficult for immigrants to find work than for the native population and the result is that the former often have many times higher unemployment rates than the latter. It is generally acknowledged that it is difficult for employers to evaluate a person’s qualifications when accredited certification is available. This is because the content of education and degrees differ to such an extent between countries (Kahila et al. 2013). Immigrants are in many cases ready to take a job not corresponding to their education, i.e. facing brain waste and overeducation, just to get the first step to labour markets and through it to integrate into the society. These types of jobs are so-called incoming jobs which include for example jobs in cleaning and restaurant work -sectors. According to Anniste and Tammaru (2014), found their survey data from 2009, around a third of the migrants from Estonia stated that upon arrival in Finland they had to accept a job that was beneath their qualifications.

In Kyhä’s (2011) dissertation, a positive finding was that if higher educated immigrants succeeded in finding employment in Finland, the work was usually completely or partially relevant to their degrees. Further, higher educated immigrants’ career starts in Finland can be categorised into three groups, each of which is further divided into two subgroups so that there are altogether six different types of career starts: 1) stable career and 2) stabilising career corresponding to education, 3) mixed career and 4) declining career partially corresponding to education, as well as 5) entry career, not corresponding to education, and 6) unemployment.

Education is a very important tool and it empowers immigrants. Language education and language learning through for example so-called non-stop language education and through hobbies like sports, sewing groups, preparing food groups etc. are some of those tools. Further education to get qualifications updated for host country standards is important. According to Kahila et al. (2013), complementary training is required in many circumstances but it has to be organized in close co-operation with both public and private sector actors.

Most of the immigrants in the BSR and Finland come from other EU countries: for example over half (52%) of the immigrants moving to Finland were from EU countries in 2012. The competition with other European countries for well-educated migrants and migrants for different types of jobs is severe. If the differences in standard of living between for example Finland and the neighbouring countries will decrease, the immigration pressure will decrease. Temporary migration, circulation and short term employment is expected to increase (see Commission of the European Communities 2006; Heikkilä 2007; Kahila et al. 2013).

The BSR and Finland will need work-based immigrants to compensate for the labour deficit due to the baby-boom generation having left the workforce during this decade. These countries thus need immigrants for a variety of sectors, and compete for them with other ageing societies. According to Kahila et al. (2013), the Central Baltic region faces a labour shortage for example in the health care sector particularly medical doctors, nurses with different specialisations and assistant nurses as well as in the social services. For example Finland has immigrant labour reserves, i.e. unemployed and those outside the labour force, living already in the country which is potential labour force. These numbers alone are, however, too small for compensating the labour deficit in the near future (see Työministeriö 2007).

According to Schmitt et al. (2008), one of the policy implications at the macro-scale is that international companies will analyse where they have access tohighly qualified labour force before they consider setting up new facilities. At the national and regional level (micro-scale) the reality of a shrinking labour force demands that new strategies on how to attract qualified migrants from other countries to compensate for this will be put in place.

There has always been a demand for certain qualification professionals in different industries, especially when business cycles are going up. For this reason, the main task of so-called Central Baltic Job Ferry (www.cbjobferry.eu) has been to promote the mobility of professional and well educated people to ensure that there are enough qualified specialists in those regions and industries which are the most important for the future development of the whole Central Baltic region. This joint project of Finland, Sweden, Latvia and Estonia was completed in summer 2013.

Targeted return policies providing information to emigrants about changing economic and social conditions in the origin country, and allowing employers to reach out to diaspora, may help to promote some returns. There is need to provide general information about the labour market situation in the home country. The average emigrant is young, but there is a wide heterogeneity, and students, professionals and circular migrants all have different needs. For those who return, initiatives for labour market reintegration need to reflect these needs. Diaspora ponds can attract also lower cost capital from emigrants and give them a means to contribute to economic development when they no longer have family to which send remittances (OECD 2013a).

The main elements for example for affecting Estonians to return back to home country are: pay which would guarantee a good standard of living, challenge, work environment, a job with an international dimension, closeness of family and friends, etc. (OECD 2013a). Return migration back to Estonia is widespread. According to the European Social Survey in 2008, eight percent of the adult population of Estonia has worked for at least six months abroad, which is one of the highest rates in Europe (Pungas et al. 2012).

When looking at Estonian immigrants in Finland, the evidence for lifetime strategy explanation stems from the fact that income-migrants have substantially stronger plans to return. These migrants are mostly attracted by the prospects of better earnings and they express elevated intentions to return. Their low attachment to Finland may be enhanced by the possibility of easy commuting between the two countries, as frequent visits help to maintain contacts with relatives and friends living in Estonia (Pungaset al. 2012). The elements, which are affecting to the process of rooting oneself in the new homeland, as Estonians to Finland, are structural integration variables, i.e. Finnish citizenship and homeownership (Anniste and Tammaru 2014).

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The relations of Russia with the North European countries have a special place in European politics. The atmosphere of these relations has evolved over many centuries, when countries traded and fought with each other, concluded dynastic alliances, explored the Northern sea and shared cultural and scientific achievements with each other. These relations were deep and multifaceted. Their bloom came in the days of the Hanseatic League, among whose participants were many Russian cities ― Novgorod, Pskov, Tikhvin, Belozersk, Tot’ma, Torzhok, Tver, Velikyi Ustyug, Revel and others. However, not only trade relations determined the nature of mutual relations between Russia and the North European countries, as marriage of state also played an important role. A significant mark in Russian history was left by Empress Maria Feodorovna, born Danish Princess Marie Sophie Frederikke Dagmara, who became the wife of Emperor Alexander III and mother of the last Russian Emperor Nikolay II.

Perhaps the most serious test of the relationship took place during the Great Northern War, when Peter the Great “cut the window” into Europe in spite of Sweden and strengthened the military position of Russia on the Baltic Sea. European capitals were not happy about the strengthening of Russia on the Baltic Sea, but after a while Stockholm and Copenhagen admitted the increasing influence of Russia on world politics. A century after Poltava Victory at the beginning of the XIX century, Russia made an enormous contribution to the development of the Finnish state, including it in its membership and granting the broadest autonomy to the Grand Duchy of Finland. Finally, in the XX century, the Soviet Union made a major contribution to the liberation of Europe from fascism; Soviet troops took part in the liberation of North Norway from Nazi troops.

The present stage of this relationship was marked by the “cold war”, when during the confrontation between West and East the policy of restraint and neutrality was used by social democratic governments of Sweden and Finland, what helped to create at that difficult time a climate of trust between the countries, belonging to different military-political blocs. Despite the fact that the level of mutual trust at that time was not always very high, it was fully offset by restraint in military and strategic issues, as well as the desire to preserve regional stability.

As you know, three of five North European countries (Norway, Denmark and Iceland) were fully integrated into the North Atlantic alliance, the first two even worked out plans in case of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, while Sweden and Finland remained neutral. At the same time Finland had a special place in the relations with the West and the Soviet Union. Its sovereignty was partially limited by a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948, in which both countries made a commitment “not to conclude any alliance and not to participate in the coalition directed against another High Contracting Parties”[1].

The disappearance of the USSR and the victory of Western democracy inspired many people to revise previous models of interaction. In the 1990s, the Finnish model was rejected by the supporters of the Euroatlantic choice and new generation of politicians of the North European countries, representing the right-wing conservatists. At the same time due to a misunderstanding were forgotten unique achievements of this model of relationship. Meanwhile, the historical significance of the model “Finlandization” lay in the fact that with the help of it Finland, on one hand, significantly reduced the risk of being involved in a confrontation between East and West, and on the other hand ― it was able to take full advantage of the economic benefits of its geographical location and the Soviet-Finnish border. The model of “Finlandization” opened access to capacious Soviet market for the high-quality Finnish goods and helped our northern neighbour to avoid confrontation with Moscow, didn’t allow to draw The Country of Thousands of Lakes in dubious military and political maneuvers that could have escalated into an armed conflict.

Whatever it was, already at a new historical stage in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the basis of these relations contained the idea of maintaining a sub-regional stability, improving the climate of trust and sustainable development. Thus the development meant not only an increase in turnover, but also the creation of democratic institutions, which would bring together the political systems of Russia and the North European countries. The indicator of progress in this direction was the emergence of subregional organizations (CBSS, BEAC), as well as the attempt to create a common space of development, expressed in the concept of “Northern Dimension”.

This stage of relations between Russia and the North European countries lead to serious contradictions, which had the ideological character. Russia agreed to adopt Western liberal democratic model for the creation and development of the Russian government institutions and local governments, but strongly disagreed with the fact that the Western liberal ideology would completely replace its national identity, abolish religious standards and force Russia to sacrifice its national interests in the nearest countries. For example, the North European countries really did not understand Russia’s reaction to the infringement of the rights of Russians in the Baltic States, believing that the imperial period of Russian history should have stayed in the past.

From its side, Russia did not understand a lot in the politics and actions of the North European countries. It was difficult to realise, for example, the reason for increased military budgets of Sweden and Finland against the significant reduction of the Russian military capacity after the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent reductions in the 1990s. It was hard to understand, why the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Baltic countries was not accompanied with a normalization of relations with Moscow, but instead led to a serious deterioration of relations in almost all important areas ― political, economic and humanitarian. Russia sincerely hoped that the North European countries, which took care of young democracies in the Baltic States, would be able to convince them of the need to ensure the equal rights of Russian-speaking population, especially since similar rights were provided to all national minorities living in the North European countries. Russia did not understand the need of the entry of the Baltic States into NATO, as well as the upsell of the thesis about the “Russian threat” by the leadership of the republics.

Over the past 10-15 years Russia’s relations with the countries of North Europe continued to develop on its special path, alternating the periods of recovery and recession. Significant milestone of this relationship became the restart of the program “Northern Dimension” in 2006. As a result, Russia was proclaimed the main target of this initiative, as originally proposed by the author of the idea of “Northern Dimension” – Finland. The program received a new framework document, identified new joint projects. ND had at its disposal two new partnerships ― in the field of transport and logistics (2008), as well as in the field of culture (2011).

However, two years later relations were spoiled by the events in the Caucasus, where Russia came to the defense of the interests of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Scandinavian countries supported Georgia’s position. Then Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt compared Russia’s actions to protect its citizens with the actions of Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland. After 8 years, he also condemned Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, comparing the policies of the President of Russia with the seizure of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein[2]. The fact that these statements were not a spontaneous and short-term splash of emotions, was confirmed by the events of 2008, when Poland and Sweden became the ideological inspirers of “Eastern Partnership”, the purpose of which was the gradual integration of the former Soviet Union in Western institutions. Anti-Russian orientation of the initiative was read between the lines.

In fact, the crisis in the Caucasus in 2008 and the promotion of the “Eastern Partnership” exacerbated the competition between Russia and the EU for the political dominance in the former Soviet Union, and a very active role in the EU’s eastern policy was played by two countries ― Poland and Sweden. From the point of view of Western countries, it looked as a competition between a neo-imperial project, which was supported by Russia as the center of Orthodox Slavic civilization and Western liberal project, aimed at establishing the economic, ideological and informational control over the European CIS countries, as well as the states of Transcaucasus. In this case, the coexistence of “Northern Dimension” and “Eastern Partnership” did not mean a fundamental difference of opinions between Finland and Sweden.

Preserving a common approach and a common strategy towards Russia, Stockholm and Helsinki disagree on tactics: if the project “Northern Dimension” is supported by Finland and is aimed at the gradual democratization of Russia and rapprochement with the West, the project “Eastern Partnership”, which is backed by Sweden, in fact recognizes that Russia is unlikely to be part of the Western world in the foreseeable future, and aims to establish control over the newly independent states established on the ruins of the Soviet Union.

Political upheaval and civil war in the Ukraine in this sense are not the starting point of the crisis in relations between Russia and the North European countries, but is a new stage of ideological confrontation, which was indicated in the middle of the 2000s. The aforementioned Swedish politician does not hide it as well. According to Carl Bildt, Russia in the 1990s demonstrated commitment to Western values, but with the coming of Vladimir Putin to power Moscow faced tough opposition to the Western policy. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden believes that the contradiction between Russia and the West is of a fundamental ideological character: “The new anti-Western and antidecadent line of Putin is built on deeply conservative orthodox ideas»[3].

It must be noted that the offensive Western policy towards Russia, combined with tough rhetoric of certain Western politicians have almost fully revived the political atmosphere of the “cold war”, and the media of the West has begun to carefully sculpt an “enemy image” from Russia. How long will the new “cold war” be, and how long will be the economic sanctions against Russia? This raises the third question: what is the position of countries on this issue? In particular, what do leaders and leading politicians of the North European countries think about it?

Many years of mutually beneficial cooperation have taught many to conclude that the North of Europe is quite a well-off region and Russia’s relations with the countries of the region seem to be promising and mutually beneficial. And, in fact, there were no open conflicts in the North of Europe with the participation of Russia, except for those systematic violations of the rights of Russians living in the Baltic states, and they mostly boil down to two main problems: failure of Latvia and Estonia to grant citizenship to all residents, who were born there and lived at the time of the declaration of independence of these countries, as well as the denial of the right of these people, and especially ― their children ― to receive education in their native language. In 2010, Russian initiative was to settle the dispute between Russia and Norway regarding the section of the Barents Sea between two countries. Thus, all potential conflicts in the region have been minimized.

However, it did not prevent the Norwegian oil company Statoil from withdrawing from the joint project of developing the Arctic shelf with Russia; Norway declared that its sanctions and EU sanctions against Russia wouls be cancelled only when Russia changed its policy in Ukraine. Explaining the position of the state, Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende recalled that the sanctions against Moscow were introduced after the annexation of the Crimea, as well as other “violations of the international law in the eastern regions of Ukraine[4].

It should be noted that Norway not being a member of the EU, was free on the question of participation in the sanctions, as well as on the issue of the degree of its rigidity and duration. For example, Turkey, which, together with Norway being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, decided not to join the sanctions at all, because it saw it as a threat to its national interests in the Black Sea region.

The fact that Norway did not simply join the sanctions, but chose their toughest variant, signifies either a serious crisis in bilateral relations, or that the foreign policy of Norway on the question of sanctions is completely subordinated to politics of Washington or Brussels. This situation has opened another unpleasant situation for Russia’s foreign policy: the signing of a bilateral agreement between Moscow and Oslo on the delimitation of the disputed waters of the Barents Sea in 2010 and reciprocal steps by President Medvedev had absolutely no effect on improving the climate of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, even in Norway one can hear louder voices of opposition to the current position of the country with regard to Russia. Thus, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre recalled “the millennial experience of a peaceful neighborhood” with Russia.[5].

Thus, the events of the Ukrainian crisis has shown that the most irreconcilable and active critics of Russia’s actions are the North European countries, namely Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Acuity of their position is not inferior to the positions of the United States and Canada, and on the degree of hardness it’s stronger that one of France and Germany. On the contrary, Finland and Iceland at the outset showed much more balanced position, based on considerations of economic pragmatism dominated the political arguments.

Finland’s position from the beginning tended to a compromise, and Prime Minister Alexander Stubb has repeatedly spoken out against imposal, extension and tightening of the sanctions, as the importance of Russia for the Finnish economy is too huge[6]. It can be explained by the fact that among all North European countries, Finland faces the greatest losses from the sanctions regime, as well as the impact from Moscow responses, which imposed a total ban on exports of beef, pork, vegetables and fruit, meat, poultry, fish, cheese, milk and dairy products to Russia.

Denmark and the Danish Board of Agriculture and the Economy also warned on the serious impact of Russian counter-sanctions on its economy. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Denmark, exports to Russia in 2013 amounted to 2.14 billion USD, of which 891 million USD accounted for agricultural exports. At the same time, the share of Russia in the exports of Denmark does not exceed 1.9%, which allows the country’s leaders to insist on the continuation of anti-Russian sanctions. This, in particular, was declared by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt[7].

According to the polls carried out in March 2014 by Taloustutkimus, the majority of Finnish society (60%) is foreign to anti-Russian sentiment, and Russia is not perceived as a threat. Finnish President Sauli Niinistë agrees with the opinion of the Finnish society: “We are neighbours. Unlike other neighbours of Russia, we are not members of NATO. Our relations with Russia are based on bilateral contacts”[8]. The position of Finland is not opportunistic, but consistent and is based on the mood of the majority of Finnish society, which has been recently shown by the events, when the Finnish leadership voted against the supply of arms of Kiev authorities^[9].

Against the balanced and moderate position of Finland Sweden is continuing to demonstrate hardness against Moscow. Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström said that Russia poses a serious threat to the security of Europe, however, along with the pressure on Russia one should continue political dialogue as well[10]. The announcement of Ambassador of Sweden in Russia Veronika Bard Bringus was in similar mode, when she did not exclude the possibility of exit of Swedish companies from the Russian market[11]. The main argument of the Ambassador was the situation with the Swedish concern Oriflame, which was accused by Russian tax authorities of deliberately understating the company’s revenues for the reduction of tax payments to the Russian budget. After losing the lawsuit in the Russian arbitration court, the company announced its intention to appeal to the international investment arbitration.

It should be noted that the current crisis in Russian-Swedish relations is not accidential. Stockholm has long been regarded Russia as a threat to its security, and therefore critically perceives any Russian actions of political or economic nature, aimed at strengthening the security of Russia in the Baltic Sea, whether it’s laying of the pipeline “Nord Stream” or the development of the military infrastructure of the Baltiysk and Kronstadt.

The story of unsuccessful search for “Russian submarine” in Swedish territorial waters in October 2014 recalled a similar story from “cold war”, when in 1981, a Soviet damaged submarine was discovered close to the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. Stockholm reacted to Russia’s actions to ensure security of Abkhazia and South Osetia with obvious disapproval, accusing Moscow of violating the territorial integrity of Georgia. A similar position was taken by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Crimean issue.

Playing the “Russian card” and the spread of the thesis of the “Russian threat” was the brand style for a number of leading Baltic politicians. The toughest position on the Russian question among the Baltic States has traditionally been shown by President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite. In her opinion, three Baltic countries faced “Russian threat” and they should be ready to respond to it during three days at least, until they get assistance from NATO members[12]. However, a different position was shown by Latvian President Andris Berzins, who does not support the imposal of sanctions and calls for their soonest cancellation. His views are shared by Foreign Minister of Latvia Edgar Rinkevich and Ventspils Mayor Aivars Lembergs.

Some political consequences of the deterioration of relations of North European and Baltic countries with Russia within the framework of the Ukrainian crisis followed shortly. In particular, it was reflected with newly resumed talks on accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO, the North European countries and the Baltic States published their plans to deepen cooperation in defense and security. So, the ongoing projects within the North European defense cooperation (Nordic Defence Cooperation ― NORDEFCO) were joined by the Baltic States ― Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia[13].

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Margot Wallström was the initiator and inspirer of the plan; she declared that military cooperation between the North European countries and the Baltic countries would decrease defense expenses and improve cooperation on border security. Russia replied immediately by performing tactical flight exercises in the Barents Sea, which were attended by the crews of fighter-interceptor MiG-31 and tactical bomber Sukhoi Su-24M of Central Military District[14].

Thus, Russia’s relations with the countries of Northern Europe are developing in an unfavorable scenario; however, there is still some potential for a gradual improvement in case of easing policy by the majority of the North European countries in respect of Russia. In this situation, the most pressing question is what position will prevail: the policy of deepening confrontation or a pragmatic and balanced policy aimed at overcoming the sanctions crisis. It seems no one can state the way of further development of relations between Russia and the North European countries, as Brussels and Washington both have a strong impact on the foreign policy of the North European countries. We can only hope for traditional Scandinavian sanity, willingness of all parties to move towards each other and take into account the legitimate interests of Russia.

The list of bibliography:

1.         Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoy pomoshi mezhdu Sojuzom Sovetskikh Socialisticheskikh Respublik i Finljandskoy Respublikoy. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

2.         V Danii opasajutsja posledstviy rossijskikh sankciy URL: http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

3.         Karl Bil’dt. Putin povel sebja kak Saddam URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

4.         Litva pugaet Pribaltiku «rossiyskoy ugrozoj». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm

5.         MID Norvegii: tol’ko izmenenie politiki RF v otnoshenyi Ukrainy privedet k snjatiu sankciy. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/

6.         Nad Barencevym morem proleteli 40 istrebiteley URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

7.         Norvegiya dolzhna prodolzhat’ politiku dobrososedstva s RF. URL: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html

8.         Nosovich, Aleksandr. Baltijskiy kontrast: Finljandiya otkazalas’ otvorachivat’sa ot Rossyi. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/

9.         Posol Shvecyi: v RF sozdajutsja prepjatstviya dlja raboty shvedskihk companiy URL: http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html

10.       Pravoslavie ― glavnaya ugroza dlya Zapadnoy civilizacii: mnenya. URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

11.       Prem’er Finljandiyi: Ukraine ne nuzhna voennay pomoshh’ URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html

12.       Strany Severnoy Evropy I Baltiki dogovorilis’ ukrepit’ voennye svjazi. URL: http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html

13.       Shadrina, Tat’jana. Finljandijaotkazalas’ otsankcij k Rossii URL: http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html.

14.       Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars. URL: http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[1] Договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Финляндской Республикой / Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

[3] Православие – главная угроза для Западной цивилизации: мнения. / Orthodoxy is main threat to Western civilization . opinions / URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

[4]МИД Норвегии: только изменение политики РФ в отношении Украины приведет к снятию санкций. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/ / MFA Norway: only changes of Russia’s policy in respect of Ukraine will lead to cancellation of sanctions

[5] Норвегия должна продолжать политику добрососедства с РФ. URL^: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html. / Norway must continue policy of neighbourliness with Russia.

[6]http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html

[7]http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

[8] Носович, Александр. Балтийский контраст: Финляндия отказалась отворачиваться от России. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/ / Nosovich Alexander. Baltic contrast: Finland refused to turn back from Russia

[9]Премьер Финляндии: Украине не нужна военная помощь URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html / PM of Finland: Ukraine does not need military aid

[10]Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars URL:http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[11]Посол Швеции: в РФ создаются препятствия для работы шведских компаний URL:http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html / Ambassador of Sweden: Russia imposes difficulties for activity of Swedish companies

[12] Литва пугает Прибалтику «российской угрозой». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm / Lithuania threatens Baltics by “Russian threat”

[13]Страны Северной Европы и Балтики договорились укрепить военные связи. URL:http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html / The North European countries and Baltics agreed on strengthening military cooperation

[14]URL:http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

This article argues that there are no common standards of integration, applicable to all countries, regardless of their economic situation’s specificity and level of development as well as of the nature of their commonly agreed objectives they seek to achieve by means of integration. The purpose to create a single internal market in the EU has determined the toolkit of the European integration, the nature and powers of the EU institutions through which it is carried out. The author argues that the construction of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space in general and within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in particular, in the image and likeness of the EU is not only unjustified, but also harmful. The founding treaty of the EAEU does not contain the purpose to construct a single internal market. The article emphasizes the high level of regional integration achieved by the Nordic countries, which has not been affected by the pattern of the EU integration. The Nordic integration began with the formation of a common labor market and creation within its framework of necessary conditions for high labor mobility. The objectives of the integration efforts of the Nordic countries, fundamentally different from the EU, are reflected in the nature of the institutions of regional cooperation and in the methods of their activity as well. The author recommends attentively looking at the Nordic integration experience to use its elements in the post-Soviet space. 

Introduction

Apart from Europe, integration processes cover today also other regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space. Such processes involve states with different levels of economic development, size, demographics, natural resources, quality of human capital, a position in the international division of labor, degree of development of market relations, participation in various international organizations and agreements and other indicators. It would be at least imprudent to assume that states entering integration processes must obey certain universal laws, undergo the same stages of integration, and create similar bodies with identical powers. The content of integration activities to a certain extent depends on the objectives of a particular state.

The European Union without proper justification is considered to be a benchmark of integration, and an example of how integration processes allegedly should unfold in the former Soviet Union. Common theories of integration, based on the experience of the EU, are designed to ascribe versatility and traits of objective law to the EU integration processes. However, copying of the EU integration experience can have very negative consequences for integration processes in the post-Soviet space. It would be advisable to study more closely the integration experience of other countries, particularly the Nordic countries, examine features of their integration model, and the problems that they solve by means of integration.

Trade and economic relations do not automatically evolve into integration. Free trade zones and customs unions can be considered as means of such relations. However, not all the participating countries are willing to develop integration. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) can serve as examples. Negotiations on a free trade area between the EU and NAFTA do not mean that their member countries are eager to take the path of integration.

A transition to conscious actions enabling convergence and merging of economies of states is equivalent to a strategic choice of ways for their further development. When deciding on joining an integration process one should have a clear idea of its long-term common goals so that participating states could use economic, political, legislative, social and other activities for the achievement of these objectives. A long and gradual character of integration requires reliable protection against fluctuations of the political and economic environment. Therefore a contractual basis is employed for this purpose and integration processes are carried out within the established permanent international intergovernmental organizations.

Initially, western European countries were planning to use development of integration processes to put an end toan infinite chainof warsbetween France and Germany that had been shaking Europe for centuries. Combined withthe continued presence of the troopsof the Western Allieson the territoryof the Federal Republic of Germany andinclusion of the latter in the North Atlantic Treaty integration processes were believed to help create realobstacles for therevivalof German militarismand reliablemonitoring toolsfor theeconomic and political developmentof Germanyafter the SecondWorld War.

These initial policy objectives, as they were successfully achieved, gradually began to take second place. The progressive extension of the EEC membership created a need for efficient development of its growing economic space, reduction of costs in cross-border commercial activities, providing conditions for profitable operation of companies in the participating states. As a result, integration processes within the EEC began to focus on the creation of a single internal market of the Community and on ensuring the most favorable conditions for the most competitive economies and companies of the member states not taking into consideration domestic production of each country.

The adoption of the Single European Act and the introduction of free movement of goods, services, capital and persons have determined the main tools for the creation of such a market. Efforts for consolidation of a single EU internal market and expansion of its rules to other states are camouflaged with attractive formulations such as “cohesion policy”, “neighborhood policy”, “Eastern Partnership”, etc. These perform more likely the functions of “soft power” of the EU rather than reflect the true essence of such activities. The European Commission has received the exclusive power to fully protect and improve the single internal market on the so-called “supranational” level, which is the most favorable for the most competitive economies and companies.

Often, the so-called “European idea” seems to be an ideological forerunner of the Western European integration. Some Russian and foreign experts believe that we will soon witness a political union of the member states of the EU capable of becoming a new state formation. Cooperation of the EU member states in the field of foreign policy, security and defense, domestic policy and justice and many other areas should be regarded as a step in this direction. However, the new Head of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said he was not going to create the United States of Europe and that he did not believe that “a united Europe could be constructed in opposition to a nation-state” (9, p.7). In fact, these areas of cooperation serve the practical needs of a single internal market and reinforce international ambitions of the EU by means of foreign policy and security.

Despite the common historical destiny, continued co-living in joint states, their geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic similarities, comparability of sizes, similarity of political cultures and political orders (2, pp.615-617), the Nordic countries do not aim at getting united into one single state. The “European idea”, despite the fact that these countries belong to Europe, has not had a considerable influence on their relationship. Three of the five countries in the region are relatively young independent states. Norway gained independence in 1905, Finland – in 1917, and Iceland finally became an independent state in 1944. That’s why these countries do not allow any attacks on their recently-found sovereignty in integration processes.

However, the Nordic countries have consistently highlighted the importance of regional cooperation for them. In 1939, the Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler said: “The North will be a political reality to the extent to which the nations are convinced that their welfare is provided by the Nordic cooperation and solidarity” (7, p.37). In March 1948, the Danish Prime Minister said in Stockholm: “Whatever happens, our peoples should be together. It would be unfortunate if we parted ways”(10, p.35). “We live in difficult times – the Prime Minister of Norway Einar Gerhardsen said in February 1953 – when the very environment necessitates that small countries that have a lot in common and that are located side by side, hold together” (5, p.217). Although regional cooperation has always enjoyed wide support among the Nordic public, however, as it was acknowledged in February 1953 by the Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft, their cooperation “had been quite irregular and random” for a long time (10, p.98).

To date, the Nordic countries have reached the most advanced and deepest level of regional integration of all known examples, with an integration path that is significantly different from the EU. Studying its features may be of interest to potential participants of integration processes in the post-Soviet space.

“The Road Map” of the Nordic integration

Integration processes in the European North have taken as a base the indisputable fact that the joint efforts of the Nordic countries can better protect their common interests than if they were acting separately. Regarding the Nordic integration processes it is appropriate to cite the Swedish scientist G. Adler-Karlsson: “Instead of looking for guidance in doctrinal theory, we have always preferred to find the best solutions that are practically achievable under given circumstances” (1, p.22).

In the early post-war years, the Nordic countries faced similar economic difficulties. In April 1948, the four Scandinavian countries officially joined the “Marshall Plan”. Within its framework, Denmark, Iceland and Norway received US aid in the form of gifts, Sweden – in the form of loans (7, p.276). As a result, they were able to partially upgrade their fixed capital in industry and agriculture and to restore economic ties among the countries of the region. Sweden, for example, was paying for the US loans with ships for Norway.

This was also encouraged by lower customs duties in comparison to other Western European states, significant devaluation of the Scandinavian currencies in 1949 (exchange rate of the Norwegian and Swedish Krones to the American Dollar fell by 30%, the Danish krone – by 44%), as well as their accession to the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which resulted in a partial reversibility of Scandinavian currencies within the EPU. As a result, the value of exports in each of the Scandinavian countries in 1948-1951 more than doubled (7, pp.276, 277).

Although Finland did not join the “Marshall Plan”, it was also receiving individual loans from its funds, as well as from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and from Sweden. By the end of 1956 the total amount of foreign loans in Finland was more than 68 billion FIM, with the share of loans from the US and Sweden being equal to 85% of that amount (4, p.18). By the beginning of the 1950s, the Nordic countries managed to complete the reimbursement of indirect losses caused by World War II (7, p.278).

In 1950 the North Economic Cooperation Committee that was established in February 1948, recommended that the Nordic countries participating in the “Marshall Plan” should begin creating a Nordic customs union. However, differences between the countries did not allow them to implement either this or any of subsequent attempts to create such a customs union. This gave impetus to the search for other ways of the “Nordic cooperation”.

In the late 1940s, Sweden was experiencing a rapid industrial rise and faced labor shortages. Other Nordic countries had problems with employment. As a result, steps were taken towards a more rational use of labor resources at the level of the Nordic region and towards formation of a common labor market. In 1951, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden concluded a convention that allowed their citizens to be employed in any of the Nordic countries without prior permission from the authorities, and agreed to facilitate moving of citizens from one country to another. In 1954 they created a regional free market for labor, and in 1957 they completed the design of a passport union. In the second half of the 1970s the passport and visa regime and customs checking were abolished for the citizens of the Nordic countries at border crossings. Icelandjoineditin 1982, FaroeIslands – in 1992.

In order to increase labor mobility within the region the Nordic countries took a series of synchronous measures in social policy and social legislation. In accordance with the Convention on Social Security, approved in 1955, citizens of these countries received the same rights, privileges and responsibilities regarding the size of the basic pension, old-age pensions, unemployment, disability, occupational injuries and sick leave, as well as additional payments when moving from one Nordic country to another. They were given an opportunity to enjoy the same social benefits as nationals of the host country.

The first steps in the field of subregional integration in the North of Europe were aimed at ensuring establishment of a general labor market, which were accompanied by adoption of a series of laws and administrative measures aimed at improving mobility and ensuring social rights of migratory workers. The labor market became a vast sphere of common interests of the Nordic countries, which became one of the key areas of their subsequent integration efforts. In the course of its creation, harmonization of legislation became the most important issue, which later evolved into one of the skeletons of the Nordic integration.

Unification of legislation of the Nordic countries began in the 19th century and reached a high level even before the start of integration processes between them. At that moment they had unified legislation on the activities of banks, in the field of property, commercial and civil law, as well as in the field of insurance, property possession, etc. The authors of the book “Scandinavia between East and West”, published in 1950 in the US, noted that “there are far more similarities between the laws of the Nordic countries, than, for example, between the laws of New York and Florida states” (10, p.109). The Northern Commission on cooperation in the field of law continued those efforts.

Within the framework of EFTA, which Denmark, Norway and Sweden joined in 1959 (Finland joined in 1961 and Iceland in 1970), the Nordic countries managed to reduce customs duties and abolish quantitative restrictions in mutual trade in industrial goods. The share of inter-Scandinavian trade, that previously had been 5-6% of the total value of foreign trade in the Nordic countries, significantly increased in the mid-1960s. The import share reached 19.2%, while the share of exports totaled 22.5%. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Scandinavian countries occupied the first place in trade with each other. Their share reached 87.7% of EFTA imports and 63.5% of EFTA exports (11, p.268). Trade between the countries in the region became a significant factor in their development and an another sphere of their common interests.

Despite the differences in the national security doctrines, the Nordic countries continued foreign policy cooperation also in the postwar period. Periodic meetings of the Prime Ministers, regular meetings of foreign ministers and representatives of the countries of the region to the United Nations Organization, permanent official contacts among the foreign ministries at the ambassadorial level and direct personal contacts among Heads of their divisions and departments, weekly meetings of Heads of delegations and daily meetings of delegates and representatives of the Nordic countries in the committees at the sessions of the UN General Assembly became common practice.

At the plenary sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1956 to the beginning of the 1970s, they voted together on international issues in more than 80% of cases. Introduction within EFTA of a duty of 15% on imports of processed goods by Britain in October 1964 had caused solidarity actions the Nordic countries that achieved its abolition in November 1966. At the talks in the “Kennedy Round” (end of 1966 – spring 1967) the Nordic countries, acting jointly, managed to get concessions from the EEC on reductions of tariffs for their trade (11, pp.272-273). Thus, the small Nordic countries received strong indications of the effectiveness of their foreign policy cooperation in ensuring common interests.

After weighing the priorities of their further development, the Nordic countries, while in EFTA, made a strategic choice in favor of regional integration and signed the Cooperation Agreement between Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (“the Helsinki Agreement”) on March 23, 1962, in Helsinki. It became the legal basis document for their further cooperation and a “road map” of their integration efforts (12). This document with account of later amendments is still valid to this day.

Embarking on the path towards integration, the Nordic countries were certainly not striving to unite into a single state, and did not aim at creating a single internal market. Their integration model is initially aimed at strengthening mutually beneficial foreign-policy cooperation of small sovereign and independent states, which, by means that are inherent in integration processes in the economic sphere, purposefully and pragmatically strengthen and extend old areas and create new areas of common or identical interests. This allows to build close and long-term cooperation on the international arena on a firm and constantly expanding basis of fundamental interests of socio-economic development, rather than on a shaky basis of temporary political arrangements and agreements and short-term, transient and situational factors.

A natural outcome of such an integration model is an influential community of states that preserve complete freedom in their economic and political decisions. The ability of such a community to effectively promote and protect common interests on the international arena is constantly growing with a simultaneous increase in the political weight of this community in the world. For a group of small countries such interaction becomes an essential element of national security and independence of each of them. On issues where their positions and interests diverge, they operate as separate and independent sovereign states.

In the Helsinki Agreement the Nordic countries defined top-priority areas of common or similar interests, for further expansion of which they decided to use their integration efforts. This document identified further measures for support and development of a common market of labor. In the sphere of legal cooperation they pledged to facilitate acquisition of citizenship of one Nordic state by nationals of another Nordic state, to seek to achieve maximum uniformity of legislation in the field of private law, as well as rules relating to criminal offenses and punishment. It recorded, in particular, an agreement to provide opportunities to investigate and prosecute crimes, committed in one of the countries in the region, in the other Nordic countries and enforce decisions of courts and other authorities of all states in the region on their territories. These provisions are intended, among other things, to ensure proper compliance with legislation by migrating citizens of Nordic countries.

The “road map” of regional integration includes a wide range of pragmatic measures of cultural interaction, which aims at preventing painful political, economic, social and cultural problems of integration of migrant workers from the other Nordic countries into the social and cultural environment of the recipient countries. It was decided to include in the curricula of Nordic schools studying of language, culture and social conditions of the other states in the region, and to provide an opportunity for students to study and take exams in the other Nordic countries.

The Nordic countries jointly fund committees of the Nordic cooperation in the field of primary, secondary and higher education, as well as adult education, regional programs of mobility for students and university teachers, pupils and school teachers. Their school and university curricula, textbooks and examination systems are standardized. Studying the languages of neighboring peoples is coordinated by the Secretariat of the northern languages and literature courses on the northern languages.

The Nordic countries have decided to ensure mutual recognition of diplomas at all levels of education, to coordinate employment services of the Nordic countries, harmonize qualification requirements for professions and work for the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in all countries of the region. They also agreed to work closely in the field of adult education, to unify the application of national provisions relating to workers’ health, occupational safety, and to develop further exchanges between the countries in the field of literature, painting, music, theater, cinema and other cultural industries. The Nordic Culture Fund, founded in 1966, funds cultural projects within the region. There have been set up and in operation also numerous joint organizations of the Nordic countries in the field of culture and media.

As a result, citizens of the Nordic countries have a privileged position on their labor markets compared to citizens of other EU member states. Article 2 of the Helsinki Agreement contains a provision that “in the development of laws and regulations in any of the Nordic countries, citizens of all the other Nordic countries receive the same rights as citizens of this country”. Moreover, this provision should be applied “to all spheres of jurisdiction affected by the Agreement on cooperation”. In other words, citizens of the other Nordic countries shall not be considered as foreign labor on the labor market of each of these countries.

Having started integration processes with creating a common labor market and providing measures to promote their mobility, the Nordic countries have agreed to extend integration onto other areas. In the area of economic cooperation, they decided to hold consultations on economic policy issues, coordinate the measures they take regarding the impact of external factors on the economic cycle, to provide freedom of movement of capital among countries in the region, stressing that joint decisions in this area should ensure common interests of the Nordic countries in the field of payments and currency, and adhere to the division of labor among countries in matters of production and capital investment, as well as create favorable conditions for direct cooperation between the companies of two or more Nordic countries in these areas.

While regularizing the relations with the European Union, each of the Nordic countries was addressing possible consequences of their decisions for the Nordic cooperation. Supporters of the “People’s Movement against the EEC”, that was founded in 1971, were speaking, for example, of the need to strengthen the Nordic cooperation along with protection of the Danish national identity (6, p.517).

Denmark’s entry into the EEC in 1973 and the subsequent conclusion by the other Nordic countries of agreements with the EEC on the duty-free trade of manufactured goods helped to keep the trading mode, which existed among the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA. Denmark’s membership in the EEC did not cause any specific problems for the Nordic cooperation until the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Its implementation was threatening to cause irreparable damage for the “Nordic cooperation”.

As a consequence, the Danish referendum on the accession of Denmark to the European Union gave a negative result. Ultimately Denmark joined the EU, but on special conditions, and the rest of the EU member states were forced to accept them (6, p.550). Special conditions for joining the EU in the future were also specified by Sweden. One of such conditions was smooth continuation of the “Nordic cooperation” (8, pp.77-79).

As part of the integration efforts the Nordic states began to work closely together in the field of scientific research and coordination of the use of allocated resources with the greatest efficiency, including establishment of joint structures and institutions to combine their academic potentials and financial capabilities.

The Nordic countries conduct numerous joint research projects, coordinate national science and technological programs. The main driving force in this area are joint academic institutions ensuring high standards of research, that are difficult to achieve at the national level. Among them are the Northern Academy of Innovation Research, Northern Institute for Theoretical Physics, Nordic Council for Arctic Medicine Studies, Northern Research and Production Program on Biotechnology, Nordic Volcanological Institute, Northern Arctic Program of Humanitarian Studies and others.

The scope of their integration efforts includes further cancellation of trade barriers among the Nordic countries, coordination of their technical and administrative customs regulations, simplification of customs procedures, development of transport communications and trans-border trade, joint economic development in adjacent areas of two or more Nordic countries, joint efforts to ensure their interests in international trade.

An important area of the Nordic integration, defined by the Helsinki Agreement, was the Nordic cooperation in the field of transport and communications, as well as environment. The Nordic countries hold mandatory consultations for construction of transport and communication networks, which involve two or more Nordic countries, and coordinate efforts to improve road safety. Border passport control has been simplified.

Countries in the region take into account environmental interests of the other Nordic countries on an equal basis with their own interests both in the legislative process and in the practical application of the laws. They harmonize rules for the protection of the environment, agree on standards and define criteria for pollution, coordinate activities aimed at flora and fauna conservation.

Important areas of agreed integration measures also include official statistics, health and medicine, production of alcoholic beverages, mutual recognition of licensing procedures or certification in the field of medical, technical and other security controls, coordination on issues of child and youth policy.

Given the characteristics of the Nordic integration model, special attention is paid to strengthening of the cooperation at the European and international level, designed to provide “opportunities for joint extraction of benefits for citizens and companies of the Nordic countries”. The governments of these countries are held responsible for ensuring mutual interests and values as it is specified by the Helsinki Agreement. Various government authorities of the region can directly communicate regarding issues that do not fall under the exclusive competence of their external relations. They coordinate activities to provide assistance to developing countries, jointly distribute information about the Nordic countries and Nordic cooperation, and provide support for Northern European citizens by diplomatic missions.

The Nordic integration is characterized by pragmatism and focus on solving specific problems. Implementation of the reached agreements dictated by long-term strategic interests of the Nordic states, allows to strengthen their cooperation in international affairs by constantly expanding the range of their common essential interests. As a consequence, the nature, structure, functions and powers of international bodies of the Nordic cooperation significantly differ from those existing in the EU.

The “Nordic cooperation” is performed in the framework of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, at the meetings of Heads of governments, by specialized authorities of the Nordic countries and by special cooperation bodies.

One of the fundamental principles of the “Nordic cooperation” is active participation of the public in discussions and decision-making in this area. Practical implementation of this principle is the Nordic Council established in 1952. It was determined in the Helsinki Agreement as an “elected public assembly of the Nordic countries” and a form of cooperation of their governments. Its Charter has been adopted by each Nordic country as an internal act which has the force of law. This body is not endowed with legislative functions. It is authorized to investigate the main components of the Nordic cooperation, to adopt recommendations, prepare research reports and other documents. The members of the Nordic Council may make inquiries to the governments or to the Nordic Council of Ministers on the issues of the “Nordic cooperation”.

The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) is a body of cooperation among governments. It is responsible for the interaction between them and the Nordic Council on the issues relating to their joint actions. It takes decisions aimed at implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement and the other agreements among the Nordic countries. The overall coordination of the Nordic cooperation rests with Prime Ministers. They are assisted in this by the Ministers responsible for this cooperation, and the Heads of state and government secretariats, that are members of permanent national committees of the Nordic cooperation.

The Chairman of the NCM is responsible for the coordination of the Nordic cooperation and initiatives for related matters. His or her decisions are taken unanimously and are binding. In the case of making decisions on issues requiring parliamentary approval, they will not take effect until the approval of the relevant national parliament. The NCM reports annually to the Nordic Council on the problems and prospects of the Nordic cooperation. At the same time, the Prime Minister of the presiding country shall submit a special report on cooperation among the governments of the Nordic countries regarding European and international affairs.

In other words, effective management of integration processes in Northern Europe are ensured by the northern cooperation bodies not endowed with any exclusive powers, special competences or so-called “supra-national” functions. These are not necessary as unanimous decisions of the Nordic Council of Ministers are binding and enforceable for the Nordic countries.

As a result of the consistent implementation of the Nordic integration model there is constant strengthening of the Nordic cooperation on international issues and convergence of their positions on many international issues. All the five Nordic countries have become members of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Arctic Council. They all participate in the activities of the “Northern Dimension”, despite the fact that some of them are not directly related to some of the regions listed here.

Before Finland and Sweden joined Denmark as members of the EU in 1995, Iceland and Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992. Its terms provided maintenance of the conditions for further practical realization of the integration model for all of the Nordic countries, along with participation in free movement of goods, services, capital and persons across borders with EU member states and joining the Schengen area (3, pp.126-127).

Denmark and Sweden stipulated for themselves special conditions for participation in the EU and Norway and Iceland did the same for the EEA. These conditions provide opportunities for further development of the “Nordic cooperation.” An important step in this direction was concluding of an agreement among the Nordic countries on cooperation in the field of defense (NORDEFCO) on 4 November 2009. This marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of their interaction on international issues and was a direct consequence of the deepening of the Nordic integration. In the EU framework they included clauses regarding their participation in the common EU policy on security and defense.

Integration scenarios for the Eurasian economic union

Integration processes in the post-Soviet space should develop with due regard to the characteristics of the participating countries and specific tasks, which they intend to solve by means of integration. Already at an early stage there should be formulated overall strategic and intermediate goals that member states intend to achieve with the use of integration mechanisms. Depending on the nature of these goals specific mechanisms for achieving them should be identified, as well as the specific role of integration levers, adapted to the economic, political, social and other conditions of the existing economic space.

General wordings of very vague objectives of the EAEU purposes, such as strengthening and modernization of the economies of member states, their convergence, increase of their competitiveness in the global markets, direct integration processes at servicing some of the current needs and improving of the existing situation according to the formula “movement is all, the ultimate goal is nothing”, rather than at achieving more or less distinct strategic objectives.

Such an approach allows little for conscious, focused and consistent creation of long-term legislative, economic, political, social and other conditions that would provide close interaction, interpenetration and fusion of economies of the countries entering the path of integration, as it does not contain any motivation that is crucial for them.

Orientation of the EAEU member states in their integration efforts on the experience of the EU, including institutional experience, would mean that they intend to build on the territory of the former Soviet Union the same single internal market, aimed at serving the needs and creating the best opportunities for extraction of benefits of the most competitive economies and companies of the member states and the EU. For most post-Soviet states, economic conditions of which have not yet recovered and have not acquired the necessary level of development and competitiveness, a rigid imposition of such rules could have a devastating effect on domestic manufacturers and economic independence as it happens with the economies of the East European EU member states. There are serious doubts that exactly this objective is optimal for integration processes in the post-Soviet space because of the large differences between the CIS and the EU as well as among post-Soviet states.

An institutional model of integration reproducing the one in the EU may also be unattractive for them as it envisages delegating of a part of sovereign powers of the member states to some supranational international executive authorities. For many post-Soviet states, that only recently gained their independence and sovereignty, an idea of a new superstate in the future is unattractive, and practical steps in this direction are considered counter-productive. There are also serious doubts that such a development will meet the fundamental interests of Russia and its companies, because overcoming of social and economic underdevelopment in these countries will be largely their duty.

It is obvious that the member states of integration processes in the post-Soviet space and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should identify those areas of common or similar interests that they would like to form with integration mechanisms, and, relating to them, identify specific tools for their practical implementation. Taking into consideration differences among post-Soviet states, discussions on common or similar interests of states and possible areas of their integration efforts can be performed both among all the participants of integration processes, and between different groups of states with regard to their economic specialization. Without this, they are doomed to copy existing integration models, which is currently the case.

It is advisable in this context to determine which of the following is preferable for Russia and other members of the EAEU: (a) creation of a single internal market of the EU-type, or (b) promotion of division of labor between the member countries and development of specialized production industries with the help of selective integration measures in each of the countries, or (c) purposeful formation of areas of common economic, social and other interests of the members states of the EAEU in order to strengthen the foundations of their close cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, security and defense policy, or, finally, (d) flexible combination of these measures with the account of development specifics of each of the post-Soviet states and the whole former Soviet Union. The general philosophic idea of the integration model of the Nordic countries and its individual elements can represent for Russia and other post-Soviet members of the EAEU a certain conceptual and practical interest.

When selecting areas of application of integration mechanisms one should pay attention primarily to those areas that, being inherited from the Soviet past, still remain essential for the economy. This could include, for example, infrastructure links among post-Soviet states. Further development and deepening of such links in the present circumstances with the use of integration mechanisms could be of mutual benefit and could contribute to the formation of common interests in this area.

Efforts related to regulation of labor markets in the post-Soviet space and its social and cultural reinforcements could be of paramount importance for application of integration measures, taking in to account the fact that the dynamics of the demographic situation in various countries of the CIS significantly differs. Cooperation in the field of educational and cultural policy, focused on servicing current and future needs of the labor force market and scientific and technical cooperation, could also become a program of long-term integration efforts of member states of the EAEU.

A specific feature of the new independent post-Soviet states is their continued breakaway from a single legal system of the Soviet Union. Therefore, cooperation in the field of law among them as a whole is unlikely to be successful. It should be selective and primarily related to the areas of interaction that will be identified as priority objects of their integration efforts.

Obviously, one can offer a lot of other areas to coordinate integration efforts in the post-Soviet space both with account of its specificity and experience of other integration groups. However in order to do this, it is necessary to determine what integration model and what strategic objectives potential participants would like to implement. The impression is that this is not completely clear yet.

References:

Antonov A.N. Shveziya: protivorechiviye process razvitiya. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znanie”, 1977

Voronkov L.S. Integrazionniye process na severe Evropy/”Evropeiskya integraziya” pod redakziyei Ol’gi Butorinoi. Moskva, 2011

Voronkov L.S. Obschee economicheskoye prostranstvo mezhdu Rossiyei i ES?/”Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta”, N. 4 (37), 2014

Voronkov L.S., Senyukov Yu. P. Finlandiya – nash severnyi sosed. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znaniye”, 1977

Goloshubov Yu.I. Skandinavia i problem poslevoennoi Evropy. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mysl’”, 1974

Istoriya Danii. Pod redakziyei Stena Buska I Henninga Poulsena. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Ves’ mir”, 2007

Kan A.S. Vneshnyaya politika skandinavskikh stran v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauka”, 1967

Kuliabina L.N. Shezia v sovremennom mire. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauchnaya kniga”, 2005

Novaya komanda v Brussele/”Ekspert”, 3-9 Noyabriya 2014, N. 45 (922)

Prokofiev Vl. Severnaya Evropa i mir. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1966

Pokhlebkin V.V. Skandinaviya: tendenzii sovremennogo razvitiya/ “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya v Zapadnoi Evrope”. Pod redakziyeyi D.E. Melnikova. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1974

Helsinkskyi Dogovor o sotrudnichestve mezhdu Daniyeyei, Finlandiyeyi, Islandiyeyi, Norvegiyeyi I Shveziyeyi (http://eulaw.edu.ru/documents/legislation/eur_int_law/nordic.htm)

What is Aurora Borealis festival , how did it emerge and how is it related to Aurora Karamzina?

The festival began in 2012 as a continuation of Christmas Candle Meetings project which the Litera studio has been organizing for five years jointly with ITAR-TASS bureau and bringing poets from Russia, Baltic countries and Northern Europe together. All the five years it was only enthusiasm but the project succeeded. In 2012 it was decided to change the format of Christmas Meetings into a festival and unite under its banner not only poets, but also playwrights, scientists, translators, and journalists. The project is implemented with the support of the Fund of Social-Economic Programs and personal support of S. A. Filatov. The organizers of the Aurora Borealis festival comprise the Russian Cultural-Democratic Union, the Russian Center of Science and Culture in Helsinki, the Litera Society, and the Runo bar-studio.

The idea enjoyed support in creative circles of Russia and Finland and has been successfully implemented for two years. In January 2012 our festival was attended by famous poets and writers from Ukraine, Russia, Finland, and Sweden. In 2013, besides winter events, the festival Aurora Borealis with participation of poet and translator E. Ioffe, bilingual writer A. Perttu, poet and translator K. Korto, Editor-in-Chief of Other Shores magazine O. Pussinen, as well as scientist and poet N. Perevezentseva from St. Petersburg held poetic evenings, literary seminars and master classes. Participants included V. Mesyats (Moscow), A. Korovin (Moscow) A. Gritsman (New York), N. Reznik (Colorado), A. Ostudin (Kazan), M. Garber (Luxembourg), A. Melnik (Liege), A. Radashkevich and G. Pogozheva (Paris) and other distinguished writers, translators and scientists form the whole world.

We decided to devote the festival to Aurora Karamzina and called it Aurora Borealis as Polar lights are also called. The name presupposes northern realities and simultaneously associates with Aurora Karamzina, an outstanding beauty of the XIX century to who Pushkin, Baratynsky, and other poets devoted verses. For organizers the role of Aurora Karamzina as public figure is also important. She was a maid of honor at the empress and advocated Finnish interests in the Royal Court and helped Finland join the Russian Empire as a Grand Duchy. She was a woman who did a lot for the country politically and as a charity provider.

We emphasize historic moments related to the history of Sweden, Russia, and Finland in order to deeply study historic processes and better comprehend modern facts.

Does the festival signify the beginning of major and long work?

Yes, we have big plans. On May 24-25 Helsinki will host a seminar of translators, publishers, historians from Russia, Finland, and Sweden. We want to create a network of translators, writers, publishers and historians. We want to promote cultural aspects which will help overcome intercultural stereotypes. It is not only belles letters, but also essays, research, etc.

We need a network of contacts which will help people better understand each other. We plan to plug organizations into the network which are experienced in the sphere, such as the Finnish literature fund (FiLi), Russian publishing houses interested in translations of Russian literature into the Finnish language and vice versa. We would like not only to unite all people engaged in the process but also to act as intermediaries between them and carry out both cultural and educational projects. The Russian side represented by Moscow project coordinator Yevgenya Dobrovoi helps us a lot as it is already launching its own educational programs in Russia and Poland. Our task is to raise the awareness of the Finnish public about modern Russian literature and introduce interesting modern Finnish poetry to Russians. Our days are the time of flourishing poetry in Finland and its golden age.

Still frame: Aurora Charlotta Karamzina (1808-1902, full name — Eva Aurora Charlotta Stjernvall, a daughter of Swedish nobleman Lord Carl Johan Stjernvall and Baroness Eva Gustava von Willebrand, came down in history as public figure and founder and supporter of various charities. She was a granddaughter of the last governor of Finland. From 1836 she had the surname of Demidova and from 1846 – Karamzina. In 1836 Aurora Charlotta became a maid of honor of Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. Together with sister Emily and Countess Musina-Pushkina she was considered the first beauty in the Royal Court in Petersburg. As a maid of honor Aurora was very influential and was among those who convinced Alexander III not to make Finland a province of the Russian Empire but preserve autonomy rights with it. Alexander, who as the crown prince stayed in the Finnish mansion of Aurora Charlotta, in the final end adhered to her advice and other supporters of Finnish autonomy and decided to create a commission for the convocation of Finnish Sejm and grant the duchy a wide autonomy and laws to ensure its financial independence.

A warship fighting in the Crimean War was named after her. It was sunk by the English and the name went over to the legendary Aurora cruiser. She had a reputation of femme fatale as her three lovers and the only son Pavel Demidov died. Aurora was the muse of many poets and artists. Pushkin and Baratynsky devoted poems to her and portraits were painted by Brullov and Gau. She was twice married. In 1836 she married one of the richest Russian men – Pavel Demidov, the co-owner of Ural enterprises, actual state counselor, and Royal master of the hunt. Legends claim wedding gifts to Aurora included not only the famous Sancy diamond but also a scarf which belonged to Napoleon’s wife Josephina Bogarne. Demidov died a sudden death in 1840 and left Aurora with a child. She got married again in 1846. The husband was Andrei, the son of distinguished historian Nikolai Karamzin. He was an outstanding officer who was considered a prototype of Mikhail Lermontov’s hero Pechorin. After eight years of a happy life Aurora again became a widow as Colonel Karamzin was killed in the Crimean campaign in 1854. After that she fully devoted herself to charities.

She went down in Finland’s history as a public and charity figure who created nursing homes, orphanages, and hospices. She donated practically all her income from Demidov’s mining enterprises to the poor. In Gelsingforce Aurora Charlotta Karamzina created a permanent nursing service. The Evangelic society of nurses which she founded yet in 1867 still exists. Aurora also opened hospices and hospitals. Children’s Home Street has been preserved in modern Helsinki.

By developing the ties we want to operate not on amateur but professional basis and produce high quality anthologies, as p r o o f – r e a d e r s say – very copy-read anthologies. We include into them only the names which are legends of the poetry of the XX-XXI centuries. We assess the authors by the text and everybody knows we shall reject bad texts.

Our festival is expanding. We now have partners in St. Petersburg and Stockholm. The Swedish friends we got thanks to Yevgenya Dobrovoi asked us to address the Swedish-language cultural center in March. St. Petersburg proposed to join the festival Petersburg Bridges in late May this year. Natalya Perevezentseva, the second Russian coordinator of the project, helps us maintain contacts with colleagues in Petersburg.

The main idea of the festival is to create international cultural space to develop projects related to translation and publishing. It also promotes preservation of the Russian language and literature abroad.

Interviewed by Yulia Andreeva,

for Amber Bridge

Unforgotten past

Finland built ships yet for the USSR – in the 1960s the shipyards of Suomi produced 1200 vessels for the big neighbor and many of them are still navigating. For example, six nuclear ice-breakers built by the Finns are still operating. The Taimyr and the Vaigach were built by Finnish shipyards, as well as diesel icebreakers Yermak, Krasin, and others. Therefore, a new ship ordered by Russia in Finland is rather a tradition than news.

“Thirty years ago the Soviet Union accounted for a quarter of Finnish exports and ships comprised a major part of it,” said Ilpo Kokkila who heads the Central union of business life in Finland.

Today shipbuilding partnership is profitable both for Russia and Finland as joint experience and know-how help guarantee high quality of production for own needs and bid for joint fulfillment of international orders. Most experts are convinced that Russian and Finnish shipbuilders can properly cope with the task.

The Finnish Maritime Industry Association estimates the country controls one percent of the global shipbuilding market which is a good result for a small country with a population of five million people. The Finnish share in the global production of cruise ships and ferries is close to 20% and in design and production of ice-breakers and ice-rated vessels – nearly 60%. Today the maritime cluster in Finland employs a total of 21 thousand people who work in over 60 companies. The annual turnover of the industry is close to 60 billion euro. Russia is considered a major strategic partner and shipbuilding for the Arctic as the most promising guideline.

“The potential of Russian-Finnish interaction in the Arctic region is immense and is not currently used in full,” said Russian trade representative in Finland Valery Shlyamin. The national Arctic strategies adopted by both countries open prospects for expanded transportation possibilities in the region and development of its natural wealth which mostly comprises energy carriers. Forecasts estimate close to a quarter of global undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are accumulated there. The development of the Russian Arctic shelf by 2030 will demand new technical means and servicing infrastructure for production and transportation of close to 110 million tons of oil and 160 billion cubic meters of gas. Experts estimate close to 150 vessels – 30 platforms and terminals, close to 50 specialized transportation ships and 70 servicing vessels – will be necessary by 2030. The big demand cannot be satisfied only by Russian shipbuilding capacity. Besides, Arctic development demands modernization of the ice-breaker fleet while oil and gas industry needs gas tankers for liquefied natural and hydrocarbon gas, container carriers and oil tankers, as well as universal multipurpose vessels. “On such a background Russia and Finland have all possibilities to efficiently develop mutually advantageous cooperation both in shipbuilding and in the creation of a joint maritime cluster,” the Russian trade representative said.

The future of the cluster was discussed by the Russian-Finnish Intergovernmental Commission for trade and economic cooperation and the Russian-Finnish Partnership in Modernization of National Economies business forum on its sidelines.

The forum of businessmen, experts and politicians named shipbuilding and biotechnologies as the most promising avenues of bilateral innovative cooperation. New developments are expected soon, f i r s t and foremost, staged emergence of the mentioned Russian- Finnish maritime cluster of recognized international scope. Its prospects were discussed by participants in the round-table Challenges in Maritime Industry in Russian-Finnish relations – Arctic Cooperation held on the sidelines of the business forum in Turku attended by nearly 90 representatives of the industry, including up to 30 Russians delegated by ship and machine-building companies and R&D organizations.

Modernization and the search for new forms and points of growth come to the foreground instyle Russian-Finnish business partner ship.

Round-table participants agreed the task of the Russian-Finnish maritime cluster in the geographic boundaries from St. Petersburg to Helsinki and Vyborg was to “create trans-border technological chains and networks of suppliers and efficiently use international labor division.” It is also important to mount the Russian participation in joint projects implemented for Russia and supplies of Russian materials and pre-fabricates, equipment and devices for the Finnish maritime industry .

Naturally, activities within the maritime cluster are not simply industrial cooperation as they also envisage cooperation of R&D and design bureaus in designing maritime hardware and new conceptual shipbuilding guidelines, etc.

Joint ventures which will emerge in the framework of the Russian-Finnish cluster will specialize in production of engines, electro-technical and onboard equipment, as well as systems for civilian ships and maritime hardware for the use in Baltic and Arctic Seas. New environment-friendly technologies have to be developed, such as the use of dual-fuel propulsion plants. Innovative cooperation will target the design of new materials for operation in Arctic conditions. Russia and Finland will jointly build shelfoperating vessels, oil and gas drilling and production platforms, multifunctional specialized icebreakers for fishing and research in extreme conditions, etc.

The idea to modernize the existing shipbuilding infrastructure and create new one will be entrusted to the Russian-Finnish technopark to be created on the Kotlin Island near St. Petersburg on the basis of the Kronstadt maritime works. Both countries declared it a priority.

The Bering and Chirikov are back to the Pacific

All principles of future partnership have been already implemented in the joint project of icebreaker construction for Sakhalin fields.

The Arctech Helsinki Shipyard created in December 2010 is considered by experts as a base for the emerging Arctic Center of shipbuilding companies which targets customers who need to modernize their Arctic fleet. That determined the basic guidelines of Russian- Finnish cooperation: construction of high-tech vessels – icebreakers, logistic ships, and other specialized ice-rated vessels.

Such is the new series of Russian-Finish icebreakers. Its identity is beak design with asymmetric hull and several propulsion plants which provide efficient forward and backward run and side motion. The diesel-electric icebreaker has a capacity of 13MW and can crush ice of up to 1,7 meter thick and navigate for 20 days at temperatures up to minus 35 degrees Centigrade. The two-year project costs 75 million euro. The icebreakers help supply production platforms and protect them from ice. “It is likely a unique vessel among existing ones and the best in its class,” said Sovcomflot CEO Sergei Frank.

The lead ship of the series named after legendary seafarer Vitus Bering is already operating in the Pacific Ocean. It will be backed by the Alexei Chirikov, the second icebreaker in the series named after great Russian seafarer and explorer of the northern part of the Pacific and companion of Bering in Kamchatka expeditions. Like three centuries ago the seafarers are again sailing the same seas and serving Russia.

The Arctech Helsinki Shipyard hopes the two icebreakers built in cooperation with Vyborg Shipyard will be followed by the third and fourth. However customer Sovcomflot said modern shipbuilding means competition and Russia can build the vessels at its own shipyards. Tender winner has to offer the best. “Competition today depends not only on money, but also on know-how ,” said Sergei Frank.

Joint ventures will specialize in production of engines, electrotechnical and onboard equipment for civilian ships and maritime hardware for the use in Baltic and Arctic Seas.

The significance attributed to shipbuilding in both countries is confirmed by the presence of heads of state at name-giving ceremonies in St. Petersburg and Helsinki. The Vitus Bering got its name in the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin, while the Alexei Chirikov – in the presence of Finnish President Sauli Niinistö.

“It means a lot for our company,” said Arctech Helsinki Shipyard Director General Esko Mustamäki. “Good contracts demand good work and current ones open a new era of Arctic shipbuilding. I am convinced that in five years Sovcomflot will become the biggest operator in Arctic waters while Arctech will supply vessels for its Arctic fleet,” said the shipyard CEO full of optimism.

Keep afloat

Finnish economic experts say the Arctech Helsinki Shipyard founded by Russian USC and STX Finland (a unit of STX Europe within Korean STX Business Group) is the most successful business component of the Finnish coowners. STX Finland runs two other shipyards in the country: Turku Shipyard in Turku and Rauma Shipyard in Rauma. The enterprises of STX Finland employ a total of 2500 people. In January 2013 Finland admitted that its shipbuilding industry was in a deep crisis which intensified after STX Finland shipyard in Turku lost a major contract for the construction of a deluxe cruise liner for American Royal Caribbean Cruises. The multibillion-dollar contract went to STX Europe in France which was a blow to Finnish shipbuilding as the order could have provided 23 thousand jobs, according to experts. The Finnish government refused to issue guarantees to the shipyard worth 50 million euro and said it had no right to risk the money of taxpayers and support a loss-making company. The shipyard had to work itself to win the order.

Lack of contracts begins to tell on the Russian-Finnish shipyard in Helsinki which in February began negotiations about temporary personnel cuts. As a result 15 people had to go on an unpaid forced leave.

Esko Mustamäki said the shipyard “did not receive sufficient orders to ensure full load on the personnel.” In such a situation partnership with Russian shipbuilders offers both a way to survival and a path to growth.

The opinion widely spread after Korean and the Finnish media announced in the spring of 2013 that STX can sell its subsidiaries abroad, including in Finland, to raise money for the parent company and preserve priority production guidelines. The news was completely unexpected for Finnish shipbuilders. Experts say it is hardly possible to find a buyer of the shipy ards in Finland.

“There is an unstable situation at the shipyards which can result in a change of owner,” said Finnish Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen adding the sale of the enterprises to a private owner can offer “a chance for Finnish economy”.

Finnish experts and media cautiously but persistently suggest that a buyer can be found on the other side of the border – in Russia. “In the coming decade the role of Arctic shipbuilding will considerably grow and Russia is a major actor on the market. Consequently, it needs hundreds of new vessels and additional capacities for their construction,” said Professor Jorma Tajna, a leading Finnish maritime expert. Like many people in Finland he concluded that “Russia may be interested in buying the Finnish shipyard.” Time will show whether Finnish experts are right.

Fall is not alwa ys fail ure

Trends in bilateral economic relations can be traced by the very name of the annual information analytical bulletin of the Russian trade mission in Helsinki – Finland – a Russian Partner. In 2012 the bulletin came out under the motto Finland – Russian Economic Partner while in 2013 the country was called Russian partner in modernization of national economy .

Modernization and the search for new forms and points of growth come to the foreground in Russian-Finnish business partnership. Old methods of trade and economic ties which until recently ensured stable positive result are losing their previous force. New time sets new tasks while trade statistics urge to accelerate their solution to the maximum.

Professor Jorma Tajna: “Russia may be interested in buying the Finnish shipyard.”

“Our economic relationship faces a major challenge as trade turnover fell 10 percent,” said Valery Shlyamin. “The problem is not only the world market situation and decreased activity in the euro zone. Traditional trade forms in which commodities – oil and petroleum products, gas, timber, etc – comprise 88 percent are outdated.” The trade representative believes Russia and Finland have to find new spheres of cooperation, first and foremost, technological. “It is wrong to stake on increased commodity exports in kind. Trade turnover figures may change but it is important that technological cooperation changes.” Regional cooperation is also important, he believes. “Our relations are multi-faceted and flexible enough and it is necessary for public-private and municipal partnerships to profit from them,” Shlyamin said.

In 2012 trade turnover between Russia and Finland comprised 17 billion dollars, twelve of which were Russian exports to Finland and five – Finnish exports to Russia. Despite the mentioned 10-percent fall Russia remains a major trade partner of Finland and accounts for 14% in its trade turnover. The share of Finland in Russian turnover is 2.1 percent.

The Russian co-chair of the Intergovernmental Commission and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak suggested at a meeting in Turku that “Russia and Finland can succeed in restoring the trade turnover in a year or two.” “Russia and Finland work to create a favorable investment climate and the agreement signed today will promote simplified border procedures. The growing number of border crossings which currently comprise 12 million a year will give an impulse to trade turnover growth,” he said and recalled that “not everything depends on us, the world economy is unstable so far and it would be wrong to give exact forecasts.”

The Finnish co-chair of the Intergovernmental Commission and Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade Alexander Stubb believes such processes, as Russian membership in the WTO and further integration in the economic system of Europe will play a positive role in restoring trade indicators. “They enhance the trends existing between Russia and Finland,” he said.

At present there are close to 600 Finnish companies operating in Russia.

Polls held by the Russian-Finnish Chamber of Industry and Commerce show that every third Finnish businessman operating in Russia plans new investments into the Russian economy. Business activity is on the rise on the other side of the border: according to Finnish research company Asiakastiedot, every sixth company which opened in South Karelia and Kymenlaakso provinces in 2011-2012 was registered by Russian owners. The Russian business already owns nearly six percent of private companies operating in the region in the sp here of tr ansport.

However both countries mostly stake on innovations. Shipbuilding, as a sphere of innovations and their implementation, will preserve in the coming years its status of one of the most promising guidelines in Russian- Finnish cooperation. It means points of joint economic growth will increase which is so important in conditions of continuing global financial instability.

Yulia Andreeva, ITAR-TASS,

Helsinki – for Amber Bridge

“Finnish partners officially notified the Russian side that the wreckage of the Soviet S-2 submarine from the Baltic fleet which sank on January 3, 1940 presumably after hitting a mine near Aland Archipelago in the territorial waters of Finland has been included into the list of Russian (Soviet) military burials in compliance with the 1992 Russian-Finnish cooperation agreement on perpetuating the memory of Russian (Soviet) military in Finland and Finnish military in Russia who died in World War Two,” the Russian foreign ministry said in a statement.

The list of burials comprises close to 90 objects in various parts of the country. The main ones are located in the towns of Mikkeli and Hanko. Most of them are common graves where numerous yet unidentified soldiers are buried. The work in archives continues.

The status of the burials is stipulated by the mentioned agreement which determines that all military monuments are protected in both countries. In Finland the interior ministry and partially the education ministry are in charge of the implementation of the agreement while in Russia it is the task of the defense ministry and partially of the foreign ministry .

“We are grateful to the partners for a positive resolution of the important issue for the Russian Federation. Respect to the memory of perished seamen is very important for their relatives and close kin and for all Russian citizens.

We are satisfied with the constructive cooperation with the Finnish side in the framework of the Russian-Finnish intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in perpetuating the memory of killed servicemen,” the Russian foreign ministry said.

Russia requested to recognize the place of the submarine sinking as a military burial in 2009 when a group of Swedish and Aland divers discovered the wreckage on the Baltic Sea bed.

Long way to the lighthouse

– It is a worthy end of the long story, said chairman of the St. Petersburg Club of submariners Retired Captain 1 Rank Igor Kurdin. The story was truly long. The S-2 shipwreck has been a mystery for long which historians worked to disclose in archives of various countries by comparing reports of Soviet and Finnish military, eyewitness reports and other evidence. Since late ’90s Aland historian Kenneth Gustavsson has been engaged in the search for missing Soviet submarine. After a many-year effort he established the coordinates of the wreckage and the likely cause of the sinking.

– Work with World War Two documents which I carried out from 1998 in archives of Russia, Finland, and Sweden helped me get a full picture of the developments at the Market Lighthouse in January 1940, Gustavsson said.

— For me it is a proven fact that S-2 hit a mine while sailing through Finnish mine fields and sank. It is confirmed by radio interceptions, Finnish military reports and other data. The mine blast detonated onboard torpedoes and the submarine broke down into three parts. The wreckage lies on the seabed this way. The submarine was discovered in area 8904 on Finnish Navy charts. It lies at a depth of thirty meters close to the wreckage of two XIX-century ships. After long research I know a lot about the S-2 story. There are various versions about the cause of the sinking but I am convinced that it hit a mine. The blast was seen from the Market Lighthouse and recollections of the light-keeper have preserved. He saw S-2 which first surfaced and then submerged. A powerful explosion followed sending a black cloud over the water surface.

Three long fog horns

After S-2 was discovered in August 2009 then Swedish military attache in Russia Christian Allerman proposed to the Petersburg Club of submariners which existed for 18 years to find the relatives of the dead Navy men. Since then the S-2 story developed into international cooperation of seamen, researchers, military, authorities and many others who were not indifferent to the fate of the perished submarine. St. Petersburg seamen found descendants of seven S-2 crewmembers from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Krasnodar. In August 2010 they visited the place of the wreckage to pay tribute to the deceased. The Russians brought a handful of Russian soil to the place and took home some sea water from Market Lighthouse. It is an old maritime tradition the water buried together with the dress coat of a perished Navy man symbolizes his new grave on land. The sea which is mostly used to Swedish speech this time heard Russian Orthodox Eternal Memory, Eternal Rest lity for the dead prayed by Archpriest Alexey Krylov from the Chesmen Church of St. Petersburg. A wreath with a Baltic fleet sailor hat was floated. Finnish seamen present at the ceremony breached the rules when the wreath was floated and sounded three fog horns and lowered the flag of Finland on the mast of the coast guard vessel which delivered the Russians to the burial place of the submarine.

From discovery to memorial

In the same year of 2009 the Russian side requested the Finns to recognize the place of S-2 sinking as an official military burial. The Finnish military inspected the territory around and said it was first necessary to defuse munitions found on the wreckage. Although a powerful explosion that ruined the submarine detonated most of munitions close to one ton of explosives in TNT equivalent were discovered onboard: torpedoes and artillery shells, as well as several mines close to the wreckage.

In May-June 2012 the Finnish police and defense forces carried out a unique operation in area 8904 to defuse S-2 munitions. The work lasted for over eight weeks and involved three vessels and 50 people. Munitions were lifted from a depth of 25 meters. Mines and torpedoes were destructed in a safe sea area, while grenades were withdrawn to a land range for elimination. After the operation a proposal was submitted to the defense ministry of Finland to ban the site of the wreckage for diving and swimming and mark it on charts. Access to the area is granted only to research expeditions upon a special permission of the Aland Board of Antiquities.

– We were the pioneers, said Aland police chief Teijo Ristola who headed the operation. It was the first demining of a wreckage in Finland. After the operation we checked the area to verify its safety. It was important also because it is now a part of a reserve and we had to comply both with general security requirements and nature preservation norms. During preparations and holding of the operation we maintained good contacts with the Russian consulate in Mariehamn, the capital city of Aland Islands. The operation was unique as it was carried out within the boundaries of the only fully demilitarized zone in Europe. Aland Islands which used to be the w e s t e r n m o s t foothold of the Russian empire were demilitarized according to the 1856 Paris peace treaty and the status of the territory remains the same up to now .

Those at sea

The operation to defuse S-2 munitions and subsequent proclamation of the place as an official military burial put an end to disputes about the future fate of the submarine and the possibility of lifting it and the bodies of the crew from the Baltic Sea bed. According to international maritime rules a perished submarine is a sacred and untouchable common grave. People on Aland Islands are convinced the issue has been finally closed: neither divers who discovered the submarine nor participants in the defusing operation discovered any human remains at the place of the shipwreck.

– It is hardly possible to lift any bodies for burial on land specifically because the blast that ruined the submarine was very powerful, said Teijo Ristola. – It may be possible to find some bones on the seabed, but nothing more. In this case the rules for their lifting will be determined in compliance with Finnish laws. Kenneth Gustavsson agreed:

– If we recall how powerful the explosion was that ruined the submarine it will become clear that lifting of bodies is unlikely. It is better to leave them on the seabed where they rest in a common grave. Therefore, Aland people suggest to leave it as it is and not to disturb the rest of perished seamen. A memorial plaque has been put on the Baltic seabed in area 8904 to commemorate the crew of the S-2. It was brought there in 2012 by relatives of the seamen from Russia. Aland divers mounted it soon after the commemorative ceremony.

End of story?

No new major turns are envisaged in the story of S-2 submarine. The relatives of the crew now have a point on the map of Europe where they can come to pray for the dead. The official burial status reliably protects the rest of Soviet seamen. All Finnish and Swedish participants in the research were thanked on behalf of the Club of submariners. In March 2011 the Russian defense ministry decided to award the medal for Merits in perpetuating the memory of perished defenders of the Motherland to Kenneth Gustavsson, head of divers Bjorn Rosenlef, Swedish Navy commander aide Christian Allerman, divers Morten Zetterstrem, Patrick Palm, Richard Juhanson, and Aland governor Peter Lindback. It was a decoration for their big personal contribution to determining the place of wreckage of Baltic fleet submarines S-7, Sch-305, and S-2 as well identifying the names of the submariners and the fates of missing Navy men.

Historians and seamen have still a lot to do in the Baltic Sea. Kenneth Gustavsson said several submarines have not been found yet.

– According to archive data which I collected three Soviet submarines sank there in 1942. Two of them were found: in 1998 S-7 was discovered and in 2007 – Sch-305, he said. They are all in Swedish territorial waters. The Sch-320 submarine has not been found. There are no German submarines there as during World War Two the German Navy carried out no operations in the area. Only by the end of the war after Finland concluded a truce with the USSR in 1944 the Germans planned to attack Aland Islands but dropped the idea. There can be a total of several hundred various shipwrecks in that area of the Baltic Sea beginning from the XVI century.

The St. Petersburg Club of submarines is now focused on the search of relatives of the crew of another submarine, S-6, which was recently found in Swedish territorial waters.

– Now we are looking for families and succeeded to establish seven contacts, Igor Kurdin said. We shall keep working, look for contacts, and help relatives of killed servicemen find their burial places so that they can come and bow to their memory like it happened with the S-2 crew .

Yulia Andreeva,

Helsinki-Mariehamn-St. Petersburg,

for Amber Bridg

Your Eminence, secular people often view your position in the Patriarchate as a foreign minister. Is there a certain misunderstanding? What are the powers of the DECR chairman?

The powers of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate traditionally include the whole sphere of external church activity. First and foremost, it is the sphere of interorthodox Church relations and brotherly contacts with autocephalous (independent) local Orthodox Churches which number 14 today, besides the Russian Orthodox Church. I am pleased to say that contacts between local Orthodox Churches have intensified of late, and the convocation of a Pan-Orthodox Council, which raises numerous questions, is currently on the agenda. Our task is to ensure strict compliance with the consensus principle at the Council so that the interests of all churches are taken into account and that the Council should safeguard against new divisions.

The second guideline of the Department’s work is inter-Christian relations, i.e. dialogue with other Christian confessions – the ancient Eastern Churches (such as the Armenian, Coptic and Ethiopian Churches), Catholics, Anglicans, and Protestants. unfortunately, the centuries of living in division have brought about major differences between these confessions and the Orthodox Church in theological issues and regarding the challenges of the modern secular world. Our Church has never worked and does not work toward certain unification with heterodox confessions at the expense of compromises in religious issues. On the contrary, we use inter-Christian dialogue as a means to evidence the truth of the Orthodoxy. At the same time, together with our heterodox brothers we look for points of contact in such issues as morality and the common expression of Christians’ faith in the face of growing secularism. It turns out that in these issues we have more in common with representatives of the communities that have kept ties with the ancient church tradition than with liberal confessions.

Another sphere of responsibility of the Department has expanded of late – outreach to compatriots abroad. It envisages holding various congresses and symposiums and interaction at various levels with our compatriots who are dispersed throughout the world.

The Department also pays much attention to the problem of persecution of Christians in various countries of the world and to interreligious dialogue, which becomes specifically important in such a situation.

You took monastic vows and began your ministry in Lithuania. How did the country and its people influence the young priest?

I have very warm recollections of the years I spent in Lithuania. They were both my first experience of monastic life, my first experience in service before the altar of God, and the first ministerial experience. I served there for nearly five years. I was a monk at the Monastery of the Holy Spirit in Vilnius for 18 months. Then I was appointed a parish priest in a village where ten people gathered for the Sunday liturgy and thirty people for Easter.

At Epiphany I toured the neighboring villages in a horse-drawn cart or by hitching a ride to sprinkle holy water on the believers’ homes. I visited many people who lived in abject poverty.

I ministered in kaunas in 1990-1991. It was the time of the breakup of the USSR. Lithuania proclaimed independence and stated its readiness to defend it. Troops entered Vilnius and occupied the television center. There were fatalities among the civilians. I was asked to make an address on kaunas television which still remained in Lithuanians’ hands, and I agreed. At that time, I had no thoughts about any political interests; the most important thing was to prevent a group of people from committing bloodshed and save the lives of others. I spoke on television and urged the soldiers not to shoot at unarmed people in case they were given such an order. Thank God, we managed to avoid further bloodshed.

It was a very interesting time, the time of gradual emergence of freedoms, including freedoms for religious life and preaching. In kaunas one of my first missionary activities was to visit the nearest Russian school, where I volunteered to teach children. At first the school administration was apprehensive. I was told there had been no such lessons in the Soviet school and that it was not possible. But one day, the school director went to the church to baptize her granddaughter. I offered her a “bargain”: I baptize her granddaughter and she lets me conduct at least one lesson in any class. This is what we agreed to. I conducted one lesson, then another and then other classes asked me to teach. Eventually, I took up all the ten classes of the school. That is, aside from a minister’s workweek, I was fully employed as a schoolteacher. Then I had invitations from other schools. I quickly understood that I could not cope alone and imparted my knowledge of Scripture to my parishioners, who followed suit and began to teach at schools. A very interesting time it was. I have very warm recollections of it today, and whenever I visit Lithuania, I feel as though I am in my homeland.

What is the Russian diaspora and the Orthodox Church situation in Lithuania?

The Orthodox tradition in Lithuania is 800 years old. In modern Lithuania, it is the Russian-speaking population that largely professes Orthodox Christianity, in the first instance Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians, so it is well-represented in the large cities such as Vilnius, Klaipeda and Visaginas. However, there are also Orthodox Lithuanians, and some Orthodox churches conduct services in Lithuanian. According to the census, Lithuania has more than 130,000 Orthodox believers.

There is the diocese of Vilna and Lithuania in the republic, currently led by Archbishop Innokenty. In 1996, the diocese was officially registered as “the Orthodox Church in Lithuania.” It comprises 50 parishes divided into three deaneries. As far as I know, the diocese is not short of priests. It runs a monastery and a convent. Some schools have Sunday classes for children from Orthodox families, and a number of Russian-language schools offer religion as a subject. The diocese takes care of the preservation and renovation of churches, and receives annual subsidies from the state for these tasks.

An overwhelming majority of Russians in the republic – who number over 200,000 – have Lithuanian citizenship. It is the only Baltic republic which adopted the so-called zero option of the citizenship law, i.e. those who were resident on the territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic were granted citizenship in the new Lithuania.

The persecution of believers and the church came to an end in the late 1980s. When you were dean of the Annunciation Cathedral in Kaunas, Sigitas Tamkevicius was rector of the local Catholic seminary who had recently returned from prison and exile. Please tell us about him.

I first met Archbishop Sigitas Tamkevicius in 1989, when he was appointed rector of the kaunas theological seminary. I was a young priest then. I asked Father Sigitas where he had been before, meaning his previous parish and post. He answered, “I have been in prison.” In those years, prisoners of conscience, including clerics, were returning from prisons and penal colonies. Tamkevicius was one of them. He was arrested in 1983 for conducting religious education and secret activities aimed at protecting believers’ rights, and spent five years in Perm and Mordovian penal colonies.

In the new historical conditions, Archbishop Tamkevicius is continuing his uncompromising defense of the freedom of faith and the Christian principles of public morals in his country; he tirelessly urges the powerful ones of this world to heed the voice of conscience in making decisions and do as required by public good, not selfish interests. Many Lithuanians take him seriously.

The first ever visit of Russia’s First Hierarch to Poland took place in August 2012. Although 600,000 Orthodox believers live there, it wasn’t merely a pastoral visit. Regrettably, Russian and European public opinion was focused on less significant events. How do you think relations between the peoples of Russia and Poland might develop in the future?

I cannot agree that Russian and European public opinion ignored His Holiness Patriarch Kirill’s visit to Poland. Many large mass media outlets reported the event. For example, the popular channel Euronews closely monitored the Russian Patriarch’s first visit to Poland. It was broadly discussed by public circles in Russia, Poland and other states, and mostly drew positive comments.

In my opinion, the positive dynamic in Russian-Polish relations that have begun to show in the recent times will continue. It is gratifying that the Russian Orthodox Church made its contribution to the rapprochement between the two peoples. During his visit to Poland, His Holiness Patriarch Kirill, together with the President of the Polish Episcopal Conference Archbishop Jozef Michalik, made a joint statement to the peoples of Russia and Poland reflecting our common Christian approach to bilateral relations. This historic address became an important contribution to the normalization of Russian-Polish relations which have a long record of strife, misunderstanding, armed conflicts and religious disputes.

We sometimes hear questions and even rebukes regarding what gives the two Churches the right to act as peacekeepers and offer ways of overcoming mutual mistrust. Both Russia and Poland are Slav countries with deep roots in Christianity. We are very close ethnically and culturally. I’m deeply convinced that spiritual affinity is the only solid foundation upon which we can build a productive and open relationship between the peoples of our countries. For its part, the Russian Orthodox Church is ready to make all efforts towards maintaining peace and accord between Russians and Poles.

The persecution of Christians is one of the most acute problems of the modern world. News about “legal” incarcerations and reckless murders is reported daily. The well-being of the North and the Baltic region against this background gives no reason for complacency. Yet it seems our societies do not wish to hear about the persecution of Christian believers all over the world, although the public quickly shows its indignation at other matters.

What is the cause of this ambiguity, this double morality? Is it aggressive secularism or the relationships between Christians?

There are several reasons here. Firstly, it is Europe’s loss of its Christian identity and the aggressive intrusion of secular notions into society. This has also affected certain Christian creeds and eroded their notions of traditional values. As a result, we encounter double standards: there is the lobbying of extreme liberalism on the one hand, and deliberate unwillingness to hear about the infringement upon Christians’ rights on the other. Consequently, the press deliberately distorts or suppresses the facts concerning the persecution of Christians. The Syrian conflict can serve as an example, with western mass media conducting an information war and preferring to deliberately suppress the problem of the persecution and murder of Christians by militants from various radical groups. Tens of thousands of Christians find themselves in a humanitarian catastrophe; many are killed by the most brutal methods, and acts of terror against them continue unabated. The West prefers to keep silent about it. But there are still some honest reporters who try to tell the truth, otherwise we would know nothing about the fate of Syrian Christians. As an example, I would like to mention Russia 24 channel reporter Anastasia Popova, whom the president recently awarded with a medal for bravery. May God let the West have more such honest and courageous journalists.

In the autumn of 2012, part of the Russian public expressed serious concern about the situation regarding a Russian-Sudanese family in Finland. Regrettably, our domestic routine, with tuberculosis and venereal diseases in children, teen drug abuse and homelessness, does not often become a subject of special attention on the part of the society. In this connection how does the Church feel about this political and legal initiative popularly known as “juvenile justice?”

Juvenile justice has been broadly discussed in society recently. The Church does not stand aside from these discussions. It is concerned about the regrettable overregulation of parent-child relations by government bodies which may dismantle the family as a social institution. There were cases of unjustified interference in family life under the pretext of protecting children’s rights.

The advocates of juvenile justice emphasize that introducing this system for underage offenders is quite justified, as it gives up repressive measures of influence upon children and returns them to the fold. Adequate programs allegedly correct the behavior of “problem” children more effectively than penal colonies for juvenile delinquents which leave them branded for life.

Yet it is right to say that a family cannot live in constant fear that somebody might come and take away their child, for example under the pretext that the standard of living in a family does not meet the needs of the child.

Recently, the phrase “creative class” has come into the vernacular, meaning a certain stratum of citizens with superior quality of thinking compared with the rest, “non-creative” Russians. Sadly, quite a few people take this formula seriously, including with respect to themselves. While taking an ironic view of this, we cannot but ask a quite serious question: what is the measure to test a modern person’s ability to build his and his country’s future?

This measure is responsibility. Building the future of one’s country or family is only possible for a person who feels responsibility for this future, in the first place responsibility before God. As St Paul said “… whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through him and for him” (Colos-sians 1, 16-17). Addressing the contemporary representatives of the “ruling class,” St Gregory the Theologian wrote : “It is with Christ that you command, with Christ that you govern, from Him that you have received the sword.”

He who assumes responsibility for the future of others should be gifted with special sense of self-sacrifice and special self-denial. Public activities and politics should not be an end in itself or a breeding ground to espouse pride, greed or other vices. St. John Chrysostom says: “A true king is he who conquers anger and jealousy and voluptuousness and subjects everything to the laws of God and does not allow the passion for pleasure to prevail in his soul.”

The building of the future can only be entrusted to him who makes public expediency and social good the cornerstone of his actions, for whom high ideals are not merely a pleasant-sounding phrase; they manifest themselves even in seemingly insignificant matters and daily “trifles,” such as everyday behavior, relations with neighbors, conscientious work, and observing the rules of communal life, not to mention observing the laws of the land.

All construction begins with the foundation. A foolish man builds his house upon the sand. A wise man builds his house upon the rock (see Matthew 7, 24-27). Jesus is the stone… “the only one who can save people.” (Acts 4, 11).

The future can be likened to our common home. The happiness of each individual and humanity as a whole depends on what comprises its foundation.

Last Easter Pavel Lungin’s film The Conductor was shown in Russia. It tells the story of guest performances by a group of musicians in Jerusalem, where the first night of the St Matthew Passion oratorio was to take place. The film sets the Gospel story of suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ to music which you had written for it. What place does music have in your life and your mission?

After taking monastic vows I was sure I had closed the musical chapter of my life once and for all. I was rather radical when I was twenty. I assumed I had given up music for good. But “man supposes and God disposes.” At some point the period of radicalism seemed to pass, and I gradually began to enjoy once again listening to classical music. However, I never occupied myself with it actively. It was only in 2006 that something suddenly changed in me and I began to compose music.

To me, music reflects the state of the soul and is an important medium for conveying the good news of the Church. It is a special language which can convey the loftiest feelings and which does not require special training in order to be understood – it is sufficient to have a soul and a heart open to these feelings. The language of music gives people the opportunity to communicate at the profoundest level where words are no longer necessary.

Music is one of the forms of sermon and mission. I use it as a means to convey the good news of the Gospel. Bringing home to people the image of live Christ was my main objective when I was writing “St Matthew Passion.“

Now we have a question about Petersburg, our northern Alexandria. What significance does this city have for the Christian Church? What significance does it hold for European civilization?

Petersburg was conceived by Peter the Great as a European capital. It is known that in his time everything of Russian origin was regarded as obsolete, not up to the spirit of time and Enlightenment standards – almost in the same way as nowadays. In this sense, the new capital in the beginning of the 18th century broke off from old Russia and its Byzantine heritage. The architecture of St Petersburg, including its churches, tried to emulate the best European style – English, Dutch and German at first and then French and Italian. It was an to endeavour to Europeanize Orthodoxy, with the view of distancing Russia from the prevailing Byzantine heritage in Eastern Christianity. Peter the Great and his followers seemed to entertain hopes of creating a new and original Russian Orthodoxy.

It is obvious today that this attempt was only partially successful, because Italian patterns in church architecture and music were alien to our culture. Although they have lasted for three centuries, they are increasingly re-appraised in a critical manner. Churches are ubiquitously built in old Russia style, and it is only rarely that European classicism is used, for example, if so required by architectural ensemble. I dare to assume that the “Petersburg period” in Russian history has come to an end.

On the other hand, Petersburg remains our favorite northern capital. To my mind, it is one of the most beautiful cities in the world. It continues to be a bridge between Russia and the West. Petersburg is associated with Dostoyevsky and Pushkin works. I believe Pushkin’s words from the Bronze Horseman about “a window to Europe” can carry not only geographical, but also cultural meaning. Petersburg became such a window for Russia.

This issue of Amber Bridge is to be published in mid-March, i.e. by Forgiveness Sunday which falls on March 17, New Style, this year. It will be read in all the countries of the Baltic region. What would be Your Eminence’s final thoughts to the readers of Amber Bridge?

Forgiveness is a basic principle of being, by which a person should live daily, on the strength of his faith in the All-Forgiving God. As a result of the “humanization” which has taken place in the past century and a half, the virtue of forgiveness has been stripped of religious substance and harnessed solely personal relationships. Thus in practical terms it has become a mere means to an end. Simultaneously its interpretation has changed: whereas people used to forgive each other solely “for the sake of God”, i.e. selflessly, by the commandment to love, they now do it out from a “humanistic” perspective; a person may be undecided as to the extent to which he should forgive his neighbor or if he should forgive at all.

I would like to wish the readers of your magazine to consider the religious meaning of forgiveness ahead of Forgivness Sunday. I am sure that Christian forgiveness “for the sake of God” will open up to us a far broader horizon in improving relations with our neighbors – family members, relatives, friends and colleagues. It will be a decisive step on the way to the God, who cannot be known without forgiving our enemies, ill-wishers and those who have insulted or hurt us.

I wish God’s help to all Amber Bridge magazine readers

Metropolitan Hilarion

It is true the wording is not easy and purely legal. All is simple regarding state property management. The talk is not about the property of the agency as a state organization. This property is very modest. But we manage our main resource – centers of science and culture abroad. They number 59 at present plus 8 affiliates. There are also representatives in 18 countries. Thus we have footholds in 77 countries of the world. We inherited some of the centers from the Soviet Union. They were created as part of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and survived the difficult ’90s when many of them were axed. The survivors and the newly created ones are operating successfully to that or another extent today.

I say “that or another extent” because not everything we plan and design can be implemented in the modest framework of our capabilities. Naturally we would like our centers to be equipped up-to-date and constantly feature in cultural event posters in their respective cities so that they are popular and in demand.

It is not the wish only of our agency. I will quote Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev who said at the traditional meeting of Rossotrudnichestvo representatives and heads of science and culture centers last September in Moscow: ” you have first to think about the contents of your work and its new forms – make the centers modern, multi-functional and useful for various social and age groups and for everyone who is interested in Russia. Efficiency criteria shall be concrete and practical indicators, such as the number of people studying Russian language and involved in cultural exchanges, the number of courses, the quality of information resources and Internet sites”.

It all demands both attention and intensive work in the center and on-site and finances to hire Russian language teachers on a long-term basis, send high-quality artistic groups and exhibitions, integrate the centers to the maximum into new realities of the information epoch. u nfortunately, so far we have sometimes to admit that we lack money even for the renovation of the centers. Perception of our performance also depends on the exterior. The theater begins from the wardrobe, they say. It is a pity that Russian “cultural embassies” sometimes look poorly in contrast to modern centers of other countries. Russia has a lot what to boast of in the cultural sphere. We have only to properly cut and illuminate the diamond.

We hope that today when the image of Russia abroad and its “soft force” enjoys much high-level attention there will be progress on the avenue. It is pleasing that in many countries people want to study the Russian language, visit our exhibitions, applaud our actors, communicate, study, read and watch. It means our efforts will not be futile.

These are the services which our agency provides. They are the services to the state in promoting its image and culture. The services can be also used by everyone abroad who is interested in Russia and naturally by our compatriots. For them it is an important and necessary possibility to maintain live contacts with the cultural environment in which they grew up and which most of them want to preserve for their children.

The work of Rossotrudnichestvo in the Baltic Sea region and in the North of Europe differs in intensity. Somewhere it is everyday effort while in other places it is ad hoc. What would you list as an achievement in the region and what do you think has to be improved?

In the Baltic Sea region and the European north we have permanent footholds in Germany, Poland, Denmark, Finland where our science and culture centers operate. They hold exhibitions (only in Helsinki there were 39 exhibitions in 2012) and performances of Russian actors, as well as master classes, Russian language courses, cinema shows (say, in Gdansk Russian and Soviet movies are shown four times a month). Unfortunately, we still do not have an office in Sweden and Norway and in Baltic countries. The reason is not only insufficient efforts of Rossotrudnichestvo. On the contrary, our center in Copenhagen tries to cover neighboring Scandinavian countries. It held events last year in Malmo and Gothenburg, as well as in the Norwegian capital city.

In some cases problems with our presence in the country are caused by a lack of funds, but in some cases – by clear and unconcealed rejection by local authorities of Russian cultural centers.

As the talk is exclusively about cultural offices in countries with big Russian-speaking communities we cannot but view such rejection as a politically motivated and unfriendly act of authorities in corresponding countries aimed not only against Russia, but their own people as well.

The fifty-nine countries where our centers operate can confirm they pose no risk to national statehood, but the mutual benefit from cultural presence (as it always builds on reciprocity) is evident. I am confident that time will put everything in place and Russian centers of science and culture will open in all countries of the region because an additional channel of bilateral cultural dialogue is necessary not only for Russia and Rossotrudnichestvo but mostly to our people who should not suffer from prejudice and phobias of various politicians.

Russia currently presides in the Council of the Baltic Sea States. It is common knowledge that the CBSS is one of the most successful institutions of regional cooperation. They said the best is the enemy of the good. How can the format become more efficient?

Rossotrudnichestvo is not engaged on the platform, and it is a pity. Cultural dimension of regional cooperation provides additional possibilities for involving a maximum number of people in various countries into dialogue projects.

The Council of the Baltic Sea States is definitely an example of successful regional cooperation and I see good prospects of its growth and development on various guidelines. I do not believe the best is the enemy of the good in this case. Any project should be adapted, firstly, to the realities of the information epoch and the emergence of new communication platforms and formals, and, secondly, to the changing needs of the people. For example, enhanced economic cooperation between countries often results in increased demand for the study of corresponding languages – we noted a growth in the number of those wishing to study the Russian language in Baltic countries and we deem it necessary to react to the trends by launching new specialized courses and providing other opportunities.

In April 2013 in the framework of Russian CBSS presidency St. Petersburg will host a forum of non-governmental organizations of the Baltic Sea region. Human rights will be a major issue. The Russian Federation has begun to pay more attention of late to the protection of the rights of its citizens who live or stay abroad. Which problems does Rossotrudnichestvo resolve in this aspect?

Protection of the rights of Russian citizens abroad is a priority task of the Russian foreign ministry as the talk is about decisions lying in the sphere of the state policy. The Fund to support and protect compatriots abroad began to operate last year. Its task is to provide assistance in resolving legal issues faced by compatriots in other countries.

The mission of Rossotrudnichestvo is to satisfy cultural needs of Russians and representatives of other peoples of Russia abroad. Therefore, our centers are in constant contact with associations of compatriots and sometimes even act as a kind of cultural or family clubs for them. They hold meetings, children’s parties, and amateur concerts. Maybe the work lacks the necessary scale which we can boast of in performance reports. But for many people outside Russia it is important to have such places of communication and leisure and therefore we shall continue to develop them and upgrade the quality of the format.

The so-called cross-year of Russia in Germany and Germany in Russia is taking place in the same chronological framework as the Russian presidency in the CBSS. One of the recent issues of the Amber Bridge carried an interview with British historian Dominic Lieven who said that “out of all European nations the Germans are most balanced about their history.” Experts noted disappointment over German-Russian relations circulating in German society. What can Russia bring to the relations in order to add a positive and optimistic mood to them?

Cross-years of Russia with other countries are truly large-scale and popular events which allow to hold a massive presentation of the country abroad. Rossotrudnichestvo is actively engaged in such projects. In particular, last year we prepared and held the International children’s forum It Is Our World in Bonn, the national culture festival Russian Constellation in Berlin, and the 3rd international student forum in the German capital in October in the framework of the year of Russia in Germany. In 2013 we shall participate in the year of Russia in the Netherlands and we hope the level of events will not be lower than in Germany.

I believe that despite all possibilities provided by social networks and new means of communication such big “live” events continue to be vital as they provide a possibility to a big number of people to dive into the immense cultural space of Russia without leaving their home country.

It is very important and fruitful in periods when there is a feeling of a certain cooling in relations or mutual interest. We can speak about some disappointment in German society regarding Russia, but it is mostly conditioned by the tone of the media coverage of domestic Russian developments. It is based on assessments of a narrow circle of people from Russian political and public life.

It is like in Soviet times when our people learned news about the West through assessments of the Communist party leaders. As a result, it boiled down to endless large-scale protests, strikes and sufferings of the working people. Definitely all the mentioned events took place but like in the coverage of modern Russian realities abroad it was not the whole truth. It is saddening because it is the reason for opinions and prejudice.

We also like to lament and paint everything in darker colors than it is in reality. It is our national trait. We have to see more good things as the authors of the private project http://www.sdelanounas.ru are doing. Every day they say what has been built, opened or produced in Russia. It is important not only for foreigners but for us as well.

Outside perception is not always based on fair assessments of Russia. You can differ on what the girls from Pussy Riot band did and on subsequent court verdict and sentence. But when everybody speaks about it emotionally and does not even recall over three million Russians who queued several nights to touch the Christian relic – the Virgin Mary’s Belt – I believe it is an information bias. Those indignant at the sentence speak in each European newspaper.

Those indignant at the punk-prayer are not heard or seen although they definitely include a majority of the mentioned three million Russians. There is an important justice principle – аudiatur et altera pars (let the other side speak out). I believe there should be a balance in the media and then we shall be able to speak about objectivity and the absence of bias.

To avoid prejudice and positions based on secondary sources we have to create as many as possible direct forms of public dialogue. In contrast to the USSR which tried to hide its realities from a foreign eye and resorted to propaganda modern Russia wants to have its developments covered objectively to the maximum. The Russian image abroad is currently worse that the true situation in the country. We want people to see our life themselves without beautification and distortions and make conclusions based on personal impressions. Therefore Russia has been insisting for decades on visa-free travel with EU countries. So far we have not received a positive answer from our partners. Besides, some Baltic countries deliberately impede the exchange of cultural centers and erect obstacles to Russian language studies. It is not Russia which creates barriers for intercultural and public dialogue. That cannot but cause concern.

The best remedy for disappointment for Germans and any other societies is in increased communications. Come, meet, and listen not only to those who say habitual things for your ear. Open various Russia for yourself and you will have less disappointments and more benefits for all. Any difficult dialogue is better than two monologues.

Many countries, including most influential and wealthy, use national and territorial branding technologies to build up and enhance the image of the country. There are numerous disputes about the technologies, there are pro and con arguments. What is the Russian position?

Today the image of any country comprises an important asset in international affairs. It is sometimes weightier than political and economic weight. Therefore, I believe nobody is still deciding whether to promote the image or not. Everyone is working to position himself in the best way before other countries. All that is the so-called “soft force” of a country – to acquire supporters abroad through attractiveness, not force.

Whether it is necessary to resort to branding technologies or act differently (e.g. by advocating your ideolog y and values, spreading your language and mass culture products, etc.) shall be decided by each country independently proceeding from its resources. Most countries have their national brands which promote their image. Everybody knows Italian fashion and design, French wines, Swiss watches, German quality, English football, and Chinese cuisine. The Russians have discovered Turkish resorts. They bring major benefits to that country which is also interested in maintaining good relations with Russia. It is a two-way traffic.

There is nothing bad if Russia reminds the others about its ballet, music, and literature (Anna Karenina is screened with success today). If our country continues to be associated with the Kremlin and St. Basil’s Cathedral, high-quality vodka and outstanding musicians, and immense territory for tourism it will be only good for it. The task is to expand the range of associations. Let new names of writers and film directors appear in it, as well as new geographic names – Sochi, Skolkovo, Russky Island, and new faces in all spheres – e.g. Buranovo Grannies.

It is not the main issue how the Russian branding (or re-branding) be technically implemented. We naturally have what to show and tell to the world. Besides, there are up to 30 million Russian-speaking compatriots abroad. Over 250 million people speak Russian in the world (by the number of people in Europe – from the Atlantic to the Urals – who say Russian is their native language it is the number one with a major lead). Russia occupies the biggest territory on the planet and I believe it will never lack attention. But we would like to have a benevolent attention aimed at dialogue and friendship. The public and the state have to take effort for that. They have to work together, not only the government and Rossotrudnichestvo. We have to remember that each of us carries the image of the country when he communicate with foreigners, goes on holidays or to study abroad.

Each Monday the Voice of Russian radio station airs the Talk with Konstantin Kosachev program. It is a strange role for a high-ranking official. Do you have any feedback?

It may be a strange role for a government official, but it does not mean the mission is wrong. Firstly, I always considered myself to be a public politician, not just an official or apparatchik. Major experience of communicating with my voters in Chuvashia from where I was thrice elected to the State Duma which I know well and love helped me a lot. Secondly, radio offers a good format from messaging your ideas to a big number of people and getting acquainted with interesting interlocutors. May be I am abusing office to a certain extent as I use my position to inviting valuable and respected guests to the broadcast. I am sincerely happy every time when I succeed and when I hear positive response to the program.

Naturally, the response is not always positive. You cannot avoid criticism (but if people disagree it means they listen to you which is also important) because people have different views. What is clear for me may be seen by another person completely differently. It is also important to look at clear things from a different point of view.

Radio, TV and printed media are the so-called non-contact formats. They are definitely necessary however the future (and likely the present) is with contact formats and platforms where live communication goes. We sometimes lack interactivity and do not always involve in the circle of sympathizers of our country abroad as many people as possible.

Rossotrudnichestvo annually implements a program of trips to Russia by young scientists, journalists, politicians, and public figures – those who we call young public opinion leaders (last year 500 people visited our country and this year we hope to raise the number to 650). We work to arrange interesting meetings and acquaintances for the guests, discussions and visits, and we are pleased to hear and read their response confirming how much their opinion of Russia has changed under the impression of what they saw with their own eyes, of their personal communication. So far it may be a drop in the sea, but an important drop.

Last year the Russian Historic Society was reestablished. Academic ties of scholars in various countries intensify, including the Baltic Sea region. International educational projects expand. The Baltic Civilization Institute at the Amber Bridge Fund contributes to the processes. What do you think are the most vital tasks in the sphere?

First and foremost, it is rapprochement of positions of scholars and experts and the public of various countries in their attitude to the past of the region and Europe in general. Unfortunately, in the past decades we witnessed the renaissance of politicized historic issues which in many countries were involved in the political and ideological context. As a result, various reciprocal claims emerged, the renaissance of old hard feelings was artificially encouraged under the cover of new chauvinistic self-conscience, the opinion of minorities was ignored, and explicit nationalists came to power.

Leave history to historians – the task is important not for governments, but for societies. Schoolbooks which our children study are also important. It is horrifying to read numerous things which children are taught in neighboring countries when the talk is about the role of Russia and Russians in their history. The surviving obsessions of parents look from the pages of the schoolbooks rather than real history. They will hardly teach their children to love their native land through provoking hatred to other peoples. This is weakness, not strength, according to me. I believe rapprochement of curricula in schools and institutes can constitute important mission for all of us as we can lay the foundation for relationship between future generations by that.

A personal question in the end. You have many ties with Sweden. According to available information in Internet, had it not been for the Soviet rules you would have been born in Stockholm. How do you perceive Sweden and Nordic countries in general?

It is true that in different political realities I could have been born in Sweden. Nevertheless I partially feel myself a Scandinavian as my childhood passed there as well as my first professional steps. The region will be always close to me no matter what government position I occupy.

I perceive it as a region of highly intellectual, original and self-sufficient people who, like Russians, are not pampered by much sun and other southern life bonuses, but succeeded to build up life on their peninsula to the envy of others – both politically, economically and socially which is confirmed by top places in international ratings.

Scandinavia for me is a region which surprisingly resembles Russia. The space, forests, exciting beauty of the North – everything is present in Russia and in Scandinavian countries. I believe we have what to borrow from the experience of our northwestern neighbors in how to preserve the wealth and treasure what nature gave us. It would be good for the Russians to acquire some Scandinavian mentality. It would be also good for Scandinavians to have some Russian one.

Thank you for the interview.