In December 2014 Denmark filed a claim with the United Nations to expand the boundaries of its continental shelf in the Arctic, and Russia is going to present its new claim in 2015. It seems impossible to elicit the meaning of the ongoing process of the Arctic continental shelf delimitation without specifying its legal and geopolitical aspects. This article is intended to systematize the international legal mechanism of the continental shelf delimitation and to highlight the actual positions of the claimant states as well as the prospects of the boundary delimitation in the Arctic continental shelf.

In December 2014 Denmark filed an application to the United Nations for extension of its continental shelf in the Arctic to 350 nautical miles, which caused numerous comments in official circles of various countries, politicians, experts and observers. Some of them saw in this step the desire of Denmark to implement its geopolitical ambitions, achieve some political goals, join the battle for resources in the Arctic, or provoke military confrontation in the region and a new “cold war”[1].

Some experts, on the basis of the thesis of economic hopelessness of central areas of the continental shelf in the Arctic (according to the US Geological Survey (USGS) «Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle», about 84% of the hydrocarbon resources of the continental shelf is already within the areas of national jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states), tend to see in the actions of Denmark the logic of the “big geopolitical game”. How justified are these estimates and what actually is it all about?

The international legal regime of the Arctic shelf is governed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to Article 76, the continental shelf of a coastal state “includes the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines… where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance”. It is important to note that the baselines – borders of inland seas – are often a subject of controversy. Due to the fact that the United States are not currently a member of the Convention, they are guided by the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, according to which the continental shelf is defined as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas”[2].

Figure 1. Scheme of the international legal status of the continental margin and its superjacent waters in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The illustration is made based on the US Navy materials: The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. Digital resource. URL: https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-0defea93325c/.

Five countries have a continental shelf in the Arctic: Russia, Canada, USA, Denmark (Greenland) and Norway. Activity on the Arctic shelf, over which sovereignty has not been recognized by any of the states, is regulated by the International Seabed Authority located in Kingston, Jamaica^[3].

In accordance with Article 4 of Annex II of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a coastal State intending to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles must submit an application (presentation) to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) within 10 years after the ratification of the Convention. Therefore, the application made by Denmark for extension of its Arctic shelf is in full compliance with the provisions of the Convention. This application was expected, and it is not dramatic and cannot give evidence about any “secret geopolitical intentions” of the Kingdom of Denmark. Russia, claiming expansion of its Arctic shelf up to 350 nautical miles, also exercises its rights granted by the 1982 Convention.

When applying for extension of a continental shelf applicant countries have the right to go by various reasons, including political arguments, but their consideration by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf must completely rule out political motives. The Commission’s decisions must be based on objective and independent scientific assessment of the structure of the seabed.

The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is a purely technical body composed of 21 experts in the field of marine geology, geophysics and hydrography who serve in their personal capacities (Article 2.1 of Annex II of the Convention). Members of the Commission shall be elected for a term of 5 years, and can be re-elected at the meetings of States Parties of the 1982 Convention, which shall be convened by the United Nations Secretary General, as necessary, in accordance with Paragraph 2 (e) of Article 319 of the 1982 Convention.

The main requirement for the composition of the Commission is to ensure equitable geographical representation: at least three members shall be elected from each geographical region. Quorum for a meeting is 2/3 of the total number of participants in the 1982 Convention. 2/3 votes of the states that are present and participate in the voting process is needed for the election of members of the Commission. It is important to note that, as the first Chairman Yu. B. Kazmin pointed out, the Commission remains an independent body, officially non-accountable to the Meeting[4]. The fourth and the latest Commission waselectedatthe 22^nd Meetingin 2012. ThisCommission hastheauthorityuntilJune 15, 2017.

Inaccordance with Article 76of the 1982 ConventionandArticles3and 6of Annex IIthereto, the Commission shall perform the followingfunctions:

1) to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 200 nautical miles;

2) to provide scientific and technical advice, if requested by the coastal State concerned during the preparation of the data referred to in subparagraph (1);

3) to provide recommendations to the coastal States on the demarcation of the outer limits of their continental shelf.

At the same time, we should note that the Commission’s recommendations are not a final and binding decision. First, according to Article 8 of Annex II of the 1982 Convention, “in the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new submission to the Commission”[5]. Second, already here we shall draw attention to the fact that international negotiations obligatorily have the decision function in the process of delimitation of the shelf.

The key criterion in determining the outer limit of the continental margin of the coastal state beyond the 200-mile zone is natural prolongation of the continental shelf. The application submitted to the Commission should contain relevant scientific evidence. Bathymetry (i.e. maps of the seabed with depth marks) and geological criteria are used to determine whether the underwater structures comply with the specified criterion.

The bathymetric criterion (i.e. associated with the assessment of the depth of the sea) involves determining the position of the foot of the continental slope (see Fig. 1) by the maximum change in the gradient, taking into account the 2,500 meter isobath (i.e. an imaginary line connecting all points along the coast where the depth is equal to 2500 meters). The assessment process for the compliance with the geological criteria is even more complex. These criteria include information on the structure and thickness of the sedimentary cover (deposits covering the shelf), the nature of the crust on the continental shelf and geological and geophysical evidence of the location of the continental foot. Sedimentary layers within the outer edge of the continental margin should be 1% (or more) of the shortest distance from the foot of the continental slope. If the data is not available on the sedimentary cover, the limit of the shelf can be marked along a line separated from the foot of the slope by no more than 60 miles.

The restrictive edge of the outer limit of the shelf is a line of 350 miles from the coast of the mainland or islands, and 100 miles from the isobath of 2500 m. However, these restrictions do not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin. These crustal blocks in the Arctic, with the nature of a mainland and almost inseparable from the continents, go deep into the ocean (i.e. the Mendeleev Elevation) or cross it from Eurasia to the Greenland-Ellesmerian Depression (the Lomonosov Ridge), separating the Arctic Ocean into two different structures – Eurasian (in which, for example, Svalbard and Franz Josef Land are located) and Amerasian (the Canadian Arctic Archipelagoes and Wrangel Island are located here). It is these circumstances that cause the mutual territorial “overlapping” of a number of applications.

Some experts – especially non-Arctic states – see some provocations in the applications for extension of the Arctic continental shelf by Arctic coastal states. For example, the analysts of the British newspaper “Financial Times” explain the desire of the Arctic coastal countries to justify their right to expand the boundaries of the continental shelf in the Arctic by the logic of the “geopolitical game”. The main prize of this game would be the North Pole, the control of which, supposedly, is a symbol of the “geopolitical victory” and leadership in the Arctic region and control over it^[6]. A number of researchers even argue that the areas claimed by Denmark, Canada and Russia, are economically future-less, as well pointing at the thickness and consistency of the ice cover over the central part of the shelf, the “minor” share of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic, concentrated in this part of the shelf .

Meanwhile, according to the research by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) «Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle», the Arctic contains about 22% of the world’s conventional oil and gas reserves (or about 29.9 billion tons of oil equivalent), with about 84% of the hydrocarbon resources of the continental shelf located at depths up to 500 m^[7]. According to some representatives of the Arctic coastal states, from 94 to 97% of offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic is already within the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states. These data were presented, for example, by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. These figures are also indicated in the Arctic strategy of Denmark for the period of 2011 – 2020[8]. The same estimates have been given by the experts of the University of the Arctic in Rovaniemi (Finland)[9].

However, we should bear in mind the very low level of exploration of the Arctic shelf, especially in high latitudes, and current prediction-like estimates of oil and gas. There is a good chance that the Arctic shelf hydrocarbon deposits outside of the 200-mile border can be much richer than expected. According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, potential hydrocarbon reserves of the central areas of the continental shelf in the Arctic are about 5 billion tons of oil equivalent, whereas the Minister S.E. Donskoy considers these estimates to be minimal[10].

If we consider that the forecast figure in exports of fuel and energy resources of the Russian Federation in 2020, according to the Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030, should reach 0.8 billion tons of oil equivalent[11], then fossil fuel resources of the central parts of the Arctic shelf may be comparable with the volume of five years of the Russian oil and gas exports at the current level. Speaking about the resource potential of the central areas of the continental shelf, it is important to stress the probability of detection of mineral resources in the central part of the Arctic shelf.

In addition, the sovereignty over the shelf gives a country the right to monitor any activity on it, including, for example, the construction of pipelines. It also assumes responsibility for the country’s environmental protection in the territory. Uncontrolled economic activity outside the areas of national jurisdiction in the area of the “common heritage of mankind” may pose a threat to the environment at the regional and global scale. Therefore, expansion of monitoring of the human activities in the Arctic shelf by the Arctic coastal States, as well as responsibility of those countries for the consequences of such actions can significantly contribute to sustainable development. Under the current circumstances of the non-alignment of the United States to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the zone of the “common heritage of mankind” in the Arctic is not feasible^[12]. However, this leaves the question of the legal status of a number of sections of the shelf unresolved, and therefore it defines only a transient, temporary state of affairs.

Given these considerations, identification of the outer limits of the jurisdiction of the coastal states of the Arctic continental shelf is a priority task of the Russian foreign policy, as defined in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation on February 12, 2013[13].

Let’s consider the claims of the Arctic coastal countries for the continental shelf in the Arctic:

Russia ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea by the Federal Law #30-FZ dated February 26, 1998. Russia filed its first application in 2001. However, the Commission considered the data provided insufficient and decided that for unambiguous classification of each of the deep-water bottom uplifts in the Amerasian sub-basin (see Fig. 2), Russia should submit experiment-backed evidence of their continental nature and their structural belonging to the continental margin of the north-eastern Eurasia, as well as develop a consistent model of the evolution of the Arctic, which explains the geological nature of these bottom uplifts[14].

In the absence of these data, the outer limit of the continental shelf in the Amerasian sub-basin cannot be farther than 350 nautical miles from the baselines, i.e. the area, which Russia can claim in the region, will not exceed 400000 km². At the same time, the use of the second criterion of the limitation of the legal shelf (100 nautical miles from the isobath of 2500 m), which applies only to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, will allow to extend the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in the Amerasian subbasin much farther. In this case,the acquired areaof theextended continental shelfof Russia will be1.2 millionsquare km^[15]. To date, according to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, a new version of the application to be submitted, according to the plan, in 2015, is at the final stage of the preparation^[16].

1. The maximumUS claimsin the Arctic Ocean are the Chukchi Cap and the seabed areas adjacent to it to the north andeast, not reachingthe North Pole^[17]. In the US a Specialinteragencycoordinating bodyhas been created to substantiate the outer limit ofthe continental shelf- The US Extended Continental Shelf Task Force.More than a dozenAmericanministries,services and agencies take part in its work^[18].

Denmark ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on November 16, 2004. The claims by Denmark apply to a part of the Lomonosov Ridge, which lies to the right of an imaginary line of the equidistance with Canada and further to the north up to the North Pole, and further, to the Russian side of the Arctic, which thus overlaps with the claims of the Russian application of 2001. Denmark submitted its application for extension of its shelf in December 2014. It also claims for the western part of the Western Nansen Basin and in the place of the East Greenland Ridge^[19]. It is important to note that in the field of shelf delimitation Denmark has close research collaboration with Canada. In 2005, these two states announced plans to jointly explore water areas of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to their territories and process the received data, which resulted in the signing of a memorandum on cooperation in Ottawa. Denmark has scientific cooperation with all the Arctic coastal states, including Russia.

Canada ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on November 7, 2003. So far, the country has not applied for extension of its continental shelf. In the “preliminary information”, delivered by Canada to the United Nations on December 6, 2013, only some vague scope of potential Canadian claims is specified: the continental margin of the continental shelf in the Canadian basin, Amundsen basin, on the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha Ridge. It is specified that on the Alpha and Lomonosov Ridges Canadian claims concern areas that are located farther than 350 nautical miles from the baselines. It is expected that Canada may acquire approximately 1.5 million km² of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines. In the “preliminary information” it is indicated that Canada is going to submit a partial application, the timeline is indicated vaguely[20].

Norway ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on June 24, 1996. It submitted its application in November 2006, claiming for the shelf of the Western part of the Nansen Basin – the same site, which is also claimed by Denmark in its application in 2014[21].

Thus, underwater elevations, which are natural components of the continental margin, belong to the shelf that is claimed in applications of several countries at the same time. The largest of these elevations is the Lomonosov Ridge (in the scientific community there is almost no dispute that the Lomonosov Ridge and other disputed areas of the shelf have a continental origin; scientists’ opinions differ on where exactly these elevations join the mainland^[22]). There is a chance that the United Nations Commission on the Law of the Sea recognizes the controversial underwater elevations as a natural component of several continental margins, and, therefore, the right to sovereignty over them by two or three Arctic coastal states at the same time. However, even in this scenario, there is no potential for conflict.

Figure 2. Location of the maingeological structuresandsections of the bottom of theArctic Ocean^[23]..

Information note: The Lomonosov Ridge was discovered by Soviet scientists in 1948. It stretches over 1500 – 1700 km and connects the Eurasian continent in the area of the New Siberian Islands (Russia) with the North American continent in the area of Ellesmere Island (Canada) and Greenland (Denmark), effectively dividing the Arctic Ocean into 2 parts – the Pacific and Atlantic (see Fig. 2). In the Pacific part there is the Mendeleev Ridge (Ellesmere – Wrangel Islands). In the central part of the ridge there was found a break. Another name for the ridge is “Alpha”. Also in the Pacific part there is the Chukchi Cap. In the Atlantic part there is the Gakkel Ridge, which is an extension of the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. The Lomonosov Ridge and the Gakkel Ridge form two basins in the Atlantic part: the Amundsen basin and the Nansen basin.

From the above it follows that the so-called “control” over the North Pole by an Arctic country with the shelf in the Arctic Ocean may be solely the result of consideration of applications of the countries concerned by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf based on scientific evidence that these countries will collect and present in support of their applications. And the “prize” will be “awarded” to the country that will perform this task in the most compelling and scientific way – unless otherwise stipulated in mutual agreements by scientifically recognized claimant countries.

With regard to the thesis of the “militarization” of the Arctic region, the reason for making such estimates is attributed to the overlapping of applications, that is, due to the intersection of shelf territories claimed by coastal Arctic states (see Fig. 3). If the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf recognizes that such claims are justified, these countries will have to hold diplomatic negotiations on the delimitation of the shelf on the basis of existing norms of the international maritime law. It is impossible to militarily impose a particular solution to the problem. This is the only possible approach and the only possible vision of the claimant states for resolving disputes, which is reflected in the Ilulissat Declaration of May 28, 2008^[24].

It is important to note that in the 2013 Kiruna Declaration of the Arctic Council all the Arctic countries (including the US) have committed themselves to act in accordance with the international law, including the law of the sea^[25]. It is significant that it was the potential for the use of international legal mechanisms of delimitation of the disputed territories of the Arctic shelf that the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed in its official commentary published in connection with the Danish application for the continental shelf in 2014^[26].

Figure 3. Scheme of the Arctic shelf: 200-mile zone and the territorial claims of countries, including the application of Denmark in 2014.

Source: Denmark challenges Russia and Canada over the North Pole // BBC News Europe. Digital resource. URL:  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30481309

2,000 km

1,000 miles

Alaska (USA), Russia, Norway, Greenland (Denmark), Canada

The North Pole, the Lomonosov Ridge

Applications/claims:

Danish application: 2014.

Russia

Canada

USA

200-miles line

It should be noted that there are two main principles of possible delimitation of maritime areas and the Arctic shelf between states. According to the “median line method”, delimitation is done based on the principle of the equidistance of the boundary line from the shoreline (or base points of the coastline) of the neighboring states. According to another method – “sectoral” – the pole is seen as a point from which straight lines are drawn along longitudes. The specific method of drawing dividing lines between the neighboring countries is not specified by the Convention on the Law of the Sea, except for referring to the principle of mutual consent and justice^[27].

Currently, the Russian Federation already has positive experience in the field of contractual delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic (namely in the eastern part of the Western Nansen Basin). On 15 September 2010, Russia signed an agreement with Norway “On Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean”.

Summarizing the above, it should be emphasized that allegations of futility, politicization and high conflict potential of the international process of delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic are incorrect and unfounded. On the contrary, we should talk about the strategic importance of this issue for all Arctic coastal countries, as well as about the effective mechanism for its solution embedded in the international law which is based on objective and impartial scientific assessment of the seabed, as well as openness of the Arctic coastal countries for a dialogue, their willingness to cooperate and find mutually beneficial solutions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Martin Lidegaard) in connection with the Danish application to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, said: “This is not an act of aggression. This is an attempt to fairly and accurately provide data of the geological expertise. We hope for constructive cooperation with experts from the United Nations and the subsequent bilateral negotiations with neighboring countries”[28].

The delimitation of the continental shelf in the Arctic is quite complicated and can take a long time. However, objectively and fairly established boundaries may for centuries provide the basis for efficient studying and development of the region, as well as for strengthening of the close partnership among the Arctic coastal states.

Bibliography

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[1]“A new cold war: Denmark gets aggressive, stakes huge claim in Race for the Arctic” // National Post. Электронныйресурс. URL: http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/12/15/a-new-cold-war-denmark-gets-aggressive-stakes-huge-claim-in-race-for-the-arctic/; “Denmark challenges Russia with the Arctic claim” // PRIO Blogs. Digital resource. URL: http://blogs.prio.org/ArcticPolitics/2014/12/denmark-challenges-russia-with-the-arctic-claim/; “Canada sparks Cold War over Arctic” // The Chronicle Gerald. Digital resource. URL: [http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1175277-canada-sparks-cold-war-over-arctic].

[2]1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.conventions.ru/view_base.php?id=34]. (Accessed 19.12.2014).

[3] Konyshev, V.N., A.A. Sergunin. The Arctic in the international politics: cooperation or competition? The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Moscow, 2011. URL: [http://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/01/1269302651/%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%A2%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%90_%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%98.pdf]. (Accessed 19.12.2014). P. 42.

[4]Doc. SPLOS/73. 14 June 2001. P.10. Para. 61.

[5] Gudev P.A. Challenges and threats to oil and gas production in the Arctic. // Ecologichesky vestnik Rossii, #2 (15). Pp. 34-35.

[6] “Denmark lays formal claim to North Pole” // Financial Times. URL: [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b7e66b1c-8442-11e4-8cc5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QCY2ciY1]. (Accessed 15.01.2015).

[7]Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle. Digital resource. URL: [http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf].

^[8] Kongeriget Danmarks Strategi for Arktis 2011–2020. // Danish Embassy in Canada, official website. [Digital resource]. URL:[http://canada.um.dk/da/~/media/Canada/Documents/Other/Arktis_Rapport_DA.pdf] P. 24. (Accessed 15.12.2014).

[9] Canada claimed for the Lomonosov Ridge. Article. Digital resource. URL: [http://pro-arctic.ru/06/12/2013/press/6010]. (Accessed: 15.12.2014).

[10]“The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment: the Russian Federation will submit an application to the United Nations for expansion of the limits of the Arctic shelf in spring 2015” // ITAR-TASS. Digital resource. URL: [http://itar-tass.com/politika/1540165]. (Accessed 15.01.2015).

[11]The energy strategy of Russia till 2030. The Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, official website. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.minenergo.gov.ru/activity/energostrategy/]. (Accessed 15.01.2015).

[12] Vylegzhanin A.N. Non-participation in the Convention on the Law of the Sea gives advantages to the USA. // RIA Novosti. Digital resource. URL: [http://ria.ru/arctic_news/20120719/704132667-print.html]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[13] The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on February 12, 2013. Subparagraphs 31, 38, 73. The official website of the President of the Russian Federation. URL: [http://news.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d447a0ce9f5a96bdc3.pdf]. Accessed: [15.12.2014].

[14] Konyshev, V.N., A.A. Sergunin. The Arctic in the international politics: cooperation or competition? The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Moscow, 2011. URL: http://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/01/1269302651/%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%A2%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%90_%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%98.pdf. (Accessed: 19.12.2014). P. 44.

[15]Same. Pp. 44-45.

[16] «The Russian application for the Arctic shelf will be ready by the end of the year». // Rossiyskaya gazeta. URL: http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/30/reg-szfo/arktika.html. (Accessed: 19.12.2014). P. 44.

[17] Gubanov A.I. Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf: international law problems and perspectives. Monograph. – M.: IKD “Zerzalo-M”, 2015. P 244.

[18]The Extended Continental Shelf Project. Information from the website: www.continentalshelf.gov URL: http://continentalshelf.gov/about.html. (Accessed: 19.12.2014).

[19] Gubanov A.I. Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf: international law problems and perspectives. Monograph. – M.: IKD “Zerzalo-M”, 2015. PP. 244-247.

[20]Same. PP. 247-248.

[21]Same, PP. 248 – 249.

[22] Evdokimov Yu. Hot Arctic //Battle on the Ice: the Arctic shelf in the world politics and economics of the 21^st century / Eds: V. Andrianov, N. Vasiliev, B.M. Golkin, 2009. P. 37.

[23] Gubanov A.I. Delimitation of the Arctic continental shelf: international law problems and perspectives. Monograph. – M.: IKD “Zerzalo-M”, 2015. P. 308.

[24]The Ilulissat Declaration. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[25] Voronkov L.S. The Arctic for 8. Evolution of the role of the NATO in the Arctic. // Russia in global politics. Digital resource. URL: [http://globalaffairs.ru/number/Arktika-na-vosmerykh-16045]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[26] The commentary by the Information and Press Department of the MFA on the Danish application for the Arctic continental shelf. MFA of the Russian Federation, official website. Digital resource. URL: [http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/C4533848E85A09A0C3257DB00053569C]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

[27] Konyshev, V.N., A.A. Sergunin. The Arctic in the international politics: cooperation or competition? The Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Moscow, 2011. URL: [http://www.hse.ru/data/2011/11/01/1269302651/%D0%90%D0%A0%D0%9A%D0%A2%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%90_%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%A1%D0%98.pdf]. (Accessed: 19.12.2014). P. 43.

[28] Regeringen og Grønlands selvstyre indgiver i dag krav på kontinentalsoklen nord for Grønland. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official website. Digital resource. URL: [http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/udenrigspolitiske-nyheder/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=7d92317d-823e-4412-8bd4-5cbcadccb45e]. (Accessed: 15.01.2015).

The relations of Russia with the North European countries have a special place in European politics. The atmosphere of these relations has evolved over many centuries, when countries traded and fought with each other, concluded dynastic alliances, explored the Northern sea and shared cultural and scientific achievements with each other. These relations were deep and multifaceted. Their bloom came in the days of the Hanseatic League, among whose participants were many Russian cities ― Novgorod, Pskov, Tikhvin, Belozersk, Tot’ma, Torzhok, Tver, Velikyi Ustyug, Revel and others. However, not only trade relations determined the nature of mutual relations between Russia and the North European countries, as marriage of state also played an important role. A significant mark in Russian history was left by Empress Maria Feodorovna, born Danish Princess Marie Sophie Frederikke Dagmara, who became the wife of Emperor Alexander III and mother of the last Russian Emperor Nikolay II.

Perhaps the most serious test of the relationship took place during the Great Northern War, when Peter the Great “cut the window” into Europe in spite of Sweden and strengthened the military position of Russia on the Baltic Sea. European capitals were not happy about the strengthening of Russia on the Baltic Sea, but after a while Stockholm and Copenhagen admitted the increasing influence of Russia on world politics. A century after Poltava Victory at the beginning of the XIX century, Russia made an enormous contribution to the development of the Finnish state, including it in its membership and granting the broadest autonomy to the Grand Duchy of Finland. Finally, in the XX century, the Soviet Union made a major contribution to the liberation of Europe from fascism; Soviet troops took part in the liberation of North Norway from Nazi troops.

The present stage of this relationship was marked by the “cold war”, when during the confrontation between West and East the policy of restraint and neutrality was used by social democratic governments of Sweden and Finland, what helped to create at that difficult time a climate of trust between the countries, belonging to different military-political blocs. Despite the fact that the level of mutual trust at that time was not always very high, it was fully offset by restraint in military and strategic issues, as well as the desire to preserve regional stability.

As you know, three of five North European countries (Norway, Denmark and Iceland) were fully integrated into the North Atlantic alliance, the first two even worked out plans in case of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, while Sweden and Finland remained neutral. At the same time Finland had a special place in the relations with the West and the Soviet Union. Its sovereignty was partially limited by a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948, in which both countries made a commitment “not to conclude any alliance and not to participate in the coalition directed against another High Contracting Parties”[1].

The disappearance of the USSR and the victory of Western democracy inspired many people to revise previous models of interaction. In the 1990s, the Finnish model was rejected by the supporters of the Euroatlantic choice and new generation of politicians of the North European countries, representing the right-wing conservatists. At the same time due to a misunderstanding were forgotten unique achievements of this model of relationship. Meanwhile, the historical significance of the model “Finlandization” lay in the fact that with the help of it Finland, on one hand, significantly reduced the risk of being involved in a confrontation between East and West, and on the other hand ― it was able to take full advantage of the economic benefits of its geographical location and the Soviet-Finnish border. The model of “Finlandization” opened access to capacious Soviet market for the high-quality Finnish goods and helped our northern neighbour to avoid confrontation with Moscow, didn’t allow to draw The Country of Thousands of Lakes in dubious military and political maneuvers that could have escalated into an armed conflict.

Whatever it was, already at a new historical stage in the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the basis of these relations contained the idea of maintaining a sub-regional stability, improving the climate of trust and sustainable development. Thus the development meant not only an increase in turnover, but also the creation of democratic institutions, which would bring together the political systems of Russia and the North European countries. The indicator of progress in this direction was the emergence of subregional organizations (CBSS, BEAC), as well as the attempt to create a common space of development, expressed in the concept of “Northern Dimension”.

This stage of relations between Russia and the North European countries lead to serious contradictions, which had the ideological character. Russia agreed to adopt Western liberal democratic model for the creation and development of the Russian government institutions and local governments, but strongly disagreed with the fact that the Western liberal ideology would completely replace its national identity, abolish religious standards and force Russia to sacrifice its national interests in the nearest countries. For example, the North European countries really did not understand Russia’s reaction to the infringement of the rights of Russians in the Baltic States, believing that the imperial period of Russian history should have stayed in the past.

From its side, Russia did not understand a lot in the politics and actions of the North European countries. It was difficult to realise, for example, the reason for increased military budgets of Sweden and Finland against the significant reduction of the Russian military capacity after the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent reductions in the 1990s. It was hard to understand, why the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Baltic countries was not accompanied with a normalization of relations with Moscow, but instead led to a serious deterioration of relations in almost all important areas ― political, economic and humanitarian. Russia sincerely hoped that the North European countries, which took care of young democracies in the Baltic States, would be able to convince them of the need to ensure the equal rights of Russian-speaking population, especially since similar rights were provided to all national minorities living in the North European countries. Russia did not understand the need of the entry of the Baltic States into NATO, as well as the upsell of the thesis about the “Russian threat” by the leadership of the republics.

Over the past 10-15 years Russia’s relations with the countries of North Europe continued to develop on its special path, alternating the periods of recovery and recession. Significant milestone of this relationship became the restart of the program “Northern Dimension” in 2006. As a result, Russia was proclaimed the main target of this initiative, as originally proposed by the author of the idea of “Northern Dimension” – Finland. The program received a new framework document, identified new joint projects. ND had at its disposal two new partnerships ― in the field of transport and logistics (2008), as well as in the field of culture (2011).

However, two years later relations were spoiled by the events in the Caucasus, where Russia came to the defense of the interests of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Scandinavian countries supported Georgia’s position. Then Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt compared Russia’s actions to protect its citizens with the actions of Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland. After 8 years, he also condemned Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, comparing the policies of the President of Russia with the seizure of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein[2]. The fact that these statements were not a spontaneous and short-term splash of emotions, was confirmed by the events of 2008, when Poland and Sweden became the ideological inspirers of “Eastern Partnership”, the purpose of which was the gradual integration of the former Soviet Union in Western institutions. Anti-Russian orientation of the initiative was read between the lines.

In fact, the crisis in the Caucasus in 2008 and the promotion of the “Eastern Partnership” exacerbated the competition between Russia and the EU for the political dominance in the former Soviet Union, and a very active role in the EU’s eastern policy was played by two countries ― Poland and Sweden. From the point of view of Western countries, it looked as a competition between a neo-imperial project, which was supported by Russia as the center of Orthodox Slavic civilization and Western liberal project, aimed at establishing the economic, ideological and informational control over the European CIS countries, as well as the states of Transcaucasus. In this case, the coexistence of “Northern Dimension” and “Eastern Partnership” did not mean a fundamental difference of opinions between Finland and Sweden.

Preserving a common approach and a common strategy towards Russia, Stockholm and Helsinki disagree on tactics: if the project “Northern Dimension” is supported by Finland and is aimed at the gradual democratization of Russia and rapprochement with the West, the project “Eastern Partnership”, which is backed by Sweden, in fact recognizes that Russia is unlikely to be part of the Western world in the foreseeable future, and aims to establish control over the newly independent states established on the ruins of the Soviet Union.

Political upheaval and civil war in the Ukraine in this sense are not the starting point of the crisis in relations between Russia and the North European countries, but is a new stage of ideological confrontation, which was indicated in the middle of the 2000s. The aforementioned Swedish politician does not hide it as well. According to Carl Bildt, Russia in the 1990s demonstrated commitment to Western values, but with the coming of Vladimir Putin to power Moscow faced tough opposition to the Western policy. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden believes that the contradiction between Russia and the West is of a fundamental ideological character: “The new anti-Western and antidecadent line of Putin is built on deeply conservative orthodox ideas»[3].

It must be noted that the offensive Western policy towards Russia, combined with tough rhetoric of certain Western politicians have almost fully revived the political atmosphere of the “cold war”, and the media of the West has begun to carefully sculpt an “enemy image” from Russia. How long will the new “cold war” be, and how long will be the economic sanctions against Russia? This raises the third question: what is the position of countries on this issue? In particular, what do leaders and leading politicians of the North European countries think about it?

Many years of mutually beneficial cooperation have taught many to conclude that the North of Europe is quite a well-off region and Russia’s relations with the countries of the region seem to be promising and mutually beneficial. And, in fact, there were no open conflicts in the North of Europe with the participation of Russia, except for those systematic violations of the rights of Russians living in the Baltic states, and they mostly boil down to two main problems: failure of Latvia and Estonia to grant citizenship to all residents, who were born there and lived at the time of the declaration of independence of these countries, as well as the denial of the right of these people, and especially ― their children ― to receive education in their native language. In 2010, Russian initiative was to settle the dispute between Russia and Norway regarding the section of the Barents Sea between two countries. Thus, all potential conflicts in the region have been minimized.

However, it did not prevent the Norwegian oil company Statoil from withdrawing from the joint project of developing the Arctic shelf with Russia; Norway declared that its sanctions and EU sanctions against Russia wouls be cancelled only when Russia changed its policy in Ukraine. Explaining the position of the state, Norwegian Foreign Minister Børge Brende recalled that the sanctions against Moscow were introduced after the annexation of the Crimea, as well as other “violations of the international law in the eastern regions of Ukraine[4].

It should be noted that Norway not being a member of the EU, was free on the question of participation in the sanctions, as well as on the issue of the degree of its rigidity and duration. For example, Turkey, which, together with Norway being a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, decided not to join the sanctions at all, because it saw it as a threat to its national interests in the Black Sea region.

The fact that Norway did not simply join the sanctions, but chose their toughest variant, signifies either a serious crisis in bilateral relations, or that the foreign policy of Norway on the question of sanctions is completely subordinated to politics of Washington or Brussels. This situation has opened another unpleasant situation for Russia’s foreign policy: the signing of a bilateral agreement between Moscow and Oslo on the delimitation of the disputed waters of the Barents Sea in 2010 and reciprocal steps by President Medvedev had absolutely no effect on improving the climate of bilateral relations. Nevertheless, even in Norway one can hear louder voices of opposition to the current position of the country with regard to Russia. Thus, ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre recalled “the millennial experience of a peaceful neighborhood” with Russia.[5].

Thus, the events of the Ukrainian crisis has shown that the most irreconcilable and active critics of Russia’s actions are the North European countries, namely Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Acuity of their position is not inferior to the positions of the United States and Canada, and on the degree of hardness it’s stronger that one of France and Germany. On the contrary, Finland and Iceland at the outset showed much more balanced position, based on considerations of economic pragmatism dominated the political arguments.

Finland’s position from the beginning tended to a compromise, and Prime Minister Alexander Stubb has repeatedly spoken out against imposal, extension and tightening of the sanctions, as the importance of Russia for the Finnish economy is too huge[6]. It can be explained by the fact that among all North European countries, Finland faces the greatest losses from the sanctions regime, as well as the impact from Moscow responses, which imposed a total ban on exports of beef, pork, vegetables and fruit, meat, poultry, fish, cheese, milk and dairy products to Russia.

Denmark and the Danish Board of Agriculture and the Economy also warned on the serious impact of Russian counter-sanctions on its economy. According to the National Institute of Statistics of Denmark, exports to Russia in 2013 amounted to 2.14 billion USD, of which 891 million USD accounted for agricultural exports. At the same time, the share of Russia in the exports of Denmark does not exceed 1.9%, which allows the country’s leaders to insist on the continuation of anti-Russian sanctions. This, in particular, was declared by Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt[7].

According to the polls carried out in March 2014 by Taloustutkimus, the majority of Finnish society (60%) is foreign to anti-Russian sentiment, and Russia is not perceived as a threat. Finnish President Sauli Niinistë agrees with the opinion of the Finnish society: “We are neighbours. Unlike other neighbours of Russia, we are not members of NATO. Our relations with Russia are based on bilateral contacts”[8]. The position of Finland is not opportunistic, but consistent and is based on the mood of the majority of Finnish society, which has been recently shown by the events, when the Finnish leadership voted against the supply of arms of Kiev authorities^[9].

Against the balanced and moderate position of Finland Sweden is continuing to demonstrate hardness against Moscow. Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström said that Russia poses a serious threat to the security of Europe, however, along with the pressure on Russia one should continue political dialogue as well[10]. The announcement of Ambassador of Sweden in Russia Veronika Bard Bringus was in similar mode, when she did not exclude the possibility of exit of Swedish companies from the Russian market[11]. The main argument of the Ambassador was the situation with the Swedish concern Oriflame, which was accused by Russian tax authorities of deliberately understating the company’s revenues for the reduction of tax payments to the Russian budget. After losing the lawsuit in the Russian arbitration court, the company announced its intention to appeal to the international investment arbitration.

It should be noted that the current crisis in Russian-Swedish relations is not accidential. Stockholm has long been regarded Russia as a threat to its security, and therefore critically perceives any Russian actions of political or economic nature, aimed at strengthening the security of Russia in the Baltic Sea, whether it’s laying of the pipeline “Nord Stream” or the development of the military infrastructure of the Baltiysk and Kronstadt.

The story of unsuccessful search for “Russian submarine” in Swedish territorial waters in October 2014 recalled a similar story from “cold war”, when in 1981, a Soviet damaged submarine was discovered close to the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. Stockholm reacted to Russia’s actions to ensure security of Abkhazia and South Osetia with obvious disapproval, accusing Moscow of violating the territorial integrity of Georgia. A similar position was taken by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Crimean issue.

Playing the “Russian card” and the spread of the thesis of the “Russian threat” was the brand style for a number of leading Baltic politicians. The toughest position on the Russian question among the Baltic States has traditionally been shown by President of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite. In her opinion, three Baltic countries faced “Russian threat” and they should be ready to respond to it during three days at least, until they get assistance from NATO members[12]. However, a different position was shown by Latvian President Andris Berzins, who does not support the imposal of sanctions and calls for their soonest cancellation. His views are shared by Foreign Minister of Latvia Edgar Rinkevich and Ventspils Mayor Aivars Lembergs.

Some political consequences of the deterioration of relations of North European and Baltic countries with Russia within the framework of the Ukrainian crisis followed shortly. In particular, it was reflected with newly resumed talks on accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO, the North European countries and the Baltic States published their plans to deepen cooperation in defense and security. So, the ongoing projects within the North European defense cooperation (Nordic Defence Cooperation ― NORDEFCO) were joined by the Baltic States ― Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia[13].

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Margot Wallström was the initiator and inspirer of the plan; she declared that military cooperation between the North European countries and the Baltic countries would decrease defense expenses and improve cooperation on border security. Russia replied immediately by performing tactical flight exercises in the Barents Sea, which were attended by the crews of fighter-interceptor MiG-31 and tactical bomber Sukhoi Su-24M of Central Military District[14].

Thus, Russia’s relations with the countries of Northern Europe are developing in an unfavorable scenario; however, there is still some potential for a gradual improvement in case of easing policy by the majority of the North European countries in respect of Russia. In this situation, the most pressing question is what position will prevail: the policy of deepening confrontation or a pragmatic and balanced policy aimed at overcoming the sanctions crisis. It seems no one can state the way of further development of relations between Russia and the North European countries, as Brussels and Washington both have a strong impact on the foreign policy of the North European countries. We can only hope for traditional Scandinavian sanity, willingness of all parties to move towards each other and take into account the legitimate interests of Russia.

The list of bibliography:

1.         Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoy pomoshi mezhdu Sojuzom Sovetskikh Socialisticheskikh Respublik i Finljandskoy Respublikoy. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

2.         V Danii opasajutsja posledstviy rossijskikh sankciy URL: http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

3.         Karl Bil’dt. Putin povel sebja kak Saddam URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

4.         Litva pugaet Pribaltiku «rossiyskoy ugrozoj». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm

5.         MID Norvegii: tol’ko izmenenie politiki RF v otnoshenyi Ukrainy privedet k snjatiu sankciy. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/

6.         Nad Barencevym morem proleteli 40 istrebiteley URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

7.         Norvegiya dolzhna prodolzhat’ politiku dobrososedstva s RF. URL: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html

8.         Nosovich, Aleksandr. Baltijskiy kontrast: Finljandiya otkazalas’ otvorachivat’sa ot Rossyi. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/

9.         Posol Shvecyi: v RF sozdajutsja prepjatstviya dlja raboty shvedskihk companiy URL: http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html

10.       Pravoslavie ― glavnaya ugroza dlya Zapadnoy civilizacii: mnenya. URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

11.       Prem’er Finljandiyi: Ukraine ne nuzhna voennay pomoshh’ URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html

12.       Strany Severnoy Evropy I Baltiki dogovorilis’ ukrepit’ voennye svjazi. URL: http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html

13.       Shadrina, Tat’jana. Finljandijaotkazalas’ otsankcij k Rossii URL: http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html.

14.       Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars. URL: http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[1] Договор о дружбе, сотрудничестве и взаимной помощи между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Финляндской Республикой / Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. URL: http://www.heninen.net/sopimus/1948_e.htm

[2] http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/multimedia/2014/07/140708_v_bildt_hard_talk_int

[3] Православие – главная угроза для Западной цивилизации: мнения. / Orthodoxy is main threat to Western civilization . opinions / URL: http://www.iarex.ru/interviews/47573.html

[4]МИД Норвегии: только изменение политики РФ в отношении Украины приведет к снятию санкций. URL: http://versii.com/news/320114/ / MFA Norway: only changes of Russia’s policy in respect of Ukraine will lead to cancellation of sanctions

[5] Норвегия должна продолжать политику добрососедства с РФ. URL^: http://www.norge.ru/news/2015/02/14/26538.html. / Norway must continue policy of neighbourliness with Russia.

[6]http://www.rg.ru/2014/08/14/finlyandiya-site.html

[7]http://russian.rt.com/article/44314

[8] Носович, Александр. Балтийский контраст: Финляндия отказалась отворачиваться от России. URL: http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/baltiyskiy-kontrast-finlyandiya-otkazalas-otvorachivatsya-ot-rossii/ / Nosovich Alexander. Baltic contrast: Finland refused to turn back from Russia

[9]Премьер Финляндии: Украине не нужна военная помощь URL: http://vz.ru/news/2015/2/4/727740.html / PM of Finland: Ukraine does not need military aid

[10]Wallström, Margot. Rysslandettallvarligt hot mot Europasfred. // SvenskaDagbladet, 6 mars URL:http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/ryssland-ett-allvarligt-hot-mot-europas-fred_4388101.svd

[11]Посол Швеции: в РФ создаются препятствия для работы шведских компаний URL:http://1prime.ru/state_regulation/20150306/804132680.html / Ambassador of Sweden: Russia imposes difficulties for activity of Swedish companies

[12] Литва пугает Прибалтику «российской угрозой». URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/litva_pugajet_pribaltiku_rossijskoj_ugrozoj_423.htm / Lithuania threatens Baltics by “Russian threat”

[13]Страны Северной Европы и Балтики договорились укрепить военные связи. URL:http://vzgliad.ru/news/2014/11/30/717796.html / The North European countries and Baltics agreed on strengthening military cooperation

[14]URL:http://www.stoletie.ru/lenta/nad_barencevym_morem_proleteli_40_istrebitelej_555.htm

This article argues that there are no common standards of integration, applicable to all countries, regardless of their economic situation’s specificity and level of development as well as of the nature of their commonly agreed objectives they seek to achieve by means of integration. The purpose to create a single internal market in the EU has determined the toolkit of the European integration, the nature and powers of the EU institutions through which it is carried out. The author argues that the construction of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space in general and within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in particular, in the image and likeness of the EU is not only unjustified, but also harmful. The founding treaty of the EAEU does not contain the purpose to construct a single internal market. The article emphasizes the high level of regional integration achieved by the Nordic countries, which has not been affected by the pattern of the EU integration. The Nordic integration began with the formation of a common labor market and creation within its framework of necessary conditions for high labor mobility. The objectives of the integration efforts of the Nordic countries, fundamentally different from the EU, are reflected in the nature of the institutions of regional cooperation and in the methods of their activity as well. The author recommends attentively looking at the Nordic integration experience to use its elements in the post-Soviet space. 

Introduction

Apart from Europe, integration processes cover today also other regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space. Such processes involve states with different levels of economic development, size, demographics, natural resources, quality of human capital, a position in the international division of labor, degree of development of market relations, participation in various international organizations and agreements and other indicators. It would be at least imprudent to assume that states entering integration processes must obey certain universal laws, undergo the same stages of integration, and create similar bodies with identical powers. The content of integration activities to a certain extent depends on the objectives of a particular state.

The European Union without proper justification is considered to be a benchmark of integration, and an example of how integration processes allegedly should unfold in the former Soviet Union. Common theories of integration, based on the experience of the EU, are designed to ascribe versatility and traits of objective law to the EU integration processes. However, copying of the EU integration experience can have very negative consequences for integration processes in the post-Soviet space. It would be advisable to study more closely the integration experience of other countries, particularly the Nordic countries, examine features of their integration model, and the problems that they solve by means of integration.

Trade and economic relations do not automatically evolve into integration. Free trade zones and customs unions can be considered as means of such relations. However, not all the participating countries are willing to develop integration. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) can serve as examples. Negotiations on a free trade area between the EU and NAFTA do not mean that their member countries are eager to take the path of integration.

A transition to conscious actions enabling convergence and merging of economies of states is equivalent to a strategic choice of ways for their further development. When deciding on joining an integration process one should have a clear idea of its long-term common goals so that participating states could use economic, political, legislative, social and other activities for the achievement of these objectives. A long and gradual character of integration requires reliable protection against fluctuations of the political and economic environment. Therefore a contractual basis is employed for this purpose and integration processes are carried out within the established permanent international intergovernmental organizations.

Initially, western European countries were planning to use development of integration processes to put an end toan infinite chainof warsbetween France and Germany that had been shaking Europe for centuries. Combined withthe continued presence of the troopsof the Western Allieson the territoryof the Federal Republic of Germany andinclusion of the latter in the North Atlantic Treaty integration processes were believed to help create realobstacles for therevivalof German militarismand reliablemonitoring toolsfor theeconomic and political developmentof Germanyafter the SecondWorld War.

These initial policy objectives, as they were successfully achieved, gradually began to take second place. The progressive extension of the EEC membership created a need for efficient development of its growing economic space, reduction of costs in cross-border commercial activities, providing conditions for profitable operation of companies in the participating states. As a result, integration processes within the EEC began to focus on the creation of a single internal market of the Community and on ensuring the most favorable conditions for the most competitive economies and companies of the member states not taking into consideration domestic production of each country.

The adoption of the Single European Act and the introduction of free movement of goods, services, capital and persons have determined the main tools for the creation of such a market. Efforts for consolidation of a single EU internal market and expansion of its rules to other states are camouflaged with attractive formulations such as “cohesion policy”, “neighborhood policy”, “Eastern Partnership”, etc. These perform more likely the functions of “soft power” of the EU rather than reflect the true essence of such activities. The European Commission has received the exclusive power to fully protect and improve the single internal market on the so-called “supranational” level, which is the most favorable for the most competitive economies and companies.

Often, the so-called “European idea” seems to be an ideological forerunner of the Western European integration. Some Russian and foreign experts believe that we will soon witness a political union of the member states of the EU capable of becoming a new state formation. Cooperation of the EU member states in the field of foreign policy, security and defense, domestic policy and justice and many other areas should be regarded as a step in this direction. However, the new Head of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said he was not going to create the United States of Europe and that he did not believe that “a united Europe could be constructed in opposition to a nation-state” (9, p.7). In fact, these areas of cooperation serve the practical needs of a single internal market and reinforce international ambitions of the EU by means of foreign policy and security.

Despite the common historical destiny, continued co-living in joint states, their geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic similarities, comparability of sizes, similarity of political cultures and political orders (2, pp.615-617), the Nordic countries do not aim at getting united into one single state. The “European idea”, despite the fact that these countries belong to Europe, has not had a considerable influence on their relationship. Three of the five countries in the region are relatively young independent states. Norway gained independence in 1905, Finland – in 1917, and Iceland finally became an independent state in 1944. That’s why these countries do not allow any attacks on their recently-found sovereignty in integration processes.

However, the Nordic countries have consistently highlighted the importance of regional cooperation for them. In 1939, the Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler said: “The North will be a political reality to the extent to which the nations are convinced that their welfare is provided by the Nordic cooperation and solidarity” (7, p.37). In March 1948, the Danish Prime Minister said in Stockholm: “Whatever happens, our peoples should be together. It would be unfortunate if we parted ways”(10, p.35). “We live in difficult times – the Prime Minister of Norway Einar Gerhardsen said in February 1953 – when the very environment necessitates that small countries that have a lot in common and that are located side by side, hold together” (5, p.217). Although regional cooperation has always enjoyed wide support among the Nordic public, however, as it was acknowledged in February 1953 by the Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft, their cooperation “had been quite irregular and random” for a long time (10, p.98).

To date, the Nordic countries have reached the most advanced and deepest level of regional integration of all known examples, with an integration path that is significantly different from the EU. Studying its features may be of interest to potential participants of integration processes in the post-Soviet space.

“The Road Map” of the Nordic integration

Integration processes in the European North have taken as a base the indisputable fact that the joint efforts of the Nordic countries can better protect their common interests than if they were acting separately. Regarding the Nordic integration processes it is appropriate to cite the Swedish scientist G. Adler-Karlsson: “Instead of looking for guidance in doctrinal theory, we have always preferred to find the best solutions that are practically achievable under given circumstances” (1, p.22).

In the early post-war years, the Nordic countries faced similar economic difficulties. In April 1948, the four Scandinavian countries officially joined the “Marshall Plan”. Within its framework, Denmark, Iceland and Norway received US aid in the form of gifts, Sweden – in the form of loans (7, p.276). As a result, they were able to partially upgrade their fixed capital in industry and agriculture and to restore economic ties among the countries of the region. Sweden, for example, was paying for the US loans with ships for Norway.

This was also encouraged by lower customs duties in comparison to other Western European states, significant devaluation of the Scandinavian currencies in 1949 (exchange rate of the Norwegian and Swedish Krones to the American Dollar fell by 30%, the Danish krone – by 44%), as well as their accession to the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which resulted in a partial reversibility of Scandinavian currencies within the EPU. As a result, the value of exports in each of the Scandinavian countries in 1948-1951 more than doubled (7, pp.276, 277).

Although Finland did not join the “Marshall Plan”, it was also receiving individual loans from its funds, as well as from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and from Sweden. By the end of 1956 the total amount of foreign loans in Finland was more than 68 billion FIM, with the share of loans from the US and Sweden being equal to 85% of that amount (4, p.18). By the beginning of the 1950s, the Nordic countries managed to complete the reimbursement of indirect losses caused by World War II (7, p.278).

In 1950 the North Economic Cooperation Committee that was established in February 1948, recommended that the Nordic countries participating in the “Marshall Plan” should begin creating a Nordic customs union. However, differences between the countries did not allow them to implement either this or any of subsequent attempts to create such a customs union. This gave impetus to the search for other ways of the “Nordic cooperation”.

In the late 1940s, Sweden was experiencing a rapid industrial rise and faced labor shortages. Other Nordic countries had problems with employment. As a result, steps were taken towards a more rational use of labor resources at the level of the Nordic region and towards formation of a common labor market. In 1951, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden concluded a convention that allowed their citizens to be employed in any of the Nordic countries without prior permission from the authorities, and agreed to facilitate moving of citizens from one country to another. In 1954 they created a regional free market for labor, and in 1957 they completed the design of a passport union. In the second half of the 1970s the passport and visa regime and customs checking were abolished for the citizens of the Nordic countries at border crossings. Icelandjoineditin 1982, FaroeIslands – in 1992.

In order to increase labor mobility within the region the Nordic countries took a series of synchronous measures in social policy and social legislation. In accordance with the Convention on Social Security, approved in 1955, citizens of these countries received the same rights, privileges and responsibilities regarding the size of the basic pension, old-age pensions, unemployment, disability, occupational injuries and sick leave, as well as additional payments when moving from one Nordic country to another. They were given an opportunity to enjoy the same social benefits as nationals of the host country.

The first steps in the field of subregional integration in the North of Europe were aimed at ensuring establishment of a general labor market, which were accompanied by adoption of a series of laws and administrative measures aimed at improving mobility and ensuring social rights of migratory workers. The labor market became a vast sphere of common interests of the Nordic countries, which became one of the key areas of their subsequent integration efforts. In the course of its creation, harmonization of legislation became the most important issue, which later evolved into one of the skeletons of the Nordic integration.

Unification of legislation of the Nordic countries began in the 19th century and reached a high level even before the start of integration processes between them. At that moment they had unified legislation on the activities of banks, in the field of property, commercial and civil law, as well as in the field of insurance, property possession, etc. The authors of the book “Scandinavia between East and West”, published in 1950 in the US, noted that “there are far more similarities between the laws of the Nordic countries, than, for example, between the laws of New York and Florida states” (10, p.109). The Northern Commission on cooperation in the field of law continued those efforts.

Within the framework of EFTA, which Denmark, Norway and Sweden joined in 1959 (Finland joined in 1961 and Iceland in 1970), the Nordic countries managed to reduce customs duties and abolish quantitative restrictions in mutual trade in industrial goods. The share of inter-Scandinavian trade, that previously had been 5-6% of the total value of foreign trade in the Nordic countries, significantly increased in the mid-1960s. The import share reached 19.2%, while the share of exports totaled 22.5%. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Scandinavian countries occupied the first place in trade with each other. Their share reached 87.7% of EFTA imports and 63.5% of EFTA exports (11, p.268). Trade between the countries in the region became a significant factor in their development and an another sphere of their common interests.

Despite the differences in the national security doctrines, the Nordic countries continued foreign policy cooperation also in the postwar period. Periodic meetings of the Prime Ministers, regular meetings of foreign ministers and representatives of the countries of the region to the United Nations Organization, permanent official contacts among the foreign ministries at the ambassadorial level and direct personal contacts among Heads of their divisions and departments, weekly meetings of Heads of delegations and daily meetings of delegates and representatives of the Nordic countries in the committees at the sessions of the UN General Assembly became common practice.

At the plenary sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1956 to the beginning of the 1970s, they voted together on international issues in more than 80% of cases. Introduction within EFTA of a duty of 15% on imports of processed goods by Britain in October 1964 had caused solidarity actions the Nordic countries that achieved its abolition in November 1966. At the talks in the “Kennedy Round” (end of 1966 – spring 1967) the Nordic countries, acting jointly, managed to get concessions from the EEC on reductions of tariffs for their trade (11, pp.272-273). Thus, the small Nordic countries received strong indications of the effectiveness of their foreign policy cooperation in ensuring common interests.

After weighing the priorities of their further development, the Nordic countries, while in EFTA, made a strategic choice in favor of regional integration and signed the Cooperation Agreement between Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (“the Helsinki Agreement”) on March 23, 1962, in Helsinki. It became the legal basis document for their further cooperation and a “road map” of their integration efforts (12). This document with account of later amendments is still valid to this day.

Embarking on the path towards integration, the Nordic countries were certainly not striving to unite into a single state, and did not aim at creating a single internal market. Their integration model is initially aimed at strengthening mutually beneficial foreign-policy cooperation of small sovereign and independent states, which, by means that are inherent in integration processes in the economic sphere, purposefully and pragmatically strengthen and extend old areas and create new areas of common or identical interests. This allows to build close and long-term cooperation on the international arena on a firm and constantly expanding basis of fundamental interests of socio-economic development, rather than on a shaky basis of temporary political arrangements and agreements and short-term, transient and situational factors.

A natural outcome of such an integration model is an influential community of states that preserve complete freedom in their economic and political decisions. The ability of such a community to effectively promote and protect common interests on the international arena is constantly growing with a simultaneous increase in the political weight of this community in the world. For a group of small countries such interaction becomes an essential element of national security and independence of each of them. On issues where their positions and interests diverge, they operate as separate and independent sovereign states.

In the Helsinki Agreement the Nordic countries defined top-priority areas of common or similar interests, for further expansion of which they decided to use their integration efforts. This document identified further measures for support and development of a common market of labor. In the sphere of legal cooperation they pledged to facilitate acquisition of citizenship of one Nordic state by nationals of another Nordic state, to seek to achieve maximum uniformity of legislation in the field of private law, as well as rules relating to criminal offenses and punishment. It recorded, in particular, an agreement to provide opportunities to investigate and prosecute crimes, committed in one of the countries in the region, in the other Nordic countries and enforce decisions of courts and other authorities of all states in the region on their territories. These provisions are intended, among other things, to ensure proper compliance with legislation by migrating citizens of Nordic countries.

The “road map” of regional integration includes a wide range of pragmatic measures of cultural interaction, which aims at preventing painful political, economic, social and cultural problems of integration of migrant workers from the other Nordic countries into the social and cultural environment of the recipient countries. It was decided to include in the curricula of Nordic schools studying of language, culture and social conditions of the other states in the region, and to provide an opportunity for students to study and take exams in the other Nordic countries.

The Nordic countries jointly fund committees of the Nordic cooperation in the field of primary, secondary and higher education, as well as adult education, regional programs of mobility for students and university teachers, pupils and school teachers. Their school and university curricula, textbooks and examination systems are standardized. Studying the languages of neighboring peoples is coordinated by the Secretariat of the northern languages and literature courses on the northern languages.

The Nordic countries have decided to ensure mutual recognition of diplomas at all levels of education, to coordinate employment services of the Nordic countries, harmonize qualification requirements for professions and work for the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in all countries of the region. They also agreed to work closely in the field of adult education, to unify the application of national provisions relating to workers’ health, occupational safety, and to develop further exchanges between the countries in the field of literature, painting, music, theater, cinema and other cultural industries. The Nordic Culture Fund, founded in 1966, funds cultural projects within the region. There have been set up and in operation also numerous joint organizations of the Nordic countries in the field of culture and media.

As a result, citizens of the Nordic countries have a privileged position on their labor markets compared to citizens of other EU member states. Article 2 of the Helsinki Agreement contains a provision that “in the development of laws and regulations in any of the Nordic countries, citizens of all the other Nordic countries receive the same rights as citizens of this country”. Moreover, this provision should be applied “to all spheres of jurisdiction affected by the Agreement on cooperation”. In other words, citizens of the other Nordic countries shall not be considered as foreign labor on the labor market of each of these countries.

Having started integration processes with creating a common labor market and providing measures to promote their mobility, the Nordic countries have agreed to extend integration onto other areas. In the area of economic cooperation, they decided to hold consultations on economic policy issues, coordinate the measures they take regarding the impact of external factors on the economic cycle, to provide freedom of movement of capital among countries in the region, stressing that joint decisions in this area should ensure common interests of the Nordic countries in the field of payments and currency, and adhere to the division of labor among countries in matters of production and capital investment, as well as create favorable conditions for direct cooperation between the companies of two or more Nordic countries in these areas.

While regularizing the relations with the European Union, each of the Nordic countries was addressing possible consequences of their decisions for the Nordic cooperation. Supporters of the “People’s Movement against the EEC”, that was founded in 1971, were speaking, for example, of the need to strengthen the Nordic cooperation along with protection of the Danish national identity (6, p.517).

Denmark’s entry into the EEC in 1973 and the subsequent conclusion by the other Nordic countries of agreements with the EEC on the duty-free trade of manufactured goods helped to keep the trading mode, which existed among the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA. Denmark’s membership in the EEC did not cause any specific problems for the Nordic cooperation until the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Its implementation was threatening to cause irreparable damage for the “Nordic cooperation”.

As a consequence, the Danish referendum on the accession of Denmark to the European Union gave a negative result. Ultimately Denmark joined the EU, but on special conditions, and the rest of the EU member states were forced to accept them (6, p.550). Special conditions for joining the EU in the future were also specified by Sweden. One of such conditions was smooth continuation of the “Nordic cooperation” (8, pp.77-79).

As part of the integration efforts the Nordic states began to work closely together in the field of scientific research and coordination of the use of allocated resources with the greatest efficiency, including establishment of joint structures and institutions to combine their academic potentials and financial capabilities.

The Nordic countries conduct numerous joint research projects, coordinate national science and technological programs. The main driving force in this area are joint academic institutions ensuring high standards of research, that are difficult to achieve at the national level. Among them are the Northern Academy of Innovation Research, Northern Institute for Theoretical Physics, Nordic Council for Arctic Medicine Studies, Northern Research and Production Program on Biotechnology, Nordic Volcanological Institute, Northern Arctic Program of Humanitarian Studies and others.

The scope of their integration efforts includes further cancellation of trade barriers among the Nordic countries, coordination of their technical and administrative customs regulations, simplification of customs procedures, development of transport communications and trans-border trade, joint economic development in adjacent areas of two or more Nordic countries, joint efforts to ensure their interests in international trade.

An important area of the Nordic integration, defined by the Helsinki Agreement, was the Nordic cooperation in the field of transport and communications, as well as environment. The Nordic countries hold mandatory consultations for construction of transport and communication networks, which involve two or more Nordic countries, and coordinate efforts to improve road safety. Border passport control has been simplified.

Countries in the region take into account environmental interests of the other Nordic countries on an equal basis with their own interests both in the legislative process and in the practical application of the laws. They harmonize rules for the protection of the environment, agree on standards and define criteria for pollution, coordinate activities aimed at flora and fauna conservation.

Important areas of agreed integration measures also include official statistics, health and medicine, production of alcoholic beverages, mutual recognition of licensing procedures or certification in the field of medical, technical and other security controls, coordination on issues of child and youth policy.

Given the characteristics of the Nordic integration model, special attention is paid to strengthening of the cooperation at the European and international level, designed to provide “opportunities for joint extraction of benefits for citizens and companies of the Nordic countries”. The governments of these countries are held responsible for ensuring mutual interests and values as it is specified by the Helsinki Agreement. Various government authorities of the region can directly communicate regarding issues that do not fall under the exclusive competence of their external relations. They coordinate activities to provide assistance to developing countries, jointly distribute information about the Nordic countries and Nordic cooperation, and provide support for Northern European citizens by diplomatic missions.

The Nordic integration is characterized by pragmatism and focus on solving specific problems. Implementation of the reached agreements dictated by long-term strategic interests of the Nordic states, allows to strengthen their cooperation in international affairs by constantly expanding the range of their common essential interests. As a consequence, the nature, structure, functions and powers of international bodies of the Nordic cooperation significantly differ from those existing in the EU.

The “Nordic cooperation” is performed in the framework of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, at the meetings of Heads of governments, by specialized authorities of the Nordic countries and by special cooperation bodies.

One of the fundamental principles of the “Nordic cooperation” is active participation of the public in discussions and decision-making in this area. Practical implementation of this principle is the Nordic Council established in 1952. It was determined in the Helsinki Agreement as an “elected public assembly of the Nordic countries” and a form of cooperation of their governments. Its Charter has been adopted by each Nordic country as an internal act which has the force of law. This body is not endowed with legislative functions. It is authorized to investigate the main components of the Nordic cooperation, to adopt recommendations, prepare research reports and other documents. The members of the Nordic Council may make inquiries to the governments or to the Nordic Council of Ministers on the issues of the “Nordic cooperation”.

The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) is a body of cooperation among governments. It is responsible for the interaction between them and the Nordic Council on the issues relating to their joint actions. It takes decisions aimed at implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement and the other agreements among the Nordic countries. The overall coordination of the Nordic cooperation rests with Prime Ministers. They are assisted in this by the Ministers responsible for this cooperation, and the Heads of state and government secretariats, that are members of permanent national committees of the Nordic cooperation.

The Chairman of the NCM is responsible for the coordination of the Nordic cooperation and initiatives for related matters. His or her decisions are taken unanimously and are binding. In the case of making decisions on issues requiring parliamentary approval, they will not take effect until the approval of the relevant national parliament. The NCM reports annually to the Nordic Council on the problems and prospects of the Nordic cooperation. At the same time, the Prime Minister of the presiding country shall submit a special report on cooperation among the governments of the Nordic countries regarding European and international affairs.

In other words, effective management of integration processes in Northern Europe are ensured by the northern cooperation bodies not endowed with any exclusive powers, special competences or so-called “supra-national” functions. These are not necessary as unanimous decisions of the Nordic Council of Ministers are binding and enforceable for the Nordic countries.

As a result of the consistent implementation of the Nordic integration model there is constant strengthening of the Nordic cooperation on international issues and convergence of their positions on many international issues. All the five Nordic countries have become members of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Arctic Council. They all participate in the activities of the “Northern Dimension”, despite the fact that some of them are not directly related to some of the regions listed here.

Before Finland and Sweden joined Denmark as members of the EU in 1995, Iceland and Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992. Its terms provided maintenance of the conditions for further practical realization of the integration model for all of the Nordic countries, along with participation in free movement of goods, services, capital and persons across borders with EU member states and joining the Schengen area (3, pp.126-127).

Denmark and Sweden stipulated for themselves special conditions for participation in the EU and Norway and Iceland did the same for the EEA. These conditions provide opportunities for further development of the “Nordic cooperation.” An important step in this direction was concluding of an agreement among the Nordic countries on cooperation in the field of defense (NORDEFCO) on 4 November 2009. This marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of their interaction on international issues and was a direct consequence of the deepening of the Nordic integration. In the EU framework they included clauses regarding their participation in the common EU policy on security and defense.

Integration scenarios for the Eurasian economic union

Integration processes in the post-Soviet space should develop with due regard to the characteristics of the participating countries and specific tasks, which they intend to solve by means of integration. Already at an early stage there should be formulated overall strategic and intermediate goals that member states intend to achieve with the use of integration mechanisms. Depending on the nature of these goals specific mechanisms for achieving them should be identified, as well as the specific role of integration levers, adapted to the economic, political, social and other conditions of the existing economic space.

General wordings of very vague objectives of the EAEU purposes, such as strengthening and modernization of the economies of member states, their convergence, increase of their competitiveness in the global markets, direct integration processes at servicing some of the current needs and improving of the existing situation according to the formula “movement is all, the ultimate goal is nothing”, rather than at achieving more or less distinct strategic objectives.

Such an approach allows little for conscious, focused and consistent creation of long-term legislative, economic, political, social and other conditions that would provide close interaction, interpenetration and fusion of economies of the countries entering the path of integration, as it does not contain any motivation that is crucial for them.

Orientation of the EAEU member states in their integration efforts on the experience of the EU, including institutional experience, would mean that they intend to build on the territory of the former Soviet Union the same single internal market, aimed at serving the needs and creating the best opportunities for extraction of benefits of the most competitive economies and companies of the member states and the EU. For most post-Soviet states, economic conditions of which have not yet recovered and have not acquired the necessary level of development and competitiveness, a rigid imposition of such rules could have a devastating effect on domestic manufacturers and economic independence as it happens with the economies of the East European EU member states. There are serious doubts that exactly this objective is optimal for integration processes in the post-Soviet space because of the large differences between the CIS and the EU as well as among post-Soviet states.

An institutional model of integration reproducing the one in the EU may also be unattractive for them as it envisages delegating of a part of sovereign powers of the member states to some supranational international executive authorities. For many post-Soviet states, that only recently gained their independence and sovereignty, an idea of a new superstate in the future is unattractive, and practical steps in this direction are considered counter-productive. There are also serious doubts that such a development will meet the fundamental interests of Russia and its companies, because overcoming of social and economic underdevelopment in these countries will be largely their duty.

It is obvious that the member states of integration processes in the post-Soviet space and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should identify those areas of common or similar interests that they would like to form with integration mechanisms, and, relating to them, identify specific tools for their practical implementation. Taking into consideration differences among post-Soviet states, discussions on common or similar interests of states and possible areas of their integration efforts can be performed both among all the participants of integration processes, and between different groups of states with regard to their economic specialization. Without this, they are doomed to copy existing integration models, which is currently the case.

It is advisable in this context to determine which of the following is preferable for Russia and other members of the EAEU: (a) creation of a single internal market of the EU-type, or (b) promotion of division of labor between the member countries and development of specialized production industries with the help of selective integration measures in each of the countries, or (c) purposeful formation of areas of common economic, social and other interests of the members states of the EAEU in order to strengthen the foundations of their close cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, security and defense policy, or, finally, (d) flexible combination of these measures with the account of development specifics of each of the post-Soviet states and the whole former Soviet Union. The general philosophic idea of the integration model of the Nordic countries and its individual elements can represent for Russia and other post-Soviet members of the EAEU a certain conceptual and practical interest.

When selecting areas of application of integration mechanisms one should pay attention primarily to those areas that, being inherited from the Soviet past, still remain essential for the economy. This could include, for example, infrastructure links among post-Soviet states. Further development and deepening of such links in the present circumstances with the use of integration mechanisms could be of mutual benefit and could contribute to the formation of common interests in this area.

Efforts related to regulation of labor markets in the post-Soviet space and its social and cultural reinforcements could be of paramount importance for application of integration measures, taking in to account the fact that the dynamics of the demographic situation in various countries of the CIS significantly differs. Cooperation in the field of educational and cultural policy, focused on servicing current and future needs of the labor force market and scientific and technical cooperation, could also become a program of long-term integration efforts of member states of the EAEU.

A specific feature of the new independent post-Soviet states is their continued breakaway from a single legal system of the Soviet Union. Therefore, cooperation in the field of law among them as a whole is unlikely to be successful. It should be selective and primarily related to the areas of interaction that will be identified as priority objects of their integration efforts.

Obviously, one can offer a lot of other areas to coordinate integration efforts in the post-Soviet space both with account of its specificity and experience of other integration groups. However in order to do this, it is necessary to determine what integration model and what strategic objectives potential participants would like to implement. The impression is that this is not completely clear yet.

References:

Antonov A.N. Shveziya: protivorechiviye process razvitiya. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znanie”, 1977

Voronkov L.S. Integrazionniye process na severe Evropy/”Evropeiskya integraziya” pod redakziyei Ol’gi Butorinoi. Moskva, 2011

Voronkov L.S. Obschee economicheskoye prostranstvo mezhdu Rossiyei i ES?/”Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta”, N. 4 (37), 2014

Voronkov L.S., Senyukov Yu. P. Finlandiya – nash severnyi sosed. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znaniye”, 1977

Goloshubov Yu.I. Skandinavia i problem poslevoennoi Evropy. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mysl’”, 1974

Istoriya Danii. Pod redakziyei Stena Buska I Henninga Poulsena. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Ves’ mir”, 2007

Kan A.S. Vneshnyaya politika skandinavskikh stran v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauka”, 1967

Kuliabina L.N. Shezia v sovremennom mire. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauchnaya kniga”, 2005

Novaya komanda v Brussele/”Ekspert”, 3-9 Noyabriya 2014, N. 45 (922)

Prokofiev Vl. Severnaya Evropa i mir. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1966

Pokhlebkin V.V. Skandinaviya: tendenzii sovremennogo razvitiya/ “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya v Zapadnoi Evrope”. Pod redakziyeyi D.E. Melnikova. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1974

Helsinkskyi Dogovor o sotrudnichestve mezhdu Daniyeyei, Finlandiyeyi, Islandiyeyi, Norvegiyeyi I Shveziyeyi (http://eulaw.edu.ru/documents/legislation/eur_int_law/nordic.htm)

Exciting optimism of the Danes is confirmed also by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Gallup Institute and other more or less known public opinion services. The OECD used a 1-100 point scale in its poll held in 140 countries. The average figure was 62.4 percent while in Denmark – 90.1.

The Danes have been constantly leading such polls since 1973 and the scholars of the world have been unsuccessfully trying for over three decades to comprehend the secret of Danish happiness by advancing different hypothesis and arriving at contradicting conclusions. Mild climate, healthy way of life, strong economy, or generous social budget?

It is true the country boasts one of the highest GDP in the world and one of the lowest unemployment rate. On the other hand, Denmark has relatively low longevity and high taxes. Hard drinking and crime are spreading, the number of divorces and suicides is on the rise. It looks as if there should be no specific happiness.

Epidemiologist Kaare Kristensen said the Danes are satisfied with their life due to high consumption of alcohol. Former Editor-in-Chief of the Politiken newspaper Theger Zeidenfaden suggested the Danes eat more sugar than other people in Europe. A group of researchers offered an explanation saying the victory over the German team in the European Football Championship in 1992 triggered nationwide euphoria in Denmark which continues to manifest itself.

Maybe the Danes have not lost a taste to simple pleasures? They mostly treasure time spent together with the family and close kin. “Happiness means to cook a tasty dinner, apply a match to candles, and dine with friends. Or drink hot coffee at a fireplace in cold winter,” said Camilla Bek Heg who returned to Denmark after five years in Paris.

You can rarely see expensive clothes or luxurious cars in Copenhagen streets. But there are no hungry poor as well. Experts agree that Denmark is one of the most egalitarian societies in the world. Research shows that inequality and resulting atmosphere of mistrust are a major reason for dissatisfaction. Therefore, many researchers explain general Danish happiness by a high level of trust which they often call the main national value.

The Danish tradition of equality and trust is unprecedented in the world. Only here the head of a company and a security guard communicate as equals. “In Denmark people consume relatively equal shares of the wealth they create and believe each other”, Reuters reported adding that in other countries people are more cynical to authorities, business and each other.

“It is hard to say how the trust emerged”, said economist Christian Bjornskov from Aarhus University. “Most likely it formed during numerous generations beginning from Vikings”. But even today Danish peasants leave berries they collected on the roadside and nobody would ever eat them without leaving some money in exchange. The scholar said the descendants of the Scandinavians who emigrated to the United States in the XIX century are the most trustful and at the same time most trustworthy Americans. During the current economic crisis Denmark was one of the first countries to announce unlimited guarantees for bank deposits, Bjornskov recalled.

“The Danes do not view the state as an enemy,” said political scientist and sociologist Peter Gundelak. He believes it may be due to the small size of the country and homogenous population. Anyway, the Danes regularly pay the highest taxes in Europe and are convinced they do it for the better .

There is also an historic explanation: Denmark used to be a northern empire and w as at war with Prussia and Austria in 1964 and suffered a crushing defeat. The Danes were undermined economically and morally but due to incredible effort succeeded to rebuild the country although national conscience was deeply hurt. Since then they had to adjust to a new situation. They do not set excessive aims and pin no major hopes. They learned to enjoy trifles. Thus, according to research, Danish happiness is a kind of self-hypnosis. “If the Danes are the happiest that is because they have less expectations than others which means less disappointments as well”, said Peter Gundelak.

John Helliwell is convinced that choir singing and common laughter at frequent parties are a major source of happy feelings among the Danes. Incessant toasts and songs at Danish weddings offer a collective therapy and a w ay to happiness, he believes.

The Danes are rather reserved and never complain. It means they are ready for misfortunes, do not expect gifts from the future and are surprised if everything goes well. It is evident from newspaper headlines – “We are the happiest, so far”. The Danes thus confirm the Taoist wisdom voiced by ancient Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi – happiness is when you do not go to attain happiness.

Scholars made numerous interesting discoveries when they began to examine Danish happiness in detail. It turned out, for example, that it is subject to seasonal changes: in winter the Danes seem to stop being the happiest people in the world. The gloom and boring days of the season result in the so-called “winter depression” or the Seasonal Affected Disorder / SAD/ syndrome.

According to the Danish Psychiatry Fund, close to 200 thousand Danes suffer from chronic depressions while 15 percent of the population or every seventh resident experienced depression at least once in his life.

In Denmark SAD is described as “episodes of depression taking place in a certain season, mostly in winter”. The risk is considered to be the highest in northern countries with long winter nights, such as Denmark. The symptoms include bad mood, tiredness, stress, and the feeling of helplessness and hopelessness.

Psychologist Martin Morsing believes that if “winter depression” is ignored, it can develop into a real depression which demands psychiatric treatment. “The syndrome is specifically dangerous for elderly people. They rarely go out while loneliness promotes depression,” said psychiatrist Sarika Staflund.

In a critical state depression can result in suicide. The Odense Center for suicide research said the number of suicides in Denmark grows 2 percent in October-November and in April-May. “Changes in the duration of daylight hours are the most likely explanation to seasonal fluctuations in suicidal behavior”, the research center said.

Naturally, early winter affects depressive people, but why does the number of suicides increase on the eve of the coming summer? “In autumn they lack initiative due to general exhaustion. In spring dark thoughts have not yet abandoned them while there is already enough energy for the lethal step,” said research fellow Berge Jensen.

Weather conditions can also promote suicide. “In cold time there are more suicides during fog or rain and less during cold and snowy winter,” Berge Jensen stressed.

Winter depression is an old enemy of the Danes and they know how to fight it. The best way is to party with friends and candles. Professionals confirm the efficiency of the “popular therapy”. Statistics show the Danes buy more candles per capita than any other people in the world.

Martin Morsing recommends light therapy with special sunlight emitting bulbs to patients who suffer from SAD and depression. 20-30 minutes a day under such light would ease depression symptoms, he believes. “However nothing can replace the true Sun. Therefore be active and go in for sports in the short hours while the Sun is shining”, he advised.

U.S. researcher Barry Whitehead studied 30 SAD cases in 17 countries and exposed that only northern US regions and Russia are ahead of Denmark in the syndrome. The average global SAD rate is 5.77 while in Denmark it is 12.4. As a result, happiness indicators among the Danes in winter are much lower than in summer .

Canadian researcher John Helliwell studied the problem from another angle. He noticed that Denmark is always the leader in assessing life in general on the basis of such criteria, as incomes, absence of corruption and the feeling of freedom. However when the Danes are asked: “Did you smile or laugh yesterday?” the rating is much more modest.

Thus, scholars concluded there can be two potential definitions of happiness. One is related to the general sense of wellbeing while the other – to specific moments of joy. The first definition depends on personal incomes and the wealth of the country while the second one – on satisfaction of personal psychological and social needs.

The commission created by France in 2008 and headed by Nobel Prize winner and economist Joseph Stiglitz determined “a major difference between such social and economic indicators as growth, inflation, and unemployment and the psychological and emotional perception of the realities.” The research resulted in two different social and economic indicators: level of life and quality of life.

Although the United States has the highest per capita GDP ratio it occupied only the 16th place in the general wellbeing classification and the 26th place in the rating based on joyful moments in life. Christian Science Monitor newspaper sadly said that the United States is the richest country in the world but the Americans are not the happiest people. Jeffrey Sachs insists popular happiness does not depend on economic development of the country. “The United States has been constantly developing economically since 1960s however happiness indicators have not changed during the time,” he said. The scholar believes social relationship and health are much more important for happiness than economic growth.

“Naturally, wealth provides a feeling of satisfaction however it does not strongly influence your life assessment as many believe,” said Ed Diner from Illinois University who participated in the Gallup poll. He pointed at the important role of social relationship and cited Costa Rica as an example as people are quite happy there despite low incomes. “Positive feelings usually emerge when you are respected, independent and engaged in labor of love. In the final end there is no single happiness recipe,” he said. You cannot buy happiness – such is the general conclusion of the Gallup Institute published by the US Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. A fat purse enhances the feeling of satisfaction however high income does not guarantee joy and positive feelings. Therefore, the Gallup Institute provides two different ratings at present. The Danes were the happiest in the first category while New Zealanders lead in the secondary (Denmark is the 31st by per capita GDP while New Zealand is the 51st).

In the meantime the serene picture of the northern kingdom makes distrustful journalists ask: are the Danes truly as happy as they claim? Many insist the Danish government is inclined to advertise the country and spends much money to promote the image of Denmark abroad.

For many Danes the declarations about incessant happiness are a “patriotic duty”, said writer Karsten Jensen and recalled the “idyllic image of a caring country which has to protect itself from the outside world at any price”. Sociologist Peter Gundelak agreed: “Many people would be traitors had they claimedotherwise”.

The long-term leadership in happiness seems to have bore to death the Danes themselves. Many of them react to happiness claims skeptically or with an irritated smile.

“Although residents of the country are a little bored in winter they are generally satisfied with life. However they are not big optimists as they would like to pose themselves to the world”, said Helen Dyrbye, one of the authors of Those Strange Danes book. “What do they say behind closed doors?”

“Like all Scandinavians the Danes widely take Prozac which treats depressive disorders and the suicide level is high among them,” said writer Lars Andreas Pedersen. “It does not look like happiness. The Danes are not happy, but satisfied,” he concluded.

Others say the problem is rooted in linguistic misunderstanding as the Danes use the word “happy” when they want to say “satisfied” or “pleased”. It is difficult to translate the Danish word “hygge” into any foreign

language. It means a feeling of comfort, coziness, and satisfaction which usually emerges at a party with close kin.

The latest conclusion seems to be true as the Danes do not complicate their life, are skeptical about high-flown words and notions, prefer concrete things and laugh at curious foreigners who want to comprehend their simple and austere w ay of life.

Foreigners who live in Denmark for a long time and are keen in mysterious Danish soul pay back in their own coin. Englishman Frank Tixton who spent over three decades in Copenhagen bluntly called Danish happiness “complacency”. “Open yourself to the world, admit that you are not perfect and you will see how much genuine happiness it will bring to you,” he wrote in Copenhagen Post.

It is only natural that each person has his or her own happiness which cannot be exchanged. The Danes do not have more or less happiness than others. Everyone has his own successes and failures, everyone has what to enjoy and strive for. Everyone does it his own way.

Nikolai Morozov,

ITAR-TASS bureau chief in Denmark,

for Amber Bridge

It is true the wording is not easy and purely legal. All is simple regarding state property management. The talk is not about the property of the agency as a state organization. This property is very modest. But we manage our main resource – centers of science and culture abroad. They number 59 at present plus 8 affiliates. There are also representatives in 18 countries. Thus we have footholds in 77 countries of the world. We inherited some of the centers from the Soviet Union. They were created as part of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies and survived the difficult ’90s when many of them were axed. The survivors and the newly created ones are operating successfully to that or another extent today.

I say “that or another extent” because not everything we plan and design can be implemented in the modest framework of our capabilities. Naturally we would like our centers to be equipped up-to-date and constantly feature in cultural event posters in their respective cities so that they are popular and in demand.

It is not the wish only of our agency. I will quote Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev who said at the traditional meeting of Rossotrudnichestvo representatives and heads of science and culture centers last September in Moscow: ” you have first to think about the contents of your work and its new forms – make the centers modern, multi-functional and useful for various social and age groups and for everyone who is interested in Russia. Efficiency criteria shall be concrete and practical indicators, such as the number of people studying Russian language and involved in cultural exchanges, the number of courses, the quality of information resources and Internet sites”.

It all demands both attention and intensive work in the center and on-site and finances to hire Russian language teachers on a long-term basis, send high-quality artistic groups and exhibitions, integrate the centers to the maximum into new realities of the information epoch. u nfortunately, so far we have sometimes to admit that we lack money even for the renovation of the centers. Perception of our performance also depends on the exterior. The theater begins from the wardrobe, they say. It is a pity that Russian “cultural embassies” sometimes look poorly in contrast to modern centers of other countries. Russia has a lot what to boast of in the cultural sphere. We have only to properly cut and illuminate the diamond.

We hope that today when the image of Russia abroad and its “soft force” enjoys much high-level attention there will be progress on the avenue. It is pleasing that in many countries people want to study the Russian language, visit our exhibitions, applaud our actors, communicate, study, read and watch. It means our efforts will not be futile.

These are the services which our agency provides. They are the services to the state in promoting its image and culture. The services can be also used by everyone abroad who is interested in Russia and naturally by our compatriots. For them it is an important and necessary possibility to maintain live contacts with the cultural environment in which they grew up and which most of them want to preserve for their children.

The work of Rossotrudnichestvo in the Baltic Sea region and in the North of Europe differs in intensity. Somewhere it is everyday effort while in other places it is ad hoc. What would you list as an achievement in the region and what do you think has to be improved?

In the Baltic Sea region and the European north we have permanent footholds in Germany, Poland, Denmark, Finland where our science and culture centers operate. They hold exhibitions (only in Helsinki there were 39 exhibitions in 2012) and performances of Russian actors, as well as master classes, Russian language courses, cinema shows (say, in Gdansk Russian and Soviet movies are shown four times a month). Unfortunately, we still do not have an office in Sweden and Norway and in Baltic countries. The reason is not only insufficient efforts of Rossotrudnichestvo. On the contrary, our center in Copenhagen tries to cover neighboring Scandinavian countries. It held events last year in Malmo and Gothenburg, as well as in the Norwegian capital city.

In some cases problems with our presence in the country are caused by a lack of funds, but in some cases – by clear and unconcealed rejection by local authorities of Russian cultural centers.

As the talk is exclusively about cultural offices in countries with big Russian-speaking communities we cannot but view such rejection as a politically motivated and unfriendly act of authorities in corresponding countries aimed not only against Russia, but their own people as well.

The fifty-nine countries where our centers operate can confirm they pose no risk to national statehood, but the mutual benefit from cultural presence (as it always builds on reciprocity) is evident. I am confident that time will put everything in place and Russian centers of science and culture will open in all countries of the region because an additional channel of bilateral cultural dialogue is necessary not only for Russia and Rossotrudnichestvo but mostly to our people who should not suffer from prejudice and phobias of various politicians.

Russia currently presides in the Council of the Baltic Sea States. It is common knowledge that the CBSS is one of the most successful institutions of regional cooperation. They said the best is the enemy of the good. How can the format become more efficient?

Rossotrudnichestvo is not engaged on the platform, and it is a pity. Cultural dimension of regional cooperation provides additional possibilities for involving a maximum number of people in various countries into dialogue projects.

The Council of the Baltic Sea States is definitely an example of successful regional cooperation and I see good prospects of its growth and development on various guidelines. I do not believe the best is the enemy of the good in this case. Any project should be adapted, firstly, to the realities of the information epoch and the emergence of new communication platforms and formals, and, secondly, to the changing needs of the people. For example, enhanced economic cooperation between countries often results in increased demand for the study of corresponding languages – we noted a growth in the number of those wishing to study the Russian language in Baltic countries and we deem it necessary to react to the trends by launching new specialized courses and providing other opportunities.

In April 2013 in the framework of Russian CBSS presidency St. Petersburg will host a forum of non-governmental organizations of the Baltic Sea region. Human rights will be a major issue. The Russian Federation has begun to pay more attention of late to the protection of the rights of its citizens who live or stay abroad. Which problems does Rossotrudnichestvo resolve in this aspect?

Protection of the rights of Russian citizens abroad is a priority task of the Russian foreign ministry as the talk is about decisions lying in the sphere of the state policy. The Fund to support and protect compatriots abroad began to operate last year. Its task is to provide assistance in resolving legal issues faced by compatriots in other countries.

The mission of Rossotrudnichestvo is to satisfy cultural needs of Russians and representatives of other peoples of Russia abroad. Therefore, our centers are in constant contact with associations of compatriots and sometimes even act as a kind of cultural or family clubs for them. They hold meetings, children’s parties, and amateur concerts. Maybe the work lacks the necessary scale which we can boast of in performance reports. But for many people outside Russia it is important to have such places of communication and leisure and therefore we shall continue to develop them and upgrade the quality of the format.

The so-called cross-year of Russia in Germany and Germany in Russia is taking place in the same chronological framework as the Russian presidency in the CBSS. One of the recent issues of the Amber Bridge carried an interview with British historian Dominic Lieven who said that “out of all European nations the Germans are most balanced about their history.” Experts noted disappointment over German-Russian relations circulating in German society. What can Russia bring to the relations in order to add a positive and optimistic mood to them?

Cross-years of Russia with other countries are truly large-scale and popular events which allow to hold a massive presentation of the country abroad. Rossotrudnichestvo is actively engaged in such projects. In particular, last year we prepared and held the International children’s forum It Is Our World in Bonn, the national culture festival Russian Constellation in Berlin, and the 3rd international student forum in the German capital in October in the framework of the year of Russia in Germany. In 2013 we shall participate in the year of Russia in the Netherlands and we hope the level of events will not be lower than in Germany.

I believe that despite all possibilities provided by social networks and new means of communication such big “live” events continue to be vital as they provide a possibility to a big number of people to dive into the immense cultural space of Russia without leaving their home country.

It is very important and fruitful in periods when there is a feeling of a certain cooling in relations or mutual interest. We can speak about some disappointment in German society regarding Russia, but it is mostly conditioned by the tone of the media coverage of domestic Russian developments. It is based on assessments of a narrow circle of people from Russian political and public life.

It is like in Soviet times when our people learned news about the West through assessments of the Communist party leaders. As a result, it boiled down to endless large-scale protests, strikes and sufferings of the working people. Definitely all the mentioned events took place but like in the coverage of modern Russian realities abroad it was not the whole truth. It is saddening because it is the reason for opinions and prejudice.

We also like to lament and paint everything in darker colors than it is in reality. It is our national trait. We have to see more good things as the authors of the private project http://www.sdelanounas.ru are doing. Every day they say what has been built, opened or produced in Russia. It is important not only for foreigners but for us as well.

Outside perception is not always based on fair assessments of Russia. You can differ on what the girls from Pussy Riot band did and on subsequent court verdict and sentence. But when everybody speaks about it emotionally and does not even recall over three million Russians who queued several nights to touch the Christian relic – the Virgin Mary’s Belt – I believe it is an information bias. Those indignant at the sentence speak in each European newspaper.

Those indignant at the punk-prayer are not heard or seen although they definitely include a majority of the mentioned three million Russians. There is an important justice principle – аudiatur et altera pars (let the other side speak out). I believe there should be a balance in the media and then we shall be able to speak about objectivity and the absence of bias.

To avoid prejudice and positions based on secondary sources we have to create as many as possible direct forms of public dialogue. In contrast to the USSR which tried to hide its realities from a foreign eye and resorted to propaganda modern Russia wants to have its developments covered objectively to the maximum. The Russian image abroad is currently worse that the true situation in the country. We want people to see our life themselves without beautification and distortions and make conclusions based on personal impressions. Therefore Russia has been insisting for decades on visa-free travel with EU countries. So far we have not received a positive answer from our partners. Besides, some Baltic countries deliberately impede the exchange of cultural centers and erect obstacles to Russian language studies. It is not Russia which creates barriers for intercultural and public dialogue. That cannot but cause concern.

The best remedy for disappointment for Germans and any other societies is in increased communications. Come, meet, and listen not only to those who say habitual things for your ear. Open various Russia for yourself and you will have less disappointments and more benefits for all. Any difficult dialogue is better than two monologues.

Many countries, including most influential and wealthy, use national and territorial branding technologies to build up and enhance the image of the country. There are numerous disputes about the technologies, there are pro and con arguments. What is the Russian position?

Today the image of any country comprises an important asset in international affairs. It is sometimes weightier than political and economic weight. Therefore, I believe nobody is still deciding whether to promote the image or not. Everyone is working to position himself in the best way before other countries. All that is the so-called “soft force” of a country – to acquire supporters abroad through attractiveness, not force.

Whether it is necessary to resort to branding technologies or act differently (e.g. by advocating your ideolog y and values, spreading your language and mass culture products, etc.) shall be decided by each country independently proceeding from its resources. Most countries have their national brands which promote their image. Everybody knows Italian fashion and design, French wines, Swiss watches, German quality, English football, and Chinese cuisine. The Russians have discovered Turkish resorts. They bring major benefits to that country which is also interested in maintaining good relations with Russia. It is a two-way traffic.

There is nothing bad if Russia reminds the others about its ballet, music, and literature (Anna Karenina is screened with success today). If our country continues to be associated with the Kremlin and St. Basil’s Cathedral, high-quality vodka and outstanding musicians, and immense territory for tourism it will be only good for it. The task is to expand the range of associations. Let new names of writers and film directors appear in it, as well as new geographic names – Sochi, Skolkovo, Russky Island, and new faces in all spheres – e.g. Buranovo Grannies.

It is not the main issue how the Russian branding (or re-branding) be technically implemented. We naturally have what to show and tell to the world. Besides, there are up to 30 million Russian-speaking compatriots abroad. Over 250 million people speak Russian in the world (by the number of people in Europe – from the Atlantic to the Urals – who say Russian is their native language it is the number one with a major lead). Russia occupies the biggest territory on the planet and I believe it will never lack attention. But we would like to have a benevolent attention aimed at dialogue and friendship. The public and the state have to take effort for that. They have to work together, not only the government and Rossotrudnichestvo. We have to remember that each of us carries the image of the country when he communicate with foreigners, goes on holidays or to study abroad.

Each Monday the Voice of Russian radio station airs the Talk with Konstantin Kosachev program. It is a strange role for a high-ranking official. Do you have any feedback?

It may be a strange role for a government official, but it does not mean the mission is wrong. Firstly, I always considered myself to be a public politician, not just an official or apparatchik. Major experience of communicating with my voters in Chuvashia from where I was thrice elected to the State Duma which I know well and love helped me a lot. Secondly, radio offers a good format from messaging your ideas to a big number of people and getting acquainted with interesting interlocutors. May be I am abusing office to a certain extent as I use my position to inviting valuable and respected guests to the broadcast. I am sincerely happy every time when I succeed and when I hear positive response to the program.

Naturally, the response is not always positive. You cannot avoid criticism (but if people disagree it means they listen to you which is also important) because people have different views. What is clear for me may be seen by another person completely differently. It is also important to look at clear things from a different point of view.

Radio, TV and printed media are the so-called non-contact formats. They are definitely necessary however the future (and likely the present) is with contact formats and platforms where live communication goes. We sometimes lack interactivity and do not always involve in the circle of sympathizers of our country abroad as many people as possible.

Rossotrudnichestvo annually implements a program of trips to Russia by young scientists, journalists, politicians, and public figures – those who we call young public opinion leaders (last year 500 people visited our country and this year we hope to raise the number to 650). We work to arrange interesting meetings and acquaintances for the guests, discussions and visits, and we are pleased to hear and read their response confirming how much their opinion of Russia has changed under the impression of what they saw with their own eyes, of their personal communication. So far it may be a drop in the sea, but an important drop.

Last year the Russian Historic Society was reestablished. Academic ties of scholars in various countries intensify, including the Baltic Sea region. International educational projects expand. The Baltic Civilization Institute at the Amber Bridge Fund contributes to the processes. What do you think are the most vital tasks in the sphere?

First and foremost, it is rapprochement of positions of scholars and experts and the public of various countries in their attitude to the past of the region and Europe in general. Unfortunately, in the past decades we witnessed the renaissance of politicized historic issues which in many countries were involved in the political and ideological context. As a result, various reciprocal claims emerged, the renaissance of old hard feelings was artificially encouraged under the cover of new chauvinistic self-conscience, the opinion of minorities was ignored, and explicit nationalists came to power.

Leave history to historians – the task is important not for governments, but for societies. Schoolbooks which our children study are also important. It is horrifying to read numerous things which children are taught in neighboring countries when the talk is about the role of Russia and Russians in their history. The surviving obsessions of parents look from the pages of the schoolbooks rather than real history. They will hardly teach their children to love their native land through provoking hatred to other peoples. This is weakness, not strength, according to me. I believe rapprochement of curricula in schools and institutes can constitute important mission for all of us as we can lay the foundation for relationship between future generations by that.

A personal question in the end. You have many ties with Sweden. According to available information in Internet, had it not been for the Soviet rules you would have been born in Stockholm. How do you perceive Sweden and Nordic countries in general?

It is true that in different political realities I could have been born in Sweden. Nevertheless I partially feel myself a Scandinavian as my childhood passed there as well as my first professional steps. The region will be always close to me no matter what government position I occupy.

I perceive it as a region of highly intellectual, original and self-sufficient people who, like Russians, are not pampered by much sun and other southern life bonuses, but succeeded to build up life on their peninsula to the envy of others – both politically, economically and socially which is confirmed by top places in international ratings.

Scandinavia for me is a region which surprisingly resembles Russia. The space, forests, exciting beauty of the North – everything is present in Russia and in Scandinavian countries. I believe we have what to borrow from the experience of our northwestern neighbors in how to preserve the wealth and treasure what nature gave us. It would be good for the Russians to acquire some Scandinavian mentality. It would be also good for Scandinavians to have some Russian one.

Thank you for the interview.