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		<title>Features of innovation policy in developed countries of the Baltic region</title>
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				<category><![CDATA[Amber Bridge. Journal of Regional Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[№2 (5) 2015]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Denmark]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Finland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Innovation Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Norway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sweden]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Mikhaylova Anna Alekseyevna – Ph.D. student, analyst of Marketing and Analytics Division, Office of Development and Strategic Planning, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia  The study examines the characteristics of the formation and implementation of national and regional innovation policies in the developed countries of the Baltic region: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Building [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p><strong><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">Mikhaylova Anna Alekseyevna </span><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">– Ph.D. student, analyst of Marketing and Analytics Division, Office of Development and Strategic Planning, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Russia </span></strong></p>
<p><em>The study examines the characteristics of the formation and implementation of national and regional innovation policies in the developed countries of the Baltic region: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden. Building on in-depth case studies of the given countries, the author has conducted retrospective analyses of the processes of formation of the innovation policy, which is treated as a result of combining the individual instruments and mechanisms of the scientific and technological, educational, industrial and regional policies in a single set of influence on the innovation system. The article assesses the innovation development of Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, and Sweden; it presents the current scheme of their national innovation systems with a special emphasis on the most significant actors. The author highlighted the key trends and characteristics of the innovation policies of the given countries at the present stage with a focus on the tools used in five thematic areas: education, basic science, applied science and entrepreneurship, regional development, internationalization. Additionally the paper highlights the issue of regional participation in the process of strategy elaboration and subsequent implementation of the chosen course of innovative development.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>The interest in innovation as a source of economic development and welfare of the society began to form in the beginning of the twentieth century under the influence of scientific ideas developed by A. Marshall, JA Schumpeter, ND Kondratyev, P. Sorokin, S. Kuznets and other outstanding scientists of that time. Addressing the multi-faceted innovative economy, complex in its multidimensional image, researchers throughout the twentieth century set themselves the task not only to grasp the essence of the phenomenon of innovation and scientific category, but to identify a set of spacial-temporal, institutional, social, cognitive and other regularities of innovative processes and its impact on the development of territorial socio-economic systems of different level and scale. The fundamentals of the innovation theory evolved in close connection with the development of theories and concepts focus on the cyclical nature of the processes in the economy, specific placement of productive forces, international division of labour and competitiveness, internationalization, regionalization and territorial capital.</p>
<p>Since the end of the twentieth century there is a growing need for applied research that can create and enrich the knowledge base for political decision-making in the field of science and technology, and also innovations. There was a number of scientific concepts, that to some extent were reflected in the strategic and program documents, securing the long-term objectives and priorities for national and regional innovation development, that acted as a basis for the development of mechanisms and tools of the innovation policy. The most common were concept of clusters, national and regional innovation systems, triple spiral, networking, open innovations, regional knowledge, innovation environment, knowledge triangle, entrepreneurial university, global challenges, service innovations, social innovations and innovations in the public sector, live labs, technopolis, competence centers and others.</p>
<p>Empirical studies are also in demand, whose task is to study and analyze the experience of different countries and regions of the world in solving important and essential problems in the innovation. As a rule, such research is thematic and narrowly focused, with a strong territorial binding, but as a whole it allows to catch and to generalize current development trends of the global innovation system and is often the basis for new up-to-date concepts or the improvement and adaptation of existing ones, taking into account changes of contextual factors and conditions.</p>
<p>This article is the result of such study, when the author tries to reveal the features of the innovative policies of developed European countries, based on the comparative assessment of innovation systems of five Baltic countries: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Germany. It should be specified, that under the innovation one means a comprehensive view of the state policy, which is a formation of scientific, technological and industrial policies implemented at national and regional levels.</p>
<p><strong>Characteristics of innovation development of the Baltic region</strong></p>
<p>The choice of the countries for the study is not accidental and is due to the innovative nature of sustainable development for a long period, what to some extent can be considered as an indication of the effectiveness of innovation policy, implemented at the state level. The results of a comparative evaluation of scientific and technical potential of the Baltic region [1, 3, 8] and the analysis of a series of periodic international rankings, dedicated to innovation and competitiveness, demonstrate consistently high positions of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Germany not only compared to the Baltic countries, Poland and Russia, but also among the countries of the European Union and the world, which allows to assign them to a group of &#8220;global innovation leaders&#8221; (Table 1).</p>
<p>Table 1</p>
<p>Level of innovation development of the countries in the Baltic region, 2014</p>
<table width="472">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="54">Country</td>
<td colspan="16" width="419">Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3" width="82">globalinnovative</td>
<td colspan="3" width="106">globalcompetitivity</td>
<td colspan="4" width="78">Innovation panel of EU</td>
<td colspan="3" width="83">Economy of knowledge*</td>
<td colspan="3" width="70">knowledge*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="32">value</td>
<td colspan="2" width="50">rank</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="35">value</td>
<td colspan="2" width="71">rank</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="35">value</td>
<td colspan="3" width="43">rank</td>
<td width="37">value</td>
<td colspan="2" width="46">rank</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="31">value</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="29">world</td>
<td width="20">BR</td>
<td width="43">world</td>
<td width="28">BR</td>
<td width="28">ЕC28</td>
<td width="12">BR</td>
<td width="29">world</td>
<td width="16">BR</td>
<td width="23">world</td>
<td width="16">BR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Sweden</td>
<td width="32">62,29</td>
<td width="29">3</td>
<td width="20">1</td>
<td width="35">5,41</td>
<td width="43">10</td>
<td width="28">3</td>
<td width="35">0,75</td>
<td width="28">1</td>
<td width="12">1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">9,43</td>
<td width="29">1</td>
<td width="16">1</td>
<td width="31">9,38</td>
<td width="23">1</td>
<td width="16">1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Finland</td>
<td width="32">60,67</td>
<td width="29">4</td>
<td width="20">2</td>
<td width="35">5,50</td>
<td width="43">4</td>
<td width="28">1</td>
<td width="35">0,68</td>
<td width="28">4</td>
<td width="12">4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">9,33</td>
<td width="29">2</td>
<td width="16">2</td>
<td width="31">9,22</td>
<td width="23">2</td>
<td width="16">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Denmark</td>
<td width="32">57,52</td>
<td width="29">8</td>
<td width="20">3</td>
<td width="35">5,29</td>
<td width="43">13</td>
<td width="28">5</td>
<td width="35">0,73</td>
<td width="28">2</td>
<td width="12">2</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">9,16</td>
<td width="29">3</td>
<td width="16">3</td>
<td width="31">9,00</td>
<td width="23">5</td>
<td width="16">3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Germany</td>
<td width="32">56,02</td>
<td width="29">13</td>
<td width="20">4</td>
<td width="35">5,49</td>
<td width="43">5</td>
<td width="28">2</td>
<td width="35">0,71</td>
<td width="28">3</td>
<td width="12">3</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">8,90</td>
<td width="29">8</td>
<td width="16">5</td>
<td width="31">8,83</td>
<td width="23">10</td>
<td width="16">5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Norway</td>
<td width="32">55,59</td>
<td width="29">14</td>
<td width="20">5</td>
<td width="35">5,35</td>
<td width="43">11</td>
<td width="28">4</td>
<td width="35">0,48</td>
<td width="28">-</td>
<td width="12">6</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">9,11</td>
<td width="29">5</td>
<td width="16">4</td>
<td width="31">8,99</td>
<td width="23">6</td>
<td width="16">4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Estonia</td>
<td width="32">51,54</td>
<td width="29">24</td>
<td width="20">6</td>
<td width="35">4,71</td>
<td width="43">29</td>
<td width="28">6</td>
<td width="35">0,50</td>
<td width="28">13</td>
<td width="12">5</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">8,40</td>
<td width="29">19</td>
<td width="16">6</td>
<td width="31">8,26</td>
<td width="23">21</td>
<td width="16">6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Latvia</td>
<td width="32">44,81</td>
<td width="29">34</td>
<td width="20">7</td>
<td width="35">4,50</td>
<td width="43">42</td>
<td width="28">8</td>
<td width="35">0,22</td>
<td width="28">27</td>
<td width="12">9</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">7,41</td>
<td width="29">32</td>
<td width="16">8</td>
<td width="31">7,15</td>
<td width="23">33</td>
<td width="16">8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Lithuania</td>
<td width="32">41,00</td>
<td width="29">39</td>
<td width="20">8</td>
<td width="35">4,51</td>
<td width="43">41</td>
<td width="28">7</td>
<td width="35">0,29</td>
<td width="28">24</td>
<td width="12">7</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">7,80</td>
<td width="29">37</td>
<td width="16">7</td>
<td width="31">7,68</td>
<td width="23">40</td>
<td width="16">7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Poland</td>
<td width="32">40,64</td>
<td width="29">45</td>
<td width="20">9</td>
<td width="35">4,48</td>
<td width="43">43</td>
<td width="28">9</td>
<td width="35">0,28</td>
<td width="28">25</td>
<td width="12">8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">7,41</td>
<td width="29">38</td>
<td width="16">9</td>
<td width="31">7,20</td>
<td width="23">39</td>
<td width="16">9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="54">Russia</td>
<td width="32">39,14</td>
<td width="29">49</td>
<td width="20">10</td>
<td width="35">4,37</td>
<td width="43">53</td>
<td width="28">10</td>
<td width="35">-</td>
<td width="28"> -</td>
<td width="12">-</td>
<td colspan="2" width="39">5,78</td>
<td width="29">55</td>
<td width="16">10</td>
<td width="31">6,96</td>
<td width="23">43</td>
<td width="16">10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Remark: * on data of 2012; BR – Baltic region</p>
<p>Source: [14, 15, 18, 19]</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Table 2 contains statistic indicators of innovation system development in these countries at present. In general, it is characterized by significant accumulation of human resources, what is due to priority of national authorities to support the education system and focus on the flow-in of skilled workers. More than 30% of the population in Finland, Norway and Sweden have higher education, slightly less in Denmark &#8211; 27%, and 24.1% in Germany. For comparison, in Russia, according to the census 2010, the share of the population with higher education was 23.4% [6], which can be comparable with Germany, however, is significantly lower than in the Nordic countries. On average, about 39% of the total economically active population in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland and Norway are engaged in the field of science and technology, accounting for nearly 27% of the total population. The leaders in terms of the concentration of human resources in science and technology sector are Denmark (40.5%) and Sweden (39.3%). Another characteristic of innovation systems in these countries is the level of employment in high-tech industry (3.9%), which is higher than the EU average both in production sector and service.</p>
<p>Table 2</p>
<p>Indicators of innovation development of developed countries of the Baltic region, 2013</p>
<table width="469">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="199">Indicator</td>
<td width="54">Sweden</td>
<td width="54">Denmark</td>
<td width="54">Germany</td>
<td width="59">Finland</td>
<td width="48">Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Share of population with higher education, %</td>
<td width="54">30,3</td>
<td width="54">27,0</td>
<td width="54">24,1</td>
<td width="59">32,1</td>
<td width="48">32,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Engaged in science and technology to economically active population, %</td>
<td width="54">39,3</td>
<td width="54">40,5</td>
<td width="54">36,4</td>
<td width="59">38,4</td>
<td width="48">38,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Engaged in high-tech spheres of industry and service to economically active population, %</td>
<td width="54">4,9</td>
<td width="54">5,5</td>
<td width="54">4,1</td>
<td width="59">5,7</td>
<td width="48">3,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Volume of venture investments to GDP, %</td>
<td width="54">0,4</td>
<td width="54">0,6</td>
<td width="54">0,2</td>
<td width="59">0,3</td>
<td width="48">0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Export of high-tech products as a share of all export, %</td>
<td width="54">13,0</td>
<td width="54">9,3</td>
<td width="54">14,2</td>
<td width="59">6,2</td>
<td width="48">…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Share of innovative products in full turnover *, %</td>
<td width="54">6,1</td>
<td width="54">13,9</td>
<td width="54">13,0</td>
<td width="59">11,1</td>
<td width="48">5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="6" width="469">Expenses for research and development, %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">To country’s GDP</td>
<td width="54">3,3</td>
<td width="54">3,1</td>
<td width="54">2,9</td>
<td width="59">3,3</td>
<td width="48">1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">From general expenses of state budget</td>
<td width="54">1,6</td>
<td width="54">1,8</td>
<td width="54">2,0</td>
<td width="59">1,7</td>
<td width="48">1,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="6" width="469">Expenses structure on research and development on source of funding, %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Business</td>
<td width="54">61,0</td>
<td width="54">59,8</td>
<td width="54">66,1*</td>
<td width="59">60,8</td>
<td width="48">43,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">State</td>
<td width="54">28,2</td>
<td width="54">29,3</td>
<td width="54">29,2*</td>
<td width="59">26,0</td>
<td width="48">45,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">High education</td>
<td width="54">1,0</td>
<td width="54">0,0</td>
<td width="54">0,0*</td>
<td width="59">0,2</td>
<td width="48">0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Non commercial companies</td>
<td width="54">3,1</td>
<td width="54">3,8</td>
<td width="54">0,4*</td>
<td width="59">1,4</td>
<td width="48">1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">Foreign sources</td>
<td width="54">6,8</td>
<td width="54">7,2</td>
<td width="54">4,3*</td>
<td width="59">11,5</td>
<td width="48">9,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="6" width="469">Applications for patents in the European Patent Office *, pcs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">For mln citizens</td>
<td width="54">289,9</td>
<td width="54">223,2</td>
<td width="54">278,2</td>
<td width="59">270,6</td>
<td width="48">111,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="199">For bln EUR of internal expenses on research and development</td>
<td width="54">197,9</td>
<td width="54">164,3</td>
<td width="54">287,8</td>
<td width="59">213,9</td>
<td width="48">86,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Remark: * data of 2012</p>
<p>Source: compiled based on data of Eurostat [11]</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>One of the most important indicators of the dynamics of the innovation system includes the volume of financing research and development activities (R &amp; D). In Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Germany the ratio of expenditure on research and development to gross domestic product (GDP) is well ahead of the average for the EU (2%) and Baltic region (1.95%). Sweden and Finland show solvent high levels of funding in the long run. Since 2000 the share of R &amp; D expenditures in the GDP of these countries did not fall below 3.2%. However, one should note the tendency for decrease of the level of funding of scientific and technical sphere in Sweden, due to lower expenditures for the development of technologies for defense.</p>
<p>Denmark and Germany on the contrary show a significant increase in the share of research and development expenditures in the said period. If in the early 2000s the ratio of R &amp; D spending to GDP was slightly more than 2%, in 2013 it amounted to 3% with a positive dynamics. It should be noted that these high rates are due to structure of R &amp; D funding,prevailing in these countries, where the main role belongs to business sector (60%). The exception is Norway, where the contribution of the state and business in the research and development is nearly equivalent: 45.8 and 43.1% respectively in 2013. As shown in Table 2, lack of high interest from Norwegian business in investments in R &amp; D, even with share of budgetary allocationscomparable with other countries in the Baltic region, has a negative impact on the total value of the financing of the innovation system of Norway. During 2000 &#8211; 2013 the share of expenditure on research and development in the country&#8217;s GDP fluctuated around 1.6%, without reaching the EU average.</p>
<p>An essential role in encouraging innovation is played by high-risk investments in companies that are engaged in development of new products and / or technologies, but not listed on the stock market. The need for its finance is formed in early stages of development (seed and start-up), and later (growth and expansion). The highest level of venture capital investment to GDP is in Denmark and Sweden: 0.6 and 0.4% respectively. This indicator is higher than in other EU countries and Baltic region, but the dynamics of such investments is unstable and still below the real needs (Pic. 1).</p>
<p>Pic. 1 –  Dynamics of volume of venture investments to GDP of Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Finland, Norway, %</p>
<p>Source: compiled based on data of Eurostat [11]</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>As the result of innovation Table 2 indicates the share of innovative products in total trade, exports of high technology products and patents. Germany shows the highest return on investment in research and development. Bearing in mind 2.9% expenses on R &amp; D of GDP, Germany shows the highest performance in turnover and export of high-tech products, as well as higher patent activity in terms of unit costs, compared with other developed countries of the Baltic region.</p>
<p><strong>Innovation policy in Sweden</strong></p>
<p>The innovation system in Sweden evolved throughout the twentieth century with limited natural resources and domestic market, which was the main driving factor for the development of technology and export industry with high added value. The need to enter international markets and compete led to the formation of several large transnational companies that currently are the main investors in research and development. The participation of small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) in the innovation process is relatively small, so the state is forced to use various motivating mechanisms for their involvement in R &amp; D. In order to overcome the negative effects of industrial policy of 1980 &#8211; 90 and stimulate economical growth Sweden developed a long-term strategy of innovative development «Innovative Sweden», which presented a nationwide vision of Sweden as a competitive, dynamic and knowledge-based economy, attractive for investments of large and small high-tech companies.</p>
<p>In 2012 Sweden adopted a new long-term innovation strategy «The road to a world-class innovation climate 2020», which became a continuation of the ideas of pan-European growth strategy «Europe 2020». The strategy is aimed at improving the quality of life and sustainable development through the maintenance of competitiveness and job creation in the global knowledge-driven economy. The main principles of its implementation are the creation of favourable conditions for innovation; support of people, business and organizations that are systematically engaged in innovation; implementation of a holistic approach based on a common vision. The structure of the modern national innovation system of Sweden is shown in Picture 2.</p>
<p>Picture 2 – National innovation system of Sweden</p>
<p>Source: compiled based on [13, 16]</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Government of Sweden is responsible for the development of innovation policy at the national level. The main role in this process is assigned to the Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of entrepreneurship and innovation. In 2001 their department established two major agencies: Swedish Research Council and Swedish governmental agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA), whose tasks included the implementation of the main directions of the state innovation policy. The activity of Swedish Research Council focuses on the support and development of basic scientific research. VINNOVA is strengthening cooperation between all actors of the innovation system, co-financing of research initiatives with further monitoring and control of its implementation, as well as support of international collaboration. In addition, support functions and the financing of industrial R &amp; D were split between several dozens of specialized state research councils and agencies that focus on meeting the needs in knowledge of the society in individual spheres. An alternative to government agencies and large industrial companies in funding R &amp; D is various para-public and private research funds, which have their own budgets. For example, Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF), Knowledge Foundation (KKS), Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research (MISTRA), Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education (STINT), Swedish Foundation for health care sciences and allergy research (Vårdal), Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, Swedish Cancer Society, and others.</p>
<p>A characteristic feature of the innovation system of Sweden is a relatively small number of research institutes established in the second half of the twentieth century and united in holding «RISE group» in order to improve the efficiency of use of financial, material and human resources and enhance its expertise and complementarity. The consequence of a lack of research institutions engaged in applied research and development has become the laying of their functions to universities with the increase in financial support of the latter. According to the Parliament decision dd. 1979 [17] University in Sweden combines three missions: education, basic research, interaction with business, being transformed from a classic structure in the enterprise.</p>
<p>One of the most urgent problems of the Swedish innovation system is the lack of commercialization of university research. It reflects the emergence of the concept of «the Swedish paradox» [7, 13], when a large amount of expenses for research and development and education shows a disproportionately low return of innovation. In many respects it is a consequence of the negative impact of legislation («teacher&#8217;s correction», laws on the public domain and state acquisition and others [5, 9]) and insufficiency of venture capital on initial stages.</p>
<p>Overcoming the effect of «the Swedish paradox» is done through the implementation of the state policy of promoting the commercialization and innovation in the framework of realization of strategic ideas of national «knowledge triangle», what brings together education, research and innovation. The main efforts of the government in this area are aimed at increasing the efficiency of the implementation capacity of universities by strengthening and deepening cooperation with other actors of the innovation system. Swedish universities dispose a developed network of incubators and science parks, as of 2010 they have created Bureau of innovative interaction &#8211; contact interuniversity platforms to improve the efficiency of R &amp; D and stimulate innovation.</p>
<p>It should be noted that such measures of stimulating innovative economy as tax incentives and credits for businesses carrying out R &amp; D did not gain widespread in Sweden. The most widely used tools are venture capital financing; subsidized loans for small and medium-sized business; state guarantees; grant support on a competitive basis (at the individual, institutional level) in the framework of national programs; advisory services; assistance in the training of personnel; creation of special areas for cooperation of participants of actors «triple spiral», etc. In recent years, active work has been carried in order to liberalize the law on state acquisition in order to use it as a driver for innovation in social sectors: infrastructure, health and welfare, environment. Particular attention is paid to support of small and medium-sized businesses, including issues related to the expansion of the participation in research and development and implementation of international activities (program «Explore and grow» and «VINN NU»). A number of organizations of supporting infrastructure were created: investment companies («ALMI Invest», Industrial Development Fund and others), technology transfer centers (Swedish organization to support innovation and technology transfer (SNITTS) and others), agency for attracting investment («Business Sweden» and others), network organizations, bringing together participants of «triple spiral» (Swedish Entrepreneurial Forum and others).</p>
<p>Important areas of ​​modern innovation policy of Sweden are regional development and support of the creation of innovation clusters. As of 2001 has been launched a national flagship initiative «Vinnväxt &#8211; Regional growth through dynamic innovation systems», whose aim is to promote sustainable regional growth by developing internationally competitive innovations in priority areas. In 2007 the idea of ​​a differentiated approach to regional development and growth gained formal acknowledgement in the «National strategy for regional competitiveness, entrepreneurship and employment in 2007-2013»; expanded long-term strategy «National strategy for regional growth and attractiveness 2014-2020» , whose base was cross-sectoral approach, multi-level control mechanism for dialogue between participants and collective training, as well as clear focus on results, entered into force in 2014.</p>
<p>In recent years, the authority of the regions of Sweden to participate in the development of regional policy has greatly increased. Currently each region is obliged to form and implement its own development strategy, including vision, goals and long-term priorities, taking into account regional characteristics and competitive advantages. Regional development strategy should contribute to the coordination of initiatives in the field of regional development, held at different levels. It should be noted that we mean regions of level NUTS 3, i.e. län or regions in which the responsibility for the implementation of national policies is traditionally divided between the county administrative boards (länsstyrelsen) &#8211; representatives of the national government at the regional level and regional district councils (landsting). By 2015 each of the 21 regions of Sweden has already formed its own regional development strategy with a planning horizon until 2020, maximum until 2025 or 2030. A number of them have also developed a strategy of innovative development, for example, the regions of Skåne and Blekinge, focusing on strengthening of its competitive advantage through the development of cooperation and the formation of clusters and internationalization.</p>
<p><strong>Innovation policy of Denmark</strong></p>
<p>Denmark as well as Sweden shows high level of innovation development among the world, Europe and Baltic region. Historically, the Danish economy is based on traditional sectors: agriculture, fishery, manufacturing. At the beginning of the twentieth century the country was highly competitive in agricultural production, which allowed it to consolidate its status as one of the world&#8217;s leading exporters of meat and dairy products. The logical consequence of active development of the agricultural sector which even at present forms the demand for qualified personnel and new technologies, was the establishment of the educational and research system of the country. Its basis was established in 1769 with the formation of the Royal Danish Agricultural Society, under whose support later were established various schools, colleges and universities that are still operating. A strong manufacturing sector of Denmark is the result of industrial and technological policy in 1960 – 1970es. Currently, the country was able to implement the industrial potential in sectors such as engineering and metalworking, food processing, chemical industry and oil refining, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, electronic and electrical industries.</p>
<p>Danish modern economy is export-oriented with a growing share of service export (about 39% in 2013 with a positive trend in the long run [4]). On one hand, it is based on the success achieved in the traditional industries, and on the other hand – it demonstrates the commitment to the development of new high-tech sectors (ICT, biotechnology, alternative energy, bioeconomy, medical technology and others). The employment of the majority of the working population is provided by SMEs. Large businesses cover a major share of Danish exports, as well as a considerable amount of investment in research and development. It should be noted that the Danish economic model developed in a relatively low domestic resource capacity and low capacity of the national market that unites it with the Swedish, is characterized by a strong dependence on the situation on the international markets. It most strongly appeared during the economic crisis of 2008-2009. Maintaining the effectiveness of such model requires government&#8217;s continuous work to improve the investment and business climate, improve the system of science and education, improve the overall competitiveness of the economy, creation of favourable innovation environment.</p>
<p>The answer to the current challenges of the world economy was the development in 2010 of the national strategy «Denmark 2020: knowledge &#8211; growth &#8211; prosperity – welfare», which was based on the principle of more effective use of internal resources due to the consolidation of public finances, increasing productivity, increasing commercialization of R &amp; D results by universities and public research organizations, introduction of new technologies (especially with a positive environmental impact), development of health care, reduction of bureaucracy level, strengthening of the competitive environment, greater involvement of the country and its regions in the process of internationalization and international cooperation (incl. scientific sphere). Innovation policy in this context is one of the key tools in achieving the strategic objectives of a long-term development of the country.</p>
<p>In 2012 it adopted a long-term national innovation strategy «Denmark – country of decisions. Strengthening cooperation and improving the innovation systems on enterprises», considerable attention in it is paid to the formation of an effective mechanism for the transformation of budgetary allocations for science and education to economic development, employment growth and improvement of social welfare. Key issues to be addressed in 2020 are associated with slow economic growth, insufficient level of productivity, need to shift from European markets to the world ones, weak position of SMEs in niche markets, imbalance in support of thematic research and development towards the dominance of certain sectors (pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, energy). The strategy developed a set of 27 tools in three areas of the innovation policy:</p>
<p>1. «Innovations in solving social problems»: optimization of the national innovation system through restructuring a number of government research councils, agencies and foundations; increasing transparency and easier access to government programs of innovation support; Danish participation in the expansion of EU initiatives on the principles of co-financing; issue of the catalog «INNO +», that identified key strategic areas of investment in innovation (transport, environment, urban development, food and bioeconomy, health, ICT, energy, innovative production); launch of initiatives to create social innovation and pilot partnerships in regions with strong scientific and business positions;</p>
<p>2. «The transformation of knowledge into innovation»: support of clusters and networks; involvement of SMEs in innovative activity (the program «Industrial PhD», «Promotion of Innovation», «Startups graduates», system of innovation vouchers (small lines of credit to finance R &amp; D expenses), development of Danish network of international innovation centers); optimization of the number of incubators by increasing critical mass of residents; facilitating the exchange of knowledge between research and business sector by increasing public funding of joint projects, expansion of the target audience of Danish science e-library, document flow, creation of additional jobs for researchers;</p>
<p>3. «Strengthening the innovation potential through education»: increase in the practice at all levels of education; support innovation in education, including new forms and methods of training; systematic support of young talents; development of innovative and entrepreneurial skills of students; strengthening cooperation between business and educational institutions.</p>
<p>Picture 3 shows present structure of the national innovation system in Denmark after the optimization carried out at the level of institutions, which formed and implemented innovation policy, and at the level of direct participants of the innovation process (for example, by consolidating universities).</p>
<p>Pic. 3 – National innovation system of Denmark</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The document dd. 2008 «Research 2015», identifying priority areas for research and development, was replaced by a new one in 2012 – «Research 2020». The current index, which was a result of joint work of universities, research organizations, ministries and research councils, represented a common vision of Sweden as a healthy, high-tech, competitive, inclusive society, developing «green» economy with a powerful innovative potential, strengths and competencies and high quality of life. According to this document, by 2020 Denmark should be among the top five OECD countries among the share of innovative SMEs, the level of private investment in R &amp; D relative to GDP and the share of employees with higher education in the commercial sector.</p>
<p>Among the most important instruments of national innovation policy, in addition to the above, one should note personal tax credits for foreign researchers and other high skilled employees in Danish companies and research institutions, in force as of 1992; tax credits for income tax for the companies involved in R &amp; D spending; framework and project grants provided by national programs supporting research and innovation; loans and loan guarantees provided by the Danish SME Development Fund; investment in large-scale infrastructure in the framework of the Roadmap for the development of research infrastructures (2011) and others.</p>
<p>Regional level of innovation policy is implemented through regional forums of economic growth, in force since 2006 in five regions of Denmark (Capital Region, North and Central Jutland, South Denmark, Zealand) and, separately, on the island of Bornholm. It is advisory bodies to the regional councils that do not have their own fund and are re-elected every 4 years. Among their main functions one can note development of regional business strategy, monitoring of trends in regional and local economies, development of recommendations for co-financing of regional measures to support entrepreneurship and innovation. All regional forums for economic growth closely cooperate with the Danish Board of economic growth in order to coordinate national and regional innovation policy. From 2007 to 2012 regional forums of economic growth were responsible for the preparation of medium-term or long-term development strategies for each region, taking into account its specific character, strengths and weaknesses, as well as national priorities. Despite the significant differentiation in the level of economic and innovative development of the regions, common to all strategies were emphasis on public education, training and attracting skilled labour, support for entrepreneurship, new technologies and innovations. Among the main measures of regional innovation policy one should mention public-private partnerships, cluster policy, open innovations, government acquisitions and innovation in the public sector, support of start-ups and innovative SMEs, promoting the exchange of knowledge, development of intellectual demand and innovation in the service sector. An important mechanism to support Danish regions is the EU framework program, funding of which is used also on creation of cross-border clusters (the most successful – «Medicon Valley») [2].</p>
<p><strong>Innovation policy in Germany</strong></p>
<p>In accordance with the principle of the federal government, enshrined in the German constitution, the responsibility for the formation of innovation policy is divided between the federal authorities and the authorities of 16 states with the release of exclusive questions and sharing knowledge. At the federal level, a significant role is played by two ministries: Education, Economy and Energy. Other ministries are involved in the development of research programs and support research within its field of competence, including the establishment of research institutes. All government institutions under the jurisdiction of the federal ministries are united in the association «Working Group of department research institutions». State authorities and management in Germany have a number of advisory bodies that assess the overall dynamics of the innovation system of the country and develop recommendations to strengthen it. The most significant and oldest is the German Council of Applied Sciences and Arts, established in 1957 by an administrative agreement between the Federal Government and the states. In addition to consulting services on higher education and scientific research, the Council carries out accreditation of non-state universities and severally liable with the German Research Foundation for funding the advanced university research within the framework of a comprehensive program «Excellence initiative».</p>
<p>The basis of innovation policy at the federal level is stated in a number of strategic and program documents, the most important of which is a comprehensive strategy in research and innovation «Strategy of high technology». It was launched in 2006 and combined a wide range of government initiatives and programs. In 2010 the country adopted an updated version of the document till 2020, where it fixed the key areas of development of promising markets and technologies (biotechnology, nanotechnology, micro-optical systems, new materials and production technology, aeronautical engineering and ICT); increased cooperation between science and business; coordination of political initiatives on both federal and regional levels. Also appeared separate national strategies on building research infrastructure, including international importance («National roadmap for research infrastructures», 2013); development of bioeconomy as an alternative to non-renewable energy sources («National research strategy bioeconomy 2030», 2013); internationalization of research activities («Strengthening of the role of Germany in the global scientific society», 2008); support for higher education and growing need for highly qualified professionals («Higher education pact 2020», 2007) and a number of others which form the basis for regional initiatives.</p>
<p>Federal states possess broad authority to develop and implement research and educational policies. Each land forms its own legal framework in this area and the budget to finance public higher education institutions and non-university research organizations and institutions. Some of the most innovative active regions developed comprehensive development strategy (North Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin, Brandenburg, and others) and issued series of program documents (Bavaria, Hesse, and others). The centerpiece of the current regional innovation policy in Germany is concluded in the idea of ​​smart specialization, based on the existing regional differences in the innovative development of land; support for SMEs, whose activities are focused on innovation; formation of strong regional clusters. A joint scientific conference, whose members are the Ministers of relevant ministries, was established in 2007 to coordinate the activity of the Federal Government and state governments in research policy. The range of issues within the conference is quite broad and incorporates financial, strategic and international areas of focus.</p>
<p>Funding of research and innovation in Germany is implemented through a wide range of government (federal, regional and joint), semi-public and private non-profit foundations, which include scientific and academic, party, church, industrial and other types. Basic tools of stock support are focused on three areas: research projects, promising young personnel, innovative SMEs. The Association of German research funds is designed to assist in overcoming disunity between funds in the implementation of its programs.</p>
<p>Research and development sector of the country is represented by a wide variety of participants, some of which trace their history from the beginning of the twentieth century and earlier: public and private universities, academia, public research organizations and institutions of basic and applied research, scientific research centers, companies with R &amp; D divisions, etc. The major research associations in Germany are four non-university public research organizations: Fraunhofer Society, Helmholtz Association of Research Centres, Leibniz Association, Max Planck Society, who has its own research funds. It should be noted that, traditionally, German research organizations and industry are characterized by close cooperation ties and, as a consequence, persistently high level of funding of science and research business, which is largely a result of strong government technology policy of the second half of the twentieth century. Modern innovation system of the country is represented in Picture 4.</p>
<p>Pic. 4 – National innovation system of Germany</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>One of the main tools of the innovation policy in Germany is the development and financing of programs to support research and development projects: a) private or thematic, which are based on long-term frameworks in specific areas of technology (biotechnology, nanotechnology, ICT, medicine and health, environmental protection, space etc); b) open, which support more versatile research and are not intended to thematic restrictions. By the beginning of 2013 the total number of programs was 242, of which 92 were federal (including 20 &#8211; open) and 150 &#8211; regional (incl. 115 &#8211; open) [10]. In order to improve the efficiency of research activities, most of the thematic programs are focused on the use of public-private partnership. Table 3 shows the major government initiatives to support research and innovation in Germany.</p>
<p>Table 3</p>
<p>Main initiatives on support of science research and innovations in Germany</p>
<table width="475">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="198">Program</td>
<td width="276">Main lines and tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="475"><em>Initiatives to support innovative SMEs and start-ups</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="198">«Innovative SMEs», «Central innovation program for SMEs», «Program Venture Capital», «EXIST Program», «Industrial collective research», «SIGNO», «Go-Inno» and others.</td>
<td width="276">facilitating the access to finance research activities of SMEs; increasing transparency and reducing costs for SMEs, including the purchase of R &amp; D and specialized services, management of innovation networks, staff; financing of start-ups (direct equity investments in the seed stage, co-financing of private investment in the early stages, repeated investment and the provision of state. guarantees in the later stages, preferential loans with below-market rate%); improving the framework conditions for the development of entrepreneurship in universities (grant support start-ups and spin-offs created by academics); facilitating access to the results of research and development for SMEs; grant support for the formation of self-organizing research associations; co-financing the costs of patenting; consulting services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="475"><em>Initiatives to improve the system of higher education</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="198">«Initiative: Qualification for Germany», «Promotion through education: open universities» and others.</td>
<td width="276">improving the quality of higher education in order to create a pool of qualified professionals; funding on a competitive basis, and initiatives to improve the integration of university curriculum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="475"><em>Initiatives in the field of regional development and the creation of innovation clusters</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="198">«innovative concept», «innovative regional growth centers»,  «potential growth centers», «Center of Innovation Competence», «Innovation Forum», «InnoProfile», «ForMaT», «Twenty 20 &#8211; Partnership for Innovation», «Competition of advanced clusters»  «Innovative alliances» (subsequently merged into «Entrepreneurial regions») and others.</td>
<td width="276">strengthening of smart specialization through the creation of innovation clusters; stimulating creative thinking and the development of competencies; support for cooperation of large industrial conglomerates and government organizations of R &amp; D to develop innovations that require long-term studies; funding of innovation in the priority areas; systematic support of the regions in East Germany; reimbursement of labour costs, establishment and development of infrastructure, equipment and staff training, purchase of consulting and research services; grants, tax breaks (including by reducing social security contributions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="475"><em>Initiatives to support young talents</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="198">«Initiative of excellence», «Germany sholarship», «Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation», «Qualification initiative», «Increasing scholarship» joint programs with various foundations and others.</td>
<td width="276">postgraduate funding of young scientists; long-term contracts with young researchers in universities; grants, student loans, scholarships to young talents; support of non-traditional research approaches; increased scholarships for students; supporting women researchers; funding for joint research projects and the participation of German researchers in international conferences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In addition to the above initiatives, Germany used a number of additional tools and mechanisms, such as fiscal incentives for the creation of a more favorable environment for financing start-ups and innovative SMEs at the early stages (new laws on venture capital and equity participation, 2008); the mechanism of state acquisition of innovative products (a joint initiative of six federal ministries «Decision to step up innovation-oriented state acquisition», 2007; Act, encourage competition, 2009); liberalization of immigration laws in order to increase the flow-in of highly skilled experts and scientists (German Immigration Act, 2005; «Labour migration helps to ensure a sufficient number of skilled workers in Germany», 2008; «The recognition of foreign skills», 2012); creating a legal framework to ensure the continued co-funding of universities by the Federal Government and the states (federal law to provide assistance in training, German Basic Law (Art. 91b) in ed. 2014) and others.</p>
<p><strong>Innovation policy in Norway</strong></p>
<p>A switch to innovation policy in Norway is due to the desire of national authorities to restructure the economy in order to reduce dependence on traditional industries, which became very crucial in the second half of the twentieth century as a result of an open and active development of oil and gas. At present, products of oil and gas sector is the basis of the country&#8217;s export, and major oil companies («Statoil», «Norsk-Hydro» and others) are the main investors in research and development. One of the mechanisms linking actors of industrial and research sphere is an instrument of «goodwill agreement», involving the provision of benefits to companies for the acquisition of exploration rights in return for the purchase of specialized R &amp; D and services produced in the country. It should be noted that despite the high profitability, such model of economy is quite vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices, and its vital resource is limited by proven hydrocarbon reserves. The maintaining of the existing system of connections increases the risk of a sharp collapse of investment in research and development as a result of negative trends in the commodity sector.</p>
<p>The desire to achieve greater stability and balanced development of the country prompted the national authorities for increased support of alternative sectors of the economy, such as biotechnology and bioeconomy, ICT, new materials, aquaculture and others and transfer their experience in innovation, known in traditional sectors: mining, agriculture, navigation and fishing. Because of the limited number of large national companies focused on R &amp; D, priority is given to the development of small and medium-sized businesses, capable of forming strong competitive clusters in the regions (especially agricultural and peripherals). The main tool to stimulate innovation in Norway is a tax credit system to support «Skattefunn», introduced in 2002 for SMEs, and since 2003 spread to all enterprises subject to taxation within the country. Ten years&#8217; experience of this system proved its high efficiency, including comparison with other innovation policy instruments (grants, subsidies, etc), which has pushed the government to significantly increase the size of tax deductions in 2014.</p>
<p>In the field of science and education in connection with the new national development priorities one can outline a number of trends: firstly, decentralization and focus on support for innovation, resulting from the research activities of the regional universities and colleges; secondly, creation and implementation of social and environmental innovation. The result of the reorganization of the leading organizations and institutions of the institutional infrastructure, done in the 2000s, was the formation of the modern structure of the innovation system in Norway, shown on Picture 5.</p>
<p>Pic. 5 – National innovation system of Norway</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Parliament and the Government of Norway are responsible for the course of the innovation policy of the country. A key role in this process is assigned to the Ministry of Education and Science, which is responsible for coordinating the overall efforts of other ministries and is the main source of financing educational and research spheres. Other ministries are involved in supporting R &amp; D within the framework of its specialization. Some of the largest budgets for research are granted by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Fisheries. The fundamental document for the development of science, education and innovation are the white book «Innovative and Sustainable Norway» (2009), «The long-term plan for research and higher education in 2015 – 2024» (2014), «The strategy of cooperation in research field with Europe» (2014). To support the priority technology areas and industries Norway also developed a number of thematic research and innovation strategies, including bioprospecting (2009), environment, biotechnology (2011), nanotechnology (2012), ICT (2013).</p>
<p>In 1993, as a result of the merger of five research councils in the innovation sector of the country appeared a large state player &#8211; The Research Council of Norway (RCN), which received the right to participate in the development of science and technology policy, to fund research and act as a communication platform for «triple spiral». RCN accumulates funds of all ministries. The level of funding from each ministry is different and depends on the tasks facing it. Currently RCN uses four groups of instruments for financing research activities [12]: a) «research programs» (support on a grant basis of collective, strategic and targeted research initiatives, promote the commercialization of innovations in a certain subject area); b) «independent projects» (funding of individual projects in the field of basic science, which are not linked to specific research programs); c) «infrastructure and institutional arrangements» (creation of the innovation infrastructure, various research institutions, purchase of scientific equipment, databases / collections); d) «network partnership event» (strategic initiative to create partnerships between actors within the country and international cooperation).</p>
<p>In 2003 it created a government agency – «Innovation Norway», whose tasks included the simplification of the formation and development of innovation and supporting infrastructure; strengthening of relations between regional development, innovation and internationalization; representation of national interests in the sphere of trade abroad. At the moment, «Innovation Norway» is acting as the center of the support for Norwegian business and innovation at all levels of management with a wide range of tools: high- and low-risk loans, grants, venture capital, consulting and advertising services, development of business networks and clusters. Also, the Agency is implementing main directions of the state regional policy: a) regional innovation clusters (strengthening and revitalization of the cluster cooperation, increase of innovation and competitiveness of regional businesses); b) business network (support of SMEs in the value chain, forming strategic partnership); c) development of competencies (improving the availability of new knowledge for regional business community through collaboration with universities and university colleges); d) program of regional development (expertise of regional programs for restructuring, management and control of its implementation).</p>
<p>Another important actor in the innovation system of Norway is the state company «Industrial Development Corporation of Norway» (SIVA). Being established in 1968 in the department of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Fisheries, by 1990 &#8211; 2000 it has expanded its role in stimulating innovation development at national level through the creation and support of innovation infrastructure (business incubators, business – «gardens», science parks in the community colleges, regional venture capital and seed funds), investment in commercial real estate and consulting services. In the 2000s, RCN, SIVA and «Innovation Norway» formed the Triple Alliance, which aim is to provide a complete package of services and public funding for science and innovation. Significant joint initiative of the Union was to launch three cluster programs that involve long-term financial, technical and consulting support on a competitive basis: «Arena» in 2003, «Norwegian competence centers» (NCE) in 2006 and «Global competence centers» (GCE) in 2014. Currently, they are combined into a single integrated multi-level program «Innovation clusters of Norway».</p>
<p>There is a relatively little number of funding sources for R &amp; D sector, that are independent from the triple alliance. Among them are some large industrial companies and organizations in the service sector, private foundations, funding specialized studies (Norwegian Cancer Society (NCS), National Public Health Association (NAPH) and others) and individuals. The EU Framework programmes are an important source of foreign funding.</p>
<p>Describing the participation of regional authorities, represented by the districts (fylkeskommuner) and the municipalities of the third level, in the formation of innovation policy, one should note the tendency to expand the area of ​​its responsibility for the selection of priority areas of development, management, coordination and co-financing activities in the area of ​​innovation. The main mechanisms to involve regions in the government initiatives to support the competitive regional innovation systems is the «regional program of research, development and innovation» (2007), including complex financial instruments, notably the creation of regional research funds.</p>
<p>Research and development works in Norway are carried out by universities, specialized and regional university colleges, research institutes of two types («research» and «with research») and R &amp; D divisions of large Norwegian companies. In 2000 as a result of merging of Norwegian Council of Universities and Norwegian Council of University Colleges was formed the Norwegian Association of higher educational institutions (UHR), which serves as a coordinating body between universities and university colleges and represent it on key issues in education and science questions in cooperation with public authorities. Since the beginning of the 2000s higher education has become actively involved in the creation of technology transfer centers, science parks and incubators. The cooperation on a contractual basis between universities and research institutes was enhanced, what established a separate joint research organizations to conduct case studies.</p>
<p><strong>Innovation policy in Finland</strong></p>
<p>Finland is one of the first countries that adopted the concept of national innovation system as a fundamental idea of ​​the strategic development of the state and the basis for the formation of innovation policy. Its innovation system has evolved over a long period and can be considered as the oldest in the Baltic region. A critical factor for changing the Finnish industrial and technological policy of the second half of the twentieth century and its subsequent transition to a comprehensive innovation policy, was the need to maintain national competitiveness through gradual restructuring: from a traditional resource-based model of industrial growth in the economy, and subsequently innovation. The process of formation of the Finnish national innovation system includes four significant periods: a) «institutionalized» (1960 &#8211; 1970es), which can be characterized by the creation of the institutional framework of the system (key institutions and links between them), development of a conceptual framework, principles and mechanisms for scientific and technical policy, implementation of measures to promote education and support industrial R &amp; D; b) «target orientation» (1980es), associated with the beginning of the implementation of national technology programs and a set of measures for the commercialization of research results (also through the creation of science parks, competence centers, etc.); c) «systemic innovation» (1990es), uniting four basic ideas of new economy, «knowledge», «education», «innovation environment» and «internationalization» as the strategic guidelines for national development, maintained by the appropriate level of public financing; d) «optimization» (2000es), characterized by enlargement of main institutions of the innovation system of the country and the consolidation of their resources, structural reforms aimed at strengthening the interdisciplinary and social significance of the research activities, deepening of international cooperation, development of innovative services, improving the effectiveness of existing mechanisms for attracting foreign direct investment.</p>
<p>Current structure of Finnish innovation system has some similarities with the innovation systems in Sweden and Norway (see Pic. 6). Among its important characteristics one should note system integrity; high institutionality and significant role of state support; focus on applied research and commercialization of R &amp; D; strong educational component; accumulated social capital and, as a consequence, development of network connections based on trust; high degree of integration of business and science in the international context. Key themes of the innovative development are bioeconomy, alternative energy, information and communications technology and health care. Also, considerable attention of Finnish government is paid to the area of ​​innovative services and creative industries.</p>
<p>Pic. 6 – National innovation system of Finland</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Implementation of the basic principles of national innovation policies is carried out through a set of tools, including <em>tax incentives</em> (tax credits for tax on personal income for invited foreign experts and researchers and on income tax for companies in terms of labour expenses for personnel engaged in R &amp; D; the postponement of the payment of capital gains tax for business angels, who provide venture capital to SMEs, tax credit for SMEs engaged in research activities, accelerated depreciation, etc.); the <em>mechanism of state acquisition</em> of innovation, aimed at promoting advanced energy and environmental solutions (such as «green» technologies), increase of the participation of SMEs in innovative activity, increase in the number of new small innovative companies; <em>venture capital financing</em>; long-term <em>investment loans, grants,</em> provided on a competitive basis through various support programs, including public and semi-public funds; <em>targeted subsidies</em>, etc.</p>
<p>Regional innovation policy in Finland is formed mainly at the national and pan-European (through structural programs EU) levels. Its main purpose is to increase the competitiveness, sustainable development and the creation of a balanced regional structure. The main instrument of innovation development of Finnish regions for nearly 20 years has been the program «Centres of excellence», transformed as of 2014 into the program «Innovative City». Events of old and new programs are focused on strengthening strategic competencies of regions and creation of competitive innovation centers (clusters). The participation of regional and municipal authorities (councils) in the formation of regional innovation policy is limited. The regional councils are responsible for the overall development of regions, forming the regional plan and a strategic program based on targets of regional development, developed at other levels, including the sphere of innovation (Pic. 7). Municipal councils are involved in supporting the system of universities of applied sciences (polytechnics otherwise) and participate in the creation of campuses.</p>
<p>Pic. 7 – Formation and implementation of regional development policy in Finland</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>According to the analysis the innovation policy in the developed countries of the Baltic region is being held since the late 1990s, but its basis was laid much earlier &#8211; in the middle of the twentieth century in the framework of industrial, scientific, educational and technological policies that were formed in parallel and in conjunction with the formation of key institutions, that subsequently formed the core of national innovation systems. Features of modern innovation policy of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Germany are largely a consequence of the tasks facing their governments throughout the twentieth century to restructure national economies in order to increase competitiveness in the international arena. Context conditions that accompanied the transition to the development of high-tech activities in these countries, as a rule, advocated a small domestic market capacity, resource constraints (human resources, investment, natural resource, etc.), high dependence on the international situation, increasing negative impact on the ecology. Common to the developed countries of the Baltic region at the current stage is the pursuit of sustainable and dynamic development by improving productivity, ensuring high standards of living, overcoming imbalances in territorial development and deepening integration into the global community. Innovation policy in this context is the main instrument for achieving the strategic guidelines.</p>
<p>The common features of national innovation policies are systematicity, integrity, continuity, result-orientedness, goal orientation and a high degree of institutionalization. Note that the process of formation and implementation of innovation policy in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Germany simultaneously affects several hierarchical levels: pan-European, national, regional and local, but in different degree. Because of the involvement of regional authorities in the development of innovative policy we have identified three country groups: those with a strong position of the regions (Germany), moderate (Denmark, Sweden, Norway) and weak (Finland). Developed countries of the Baltic region, as well as others, that implement an innovative model of the economy, still see relevance of issues related to lack of venture capital, need to attract highly qualified specialists, weak involvement of SMEs in research activities, mismatch of volume of commercialized R &amp; D results to state investments in the research sector, strong differentiation of regions in terms of innovation, lack of patent activity, etc. Each of the countries, taking into account the general line of the European Union, is developing its range of innovation policy tools aimed at addressing these problems, but in general, there are five clusters of influence: education, basic science, applied science and entrepreneurship, regional development, internationalization. Among the most striking trends in innovation policy of the countries in question until 2020 we marked interdisciplinarity and intersector approach, focus on consolidation of internal resources and improve of the efficiency of its use, development of ideas for smart specialization of regions, increased attention to the social and environmental importance of innovations, more active support of the internationalization of SMEs, implementation of the concept of open innovation, strong educational component, associated with the support of talented youth.</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>List of references</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>Voloshenko K.Yu., Mikhaylova A.A. Rossiyskiy nauchno-tehnologicheskiy potentsial v sopostavlenii s drugimi stranami Baltiyskogo regiona // Potentsial vzaimodeystviya Rossii i ES v innovatsionnoy sfere na Baltike: monografiya / pod red. A. P. Klemesheva, G. M. Fedorova. — Kaliningrad: Izd-vo IKBFU, 2013. S. 26-67.</li>
<li>Mikhaylov A.S. Geografiya mezhdunarodnyih klasterov v Baltiyskom regione // Baltiyskiy region. 2014, №1. S. 149-163.</li>
<li>Mikhaylova A.A. Sravnitelnyiy analiz nauchno-tehnicheskogo potentsiala Rossii i stran Baltii // Baltiyskiy region. 2013, № 1(15). С. 128-142.</li>
<li>Osnovnyie makroekonomicheskie pokazateli Danii, 2013. Ministerstvo ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii. URL:  http://www.ved.gov.ru/files/images/kai/Daniya/Osnovnyye_makroekonomicheskiye_pokazateli_Danii_(po_sostoyaniyu_na_2013g).pdf (Data obrascheniya: 10.06.2015)</li>
<li>Redin H. O zakonah, prepyatstvuyuschih shvedskim innovatsiyam // Periodicheskiy byulleten Instituta obschestvennogo proektirovaniya. Innovatsionnyie trendyi.2011, № 7. С. 27-29.</li>
<li>Rossiyskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik. Federalnaya sluzhba gosudarstvennoy statistiki, 2014. URL: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b14_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/07-03.htm (Data obrascheniya: 28.05.2015)</li>
<li>SYorvik Y. Mezhdu krupnyimi korporatsiyami i gosudarstvom suschestvovali osobyie otnosheniya // Periodicheskiy byulleten Instituta obschestvennogo proektirovaniya. Innovatsionnyie trendyi. № 7. 2011. С. 7-10.</li>
<li>Fedorov G.M., Voloshenko E.V., Mikhaylova A.A., Osmolovskaya L.G., Fedorov D.G. Territorialnyie razlichiya innovatsionnogo razvitiya Shvetsii, Finlyandii i Severo-Zapadnogo federalnogo okruga RF // Baltiyskiyregion. 2012, № 3(13). С. 87-102.</li>
<li>Yuhansson O. Duh predprinimatelstva v gosudarstve vseobschego blagosostoyaniya // Periodicheskiy byulleten Instituta obschestvennogo proektirovaniya. Innovatsionnyie trendyi. 2011, № 7. С. 5-6.</li>
<li>Eickelpasch А. Innovation policy in Germany. Strategies and programmes at the federal and the regional level. Report. IRPET. 2013. 39 p.</li>
<li>Eurostat Database, 2013. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (Датаобращения: 24.05.2015)</li>
<li>Funding schemes. The Research Council of Norway. URL: http://www.forskningsradet.no/en/Funding_schemes/1138882212929 (Дата обращения: 14.06.2015)</li>
<li>Hallonsten O. ERAWATCH Country Reports 2013: Sweden. Joint Research Centre. Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. 2014. 53 p.</li>
<li>Innovation Union Scoreboard 2014. European Union, 2014. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ius/ius-2014_en.pdf (Дата обращения: 18.05.2015)</li>
<li>KEI and KI Indexes. World bank, 2012. URL: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp (Дата обращения: 27.02.2013).</li>
<li>Melin G., Håkansson A., Thorell N. Mini Country Report: Sweden. Thematic Report 2011 under Specific Contract for the Integration of INNO Policy Trend Chart with ERAWATCH (2011-2012). 2011. 22 p.</li>
<li>OECD Reviews Of Innovation Policy Sweden 2012. 2013. URL: http://www.vinnova.se/upload/EPiStorePDF/OECDReviewsOfInnovationPolicySweden2012.pdf (Дата обращения: 29.05.2015)</li>
<li>Schwab K., Sala-i-Martín X. The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015: Full. World Economic Forum. Geneva. 2014. URL: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf (Датаобращения: 18.05.2015)</li>
<li>The Global Innovation Index, 2014. URL: http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.aspx?page=gii-full-report-2014#pdfopener (Датаобращения: 18.05.2015)</li>
</ol>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Arctic dimension of German politics: National approach and aspects of international cooperation</title>
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				<category><![CDATA[Amber Bridge. Journal of Regional Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[№2 (5) 2015]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arctic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arctic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Continental Shelf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ecology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Maritime Transportation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Northern Sea Route]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Norway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[The Arctic Ocean]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Vyatkin Kirill Sergeyevich — Ph.D., Amber Bridge Fund, Head of the Berlin office.  Recently Germany has been more clearly indicating growing interest towards the Arctic region. It is determined by a number of political and economic processes in the modern world, occurring against lack of study of the dynamics of climate changes on the planet. [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p><strong><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">Vyatkin Kirill Sergeyevich </span><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">— Ph.D., Amber Bridge Fund, Head of the Berlin office. </span></strong></p>
<p><em>Recently Germany has been more clearly indicating growing interest towards the Arctic region. It is determined by a number of political and economic processes in the modern world, occurring against lack of study of the dynamics of climate changes on the planet. The article analyzes the most important factors specifying the interests of Germany in the Arctic; it examines the potential opportunities and a set of tools at the disposal of German policy to achieve its goals; it assesses the nature and degree of involvement of Germany in the process of international cooperation in the Arctic area. Special attention is given to forecasts of further development of Germany in the Arctic project, including international development.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>As it is known, Germany is among the countries that do not have direct access to the coast of the Arctic Ocean and, therefore, does not have legal rights to the independent development of the Arctic shelf. Its location is not close to the Arctic Circle and doesn’t have sovereign territories in the Arctic[1].</p>
<p>However, in November 2013, Federal Republic of Germany adopted a document entitled &#8220;Guidelines for German policy in the Arctic&#8221; [4], which largely explains the renewed interest of Germany to the region.</p>
<p>ARCTIC &#8220;MAGNIT&#8221; OR GERMAN INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC</p>
<p>First of all, like most other countries outside the region, the Arctic attracts Germany with its immense hydrocarbon reserves. According to some foreign estimates (which, however, generally refer to the US Geological Survey data [6]), it may contain about a quarter of undiscovered deposits of hydrocarbons in the world. While the proportion of the Arctic in global oil resources is relatively small (less than 7 percent), the amount of gas resources is considered to be much more significant &#8211; about 25 percent or more[2].</p>
<p>As an alternative to nuclear power (and the trip of the last reactor is scheduled to 2022) Germany today is focusing on priority development of the so-called &#8220;renewable&#8221; energy sources &#8211; solar, wind, biological and so on. So far, however, even optimistic adherents of &#8220;green energy&#8221; provide long-term forecasts. So it seems clear that in the short and medium term Germany is likely to increase the consumption of traditional energy resources &#8211; oil, gas and coal. Therefore no wonder that the Arctic hydrocarbon reserves and the ways of its transportation are in the center of attention of political Berlin.</p>
<p>Secondly, the Arctic region possesses (again, mostly presumably) considerable reserves of rare metals, minerals, ores and other raw materials of strategic importance. This category, in particular, includes estimated deposit apatite, nickel, cobalt, copper, tungsten, titanium, chromium, manganese, platinum group metals, tin, mercury, gold, silver, diamond and so on. An important feature of a number of known nickel deposits is integrated ore composition, allowing &#8211; in the presence of appropriate technology, that Germany has &#8211; simultaneously remove additional amount of copper, platinum group of metals, gold, silver, selenium and tellurium. It dramatically increases the value of the ore, despite the high cost of extraction and production in the Arctic Circle [1, Volume 1, p. 126].</p>
<p>Thirdly, the Arctic attracts Germany, as well as other European countries, with its biological resources. The Arctic Ocean is the habitat to more than four hundred unique species of fish and animals. It is home of important species for European fisheries, namely, herring, cod, salmon, flatfish and others.</p>
<p>Fourthly, the Arctic is the area of ​​emerging international transport corridors. In case positive forecasts are right (what happens sometimes), one can expect a lot of new opportunities for further development. When it comes to sea routes, one obviously means the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs near the Arctic coast of Russia, and the so-called Northwest Passage, located along the northern coast of Canada. Assuming the continuation of melting ice NSR is likely to become a major transport artery of world importance that will significantly reduce the shipping routes between Europe and Asia-Pacific region[3].</p>
<p>Finally, fifthly, Germany, and many other countries of the world are concerned about global climate change, which is believed to have a direct impact on the environment, economic activities, public health. That is why the monitoring of the climatic situation in the Arctic is of primary importance for the scientific community of Germany. For these purposes the country has already created and successfully launched a number of institutions involved in research in polar regions, including environmental monitoring in the Arctic and Antarctica.</p>
<p>INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS</p>
<p>The mechanism of the formation and implementation of the Arctic policy in Germany is quite efficient. Traditionally, the main coordinating role in this important political direction is done by the Office of the Federal Chancellor. Four departments &#8211; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education and Research and Ministry of Economy and Energy are responsible for practical implementation of the basic provisions of the above-mentioned political strategy.</p>
<p>The lead operator for the preparation and conduct of research studies in various regions, including the Arctic region, is the Federal Agency for Geosciences and Mineral Resources (BGR), which is subordinated to the Ministry of Economy and Energy.</p>
<p>One of the main activities of the agency in the Arctic is the study of geodynamic processes in the coastal regions of the Arctic water areas. In this regard, since 1992 the agency has been implementing a multi-year international program CASE (<em>Circum-Arctic Structural Events)</em> [7]. During the reporting period over 15 major research (with a focus on geological and geophysical surveys) expeditions to Svalbard, northern Greenland, the Canadian Arctic and polar regions of Siberia were organized within the program[4].</p>
<p>Since all lands in the Arctic area (ie located to the north of the 66th latitude), as well as adjacent offshore areas are under the territorial sovereignty of well-known five states &#8211; members of the Arctic Council, German authorities strictly and consistently adhere to the principle of prior consultation with the countries concerning their programs of scientific and practical studies, which are usually held on the terms of cooperation.</p>
<p>Thus, BGR works on Svalbard are conducted in cooperation with the Norwegian Polar Institute. With respect to Greenland, which is under the sovereignty of Denmark, BGR cooperates with the Geological Service of Greenland in Copenhagen. Project in Canada is implemented within a multi-year program of scientific and technical cooperation (WTZ) between two countries. The main partners from the Canadian side are the Geological Service of Canada and the University of Laval / Quebec. The partners of BGR in the Urals in the frame of the same program[5]are institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow and Syktyvkar (Komi Republic).</p>
<p>&#8220;Siberian&#8221; part of the project is a priority for BGR. Among its most important exploratory tasks in the Arctic region, in particular, are:</p>
<p>-              a range of issues related to the possible continental extension and access mid-ocean ridge of the Arctic Ocean on the mainland of Siberia;</p>
<p>-              potential of Laptev Sea bed in terms of mineral (especially hydrocarbon) resources;</p>
<p>-              potential of polar Urals in terms of chromite and platinum group elements[6];</p>
<p>-              the phenomenon of permafrost and its resource potential; dynamics in this sector and its impact on the processes of climate change on the planet[7].</p>
<p>Thus, in 2001-2003 in the framework of the aforementioned program for scientific and technical cooperation <em>(WTZ)</em> with Russian Federation BGR implemented the project <em>PURE (Polar Urals Expedition),</em> by carrying out three geological expeditions to polar Urals. Long-awaited expedition to New Siberian islands[8] organized in 2011 as part of the program <em>CASE</em>-13 was considered a great success of BGR. The first phase associated with marine geophysical work in Laptev Sea, was finished in the mid-1990s (in cooperation with Murmansk Institute Sevmorneftegeofizika).</p>
<p>The next stage (project <em>CASE</em>-3, 1998), aimed at carrying out complementary geological studies on land, ended in a relative failure. It is essential that the year of default was not the best for polar research in Russia. Extremely unfavorable weather conditions in that year, huge problems in logistics, supply and financial support caused the premature cessation of work.</p>
<p>The subsequent adjustment of the political and economic course of our country, fundamental change in approach towards the Arctic allowed to provide favorable conditions for mutually beneficial international cooperation. The result of intensive and fruitful cooperation between <em>BGR</em> and a number of Russian institutions (the main partner &#8211; A.P. <em>Karpinsky</em> Russian <em>Geological</em> Research <em>Institute in St. Petersburg</em>) was the success of obtaining unique scientific data during the international expedition<em> CASE</em>-13 in 2011. Scientists not only from Russia and Germany, but also from France, Britain, Italy and Sweden took part in that project.</p>
<p>Starting from 2015 German Ministry for Education and Research is implementing the third framework program &#8220;Research for Sustainable Development» <em>(FONA</em>-3). The Arctic region is one of the key regions of the studies held in the framework of this program. Annually the Ministry allocates an average of about 20 million euros to support research projects in the Arctic. In general, Germany invests around 200 million euros per year in polar and marine research [8].</p>
<p>Among the research institutions of Germany dealing with Arctic issues, the main is undoubtedly Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research (<em>AWI</em>), located in the north of Germany in Bremerhaven town. The Institute is one of 18 major research centers united in the Helmholtz Society. It has about 780 employees, including 450 scientists, employed on a permanent basis, what means a lot for the German standards. The annual budget of the institute amounts to 60 million euros. 90% of the funding comes from the Ministry of Education and Research.</p>
<p><em>AWI</em> Institute has three departments:</p>
<p>-              Research Center in Potsdam</p>
<p>-              Biological Institute Helgoland[9]</p>
<p>-              Wadden Seastation Sylt [10]</p>
<p>In 1992 in accordance with the recommendations of the Scientific Council of the federal government, a research unit of the Institute AWI was opened in Potsdam in order to preserve the practices and scientific potential of the former GDR in geophysics and polar research. Today its main activities are focused on geophysical surveys in regions of permafrost, as well as experimental studies of atmospheric processes in the polar regions (primarily in areas of permafrost in Siberia and Svalbard). Scientists from &#8220;climate science»[11] department explore physical and chemical processes in the system &#8220;ocean &#8211; ice &#8211; atmosphere&#8221; and its importance for the development of the global climate. Working groups are engaged in studies of regional and large-scale circulation system and physical and chemical processes in the atmosphere. Current research in this area covers various topics, including influence of clouds and sea ice in the energy exchange between the ocean and the atmosphere, circulation of water masses in polar regions, study of natural climate change and modeling of atmospheric circulation in the Arctic.</p>
<p>A distinctive feature of the Research Center in Potsdam is a close scientific and practical cooperation with the university centers in Brandenburg state, and a number of other federal states. Well-organized system of scientific exchange and cooperation with partners in the universities of Berlin (Technical, Free, Humboldt), Potsdam (University of Brandenburg), Erlangen (Bavaria), Hamburg, Bremen, Kiel (Schleswig-Holstein), Trier (North Rhine-Westphalia) is designed to stimulate the flow of new knowledge and to ensure continuity, including personnel, in the area of ​​polar research.</p>
<p>The Research Center is focused also on two research areas – «Earth Science» and «Biological sciences». Within «Earth Science» scientists reconstruct changes that have taken place in the past. Scientists from Bremerhaven, Potsdam and Sylt study the effect of occurring earlier processes on the climate development. They study the structure of oceanic sediments, surface deposits, polar ice caps. In particular, they analyze composition and distribution of marine sediments, material and energy flows in areas of permafrost and changes in the structure of the crust and polar ice sheets.</p>
<p>«Biological sciences» (which is the main focus of research scientists from Biological Institute Helgoland) cover environmental, physiological and ecotoxicological issues. Particular attention is paid to the study of processes in offshore and coastal zone of the North Sea. Research subjects include reaction of cells, organisms, populations and communities to external influence and organization and dynamics of populations, communities and ecosystems.</p>
<p>Scientists from <em>AWI</em> Institute often conduct research in the high seas or directly in the ice of Arctic and Antarctica. They have stations<em> AWIPEV</em>[12]  (Svalbard, 79 ° N) and &#8220;Samoylovsky&#8221; (island Samoylovsky in the delta of the Lena River, 72 ° N).</p>
<p>As of 1998 island Samoylovsky locates a base for field research. In 2013 it was completely renovated to become a modern well-equipped Arctic research station. Initially the main organizers were <em>AWI</em> Institute from German side and Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute of Roshydromet (at the federal level) and Melnikov Permafrost Institute of the Siberian Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences (at regional level) from Russian side. Currently the station is on the balance of the <em>Institute of Petroleum</em>-Gas <em>Geology and Geophysics</em> of the Siberian Branch of the RAS (Novosibirsk) and is a part of the Arctic Centre, specially created in the institute. It should be emphasized that the whole station was built and equipped with Russian assets, the German side only finances the work of their representatives.</p>
<p>«Experimental Station on island Samoylovsky» is one of three projects (two others – «Global change in the seas of Eurasian Arctic shelf: frontal zones and polynyas in the Laptev Sea» and «<em>Otto Schmidt Laboratory</em> for <em>Polar</em> and <em>Marine Research</em> (OSHL)»), which are part of a large-scale Russian-German program «Laptev Sea System». In turn, the project «Laptev Sea System» is a branch of the Russian-German program «Trans-system of the Arctic Ocean» (Transdrift) and can rightly be regarded as «longevity» and one of the most successful ventures in the history of Russian-German joint research in high latitudes of Arctic.</p>
<p>In addition, Institute <em>AWI</em> incorporates year-round functioning German station Neumayer-3 (71 ° S) as well as Kohnen Station (75 ° S) and laboratory Dallman (68 ° S) in Antarctica. The stations in Arctic and Antarctic carry out meteorological and geophysical measurements all year round.</p>
<p>The main mobile research platform is icebreaker «Polarstern» («Polar Star», in fact being the only icebreaker in Germany)[13]. At the same time it carries out a close international cooperation &#8211; about a quarter of the members of the expedition on «Polarstern» are traditionally foreign researchers. In addition, the Institute operates five research vessels to work in temperate latitudes, and two polar aircrafts <em>Polar</em> 5 and <em>Polar </em>6.</p>
<p>In addition to fundamental and applied scientific research institute <em>AWI </em>also provides coordination and advisory services. Particular attention is paid to biological monitoring, science and technology, infrastructure and logistics support for polar research in Germany, as well as advising the Government of Germany.</p>
<p>In April 2015 a delegation of German politicians and scientists led by the Minister for Education and Research Johanna Vank visited Svalbard. The program of the visit included a visit of a number of German and international research centers.</p>
<p>One of the aims of the visit was a visit to the Norwegian settlement of Ny-Alesund, which is the world&#8217;s most northern permanent public settlement. Here is located the world&#8217;s most northern permanent civil research station. Researchers from Norway (who has administrative control over then territory), Germany, France and China permanently work there. On a temporary basis the station is visited by scientists from Italy, Britain, Netherlands and Japan. In addition, the politicians got acquainted with the activities of the research station of the Institute <em>AWI</em>, which now operates in a joint German-French-format (<em>AWIPEV</em>).</p>
<p>In general we can say that polar research in Germany is based on an extensive network of public and private institutions that coordinate financial, scientific and practical activities in this area. Ministry of Economy and Energy and Ministry of Education and Research provide primarily institutional support. In addition, Ministry of Education and Research conducts targeted support of research projects in the Arctic.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the 1990s the German Research Foundation (DFG)[14]actively supports polar research. In 1992 the Presidium of the company established the Special Committee <em>SCAR / IASC (Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research / International Arctic Science Committee),</em> whose tasks include planning and coordination of scientific and practical activities of German universities and university centers with institute <em>AWI</em> and relevant government departments in the field of polar research. Currently, with the support of <em>DFG</em> on the basis of a number of German universities functions an interdisciplinary program of comparative research in Antarctica and Arctic (in 2012 the program has been extended until 2018).</p>
<p>Some more specialized projects for the Arctic are conducted with the participation of the institutions of Max Planck Society, Leibniz Association. Finally, the most important instrument in terms of interdisciplinary coordination and cooperation is the German Society of Polar Research (DGP) that brings together representatives of various scientific disciplines.</p>
<p>POLITICAL ORIENTATION</p>
<p>Obviously, in the foreseeable future Germany will continue the policy of further strengthening of &#8220;indirect voting rights&#8221; in its Arctic affairs, primarily relying on their undoubted achievements in the field of research and scientific practice. With good expertise in qualified scientific works, as well as solid financial, technical and technological potential for further development, Germany intends to use expert assessments to influence political decision-making, relating to the Arctic.</p>
<p>In this regard, Germany, for example, appreciates the opportunities for cooperation in the framework of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). Secretariat of the Committee is based in the branch of the Institute <em>AWI</em> in Potsdam, and the Executive Secretary of it is the authoritative German expert on Arctic F. Rahold. <em>IASC</em> members are national scientific organizations. Germany is represented by the aforementioned German Research Foundation <em>DFG</em>.</p>
<p>Executive Director of the International Association on permafrost (IPA) is held by a German (an employee of the Institute <em>AWI</em> K. Schollen). At the same time, Germany has been active in the European Polar Board (European Polar Board). As a division of the European Science Foundation (European Science Foundation, ESF), it is an important platform for the coordination of polar research between interested countries &#8211; EU members. The German experience in the field of polar research has formed the basis of the relevant areas within the next 8-th EU program for research, covering the period 2014-2020.[15]</p>
<p>The specificity of the German Arctic strategy lies in the emphasis on the environmental consequences of industrial development in the Arctic. If desired, one can discern the intention of the international community to form a negative attitude towards any attempt to operate Arctic resources without the use of special &#8220;green&#8221; technologies. In an effort to ensure high standards of environmental safety as international standards, Berlin, obviously is trying to secure for its own (and European) companies more favorable conditions for the promotion to the Arctic.</p>
<p>At the same time it should be noted, that Germany is quite realistic regarding its competitive opportunities in several areas. For example, Germany so far has only one relatively large oil and gas company operating on an international scale &#8211; <em>Wintershall</em>. Concerning the Arctic, its strategic focus is the development of offshore fields in Norway.</p>
<p>However, the company has been recently gradually consolidating its position as one of the largest producers of gas on the Norwegian continental shelf. A subsidiary of the <em>BASF</em> concern has successfully established itself as an integrated enterprise in the field of exploration and production. One of the backgrounds of its growth is its rich portfolio of licenses. <em>Wintershall</em> is one of the largest license holders on the Norwegian continental shelf: it has about 50 licenses, over half of which endows it with the rights of the operator works. Most recently, in January 2015, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of Norway issued the company 8 new licenses, giving great prospects. Yet it must be acknowledged that the scope of its activities is not up to a level comparable with world known giants of oil and gas industry.</p>
<p>Obviously, in the foreseeable future Germany will stop its Arctic ambitions by concentrating on production of renewable resources (fish and seafood) as well as on the exploitation of the Northern Sea Route[16]. In this regard, it would be appropriate to recall that Germany has the largest fleet of containerships in the world, therefore it should be interested in the development of new transport communications. Besides, it is an additional opportunity for the development of the national shipbuilding industry. Thus, in December 2012, the Federal Agency of Sea and River Transport of Russia and the German company <em>«Nordic Yards»</em> signed a state contract for the construction of two multipurpose salvage vessels with capacity of 7 MW, designed to work in the Russian Arctic. The total amount of orders amounted to 150 mln Eur. The ships were transferred to the Russian side in time and became part of its fleet at the beginning of the year[17].</p>
<p>Germany is likely to leave the development of the access to the region&#8217;s energy resources to its partners &#8211; Norway and Russia. Berlin is satisfied with the role of the distributor of Russian raw materials on the world market.</p>
<p>Most of German experts are rather skeptic regarding the thesis that the &#8220;Arctic is growing potential conflict,&#8221; and that predicted by some researchers conflicts in the Arctic will be conflicts over access to hydrocarbon resources. [2] The extent of the reserves in the region, mostly widespread in pseudo-scientific circles, is greatly exaggerated. German experts (in particular, from<em> BGR</em>) are more careful about such estimations. According to them, data on stocks, which are now provided by different sources, are very approximate &#8211; primarily due to poor knowledge of the region. For the time being it’s mostly forecasts. Proved reserves are significantly low[18].</p>
<p>It is also noted that in order to assess the potential for conflict in the northern polar regions it is important, that almost all estimated hydrocarbon reserves of the Arctic are concentrated in the exclusive economic zones of coastal States, ie within their undisputed jurisdiction. The central part of the Arctic Ocean, which could theoretically meet claims of coastal states over the continental shelf, is of little promise in search for hydrocarbon resources[19].</p>
<p>In other words, there is simply no reason for the emergence of a new «arms race» in the region[20]. It is significant that the participants of the last annual Security Conference in Munich (February 2015) did not discuss the current situation and its development in the Arctic &#8211; apparently due to lack of reasonable forecast expectations for the foreseeable future acute conflict situations in the region.</p>
<p>It entirely corresponds to the estimates from <strong>defense authorities</strong> of Germany. For example, published in July 2014 analytical study «Climate Change and Security in the Arctic after 2014&#8243; prepared by planning department of Bundeswehr concludes that a widespread and military interstate conflict in the Far North is unlikely to happen. Even in the context of the ongoing melting of ice the Arctic will remain quite stable region for Germany, having nevertheless increasing economic and environmental value. In light of this, German security policy will primarily face the task of a comprehensive and long-term-oriented monitoring of the situation in the region [3, S.24]. For the process to be monitored and analysed one can attribute, for example, political dynamics associated with the autonomy of Greenland (which, in turn, could lead to the transformation of the «Arctic» status of Denmark), or increased political activity in the Arctic Council of «observers» among Asian countries (mainly China and Japan).</p>
<p>Sharing the opinion of the majority of Russian, Norwegian, Canadian experts, German experts say that today the military are able to fully ensure the safety and protection for civilian use such a wayward region as Arctic. However, they note that there is currently no need for additional support of Arctic forces of German partners in NATO with forces and means of Bundeswehr. Improving capacity and operational capabilities of German armed forces in Arctic is neither today nor in foreseeable future a priority of the development [3, S.25].</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>List of References</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>Аrkticheskij region: problemy mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva. Khrestomatiya v 3-х tt. Izdatelstvo RSMD. М., 2013.</li>
<li>Corinna Röver, Katrin Ridder-Strolis, «Nachhaltigkeit in der Arktis: Prämissen, Probleme und Potentiale». Länderberichte der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Oktober 2014.</li>
<li>Klimawandel und Sicherheit in der Arktis nach 2014. Hat die friedliche und kooperative internationale Arktispolitik eine langfristige Zukunft? Planungsamt der Bundeswehr, Dezernat Zukunftsanalyse. Juli 2014.</li>
<li>Leitlinien deutscher Arktispolitik. Verantwortung übernehmen, Chancen nutzen. Auswärtiges Amt, November 2013.</li>
<li>Nichtstaatliche Konflikte in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. Planungsamt der Bundeswehr, Dezernat Zukunftsanalyse. Future Study 2012.</li>
<li>United States Geological Survey. URL: <em>http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980#.VWRhOEa8xip</em></li>
<li>Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe. URL: <em>http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Polarforschung/Arktis/Expeditionen/expeditionen_node.html</em></li>
</ol>
<p>Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung. URL: <em>http://www.bmbf.de/de/26677.php</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>[1] Perhaps Svalbard archipelago may be a specific exception, the territory of which is under sovereignty of Norway. Since 1925 Germany is a party to the Paris Treaty on Spitsbergen of 1920, which provides that parties equal rights to exploit natural resources of Svalbard and its territorial waters</p>
<p>[2]See f.e.: <em>http</em><em>://</em><em>polpred</em><em>.</em><em>com</em><em>/?</em><em>ns</em><em>=1&amp;</em><em>ns</em><em>_</em><em>id</em><em>=1159650&amp;</em><em>searchtext</em><em>=</em> or</p>
<p><em>http://www.zeit.de/wissen/2015-05/arktis-klimawandel-erderwaermung-eisschmelze-rohstoffe</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>[3] With a relatively favorable ice and weather conditions taking NSR from the German Hamburg to Japanese Yokohama could make only about 6,600 nautical miles, while through Suez Canal &#8211; 11 400 miles. Accordingly, the transportation time of cargo could be reduced to 40%. [5,S.26].</p>
<p>[4] Indeed, regions (and hence organizations) of United States are not present in this list.</p>
<p>[5] It is based on an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation (WTZ), which was signed by Germany and Soviet Union in 1987, subsequently was subject to repeated amendments and additions, in particular, during German-Russian intergovernmental consultations in July 2009.</p>
<p>[6] This area is of particular interest to Russia because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it lost access to the largest in the USSR deposits of chrome ore in Kazakhstan.</p>
<p>[7] In this case, the Germans seem to be &#8220;engaged&#8221; in a very promising process. The fact is that as long as the Americans are developing shale gas, the world begins to develop a much more substantial reserves of &#8220;blue fuel&#8221;, which, in compressed form &#8211; so-called gas hydrates &#8211; are stored in the permafrost on the seabed and on land. According to the Russian Ministry of Energy (2013), reserves of gas hydrates are more than twice of the total reserves of shale and conventional natural gas. Russia has large deposits of natural hydrates found in areas of permafrost in Yakutia and West Siberia. Large reserves are discovered on the Sakhalin shelf in the Okhotskoye Sea (in particular in the area of ​​the east coast), and the Kuril Islands (which, by the way, is so eager to get Japan).</p>
<p>[8] New Siberian Islands &#8211; Russian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean, located between the Laptev Sea and East Siberian Sea.</p>
<p>[9] Helgoland &#8211; German-owned archipelago located in the Bay of Heligoland in the south-east of the North Sea.</p>
<p>[10] Sylt &#8211; Germany&#8217;s largest island in the North Sea, which is part of the waters of the Wadden Sea; since 1927 the island connected to the mainland by a causeway.</p>
<p>[11] This area is part of one of the six areas of basic research, on which Helmholtz Societyis concentrated: Energy, Earth and Environment, Health, Aeronautics, Space and Transport, Key Technologies, Structure of Matter.</p>
<p>[12] The base is named after Carl Koldewey, in honour of the head of the first German polar expedition in 1868. It was founded in Germany in August 1991 as a base of the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI), and in 2003 it merged with the base of the French Institute Paul Emile Victor (<em>IPEV</em>).</p>
<p>[13]The construction of the new multi-polar vessel, which should replace the current ship carrying &#8220;scientific watch&#8221; since 1983 is planned by the end of 2019.</p>
<p>[14] The Foundation is the central organization for promotion of research in Germany. It operates on the principles of self-government and is organized on the basis of civil law. Its main task is research funding of universities and public research institutions of Germany. The Foundation itself is financed mainly at the expense of federal and state governments.</p>
<p>[15]<em>http</em><em>://</em><em>www</em><em>3.</em><em>uni</em><em>-</em><em>bonn</em><em>.</em><em>de</em><em>/</em><em>forschung</em><em>/</em><em>euroconsult</em><em>/8.-</em><em>frp</em></p>
<p>[16] It should, however, added that in these areas Germany prefers cautious forecasts. For example, regarding the NSR it is noted that severe weather conditions and unpredictable ice conditions will remain for the foreseeable future dependence of marine transportation vessels of icebreakers and, most importantly, trained personnel, what in financial terms largely eliminates the possible gains from reducing the distance and travel time. Therefore transarctic container transport (especially those which are carried out on an urgent basis &#8220;just-in-time&#8221;) are not a short thing of the future.</p>
<p>Equally uncertain (and in fact, simply unexplored) remain assessments as to whether the result of the temporary exemption of ocean space from ice is to expand commercial fish habitat and thus will lead to an increase in their populations.</p>
<p>[17]Being a class of Icebreaker 6, the vessels may conduct rescue operations in difficult conditions. They can be used for icebreaking operations in port and at sea in the thickness of the ice up to 1 meter, extinguish fires on floating objects and coastal oil spill.</p>
<p>[18]F.e., opinion of expert of <em>BGR</em>G.Elsner in: <em>http</em><em>://</em><em>www</em><em>.</em><em>zeit</em><em>.</em><em>de</em><em>/</em><em>wissen</em><em>/2015-05/</em><em>arktis</em><em>-</em><em>klimawandel</em><em>-</em><em>erderwaermung</em><em>-</em><em>eisschmelze</em><em>-</em><em>rohstoffe</em><em>/</em><em>seite</em><em>-2</em></p>
<p>[19]Expert <em>BGR</em>K. Reihert, the same source.</p>
<p>[20] In particular, experts of authoritative German Foundation for Science and Policy, acting as a leading consulting center for the government of Germany, followed in their assessments this line. See: <em>http://www.swp-berlin.org/publikationen/kurz-gesagt/arktische-kooperation-trotz-europaeischen-frosts.html</em></p>
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		<title>The Kaliningrad nuclear power plant project and its regional ramifications</title>
		<link>http://en.abfund.org/?p=1077</link>
		<comments>http://en.abfund.org/?p=1077#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2015 19:45:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Admin]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Amber Bridge. Journal of Regional Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[№2 (5) 2015]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kaliningrad Oblast]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public Opinion]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://en.abfund.org/?p=1077</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Prof. Leszek Jesień is the head of the Institute of International Affairs and Sustainable Development at the Collegium Civitas University in Warsaw. Dr. Łukasz Tolak is a specialist on nuclear energy at the Collegium Civitas University.  The project of Kaliningrad nuclear power plant, if of much greater capacity than conceivable needs of the oblast, will necessarily [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Prof. Leszek Jesień is the head of the Institute of International Affairs and Sustainable Development at the Collegium Civitas University in Warsaw.</strong><br />
<strong>Dr. Łukasz Tolak is a specialist on nuclear energy at the Collegium Civitas University. </strong></p>
<p>The project of Kaliningrad nuclear power plant, if of much greater capacity than conceivable needs of the oblast, will necessarily influence plans and feasibility of the nuclear power plants intended and/or planned in the Baltic Sea region. Complexity</p>
<p>of the nuclear situation in the region is greatly enhanced by diverging concepts and imaginations about the nuclear-for-electricity as energy generation technology. In the region, there are countries that do not intend to have nuclear electricity capacity (Denmark), or that want to get rid of it (Germany). But there are also those that firmly rely on nuclear electricity generation (Finland), or those that seem to agree to</p>
<p>it because of its climate action preferences (Sweden). At the same time, there are those that signal their intention of building one or two nuclear power plants (Poland), or those that want to return to their nuclear generation past (Lithuania).</p>
<p>The situation is complex also because the former Soviet electricity system that used</p>
<p>to embrace all the former Soviet Union count­ries (including now firmly again independent Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), as well as Poland as a part of former com­munist bloc, still operate in the Baltic states. That makes for a awkward situation when an important part of the European Union (the Baltic states), potentially an indispensible connection north-south from Scandinavia to the European mainland in Poland, cannot contribute to making of the common electri­city system of the EU. Conversely, if they fi­nally switch over to the European electricity standard, they will make the Kaliningrad ob­last an electricity island within the EU, much as it stands in all other areas. A possibility of the Kaliningrad region switching to the EU’s electricity standard together with other three Baltic states would naturally reverse the logic and would separate – in electricity terms – the Kaliningrad oblast from the Russia mainland.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Fig 1. </strong>Planned Kaliningrad NPP capacity versus total electricity consumption of</p>
<p>the Kaliningrad oblast and the Baltic states (TWh/year)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Source: Own calculations, data on total electricity consumption from the World Factbook, 2013-14.</p>
<p>Here is where the local nuclear power plant plays a huge role. Its capacity greater than the needs of the local Kaliningrad market means that the Russian authorities play on the logical assumption of either the Baltic states remaining firmly in the post-Soviet electricity system, or the Kaliningrad oblast joining the EU standard. If the capacity is to be greater than the needs of Kaliningrad and Lithuania combined, as intended in the first project, than its feasibility may rely on export oppor­tunities to the EU standard neighbours, mainly Poland, perhaps Sweden, or even Germany.</p>
<p>This seems possible only if Kaliningrad oblast switches to EU electricity standard.</p>
<p><strong>The Kaliningrad nuclear power plant project</strong></p>
<p>The Russian Federation is planning a significant strengthening of their nuclear sector as a way to increase its share in electricity production. According to the adopted plans, by 2030 the nuclear share will grow to about 25-30% of the global electricity production and then to 45-50% after the next two decades1. The aim is to achieve three objectives that seem crucial for the Russian economy. The first is to make available a significant amount of gas for exports. Approximately 70% of Russian annual gas production is consumed by the domestic market2. The second reason, most obvious, is to secure increasing energy needs in next two or three decades. Last but not least is to make Russian nuclear technology more competitive on the international market. In order to meet the above tasks, the process of lifetime exten­sion of existing reactors is in progress. More than 35 new reactors are under construction, or planned3. With exception of the most advanced investments, the future of the suggested, new nuclear power plants is uncertain.</p>
<p>In the context of ambitious Moscow plans, the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) (Kaliningrad) has got a very special status. The first proposal to erect a new nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad province has been announced by InterRAO UES in 2008. The construction agreement with the Kaliningrad authority was signed in April 2008 and the future installation located in the town of Neman near the Lithua­nian border4. The initial plans assumed building a twin AES-92 plant with two VVER-1000 reactors5. It was supposed to be the first nuclear installation in Russian Federation with its output destined for export. Energy needs of Kaliningrad were of secondary importance. The energy security of the town is currently guaranteed by its thermal power plant (Kalinin­gradskaya Thermal Power Plant 2 &#8211; 875MWe)6.</p>
<p>The nuclear power plant is expected to be the first case in the history of nuclear industry of Russian Federation to have the anticipated foreign equity share (albeit no more than 49%)7. Part of the main plant modules is to be developed in cooperation with foreign industry. The contract signed in February 2012 by the Alstom-Atomenergomash (AAEM) company provides, among the other things, that Alstom would deliver steam turbines ARABELLE and moisture separator re-heaters, power generators and other auxiliary equipment. The contract is estimated at 875 million euro8.</p>
<p>According to a more recent project, the new nuclear power plant would be based on the larger and more modern AES-2006 design with two pressurized water reactors (PWR) VVER- 12009. Each VVER-1200(V491) reactor has the thermal capacity of 3200MWth and electrical capacity of 1170MWe gross. The design is the common project of OKB ”Gidropress” and “Atomenergoproekt” with the scientific supervision of Kurchatov Institute from Moscow10.</p>
<p>The Russian VVER-1000/1200 family are equi­valent of the Western PWR reactors (genera­tion III and III+). VVER-1200(V-491) based on AES-2006 design, are classified as generation III+ with an expected service life of 60 years. It would probably be the most modern project of the Russian nuclear industry until the beginning of the next decade. As many as 17 of similar VVER-1200 reactors are expected to be commissioned in other locations in the Russian Federation by 202011. It’s also an export success. The identical project is planned in Turkey (Akkuyu nuclear power plant). The Turkey-Russia agreement of May 2010 provides for the construction of four VVER-1200 reactors around 2020-23. The total electrical capacity of the Akkuyu will be about 4800MWe12. The contract value is about 20 billion dollars.</p>
<p>The doubts about nuclear safety raised in con­nection with the Kaliningrad nuclear power plant investment, can be referred to all the latest-generation reactors. There might be problems, as in case of all III/III+ generation projects, with the reliability of the most important modules in assumed long-standing service life13. The VVER-1200 reactors are based on many-year-experience with operating of earlier generations of VVER family. There are about 50 VVER-440 and VVER-1000 operating units in Russian Federation and abroad. They are more reliable in comparison to other Soviet designs (RBMK reactors in particular). According to the official information, the VVER-1200 reactors that are currently under construction contain extensive passive and active safety systems with the increased share of the passive one. It comprises, inter alia, a passive heat removal system and a passive reactor scram system, as well as a passive hydrogen removal system and a secondary system of passive heat removal via steam generators14. In the opinion of the Russian specialists, the concept of the safety system is comparable to the western designs of PWR reactors of the III and III+ generation.</p>
<p>The preparatory work of the project in Kaliningrad has begun in February 201015. The first elements of concrete were poured two years later. According to the plan, the first reactor should be in commercial service by 2017. The cost of the project is estimated at 6-8 billion euro.</p>
<p>Due to the electricity exports objectives of the project, there are several conditions to be fulfilled, before it gets operational. The first one was to attract foreign investors and loans to finance the project. The second one was to attract the real interest for future foreign customers. Only a small part of planned output (2300MWe) may be consumed by energy needs of Kaliningrad. The long-term contracts from foreign partners are necessary to ensure the economic side of the investment. Last but not least, there are grid connection requirements. The Russian enclave has got a limited capacity transmission line with Lithuania and no connec­tion to Poland. This situation makes a future export of electricity impossible, unless funda­mentally changed. Project of such a big nuclear power plant in the Kaliningrad Province, if not fully connected of to the EU grid system, is not really arguable in economic terms.</p>
<p>In the course of last five years none of the conditions mentioned above was fulfilled.</p>
<p>There is no long-term contract for future supplies of electricity, although the proposal</p>
<p>has aroused some interest. The project seems to be in direct contradiction with energy strategies of neighbouring countries, all of which are very much interested in raising their energy independence ratio.</p>
<p>The latest news from Kaliningrad indicate a possible change in the schedule of the project’s implementation. This could mean, at least, a significant delay of the works, if not abandoning of the project altogether. A possible scenarios assumes that the VVER- 1200 reactors could be replaced by a smaller design, thus better corresponding to the real energy needs of the region itself, and less relying on the external markets.16</p>
<p><strong>Poland still uncertain</strong></p>
<p>In Poland, until now with no nuclear generated electricity, in November 2008 the government took decision to explore possibilities for building two nuclear power plants that should be operational by 2023-24. It therefore created a special purpose company, that is a consortium of mostly state owned electricity utility companies PGE, Tauron and Enea, together with the KGHM, a copper mining conglomerate. So far, the three possible locations were all considered at the Baltic  Sea shore in either Gąski,  Choczewo, and/or Żarnowiec, as seen from the West to the East.</p>
<p>However, the Polish public opinion remains divided on the issue. On one side, the nuclear generated electricity could enhance the country energy security, so far – for electricity generation – largely (by 90%) based on coal and lignite. It would also significantly contribute to lowering the country’s CO2 emissions, thus contributing to the EU’s driven climate change action. Yet, when things got to local, things turned bad. In a local referendum in Gąski (February 2012), an overwhelming majority of 95% of 50% turnout voted against any new nuclear power plant built in vicinity. Although, there was no public awareness campaign before, and the local population was not familiarized with the benefits of such an option, still the results were considered straightforward in saying ‘no’.</p>
<p>In politics, two parliamentary left wing parties, Ruch Palikota and SLD, with one fringe right wing party Solidarity Poland, are all against, while all major mainstream parties of both the government and the opposition are favourable for building a nuclear electricity generating capacity in Poland. In short, over three quarters</p>
<p>of the current parliament is in favour of the nuclear power plants in the country.</p>
<p><strong>Fig 2. </strong>Polish parliament split on nuclear electricity generation, 2013</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Source: own analysis of party platforms. Those bolded are against, or rather against nuclear power plants;</p>
<p>L = left; R = right; C = centre; (-) and (&#8211;) = against nuclear; (+) and (++) = for nuclear; (-/+) = split.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>It plays a role, that Poland is in fact currently surrounded by the nuclear producing countries: Germany, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Belarus, and Sweden with Finland across the Baltics. There are several well known exceptions to that picture that do and will play a role. Germany has announced its Energiewende, the energy transition that presupposes also closing their nuclear power plants by 2022. Lithuania used to be a strong player on the local market thanks to its Ignalina nuclear power plant, but this was closed at the end of 2009 as a part of their accession deal with the EU, the installations there considered not secure enough. The Kaliningrad oblast, although Russian territory, does not produce nuclear based electricity for now. And Denmark, again across the Baltics, has decided already in 1985 not to produce nuclear energy at all. Even if it imports electricity from Sweden and Germany, thus partially imports the nuclear derived elec-tricity, it was able to successfully exert pressure on the Swedish public opinion. Consequently, the Swedes closed two Barsebäck units, what ultimately happened in 1999 and 2005 respec­tively.17 Finns apparently managed to solve the nuclear waste problem, and seem to pro­ceed to the final stage with their European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) at Olkiluoto 3. The EPR there, although much delayed now (from 2008), is expected to go operational in 2016, with almost tripled costs of now estimated 8.5 bn EUR18. This, along with the French Flamanville project and the British one, could contribute to the possible implementation of the European nuclear energy design EPR.</p>
<p><strong>Lithuania going for and hesitating </strong></p>
<p>An interesting project, from the point of view of the Baltic Sea nuclear situation is the</p>
<p>Lithuanian concept of Visaginas, the new nuclear power plant. It has been construed as one not only to replace the closed Ignalina, but also to provide a backbone to the long needed and awaited north-south connection from the Scandinavian Finland and Sweden, via the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to Poland in the south. The region suffered long from incompatible inheritance of the Soviet times when it was largely connected east-west, to the USSR as a pole and source of energy and dependence. The Visaginas project started in 2007 with participation of companies from Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland, which subsequently withdrew in 2011. The main technology provider, and strategic investor would be Hitachi GE, which should start to build a single 1350 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor in 2015, intended to be opera­tional as of 2021. It is estimated to cost almost 5 bn EUR. Still, the project has been over-shadowed by the national referendum in Lithuania, which in October 2012 proved negative sentiment by a large margin of almost 65%.</p>
<p>Although non-binding, the referendum might indicate problems with the project at a later stage.19</p>
<p>The Visaginas has been planned to be the cornerstone of the new Baltic Energy Market Interconnector Plan (BEMIP), which is intended to link Poland with Finland and Sweden, via the three Baltic States. It gets support of the European Union which funds seve­ral of its parts: LitPolLink (Lithuania-Poland), Estlink-1 and Estlink-2 (Estonia-Finland), NordBalt (Lithuania-Sweden). The links as the interconnectors should effectively reverse the situation when, now, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are still parts of the Russian controlled IPS/UPS electricity system. With the three Baltics states connected to the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO), the Kaliningrad oblast would get isolated from the mainland Russia. Apparently, the Russians recognize this situation and Rosatom proposed to build a link between Poland and Kaliningrad that would effectively forge the Kaliningrad electricity system with that of the EU. This prospect would eventually facilitate greatly any Kaliningrad nuclear generated electricity exports to the EU, either Poland, or Lithuania, or even all the eastern and southern Baltic states.20</p>
<p>Eventually, Poland would add one or two of its own nuclear power plants, if the government’s plans are going to materialize. The decision on the technology, the reactors and design, has not been taken, however. With the Swedish 10 nuclear reactors, and their public opinion strongly backing them as a viable strategy for climate action, the Baltic Sea nuclear prospects seem a bit diversified. But there are interesting patterns emerging where the Kaliningrad nuclear power stations or the Polish nuclear power plants may play important roles. Particularly, if we take into account the Germans going the Danish road to abandoning the nuclear electricity generation, with their Energiewende. This way, the west of the Baltics would be free from nuclear energy capacity, while there would be strong production sites in the north, south and east of it.</p>
<p>The situation in the north and east of the Baltic Sea seems clear: both the Swedes and</p>
<p>especially the Finns are seemed prone to rely heavily on nuclear for their electricity</p>
<p>generation. Their capacities are construed. Specifically, the Finnish seem to generate</p>
<p>electricity from nuclear fission &#8211; based their cooperative concept of ownership of the nuclear capacities &#8211; for domestic purposes, and not really intended for serious exportation.</p>
<p><strong>Sweden nuclear, but… </strong></p>
<p>The current status of Sweden’s nuclear industry is a result of the decades of develop­ment, beginning with the top secret nuclear weapon program for advanced nuclear</p>
<p>industry. As far as today more than 40 percent of Swedish electric power comes from ten nuclear reactors at three nuclear power plants. Four of them entered commercial</p>
<p>service in the 1970s (Oskarshamn 1,2 and Ringhals 1,2) and six began to operate in 1980’s. As mentioned, the Barsebäck nuclear power plants were ultimately closed in 2005.</p>
<p>Interestingly, for more than 30 recent years, the Swedish nuclear power plants have under­gone consistent process of expanding nuclear capacity as well as their operational lifetimes. In case of the Ringhals nuclear power plant it has meant an increase of about 337 MWe21 to 450 MWe by 2012.22  This action, despite the closure of the Barsebäck has allowed to maintain the st­rong position of nuclear energy in the Swedish electricity mix and to add about 1050MWe to the ten working reactors by the end of 2008.23 Further investments of this kind are planned.</p>
<p>Sweden has one of the most advanced pro­grams of nuclear waste management. The Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund is administrated by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and will cover costs associated with the decommis­sioning of nuclear reactors and waste storage. The fund is financed from the fees of nuclear power operators.</p>
<p>According to the plans of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB, the ultimate repository for used fuel from Swedish NPP will be located in Söderviken, close to the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant. The repository will be placed at the depth of approximately 500 m in geologically stable granite bedrock. The beginning of the construction is planned for 2019 and the investment will be completed about 2025. The repository will be in use until about 2070 and at that time it will have 60 km of tunnels and about 4 square kilometers of underground storage surface. Its total capacity is expected at 12000 tons and it will be able to store as many as 6000 iron, copper-cast canisters containing used fuel.24 The canisters will be stored in the holes bored in the tunnel floor. Each canister will be surrounded by bentonite clay to isolate it form the bedrock and to absorb water. That is to help to stop a corrosion process of the copper canister. In case of leakage or other damage of a canister the clay insulators of the granite bedrock would delay radioactive materials from reaching the surface.25</p>
<p>This kind of storage is known as the KBS method. The technology should isolate radio­active material from people and living nature for at least 100 thousand years. Given the time-span of the storage project, the speed of corrosion of the copper containers seems to be a crucial safety problem. The bentonite clay as well as the repository environment are both intended to help to stop the corrosion process of copper, but there are still controversies over the safety issues of the technology. The newest report of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority indicated that the corrosion had occurred on the surface of the copper elements during the last tests. The issue would require further research to solve the contro­versy.26 In the last three decades Sweden went through ambivalent nuclear ”phase out” policy. The US Three Mile Island catastrophe of 1979 was the reason for the Swedes to organize a referendum about future of the Swedish nuclear energy. In 1980 a majority of Swedes voted for not developing the next generation of nuclear power plants after having ended lives of those plants already operational or under-construction. Conse-quently, the Swedish parliament took a decision to close all twelve nuclear power plant by 2010. For economical reasons and under a strong pressure from industry and labor unions, the Swedish political elite has not made a serious attempt to implement this decision and the 2010 target was subse-quently abandoned.27 In 2010, in spite of resistance from the political opposition and ecological movements, the Swedish govern­ment adopted a new plan of replacement of all ten nuclear reactors by new ones, and passed it through the parliament. The plan is strictly limited and assumes replacements only. The number of reactors is not allowed to exceed ten, and all of them must be built at the same site of as currently existing nuclear plants.28</p>
<p>According to the plan, the first new nuclear reactor would be required after 2025.</p>
<p>Today, it is difficult to foresee future of nuclear energy in Sweden. Still, taking into account the public opinion shift in favor of continuing of the nuclear power program and ambitious government’s plans, atom seems to be an important part of the Swedish climate policy. Together with renewable energy sources, nuclear plants will contribute towards environ-mental goals and will help to impose further limits on the fossils fuel share in the Swedish energy mix.</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Finland firmly nuclear</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>The nuclear industry in Finland is providing nearly 30% of the electricity. The first genera­tions of nuclear power plants, like in Sweden, were completed from 1977 to 1980. All four nuclear power reactors built at the time, are currently in use. Unlike Sweden, Finland has not developed its own nuclear technology capacity. Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are based on the Swedish technology, and Loviisa 1 and 2 on the Russian one. In spite of this, an average lifetime capacity factor is one of the highest in the world &#8211; over 85%. Moreover, as in the case of the Swedish nuclear power plants, the nominal capacity of the Finnish reactors have been uprated ever since they were built. In case of the Olkiluoto, the nominal capacity of each reactor has increased from 658 MWe to 880 MWe.29</p>
<p>The decision about the future of the nuclear industry in Finland has been taken in 2002. For economical reasons, in May 2002 the Finnish parliament approved a proposition to build fifth nuclear reactor.30 According to the ini­tial investment plan, developed together with French Areva (EPR reactor EPR reactor, 1600 MWe), it should have been in commercial service in 2013. Unfortunately, due to the sophistication of the project, serious technical problems and delays have been encountered. The budget exceeded more than twice by now, and today its commercial operation is planned for 2016.31</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>All these problems have not stopped the Finnish intentions to further expand its nuclear power industry. Of two new projects, the first one – Olkiluoto 4 – is intended to be one of the modern western designs, whi­le the other one &#8211; Hanhikivi 1 NPP, led by the new consortium in the nuclear power industry: Fennovoima Oy – would most likely get partnered with the Rusatom Overseas to develop the AES-2006 design based on the VVER-1200 reactor.32 In July 2010 the Finnish parliament approved construction of the new reactors.</p>
<p>Finland’s nuclear waste management program was initiated in 1983, and is in general similar to the Swedish one. The key player is Posiva Oi, company responsible for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The company is owned by two Finnish nuclear power plants operators: TVO – 60% and Fortum – 40%.33 The final repository and waste encapsulation plant will be placed at Olkiluoto up to 450 meters underground in the stable bedrock. Disposal will be based on the Swedish SKB-3 concept with the copper canister and bentonite clay as the second barrier.34 The planned capacity of the deposit is 9000 tons and will allow to dispose of all spent fuel from the four existing reactors as well as the new Olkiluoto 3 and 4 units. The future of the spent fuel from Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant is still unclear.35</p>
<p>The cost connected with the final disposal and decommissioning of nuclear power plants will be covered by the state owned Nuclear Waste Management Fund. The fund is financed from the charges on the generated electricity which amounts to about 10% of the total electricity production cost. According the Ministry of Employment and Economy, at the end of 2012 the Fund has amassed about 2.16 billion Euro.36 This amount of money seems sufficient to cover all the costs of management of current nuclear waste stockpile as well as decommissi­oning of the existing power plants.</p>
<p>In Finland the nuclear energy is perceived as a reliable and safe source of electric power. The Finnish public is among the strongest supporters of the nuclear energy in Europe. Successful finishing of Olkiluoto3 and the two planned projects will extend a nuclear horizon far beyond 2050 and will root nuclear power deeply in the Finnish climate and energy stra­tegy. The future of nuclear energy in Finland seems to be stable and certain.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>To sum up, the nuclear electricity generation on the south and east side of the Baltic Sea remains mixed. There are several reasons for that, with perhaps the most important one being social and political uncertainty about the projects and their public perceptions among nations and locally. External developments, with Fukushima disaster, German Energiewende, and pressures from the non governmental organizations, which in many cases do not recognize nuclear electricity generation as beneficial for climate action and they still press for the development of renewable resources.</p>
<p>The other very important reason is an apparent competition between three major concepts: Kaliningrad power station, Visaginas project in Lithuania and Poland’s plan for two major power plants, all of them intended to be nuclear and located in the north of the country. It seems either – or. With serious inroads of the renewable resources into the electricity mixes and consumption needs, there seem not to be place for more than one project regionally.</p>
<p>Moreover, their business chances are interlinked – any increased possibility of advancing and implementing of one of them does and will indeed influence chances of financing and building the others. Clearly, capacity of the projects to raise money and loans are inter-linked as all investors and banks would naturally look into the externalities of each project.</p>
<p>Finally, neither of them have yet crossed their respective points of no return. While the Kaliningrad project seemed most advanced, it got stilled. The Visaginas has been clouded by the Lithuanian public opinion referendum. And the Polish plans are still far from being stable.</p>
<p>Interestingly, the European Union does not play any important role in these cases. As only natural with energy projects, especially of this magnitude of investment needs, the na­tional authorities are the key players. Even if the case of local cooperation across and along the Baltics would normally call for somewhat closer cooperation on the issue, this is not the case. The European Commission might get in­terested in the issues, especially with its inter­est for the single energy market, but it has not been noted as an important player among the parties here. Its role is marked in pressing for making of the north-south energy and tran­sportation connectivity, but not on the choice of ways of electricity production. While this being national prerogative, Brussels would still seem only a natural point of meeting and coor­dinating of regional plans, a helping hand to be.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>List of References:</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ol>
<li>Nuclear Power in Russia, World Nuclear Association,</li>
</ol>
<p>http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ Countries-O-S/Russia&#8211;Nuclear-Power/#.</p>
<p>UkseEb7wFRA (accessed: 27.09.2013).</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, BP June 2013,</li>
</ol>
<p>http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/ statistical- review/statistical_review_of_world_ energy_2013.pdf (accessed: 22.09.2013).</p>
<ol start="3">
<li>Nuclear Power in Russia, World Nuclear Association,</li>
</ol>
<p>http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ Countries-O-S/Russia&#8211;Nuclear-Power/#. UkseEb7wFRA (accessed: 27.09.2013).</p>
<ol start="4">
<li>Kaliningrad plan for Baltic States market, “World Nuclear News”, 17 April 2008, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NNKaliningrad_plan_for_Baltic_States_market_ 1704086.html (accessed: 30.09.2013).</li>
<li>Ibidem.</li>
<li>Kaliningradskaya Thermal Power Plant 2, JSC INTER RAO — Electric Power Plants website, http://irao-generation.com/en/stations/kalinigradg/ (accessed: 30.09.2013).</li>
<li>Baltic NPP Project, Rosatom website, http://www.rosatom.ru/en/investmentstrategy/ projects/ (accessed: 27.09.2013).</li>
<li>Russian joint venture of State Corporation Rosatom and Alstom will supply the turbine island to the Baltic nuclear power plant, Alstom, 2 February 2012,</li>
</ol>
<p>http://www.alstom.com/Global/Group/Resources/Documents/Investors%20document/Regulated%20 Information/Russian%20joint%20venture%20of%20 State%20Corporation%20Rosatom%20and%20 Alstom%20will%20supply%20the%20turbine%20island%20to%20the%20Baltic%20nuclear%20power%20 plant.pdf (accessed: 27.09.2013).</p>
<p>9. Baltic nuclear plant brought forward, “World Nuclear News”, 27 August 2008</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Baltic_ nuclear_plant_brought_forward_2708083.html (accessed: 27.09.2013).</p>
<p>10. IAEA Status report 108 &#8211; VVER-1200 (V-491) (VVER- 1200 (V-491)), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2011,</p>
<p>http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloadable/ aris/2013/36.VVER-1200(V-491).pdf (accessed: 30.09.2013).</p>
<p>11. Mark J. Harper, Advanced Reactor Technology Development for Near Term Deployment, Nuclear Energy Management School Tokai Mura, Japan June 2012,</p>
<p>http://www.iaea.org/nuclearenergy/ nuclearknowledge/schools/NEM-school/2012/Japan/ PDFs/week1/5-1_HARPER_Current_LWR_Technology_ NEMSchool.pdf (accessed: 29.09.2013).</p>
<p>12. Akkuyu NPP JSC website</p>
<p>http://www.akkunpp.com/index.php?lang=en (accessed: 29.09.2013).</p>
<p>13. Jozef Mišák, Evolution of safety assessment appro-aches for Gen III systems and implications for future systems, INPRO Dialogue Forum on Nuclear Energy Innovations 1-4 February 2010, IAEA, Vienna http://www.iaea.org/INPRO/1st_Dialogue_Forum/ 22-Misak.pdf (accessed: 29.09.2013).</p>
<p>14. Status and perspectives of VVER nuclear power plants, Meeting of the TWG-LWR IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 26 -28 July 2011, http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/ Technology/meetings/2011-Jul-26-28-TWG-LWR-HWR/Session-I/21.TWG-LWR-Russia.pdf (accessed: 29.09.2013).</p>
<p>15. Baltic site works, “World Nuclear News”, 27 August 2010,</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Baltic_ site_works_2708101.html (accessed: 19.09.2013).</p>
<p>16. Grid concerns for Baltic project, “World Nuclear News”, 11 June 2013,</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_Grid_ concerns_for_Baltic_project_1106131.html (accessed: 19.09.2013).</p>
<p>17. Barsebäck nuclear power plant own website:</p>
<p>http://www.barsebackkraft.se/index.sp?ItemID=1291 (accessed: 25.08.2013).</p>
<p>18. Sonja van Renssen, New nuclear power in Europe – will Finland show the way?, “European Energy Review”, EER Monthly, February 2013.</p>
<p>19. Results of the referendum from the Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania,</p>
<p>http://www.vrk.lt/2012_seimo_rinkimai/output_ en/referendumas/referendumas.html</p>
<p>(accessed: 13.09.2013).</p>
<p>20. Nuclear Power in Lithuania, World Nuclear Association,</p>
<p>http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ Countries-G-N/Lithuania/#.UkiVbdK-1vI (accessed: 1.09.2013).</p>
<p>21. Own calculations, data on the Ringhals NPP reactors from PRISM – Power Reactor Information System, IAEA, 30 September 2013, http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=SE</p>
<p>(accessed: 01.10.2013).</p>
<p>22. Nuclear Power in Sweden, World Nuclear Association</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country- Profiles/Countries-O-S/Sweden/#.Ukqqwr7wFRA (accessed: 15.09.2013).</p>
<p>23. Ibidem.</p>
<p>24. A repository for nuclear fuel in 1.9 billion year old bedrock, SKB &#8211; The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, 4 April, 2010,</p>
<p>http://www.skb.se/Templates/Standard____28848. aspx (accessed: 30.09.2013).</p>
<p>25. Harold Feiveson, Zia Mian, M.V. Ramana and Frank von Hippel, Managing Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors, Experience and Lessons from Around the World, International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), p. 78 92, September 2011,</p>
<p>http://fissilematerials.org/library/rr10.pdf (accessed: 30.09.2013).</p>
<p>26. Barbro Plogander, Sweden’s Planned Nuclear Waste Storage Faces Problems, The Epoch Times, 12 February 2013,</p>
<p>http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/ swedens-planned-nuclear-waste-storage-faces-problems-346787.html (accessed: 25.09.2013).</p>
<p>See also: Nuclear Waste State-of-the-Art Report 2013 &#8211; Final repository application under review: supplementary information and alternative futures, Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste, Stock-holm 2013,</p>
<p>http://www.karnavfallsradet.se/sites/default/files/ sou_2013_11_eng_vers.pdf (accessed: 01.10.2013).</p>
<p>27. Johan Bergenas, Nuclear power in Sweden, The Stimson Center, 15 April 2011,</p>
<p>http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/nuclear-power-in-sweden/ (accessed: 15.09.2013).</p>
<p>28. Sweden to replace existing nuclear plants with new ones, “BBC News”, 18 June 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10347187 (accessed: 05.09.2013).</p>
<p>29. Nuclear power plant units Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO), January 2008,</p>
<p>http://www.tvo.fi/uploads/File/nuclear-power-plant-units.pdf (accessed: 30.09.2013). See also: OLKILUOTO-1, PRISM – Power Reactor Information System, IAEA, 30 September 2013,</p>
<p>http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/ ReactorDetails.aspx?current=159 (accessed: 01.10.2013).</p>
<p>30. Finland opts for new nuclear reactor, “BBC News”, 24 May 2002</p>
<p>http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2006191.stm (accessed: 01.10.2013).</p>
<p>31. Dome in place at Flamanville EPR, “World Nuclear News”, 16 July 2013,</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Dome_in_ place_at_Flamanville_EPR-1607134.html (accessed: 26.09.2013).</p>
<p>32. Hanhikivi contract by year end, “World Nuclear News”, 3 September 2013</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Hanhikivi_ contract_by_year_end-0309137.html (accessed: 26.09.2013).</p>
<p>33. Posiva Oy, Posiva Oy website, http://www.posiva.fi/en/posiva (accessed: 28.09.2013) .</p>
<p>34. The Principles for Final Disposal, Posiva Oy website, http://www.posiva.fi/en/final_disposal/the_ principles_for_final_disposal/ (accessed: 28.09.2013).</p>
<p>35. No room at the repository, “World Nuclear News”, 9 march 2012,</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/WR-No_ room_at_the_repository-0903127.html (accessed: 28.09.2013).</p>
<p>36. Finnish waste fund continues to grow, “World Nuclear News”, 26 March 2013,</p>
<p>http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/wr-finnish_ waste_fund_continues_to_grow-2603134.html (accessed: 22.09.2013).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Source: BSR Policy Briefing 4/2013, Centrum Balticum, www.centrumbalticum.org</p>
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		<title>A Russian Sudden Stop or Just a Slippery Oil Slope to Stagnation?</title>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2015 19:42:05 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Amber Bridge. Journal of Regional Studies]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Torbjörn Becker is the Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics. Web: www.hhs.se/site Can the Russian economy weather the combined effect of falling oil prices and massive capital out­flows while preserving some growth or is the economy heading for a sudden stop scenario with falling GDP?  Recent forecasts [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Torbjörn Becker is the Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics. </strong><br />
<strong>Web: www.hhs.se/site</strong></p>
<p><em>Can the Russian economy weather the combined effect of falling oil prices and massive capital out­flows while preserving some growth or is the economy heading for a sudden stop scenario with falling GDP?</em></p>
<p><em> <strong>Recent forecasts of Russian growth</strong></em></p>
<p>Forecasts for Russian GDP growth have been revised down several times over the last couple of years, starting well before the conflict with Ukraine and the sanctions that followed. This is well illustrated by how different vintages of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts change in Figure 1.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 1. </strong>IMF forecasts of Russian real GDP growth</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The forecasts from 2012 projected a real GDP growth of around 4 percent per year for 2014 and 2015, and then just slightly below 4 percent over the next two years. In 2013 the April forecast was lowered to around 3.5 percent over the forecast horizon, while the October forecast the same year was revised down significantly for 2013 as the poor growth performance that year became hard to ignore. However, it nevertheless showed a strong rebound in growth in 2014 and in 2015, and going forward the forecast was back at 3.5 percent growth. Then in April 2014, there was a sharp downward revision of growth for 2014, from 3 to less than 1.5 percent, followed by a long-run growth forecast of 2.5 percent. The slippery slope of growth revision has not stopped there and the latest forecast in October 2014 projects a barely positive growth rate for 2014 and a mod­est pick-up in 2015 before a gradual climb back to 2 percent growth in 2018 and 2019.1</p>
<p><strong>Implications for income levels</strong></p>
<p>It may not sound very dramatic that growth falls a percent or two in the revised forecasts, but summing up all the growth revisions &#8211; both in the short-run and adding the significant drops in projected long-run growth — amounts to enor­mous losses of income for the Russian economy should the forecasts be realized. Figure 2 com­pares how income levels evolve until 2019 using the April 2012 and October 2014 forecasts.2</p>
<p><strong>Figure 2. </strong>Income levels based on different forecast of real GDP growth</p>
<p>Source: Authors calculations based on IMF WEO forecast April 2012 and October 2014</p>
<p>In the April 2012 growth scenario, Russian GDP would be 12 percent higher in 2014 than in 2011 and by 2019, growth would have lifted GDP by more than 35 percent. However, the October 2014 forecast has GDP in 2014 only 5 percent high­er than in 2011 after the end of 2014 and merely 13 percent up in 2019. Comparing the two scenarios, the income level at the end of the forecast period is 20 percent lower based on the current forecast compared with the April 2012 projection.</p>
<p>However, also the 2014 forecast shows increas­ing income levels which given the latest devel­opment of oil prices and capital flows seems unrealistic. The following sections of this brief will detail why Russian GDP growth is in grave danger of not only continue a slow slide down but could instead enter a “sudden stop” scenario with fall­ing GDP.</p>
<p><strong>Oil and growth</strong></p>
<p>The price of oil is the single most important de­terminant Russia GDP growth. Figure 3 shows how real oil prices and income per capita in USD have developed over the last two decades. The rising incomes from 1999 to late 2008 were strongly correlated with a real oil price index that went from around 25 to over 180. Similarly the decline in income in 2009 was concurrent with the oil price index sliding to 116. With oil prices rebounding in 2010 and 2011 before leveling off in 2012, Russian income levels followed suit. Of course many other factors changed in the eco­nomic environment, not least in 2008/9, but in many ways this just reinforces how strong the link between oil prices and Russian incomes is.</p>
<p>The question is if the strong relationship evident in Figure 3 between oil prices and income levels also holds for growth rates, which would be a bit less susceptible to criticism of spurious correla­tions between non-stationary time series. Figure 4 shows that the impression from time series of price and income levels follows through also when both series are in growth rates and presented in a scatter plot. Note that the charts in­clude oil prices and not oil revenue, so it abstracts from changes in oil production. In this sense, it does not capture what would be included in the calculation of real GDP (which would include changes in production rather than prices) but simply the correlation between an exogenous variable — international oil prices — and Russian growth.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 3. </strong>Oil prices and income growing together</p>
<p>Source: IMF oil price index, World Bank for GDP per capita in 2005 USD</p>
<p><strong>Figure 4. </strong>Scatter plot of oil prices and income</p>
<p>Source: Author’s calculation based on data from IMF and the World Bank</p>
<p>A simple OLS regression presented in Table 1 quantifies the relationship in Figure 4. It is quite striking how a regression with one explanato­ry variable manages to pick-up 60 percent of the variation in growth of Russian GDP per capita. The estimated “model” basically says that without any changes in oil prices, Russian GDP growth would be just above 2 percent. This hap­pens to coincide rather closely with the IMF’s Oc­tober 2014 longer-run forecast. In addition, a 10 percent increase (decline) in oil prices adds (sub­tracts) 1.5 percent GDP per capita growth. The coefficient on oil price changes is not only high­ly significant from an economic perspective but also from a statistical. The equation is estimated with only 16 observations and no other control variables are included, so there are reasons to take the result with plenty of caution. Neverthe­less, it is not often a one-variable regression ac­counts for this amount of variation in a country’s growth rate. Again, it should be stressed that it is the price of oil &#8211; which is an exogenous variable &#8211; that is included in the regression and not the value of Russian oil export revenues.</p>
<p><strong>Table 1. </strong>Regressing income growth on oil price changes</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Dependent variable is GDP/capita in 2005 USD (% change)</p>
<p>Coeff.   Std.err.   t-stat</p>
<p>Real oil price (% change)      0.15       0.03       4.8</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Constant                                 2.42       0.89       2.7</p>
<ol>
<li>          16</li>
</ol>
<p>Adj. R-square                          0.60</p>
<p><strong>Imports, growth and capital flows</strong></p>
<p>The reason oil prices are so important for Russian growth is that it determines how much the country can import, which in turn contributes signifi­cantly to domestic consumption and investment. It may be puzzling at first that imports contribute to growth since it enters the national income ac­counting identity with a negative sign.3 However, whatever is imported is either used for consump­tion or investment, and since this consumption or investment is usually accompanied by domestically produced inputs, it means that the overall effect on growth from imports is positive. Russia GDP growth also shows a strong positive correla­tion (90%) with import growth as can be seen in Figure 5.</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Figure 5. </strong>Scatter plot of quarterly GDP growth and changes in import</p>
<p>Source: Author’s calculation based on Goskomstat data</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, imports are not included in the regres­sion above since it is part of GDP and thus an en­dogenous variable with respect to growth. The scatter plot in Figure 5 can obviously not be given a causal interpretation for the same reasons, but it is still informative that imports have shown a higher positive correlation with growth than ex­ports have. In fact, net exports, the difference between exports and imports that enter the ac­counting relationship with GDP with a positive sign, showed massive “contributions” to GDP growth in all of the quarters of 2009 when GDP growth fell significantly. Again, this was linked to large declines in imports coupled with sharp con­tractions of investments. In other words, what at a first glance can look as an improved trade balance may instead be a sign of lost confidence and reduced external financing for domestic in­vestments and consumption.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 6. </strong>Net capital flows, private sector</p>
<p>Source: Central Bank of Russia</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In many emerging market countries, capital in­flows are highly correlated with imports as well, since they are needed to finance imports when export revenues are not sufficient to do so. For Russia, strong growth in oil revenues due to in­creasing prices has made the country less dependent on capital flows to finance imports in the past. However, with lower oil prices, this will change and capital flows will be a more import­ant factor also for Russia in this respect.</p>
<p>Capital flows are basically determined by expected re­turns on financial and real investment in a country relative to alternative investments abroad. These expectations are in turn dependent on many different factors, including real growth prospects linked to macro economic policies, economic and legal institutions and the elusive concept of market “sentiment”. Attracting the necessary capital will be a challenge for Russia if policies do not change.</p>
<p>Net private capital flows have been negative in all but three quarters since mid-2008 with peak out­flows of $132 billion in the final quarter of 2008 in the midst of the global financial crisis (Figure 6). With the crisis in Ukraine, capital outflows accelerated in the beginning of 2014, reaching almost $50 billion in the first quarter alone. Over the first three quarters of 2014, outflows amounted to $85 billion, which is more than the total value of imports in the second quarter.</p>
<p>The net outflow of capital and lower oil prices are also leaving a mark on Russia’s external bal­ance sheet. Often when Russia’s external posi­tion is discussed, the focus is on the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR)4 large international reserves. However, they are also not immune to chang­es in oil prices or capital flows since the CBR intervenes in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the ruble as is evident in Figure 7. Nevertheless, even after significant interventions, reserves were around $450 billion at the end of September 2014, which is a non-trivial amount for a $2,000 billion economy and the third largest in the world after China and Japan. The CBR can probably continue to intervene at a similar rate as it has done in 2014 for several years, but the question is if Russia do not have better ways to spend $50-100 billion a year. Another question is how confidence in the foreign exchange market is affected by these interventions. It may be good to keep the ruble from a complete free fall, but at the same time, the CBR does not want to find itself in a situation that looks too much like a cen­tral bank that loses much if its reserves in a reg­ular speculative attack on a fixed exchange rate.</p>
<p>What has been less in focus, but came into the spotlight already in the global financial crisis, is the external debt of the private and public sec­tor beyond regular sovereign borrowing. Banks and non-financial firms in the private and public sectors had together borrowed over $700 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2014, which is the latest available number. If borrowing has remained unchanged in the following two quar­ters, it would mean that external borrowing is now over $250 billion more than the internation­al reserves held by the CBR. External debt at 35 percent of GDP is in itself not alarming but if ma­jor companies are unable to access international markets it can soon become a problem.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 7. </strong>External debt and international reserves</p>
<p>Source: CBR and author’s calculations</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Despite significant interventions by the CBR, ear­ly October the ruble had lost 20 percent of its value against the dollar since the beginning of 2014, as had the stock market (Figure 8). In some ways the global financial crisis was a good les­son for the CBR on the cost of trying to defend an overvalued currency. Then the CBR lost more than $200 billion while trying to keep the ruble exchange rate fixed. The currency defense did not prevent the ruble from falling by around 30 percent at the end of 2008 and beginning 2009. Since then, the exchange rate has been allowed more flexibility, although the CBR tries to avoid more abrupt changes. Russia also intends to focus its policy on inflation rather than the ex­change rate going forward, but the question is if this is credible given what has happened in the second half of 2014.</p>
<p>The stock market is also affected by capital out­flows, falling oil prices, and a deterioration of confidence in the Russian economy that has come with the sanctions related to the conflict in Ukraine. At around 1,000, the RTSI is back to its 2005 level, after having peaked at almost 2,500 before the global financial crisis and then reach­ing a post-crisis peak of 2,000 in 2011.</p>
<p>Although the sanctions have played a role in the developments in 2014, it is clear that the decline in both the stock market and exchange rate goes back to 2011 when oil prices leveled off and growth started to slow. In other words, the struc­tural dependence on increasing oil prices to gen­erate growth again shows its importance also for capital flows, the exchange rate and stock mar­ket returns. The reform program launched by then-president Medvedev in 2009 in response to the crisis, under the “Russia forward” heading, made little difference since the most important parts were never implemented.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 8. </strong>Exchange rate and stock market</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Source: MICEX</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Sudden stops dynamics and a more realistic growth forecast</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>In a paper studying the correlates of output drops, Becker and Mauro (2006) look at a long list of shocks that include both macro-financial shocks as well as real shocks. One of the find­ings is that sudden stops in capital flows cause the most damage in emerging market countries. In a typical sudden stop triggered crisis, the average emerging market country loses an aggre­gate of 64 percent of initial GDP, which is related to a large initial drop in income and several years of recovering to bring income back to the pre-cri­sis level. The sudden stop episodes in the paper are defined as a reversal of capital inflows that suddenly turn around and become outflows. In countries with insufficient export revenues, this leads to a sharp contraction in imports, which (as discussed above) leads to a significant drop in output.</p>
<p>Reducing imports may sometimes be interpreted as a sign of a country being able to pro­duce more at home and therefore a sign of strength. But when imports contract very quickly in response to a drop in available financing, it sig­nals something different; the lack of confidence in an economy, with large economic costs in terms of falling incomes as a consequence. This type of scenario is a very real possibility in Rus­sia given recent developments. All the indicators above — oil prices, capital flows and imports — point to a much more negative growth outlook than the IMFs World Economic Outlook forecast published in October 2014. Since July of 2014, the WTI price has fallen from around $100/barrel to just north of $80/barrel in mid-October. The IMF World Economic Outlook in October 2014 fore­casted a continued decline in oil prices for 2015 and 2016, but this was based on mid-year prices rather than mid-October prices. Futures contract over the next five years price oil around $80/bar­rel for the entire period. Although this is mostly a function of historical oil prices following a ran­dom walk so it makes it hard to predict changes up or down, it still means that there is currently no information that would suggest that oil prices will move up any time soon.</p>
<p>Taking $80/barrel as the relevant forecast for 2015 it would be a drop in oil prices of over 20 percent compared to mid-2014. If we use the sim­ple growth-oil price equation estimated above — which despite its simplicity generated an adjusted R-square of 60 percent — it implies that the oil effect on growth is around minus three percentage points. The intercept in that regres­sion is 2.4 so the forecast from this regression is negative growth of around half a percent for Russia in 2015. Of course this empirical estimate is not really a proper macro model and excludes a long list of other important variables that will affect growth, including policy changes.</p>
<p>However, one crucial factor that will contribute to the downside risk of the already negative fore­cast based on falling oil prices is capital outflows — linked to investor confidence — which sug­gests that there will be less money for imports and further negative pressure on growth rates in 2015 and forward. Capital usually flows to countries with good growth prospects and rewarding investment opportunities. Capital rarely flows to places where the growth outlook is negative and uncertain. It is not easy to predict capital flows with any precision. In the event capital outflows continue at the pace they have in the first three quarters of 2014, it will push imports down by a significant amount and perhaps shave off another 1 to 2 percent of an already negative projected growth rate for 2015.</p>
<p>Import growth has already turned negative in the first two quarters of 2014, and if the trend con­tinues, there is a strong likelihood that imports decline so much that quarterly GDP growth turns negative in the last part of this year. It may still be that the growth for the full year stays positive, but probably not by much. The real problems with growth will then be for 2015 if nothing positive happens with oil prices and capital flows. In sum, the no-change scenario for Russian growth in 2015 points to a real danger of a sudden stop type of output decline of 2-3 percent rather than IMF’s October 2014 forecast of 1.5 percent posi­tive growth. Needless to say, if the sudden stop scenario rather than the IMF forecast materializes it will have serious effects on Russian in­come levels in the years to come as was illustrat­ed in Figure 2 earlier.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Policy options to avoid a growth collapse</strong></p>
<p>The question is then how Russia can avoid a full-blown sudden stop scenario with accelerating capital outflows, shrinking imports and a col­lapse in growth. What policies can be implement to generate growth in the economy in 2015? The first option is to do nothing and hope for higher oil prices. A significant increase in oil prices will in all likelihood provide conditions to resume import growth that can feed domestic con­sumption and investment. However, this is not in the cards at the moment as discussed above.</p>
<p>The economic policy areas under control of Russian policy makers include monetary and exchange rate policy, fiscal policy and the “catch-all” area of structural reforms. The lat­ter a crucial area that affect investor and con­sumer sentiment which determine capital flows and domestic demand. A closer look at these areas below suggests that the policy space is mainly in the area of structural reforms.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>First out is monetary and exchange rate policy. As students of basic macro knows, in a world of capital mobility, policy makers have to either focus on targeting inflation or the exchange rate. Attempts at steering both will regularly have only short-lived effects or be associated with significant economic costs coming from trying to regulate capital flows more vigorously. Russia has over the last couple of years stated that inflation rather than the exchange rate should be the primary policy target for the CBR from 2015. The inflation target is initially set at 5 percent and supposed to move to 4 percent over the medium-term. Governor Nabiullina of the CBR states that the inflation targeting framework and associated goals will not be implemented if the cost of doing so is too high (CBR, 2014). However, with inflation now running at around 8 percent, capital flowing out of the country and the exchange rate falling, trying to stimulate growth with looser monetary policy does not seem to be a viable option regardless of the CBR pursuing an explicit inflation target or not.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Fiscal policy can possibly help stimulate demand. The low oil prices put pressure on fiscal policy as well, but the falling exchange rate means that the ruble value of oil revenues is kept up. The result is a relatively modest fiscal deficit of around 1 percent of GDP at the General government level.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Behind this is a nonoil deficit of around 12 percent of GDP. In other words, government oil revenues account for around 11 percent of GDP, which is a strong indication of the importance of oil in all sectors of the economy. The reserve and wealth funds that have been accumulated from past oil revenues provide some additional fiscal room to maneuver.5 In September 2014 the reserve fund stood at $90 billion and the wealth fund at $83 billion. These are of course significant amounts, but relative to net capital outflows of $85 billion in the first three quarters of 2014, they are perhaps a bit less impressive. It is also noteworthy how quickly the reserve fund was run down in response to the global financial crisis. From the start of 2009 to 2011 the reserve fund went from almost $140 billion to $25 billion, or a drop of $115 billion, more than what is currently in the reserve fund. The message for fiscal policy is that there is some room for providing stimulus but the funds are not sufficient to keep doing this for several years. It may be enough to add a few percent to GDP in 2015, but if nothing else then happens, 2016 will not have the same fiscal space available. At best, fiscal policy can buy a year or so of time, but it really just delays much needed reforms aimed at underlying structural weaknesses that puts a drag on confidence and economic performance.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The most obvious “reform” is for Russia to con- tribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. This would alleviate the serious confidence effect the sanctions have had on investment and capital flows. More importantly, the main effects of the sanctions are still to come when important Russian companies need to refinance large loans in 2015 and 2016. If they are shut off from international financial markets it will contribute to net capital outflows as the expiring international loans are replaced by domestic ones. The impact on capital flows does not stop with the direct sanctions targeting specific firms since the confidence effect of sanctions hit all possible investments in Russia. Even if some international loans will be available to Russian firms, the conditions for such loans will be worse as long as the sanctions are around, which is a real cost for the Russian economy. It is hard to quantify the exact gain of restoring confidence and removing sanctions for the Russian economy, but in the current circumstances, confidence is a crucial element to avoid a full-blown sudden stop scenario.</p>
<p>In addition to the hugely important aspect of resolving the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has a long structural reform agenda ahead if its leaders want to move Russia’s citizens up the global income ranking where they currently are in 51st place just behind Argentina and a few places behind Latvia in 47th place.6 Again, this is not news to the leaders of Russia and several key elements were part of Medvedev’s “Russia forward” plan of 2009. Institutional reforms aimed at fighting corruption at all levels, creating a rule of law and modernizing government are still high on the list of priorities. However, it is hard to see how real changes in these areas are going to be made, in particular if the leader(s) that push reforms want to stay in power once the reforms are implemented.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Any internal reform efforts that directly contribute to a positive development for the Russian economy is likely to also have important indirect effects through its trading partners. Although the Russian economy is not large enough to alone make a significant impact on world growth directly — it accounts for less than 3 percent of global GDP — its importance for trade and finance should not be ignored. Besides being one of the key energy providers to the global economy, it is also capable of affecting confidence and market sentiment in the rest of the world. The exact effect is hard to quantify but in times of ample volatility in financial markets, removing one piece of uncertainty would possibly be of great importance. From a Russian perspective this is also important since improved sentiment in the global economy is likely to lead to increased energy demand and upward pressure on oil prices.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Without serious reforms aimed at rebuilding international financial confidence and trade ties, the Russian economy will likely face a sudden stop scenario in 2015 or at best find itself on a slippery slope towards stagnation. This is not in the interest of the current leaders and citizens of Russia, nor of its neighbors and trading partners. There are clear win-win propositions in terms of policies that Russia can undertake today to avoid an economic crash landing. The question is if Russia is ready to move towards the modern approach of looking for win-win solutions or if it will remain stuck playing strategic games where your gain is always my loss.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Notes </strong></p>
<p>1 Note that this brief was written in mid-October 2014 and therefore based on the data and forecasts available at that point in time.</p>
<p>2 The original April 2012 forecast ends in 2017 and the forecast to 2019 here is based on extending the 2016 and 2017 forecast of 3.8 percent growth over 2018 and 2019.</p>
<p>3 The basic accounting identity says that national income is equal to private and public consumption and investment, plus exports minus imports.</p>
<p>4 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, also called Bank of Russia, will be abbreviated as the commonly used acronym CBR which is also its web address www.cbr.ru.</p>
<p>5 The initial oil fund was called the Stabilization fund but was divided up in a National wealth fund and a Reserve fund in 2008, where the former should support future pensions while the latter has the stated purpose of financing the federal budget when oil and gas revenues decline.</p>
<p>6 Income ranking based on market exchange rates and IMF data from 2013.</p>
<p><strong>References </strong></p>
<p>Becker, Torbjorn and Paolo Mauro, 2006, “Out- put drops and the shocks that matter”, IMF Working paper, WP/06/172.</p>
<p>CBR, 2014, The Central Bank of the Russian Fed- eration (Bank of Russia) Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy in 2015 and for 2016 and 2017, Draft as of 26.09.2014. Available at http:// cbr.ru/Eng/today/publications_reports/on_15- eng_draft.pdf</p>
<p>IMF, 2014, “Russian Federation, 2014 Article IV consultation — Staff report”, IMF country report No. 14/175, International Monetary Fund, Wash- ington D.C.</p>
<p>IMF, 2012-2014, World Economic Outlook fore- casts available at www.imf.org.</p>
<p>Source: BSR Policy Briefing 4/2014, Centrum Balticum, www.centrumbalticum.org</p>
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		<title>Germany&#8217;s trade with the Baltic countries</title>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2015 19:31:39 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Amber Bridge. Journal of Regional Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[№2 (5) 2015]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crude]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Denmark]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Estonia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Finland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Latvia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lithuania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Natural Gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil Products]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sweden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trade Statistics]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Maria Vladimirovna Gracheva — Ph.D. in Economics, leading researcher of Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.  The article of Maria Gracheva examines the characteristics of Germany’s trade with the countries that along with the FRG are the members of the Council of the Baltic Sea states. The analysis is [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">Maria Vladimirovna Gracheva </span><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">— Ph.D. in Economics, leading researcher of Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. </span></p>
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<p><span style="font-style: italic; color: #333333;">The article of Maria Gracheva examines the characteristics of Germany’s trade with the countries that along with the FRG are the members of the Council of the Baltic Sea states. The analysis is based on the statistics of German federal statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) in the period of 1992-2014. The author considers such indicators as the share of Baltic states in the German foreign trade turnover, the volumes of Germany’s trade with the particular countries, the trade’s breakdown into the commodity groups. The main Germany’s trade partner countries and the key trade growth/downturn drivers among Baltic countries are identified. Special attention is paid to the peculiarities of the commodity structure of the Germany’s trade with the particular countries, including their comparison with the relevant indicators of the total German foreign trade. The main commodities of the Germany’s export/import to/from Baltic countries by the three-digit classification are analysed as well as the roles of the particular countries as the German buyers and suppliers. Some important facts of the period of 2008-2014 are registered, such as the decline of the oil/gas import from Norway and Russia and the growth of the oil products’ import from Russia. The data of German- Baltic trade’s reduction in the first quarter of 2015 are presented and explained chiefly by the negative dynamics of the Russian import due to the termination of the compensation by means of the oil products. The author comes to the conclusion, that in two-three years already Russia can come down to the Germany’s second-class trade partners, and within the Baltic region the main beneficiaries thereon will be Poland, Sweden and Norway. </span></p>
<p>The Baltic States are important trade partners of Germany: in 2014 their share in the foreign trade turnover of Germany amounted to 13.3%, including 12.2% in exports from Germany and 14.6% in imports into the Federal Republic of Germany (the rest of European countries accounted for 56.0% of the German turnover, including 55.8% of exports and 56.4% of imports)[1].</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Pic. 1. Role of the Baltic States in the foreign trade of Germany</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>(Share of import from the Baltic States in the cumulative import to Germany</p>
<p>Share of export to the Baltic States in the cumulative export from Germany)</p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>In 1992-2008 indicators of the Baltic countries showed a relatively constant growth: from 8.8 to 14.2% of turnover, including a growth from 8.1 to 13.4% of exports from Germany and a growth from 9.6 to 15.0% of imports into Germany (see. Fig. 1), while the share of the rest of European countries declined (turnover &#8211; from 66.1 to 58.5%, exports from Germany &#8211; from 68.9 to 61.1%, and imports into Germany &#8211; from 63.1 to 55.4%). Since 2009, there has been a downward trend in the role of both the Baltic States and other European countries in the foreign trade of Germany (the importance of the countries of Asia &#8211; primarily China, by contrast, has increased). Information on the volumes of German trade with individual countries of the Baltic region is presented in Tables 1 and 2.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table 1. Trade between Germany and the Baltic States in 1992-2014.</strong></p>
<table style="height: 635px;" width="673">
<thead>
<tr>
<td rowspan="3" width="86"><strong>Country</strong><strong>/<br />
</strong><strong>group of countries</strong></td>
<td colspan="11" width="424"><strong>1992-2014</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3" width="119"><strong>Turnover, Germany</strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="113"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="121"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="71"><strong>Balance for Germany </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>position </strong></td>
<td width="39"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="39"><strong>position </strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="44"><strong>position </strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="43">919,9</td>
<td width="36">3,07</td>
<td width="40">1</td>
<td width="39">518,2</td>
<td width="36">3,18</td>
<td width="39">1</td>
<td width="40">401,7</td>
<td width="36">2,95</td>
<td width="44">2</td>
<td width="35">116,5</td>
<td rowspan="10" width="36"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Russia </strong></td>
<td width="43">855,2</td>
<td width="36">2,86</td>
<td width="40">2</td>
<td width="39">387,8</td>
<td width="36">2,38</td>
<td width="39">2</td>
<td width="40">467,4</td>
<td width="36">3,43</td>
<td width="44">1</td>
<td width="35">-79,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Sweden </strong></td>
<td width="43">580,3</td>
<td width="36">1,94</td>
<td width="40">3</td>
<td width="39">342,2</td>
<td width="36">2,10</td>
<td width="39">3</td>
<td width="40">238,1</td>
<td width="36">1,75</td>
<td width="44">4</td>
<td width="35">104,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Denmark </strong></td>
<td width="43">472,7</td>
<td width="36">1,58</td>
<td width="40">4</td>
<td width="39">260,7</td>
<td width="36">1,60</td>
<td width="39">4</td>
<td width="40">212,0</td>
<td width="36">1,56</td>
<td width="44">5</td>
<td width="35">48,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Norway </strong></td>
<td width="43">431,0</td>
<td width="36">1,44</td>
<td width="40">5</td>
<td width="39">125,1</td>
<td width="36">0,77</td>
<td width="39">6</td>
<td width="40">305,9</td>
<td width="36">2,25</td>
<td width="44">3</td>
<td width="35">-180,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Finland </strong></td>
<td width="43">280,7</td>
<td width="36">0,94</td>
<td width="40">6</td>
<td width="39">150,1</td>
<td width="36">0,92</td>
<td width="39">5</td>
<td width="40">130,6</td>
<td width="36">0,96</td>
<td width="44">6</td>
<td width="35">19,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Lithuania </strong></td>
<td width="43">51,9</td>
<td width="36">0,17</td>
<td width="40">7</td>
<td width="39">32,3</td>
<td width="36">0,20</td>
<td width="39">7</td>
<td width="40">19,6</td>
<td width="36">0,14</td>
<td width="44">7</td>
<td width="35">12,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td width="43">29,2</td>
<td width="36">0,10</td>
<td width="40">8</td>
<td width="39">19,6</td>
<td width="36">0,12</td>
<td width="39">8</td>
<td width="40">9,6</td>
<td width="36">0,07</td>
<td width="44">8</td>
<td width="35">10,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Estonia </strong></td>
<td width="43">26,2</td>
<td width="36">0,09</td>
<td width="40">9</td>
<td width="39">18,8</td>
<td width="36">0,12</td>
<td width="39">9</td>
<td width="40">7,4</td>
<td width="36">0,05</td>
<td width="44">10</td>
<td width="35">11,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Iceland</strong></td>
<td width="43">16,0</td>
<td width="36">0,05</td>
<td width="40">10</td>
<td width="39">6,7</td>
<td width="36">0,04</td>
<td width="39">10</td>
<td width="40">9,3</td>
<td width="36">0,07</td>
<td width="44">9</td>
<td width="35">-2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Total Baltic States </strong></td>
<td width="43">3.663,1</td>
<td width="36">12,24</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="39">1.861,4</td>
<td width="36">11,41</td>
<td width="39"></td>
<td width="40">1.801,7</td>
<td width="36">13,23</td>
<td width="44"></td>
<td width="35">59,7</td>
<td width="36">2,22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong> </strong></td>
<td width="43"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="39"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
<td width="39"></td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
<td width="44"></td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="86"><strong>Whole world </strong></td>
<td width="43">29.926,6</td>
<td width="36">100,00</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="39">16.307,5</td>
<td width="36">100,00</td>
<td width="39"></td>
<td width="40">13.619,1</td>
<td width="36">100,00</td>
<td width="44"></td>
<td width="35">2.688,4</td>
<td width="36">100,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Note: The Baltic States are presented in descending order of their turnover with Germany in 1992-2014.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table</strong><strong> 2. </strong><strong>Main partner countries of Germany in its trade with the Baltic States in 1992 and in 2014. </strong></p>
<table width="510">
<thead>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="56"><strong>Indicator </strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Country </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="58"><strong>1992</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="55"><strong>Indicator </strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Country </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="60"><strong>2014</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="28"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="30"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="31"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="6" width="56"><strong>Turnover </strong><strong><br />
</strong><strong>Germany – Baltic States </strong></td>
<td width="141"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="28">14,7</td>
<td width="30">24,9</td>
<td rowspan="6" width="55"><strong>Turnover </strong><strong><br />
</strong><strong>Germany – Baltic States</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="31">87,5</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">32,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">14,0</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="30">23,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="31">67,7</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">24,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="28">8,4</td>
<td width="30">14,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>3 main countries, total</strong></td>
<td width="28">37,1</td>
<td width="30">62,9</td>
<td width="141"><strong>2 main countries, total </strong></td>
<td width="31">155,0</td>
<td width="28">56,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Turnover Germany – Baltic States, total</strong></td>
<td width="28">59,0</td>
<td width="30">100,0</td>
<td width="141"><strong>Turnover Germany – Baltic States, total</strong></td>
<td width="31">272,8</td>
<td width="28">100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="56"><strong>Export<br />
from Germany to the Baltic States </strong></td>
<td width="141"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="28">7,5</td>
<td width="30">26,9</td>
<td rowspan="4" width="55"><strong>Export<br />
from Germany to the Baltic States</strong></td>
<td width="141"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="31">47,7</td>
<td width="28">34,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td width="28">6,6</td>
<td width="30">23,8</td>
<td width="141"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="31">29,3</td>
<td width="28">21,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>2 main countries, total </strong></td>
<td width="28">14,1</td>
<td width="30">50,8</td>
<td width="141"><strong>2 main countries, total</strong></td>
<td width="31">77,1</td>
<td width="28">55,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Export from Germany to the Baltic States, total</strong></td>
<td width="28">27,8</td>
<td width="30">100,0</td>
<td width="141"><strong>Export from Germany to the Baltic States, total</strong></td>
<td width="31">138,9</td>
<td width="28">100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="6" width="56"><strong>Import<br />
from the Baltic States to Germany </strong></td>
<td width="141"><strong>Denmark </strong></td>
<td width="28">7,3</td>
<td width="30">23,5</td>
<td rowspan="6" width="55"><strong>Import<br />
from the Baltic States to Germany</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="31">39,8</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">29,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">7,2</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="30">23,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="31">38,4</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">28,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="28">4,7</td>
<td width="30">14,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>3 main countries, total</strong></td>
<td width="28">19,2</td>
<td width="30">61,6</td>
<td width="141"><strong>2 main countries, total </strong></td>
<td width="31">78,2</td>
<td width="28">58,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Import from the Baltic States to Germany, total </strong></td>
<td width="28">31,2</td>
<td width="30">100,0</td>
<td width="141"><strong>Import from the Baltic States to Germany, total</strong></td>
<td width="31">133,8</td>
<td width="28">100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="56"><strong>Balance for Germany – cumulative surplus </strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">0,3</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="30">90,0</td>
<td rowspan="4" width="55"><strong>Balance for Germany – cumulative surplus</strong></td>
<td width="141"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="31">8,0</td>
<td width="28">32,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="31">7,4</td>
<td width="28">29,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>1 main country, total </strong></td>
<td width="28">0,3</td>
<td width="30">90,0</td>
<td width="141"><strong>2 main countries, total</strong></td>
<td width="31">15,4</td>
<td width="28">61,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Cumulative surplus for Germany, total </strong></td>
<td width="28">0,3</td>
<td width="30">100,0</td>
<td width="141"><strong>Cumulative surplus for Germany, total</strong></td>
<td width="31">25,0</td>
<td width="28">100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="56"><strong>Balance for Germany – combined deficit </strong></td>
<td width="141"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="28">-1,8</td>
<td width="30">47,6</td>
<td rowspan="4" width="55"><strong>Balance for Germany – combined deficit</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="141"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td rowspan="2" width="31">-10,7</td>
<td rowspan="2" width="28">53,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td width="28">-0,7</td>
<td width="30">19,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>2 main countries, total </strong></td>
<td width="28">-2,5</td>
<td width="30">66,8</td>
<td width="141"><strong>One main country, total </strong></td>
<td width="31">-10,7</td>
<td width="28">53,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="141"><strong>Combined deficit for Germany, total </strong></td>
<td width="28">-3,7</td>
<td width="30">100,0</td>
<td width="141"><strong>Combined deficit for Germany, total </strong></td>
<td width="31">-20,0</td>
<td width="28">100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Note. The main partners are listed as countries in descending order with the largest volume of trade, export, import and balance, which together accounted for more than 50% of the respective indicators in 1992 and 2014.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Within the whole period of 1992-2014, Germany&#8217;s main partners among the ten Baltic States were the following four countries &#8211; <strong>Poland, Russia, Sweden and Norway</strong>, including:</p>
<p>- Poland, Russia, Sweden &#8211; in turnover and exports from Germany,</p>
<p>- Russia, Poland, Norway &#8211; in imports to Germany,</p>
<p>- Poland and Sweden &#8211; in surplus for Germany,</p>
<p>- Norway – in deficit for Germany.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>For more than twenty years there have occurred major shifts: in 1992, the most important contractors were Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Poland; now Denmark is not among them, and Sweden and Norway have been overshadowed by Poland and Russia.</p>
<p>In 1992-2014 Germany formed a surplus in trade with the Baltic countries totaling 60 billion euros, but its share in the German foreign trade surplus as a whole (2.7 trillion euros) was only 2.2% &#8211; much lower than the corresponding figures of turnover (12.2 %), exports from Germany (11.4%) and imports to Germany (13.2%). This situation is due to the sustained deficit in German trade with Norway and Russia (these countries are on the second and third places after the Netherlands in terms of the German trade deficit). In 1992-2003 the German-Baltic trade balance was variable with a predominance of the negative balance for Germany. Since 2004 it has become steadily positive for Germany (mainly due to a rapid increase of surplus in the trade with Poland).</p>
<p>Key countries to determine the dynamics of the German trade with the Baltic States are shown in Tables 4 and 5. The most powerful driving forces in general over the last 22 years were Poland and Russia (they were the main factors of growth both in exports from Germany, as well as in imports into Germany, and in 1992-2014 provided respectively 37 and 28% of growth of the German-Baltic turnover). Sweden and Norway took the second place (with growth of 10% and 9%).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table 4. Key forces – countries of the German – Baltic trade in 1992-2014, 1992-2000 and in 2000-2008.</strong></p>
<table width="510">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="64"><strong>Country/group of countries </strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="140"><strong>Total change </strong><strong>2014/1992</strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="150"><strong>Change </strong><strong>2000/1992</strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="156"><strong>Change </strong><strong>2008/2000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="66"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="74"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="74"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="77"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="78"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="79"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="27"><strong>Growth</strong></td>
<td width="39"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="39"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="34"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="34"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="42"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="33"><strong>Growth</strong></td>
<td width="44"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="33"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="45"><strong>Growth share</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="27"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="39"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Bln euro </strong></td>
<td width="39"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="34"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="34"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="42"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="33"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="44"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td width="33"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td width="45"><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="64"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="27">+43,5</td>
<td width="39">+39,2</td>
<td width="35">+35,5</td>
<td width="39">+34,6</td>
<td width="34">+10,3</td>
<td width="40">+34,3</td>
<td width="34">+7,7</td>
<td width="42">+23,5</td>
<td width="33">+26,2</td>
<td width="44">+35,3</td>
<td width="33">+13,9</td>
<td width="45">+24,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="64"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="27">+26,1</td>
<td width="39">+23,5</td>
<td width="35">+34,5</td>
<td width="39">+33,6</td>
<td width="34"></td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="34">+10,8</td>
<td width="42">+33,1</td>
<td width="33">+25,7</td>
<td width="44">+34,5</td>
<td width="33">+22,4</td>
<td width="45">+39,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="64"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="27"></td>
<td width="39"></td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="39"></td>
<td width="34">+6,0</td>
<td width="40">+20,1</td>
<td width="34"></td>
<td width="42"></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="44"></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="45"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="64"><strong>Growth in the Baltic countries </strong></td>
<td width="27">+111,1</td>
<td width="39">+100,0</td>
<td width="35">+102,7</td>
<td width="39">+100,0</td>
<td width="34">+30,1</td>
<td width="40">+100,0</td>
<td width="34">+32,7</td>
<td width="42">+100,0</td>
<td width="33">+74,3</td>
<td width="44">+100,0</td>
<td width="33">+57,3</td>
<td width="45">100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table 5. Key forces – countries of the German – Baltic trade in 2008-2014 and 2012-2014.</strong></p>
<table width="510">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="43"><strong>Country/group of countries </strong></td>
<td colspan="8" width="241"><strong>Change </strong><strong>2014/2008</strong></td>
<td colspan="8" width="227"><strong>Change </strong><strong>2014/2012</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="4" width="127"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="114"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="114"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="114"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="35"><strong>Growth</strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Decline</strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>Decline share </strong></td>
<td width="29"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>Decline </strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>Decline share </strong></td>
<td width="23"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>Decline </strong></td>
<td width="29"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="34"><strong>Decline share </strong></td>
<td width="23"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="27"><strong>Decline </strong></td>
<td width="30"><strong>Growth share </strong></td>
<td width="34"><strong>Decline share </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="71"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="56"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="57"><strong>Bln euro </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="56"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="50"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="64"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="50"><strong>Bln euro</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="64"><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="35">+7,0</td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="28">+65,4</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="29">+13,9</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28">+85,2</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="23">+5,9</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="29">+62,1</td>
<td width="34"></td>
<td width="23">+6,7</td>
<td width="27"></td>
<td width="30">+77,7</td>
<td width="34"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="35">-3,0</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28">-76,4</td>
<td width="29"></td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="23"></td>
<td width="28">-8,8</td>
<td width="29"></td>
<td width="34">-99,5</td>
<td width="23"></td>
<td width="27"></td>
<td width="30"></td>
<td width="34"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="29"></td>
<td width="28">-3,1</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28">-82,0</td>
<td width="23"></td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="29"></td>
<td width="34"></td>
<td width="23"></td>
<td width="27">-7,0</td>
<td width="30"></td>
<td width="34">-59,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Growth in the Baltic States </strong></td>
<td width="35">+10,7</td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="28">+100,0</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="29">+16,3</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28">+100,0</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="23">+9,5</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="29">+100,0</td>
<td width="34"></td>
<td width="23">+8,7</td>
<td width="27"></td>
<td width="30">+100,0</td>
<td width="34"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Decline in the Baltic States </strong></td>
<td width="35"></td>
<td width="35">-3,9</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28">-100,0</td>
<td width="29"></td>
<td width="28">-3,8</td>
<td width="28"></td>
<td width="28">-100,0</td>
<td width="23"></td>
<td width="28">-8,8</td>
<td width="29"></td>
<td width="34">-100,0</td>
<td width="23"></td>
<td width="27">-11,8</td>
<td width="30"></td>
<td width="34">-100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Note. The main factors are countries listed in descending order with the largest increase/reduction of export/import, which total share in the growth/decline of the corresponding indicators was more than 50%.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In certain periods the following countries were the main trade partners:</p>
<p>- In 1992-2000: for exports from Germany &#8211; Poland and Sweden (growth factors), for imports into Germany &#8211; Russia and Poland (growth factors);</p>
<p>- In 2000-2008: for exports from Germany &#8211; Poland and Russia (growth factors), for imports into Germany &#8211; Russia and Poland (growth factors);</p>
<p>- In 2008-2014 years in general and in 2012-2014 in particular: for exports from Germany &#8211; Poland (growth factor) and Russia (recession factor), for imports into Germany &#8211; Poland (growth factor), and Norway (recession factor).</p>
<p>Poland would return as a source of positive pulses after each case of decrease of the indicators of its trade with Germany in 1992-2014. Russia, too, managed to do this for 20 years, but in the last two years it has dramatically changed its role, becoming the brake of the German-Baltic trade instead of its accelerator. The share of Poland in the foreign trade turnover of Germany rose from 1.3% in 1992 to 4.3% in 2014, the corresponding indicator for Russia rose from 1.1 to 3.3% (maximum &#8211; 4.0% &#8211; was achieved in 2012).</p>
<p>As for the remaining six of the Baltic countries, among them are two larger counterparts of Germany &#8211; Denmark and Finland, and four smaller &#8211; three post-Soviet states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and Iceland. Both in 1992-2000 and in 2000-2008, all six countries were factors of growth for the trade between Germany and the Baltic States (being inferior to a group of four countries mentioned above). But in 2008-2014 only the new European trio played a positive role, while the “old Europeans” generated negative pulses (Finland and Iceland &#8211; in both directions of trade, Denmark &#8211; for imports to Germany). As a result, the total share of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the foreign trade turnover of Germany rose from 0.1% in 1992 to 0.4% in 2014, thus indicating that the growth rate of Germany&#8217;s trade with these countries turned out to be the highest within the Baltic region.</p>
<p>Distribution of the indicators of the German trade with the Baltic countries and the whole world for four product groups, that are classified in accordance with the increase in the degree of processing of the goods (and, consequently, increase of the share of value added in the value of goods), is presented in Tables 6 and 7.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table</strong><strong> 6. </strong><strong>Structure of the goods of the German – Baltic trade in 2014, % of turnover between Germany and the Baltic States </strong></p>
<table width="510">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="3" width="99"><strong>Indicator/goods group (code, name) </strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="28"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="31"><strong>Denmark </strong></td>
<td width="46"><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Lithuania</strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Iceland</strong></td>
<td width="49"><strong>Turnover Germany – Baltic States, total </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="42"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td width="14"><strong>1-4</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Food</strong></td>
<td width="35">1,5</td>
<td width="28">0,4</td>
<td width="35">0,5</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
<td width="31">1,0</td>
<td width="46">0,3</td>
<td width="43">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="49">4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="14"><strong>5</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Raw materials</strong></td>
<td width="35">0,2</td>
<td width="28">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="36">0,0</td>
<td width="31">0,3</td>
<td width="46">0,0</td>
<td width="43">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="49">0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="14"><strong>6</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Semi-processed goods</strong></td>
<td width="35">1,6</td>
<td width="28">0,2</td>
<td width="35">0,3</td>
<td width="36">0,1</td>
<td width="31">0,3</td>
<td width="46">0,2</td>
<td width="43">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="49">2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="14"><strong>7-8</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Finished products</strong></td>
<td width="35">14,1</td>
<td width="28">10,4</td>
<td width="35">7,0</td>
<td width="36">2,9</td>
<td width="31">4,5</td>
<td width="46">2,8</td>
<td width="43">0,8</td>
<td width="35">0,5</td>
<td width="35">0,5</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="49">43,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="4" width="42"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
<td width="14"><strong>1-4</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Food</strong></td>
<td width="35">1,7</td>
<td width="28">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
<td width="31">1,2</td>
<td width="46">0,0</td>
<td width="43">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="49">3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="14"><strong>5</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Raw materials</strong></td>
<td width="35">0,3</td>
<td width="28">10,2</td>
<td width="35">0,3</td>
<td width="36">6,1</td>
<td width="31">0,3</td>
<td width="46">0,0</td>
<td width="43">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="49">17,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="14"><strong>6</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Semi-processed goods</strong></td>
<td width="35">1,2</td>
<td width="28">3,7</td>
<td width="35">0,8</td>
<td width="36">0,6</td>
<td width="31">0,2</td>
<td width="46">0,6</td>
<td width="43">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="49">7,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="14"><strong>7-8</strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Finished products</strong></td>
<td width="35">10,8</td>
<td width="28">0,7</td>
<td width="35">3,8</td>
<td width="36">0,4</td>
<td width="31">2,3</td>
<td width="46">2,0</td>
<td width="43">0,3</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,1</td>
<td width="35">0,0</td>
<td width="49">20,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="3" width="99"><strong>Turnover Germany – Baltic States, total*</strong></td>
<td width="35">31,4</td>
<td width="28">25,7</td>
<td width="35">12,9</td>
<td width="36">10,5</td>
<td width="31">10,2</td>
<td width="46">5,9</td>
<td width="43">1,5</td>
<td width="35">0,8</td>
<td width="35">0,8</td>
<td width="35">0,3</td>
<td width="49">100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>* excluding returned, replaced and not allocated by commodity groups goods.</p>
<p>Note. The Baltic countries are presented in descending order of their turnover with Germany in 2014.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table</strong><strong>  7. </strong><strong>Structure of the goods of the German &#8211; Baltic trade and the overall German foreign trade in 2014, % of export/import/turnover of certain countries, Baltic States and the whole world. </strong></p>
<table width="510">
<thead>
<tr>
<td colspan="3" width="88"><strong>Indicator/goods group (code, name)</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="31"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="37"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="43"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="31"><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="39"><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td width="31"><strong>Lithuania </strong></td>
<td width="41"><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>Iceland</strong></td>
<td width="35"><strong>Baltic States, total </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="26"><strong>Whole world</strong></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="5" width="14"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td width="21"><strong>1-4</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Food</strong></td>
<td width="36">8,4</td>
<td width="31">4,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="37">6,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">7,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">16,4</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">8,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="32">11,6</td>
<td width="41">7,7</td>
<td width="36">10,2</td>
<td width="36">12,1</td>
<td width="35">8,2</td>
<td colspan="2" width="26">6,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>5</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Raw materials </strong></td>
<td width="36">1,2</td>
<td width="31">0,3</td>
<td colspan="2" width="37">0,9</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">0,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">4,4</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">0,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="32">0,4</td>
<td width="41">0,5</td>
<td width="36">0,9</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
<td width="35">1,2</td>
<td colspan="2" width="26">1,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>6</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Semi-processed goods </strong></td>
<td width="36">9,0</td>
<td width="31">1,7</td>
<td colspan="2" width="37">4,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">3,2</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">5,1</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">6,1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="32">3,5</td>
<td width="41">10,1</td>
<td width="36">4,3</td>
<td width="36">2,3</td>
<td width="35">5,5</td>
<td colspan="2" width="26">5,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>7-8</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Finished products </strong></td>
<td width="36">81,4</td>
<td width="31">94,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="37">88,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">89,1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">74,1</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">85,1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="32">84,5</td>
<td width="41">81,7</td>
<td width="36">84,6</td>
<td width="36">85,4</td>
<td width="35">85,1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="26">86,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="74"><strong>Export from Germany, total </strong></td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="31">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">100,0</td>
<td colspan="3" width="31">100,0</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="32">100,0</td>
<td width="41">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="35">100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="26">100,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="5" width="14"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
<td width="21"><strong>1-4</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Food</strong></td>
<td width="36">11,9</td>
<td width="31">0,6</td>
<td width="36">2,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">2,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">28,6</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">1,1</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">21,2</td>
<td width="41">6,0</td>
<td width="36">14,8</td>
<td width="36">17,2</td>
<td width="35">7,1</td>
<td width="26">8,5</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>5</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Raw materials </strong></td>
<td width="36">2,4</td>
<td width="31">69,6</td>
<td width="36">5,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">83,6</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">7,7</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">0,6</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">2,5</td>
<td width="41">9,8</td>
<td width="36">9,1</td>
<td width="36">2,7</td>
<td width="35">35,6</td>
<td width="26">11,6</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>6</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Semi-processed goods </strong></td>
<td width="36">8,7</td>
<td width="31">25,2</td>
<td width="36">16,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">7,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">5,9</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">21,0</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">16,1</td>
<td width="41">14,0</td>
<td width="36">11,0</td>
<td width="36">68,4</td>
<td width="35">15,1</td>
<td width="26">8,7</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>7-8</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Finished products </strong></td>
<td width="36">77,0</td>
<td width="31">4,6</td>
<td width="36">75,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">5,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">57,8</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">77,3</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">60,2</td>
<td width="41">70,2</td>
<td width="36">65,1</td>
<td width="36">11,7</td>
<td width="35">42,2</td>
<td width="26">71,2</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="74"><strong>Import to Germany, total </strong></td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="31">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">100,0</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">100,0</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">100,0</td>
<td width="41">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="35">100,0</td>
<td width="26">100,0</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td rowspan="5" width="14"><strong>Turnover of Germany </strong></td>
<td width="21"><strong>1-4</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Food </strong></td>
<td width="36">10,0</td>
<td width="31">2,0</td>
<td width="36">5,3</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">4,2</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">21,2</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">5,1</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">15,1</td>
<td width="41">7,4</td>
<td width="36">11,5</td>
<td width="36">15,2</td>
<td width="35">7,6</td>
<td width="26">7,1</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>5</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Raw materials </strong></td>
<td width="36">1,7</td>
<td width="31">39,7</td>
<td width="36">2,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">58,1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">5,7</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">0,5</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">1,1</td>
<td width="41">2,5</td>
<td width="36">3,2</td>
<td width="36">1,7</td>
<td width="35">18,0</td>
<td width="26">6,0</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>6</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Semi-processed goods </strong></td>
<td width="36">8,9</td>
<td width="31">15,1</td>
<td width="36">8,8</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">6,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">5,4</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">12,8</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">8,1</td>
<td width="41">11,0</td>
<td width="36">6,2</td>
<td width="36">42,4</td>
<td width="35">10,2</td>
<td width="26">7,0</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="21"><strong>7-8</strong></td>
<td width="53"><strong>Finished products </strong></td>
<td width="36">79,4</td>
<td width="31">43,2</td>
<td width="36">83,1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">31,3</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">67,6</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">81,6</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">75,6</td>
<td width="41">79,1</td>
<td width="36">79,1</td>
<td width="36">40,8</td>
<td width="35">64,2</td>
<td width="26">79,9</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="74"><strong>Turnover Germany – Baltic States, total*</strong></td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="31">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="43">100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="31">100,0</td>
<td colspan="3" width="39">100,0</td>
<td colspan="3" width="32">100,0</td>
<td width="41">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="36">100,0</td>
<td width="35">100,0</td>
<td width="26">100,0</td>
<td width="0"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>* excluding returned, replaced and not allocated by commodity groups goods.</p>
<p>Note. The Baltic countries are presented in descending order of their turnover with Germany in 2014.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The main part of the German-Baltic trade (52.6% of the turnover) is in:</p>
<p>- German exports of finished products into Poland (14.1%), Russia (10.4%) and Sweden (7.0%),</p>
<p>- Import of finished products from Poland (10.8%) and raw materials from Russia (10.2%).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>A substantial component is also import of raw materials from Norway (6.1%). In other cases, the share of product groups by country does not exceed 5%. Germany has a positive balance in the German-Baltic trade of food and finished products, and a negative balance – in the trade in raw materials and semi-processed goods. The total surplus for Germany consists mainly of excess surplus in finished products (Poland and Sweden) over the deficit of raw material (Norway and Russia).</p>
<p>The structure of German exports to the Baltic States and the overall German exports are very similar: the maximum difference (the share of food) is only slightly more than two percentage points. German imports from the Baltic States, by contrast, strongly deviates from the overall German import: on the one hand, by the shares of raw materials and semi-finished goods (the German import from the Baltic States has, respectively, 24 and 6 percentage points more than the overall German import); on the other hand, by the share of finished products (the German import from the Baltic States has 29 percentage points less than the overall German import). As a result, the basis of turnover of Germany with the world and with the Baltic States is the same &#8211; products with a higher degree of processing, namely finished products (64 and 80%, respectively), but the value of the goods with a low and medium degree of processing &#8211; raw materials and semi-finished products &#8211; in the German – Baltic trade is much larger (28%) than in the foreign trade of Germany as a whole (13%).</p>
<p>The structure of German exports in each of the Baltic countries is characterized by a common main feature &#8211; a strong dominance of finished products (ranging from 74.1% in Denmark to 94.0% in Russia; average Baltic and average world indicators are, respectively, 85.1 and 86.9%). At the same time, six countries have an additional focus: on food &#8211; Denmark (16.4%), Iceland (12.1%), Lithuania (11.6%), Latvia (10.2%) with the average Baltic and average world level of, respectively, 8.2 and 6.0%; semi-processed goods &#8211; Estonia (10.1%) and Poland (9.0%) with the average Baltic and average world level of, respectively, 5.5 and 5.6%. In four countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia) there are no such focuses.</p>
<p>As sources of the German import certain Baltic countries show considerable specificity. The most striking peculiarity is that of these three importers with an extremely low share of finished products (Russia &#8211; 4.6%, Norway &#8211; 5.8%, Iceland &#8211; 11.7%). For the rest of the Baltic countries this figure ranges from 57.8 to 77.3%, the average Baltic value is 42.2%, the world average is 71.2%. The above mentioned three countries are specialized in: Norway and Russia &#8211; raw materials (83.6 and 69.6%, respectively), Iceland – semi-processed goods (68.4%). Russia has an additional emphasis on semi-processed products (25.2%), Norway and Iceland do not have it. Since the absolute volume of imports of semi-processed products from Iceland is very small, the above-noted important role of the Baltic States for Germany as a source of raw materials and semi-processed products is concentrated in only two of the ten countries &#8211; Russia (raw materials and semi-processed products) and Norway (raw materials).</p>
<p>Among the other seven importers, who are leaders in finished products, two groups with additional focuses can be distinguished:</p>
<p>• focus on food &#8211; Denmark (28.6%), Lithuania (21.2%), Latvia (14.8%), Poland (11.9%) with the world average of 8.5%;</p>
<p>• on semi-processed products &#8211; Finland (21.0%), Lithuania (16.1%), Sweden (16.0%), Estonia (14.0%) with the world average of 8.7%.</p>
<p>The concretization of these features in the context of three-digit product classification is presented in Tables 8 and 9.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table 8. Main goods of the German export in the Baltic States in 2014.</strong></p>
<table width="513">
<thead>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="43"><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="323"><strong>Main goods of export from Germany to a country </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="147"><strong>Main goods of the additional export focus of the country </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="133"><strong>Goods (code, name) </strong></td>
<td width="45"><strong>Share in the export from Germany to a country, %</strong></td>
<td width="73"><strong>Share of a country in the overall German export of these goods, %</strong></td>
<td width="73"><strong>Position of the country in the overall German export of the goods </strong></td>
<td width="101"><strong>Goods position (code, name) </strong></td>
<td width="46"><strong>Share in the export of Germany to a country, %</strong></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="133">885. Passenger cars</td>
<td width="45">19,2</td>
<td width="73">1,3</td>
<td width="73">18</td>
<td colspan="2" width="147"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td width="133">885. Passenger cars</td>
<td width="45">12,4</td>
<td width="73">0,1</td>
<td width="73">48</td>
<td width="101">423. Strong alcohol beverages</td>
<td width="46">1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="133">885. Passenger cars</td>
<td width="45">11,6</td>
<td width="73">2,0</td>
<td width="73">14</td>
<td colspan="2" width="147"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Iceland</strong></td>
<td width="133">885. Passenger cars</td>
<td width="45">9,9</td>
<td width="73">0,0</td>
<td width="73">78</td>
<td width="101">206. Fish, shellfish, mussels</td>
<td width="46">2,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td width="133">861. Equipment for production and distribution of electricity</td>
<td width="45">9,2</td>
<td width="73">0,3</td>
<td width="73">44</td>
<td width="101">669. Oil products</td>
<td width="46">4,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td width="133">885. Passenger cars</td>
<td width="45">8,4</td>
<td width="73">0,6</td>
<td width="73">27</td>
<td colspan="2" width="147"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="133">884. Automobile components</td>
<td width="45">8,3</td>
<td width="73">3,3</td>
<td width="73">10</td>
<td colspan="2" width="147"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="133">884. Automobile components</td>
<td width="45">8,2</td>
<td width="73">5,1</td>
<td width="73">6</td>
<td width="101">669. Oil products</td>
<td width="46">3,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td width="133">861. Machinery for production and distribution of energy</td>
<td width="45">5,3</td>
<td width="73">1,7</td>
<td width="73">18</td>
<td width="101">204. Meat and meat products</td>
<td width="46">3,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="43"><strong>Lithuania </strong></td>
<td width="133">834. Pharmaceutical products</td>
<td width="45">5,0</td>
<td width="73">0,2</td>
<td width="73">49</td>
<td width="101">395. Other foods of plant origin</td>
<td width="46">1,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Note: The Baltic countries are presented in descending order of the proportion of the main export commodity in the exports from Germany in 2014.</p>
<p><strong>Table 9. Main goods of the German import from the Baltic States in 2014.</strong></p>
<table width="514">
<thead>
<tr>
<td rowspan="2" width="46"><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="320"><strong>Main goods of the import into Germany from a country </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="148"><strong>Main goods of the additional import focus </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="132"><strong>Goods (code, name) </strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Share in the import into Germany from a country, %</strong></td>
<td width="74"><strong>Share of a country in the overall German import of these goods, %</strong></td>
<td width="72"><strong>Position of a country in the overall German imports of the goods </strong></td>
<td width="106"><strong>Position of the goods (code, name) </strong></td>
<td width="43"><strong>Share in the import into Germany from a country, %</strong></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="132">518. Oil and natural gas</td>
<td width="43">82,0</td>
<td width="74">18,9</td>
<td width="72">2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="132">518. Oil and natural gas</td>
<td width="43">66,6</td>
<td width="74">30,8</td>
<td width="72">1</td>
<td width="106">669. Oil products</td>
<td width="43">16,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Iceland</strong></td>
<td width="132">645. Aluminum and aluminum alloys, including waste and scrap</td>
<td width="43">64,3</td>
<td width="74">5,6</td>
<td width="72">8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td width="132">708. Paperandcardboard</td>
<td width="43">20,4</td>
<td width="74">19,0</td>
<td width="72">2</td>
<td width="106">608. Semi-finished products of cellulose fiber</td>
<td width="43">5,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="132">884. Automobile components</td>
<td width="43">13,2</td>
<td width="74">10,6</td>
<td width="72">3</td>
<td width="106">
<ol start="6">
<li>Fish, shell fish, mussels</li>
</ol>
</td>
<td width="43">2,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="132">708. Paper and cardboard</td>
<td width="43">12,1</td>
<td width="74">21,3</td>
<td width="72">1</td>
<td width="106">608. Semi-finished products of cellulose fiber</td>
<td width="43">4,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td width="132">815. Items made of wood (apart from furniture)</td>
<td width="43">11,6</td>
<td width="74">2,2</td>
<td width="72">10</td>
<td width="106">607. Lumber</td>
<td width="43">5,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Lithuania </strong></td>
<td width="132">875. Furniture</td>
<td width="43">10,0</td>
<td width="74">1,3</td>
<td width="72">18</td>
<td width="106">206. Fish, shell fish, mussels</td>
<td width="43">7,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Latvia </strong></td>
<td width="132">709. Plywood and plywood sheets, chipboards</td>
<td width="43">8,2</td>
<td width="74">2,6</td>
<td width="72">11</td>
<td width="106">383. Oil cake</td>
<td width="43">5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="46"><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td width="132">834. Pharmaceutical products</td>
<td width="43">6,9</td>
<td width="74">2,1</td>
<td width="72">11</td>
<td width="106">204. Meat and meat products</td>
<td width="43">6,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Note. The Baltic countries are presented in descending order of the share of the main imported goods in the imports of Germany in 2014.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Passenger cars belonging to the product group &#8220;finished products&#8221; are the main commodity items of the overall German exports (0.9%), German exports to the Baltic States (6.9%) and German exports into five Baltic countries (Norway, Latvia, Sweden, Iceland , Finland). “Automotive components”, which are close to the group of passenger cars, are the leader in exports from Germany to Russia and Poland. Only in three cases, the leading role is played by other products, also belonging to the group of “finished products”- equipment for the production and distribution of electricity (Estonia and Denmark) and pharmaceutical products (Lithuania). Five countries (Poland, Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark) are in the top twenty of the German consumers for the corresponding main goods, with the highest position &#8211; the sixth in export of automobile components from Germany –is held by Poland. Two countries (Estonia and Poland) have the same additional export emphasis on semi-finished products (oil products), and there is no unity for countries with a focus on food.</p>
<p>Oil and natural gas belonging to the commodity group &#8220;raw material&#8221; are the main position of the overall German imports (9.5%), German imports from the Baltic States (32.9%) and German imports from Norway and Russia. Imports from Iceland to Germany are focused on aluminum (group &#8220;semi-finished products&#8221;). Specialization on the group &#8220;finished products&#8221; is characteristic of German imports from the other seven Baltic countries, including: specialization on products related to the processing of wood &#8211; from Finland, Sweden (paper and cardboard), Estonia (wood products except furniture), Lithuania (furniture), Latvia (plywood); on automotive components &#8211; from Poland, for pharmaceutical products – from Denmark. All Baltic countries are in the top twenty of the German suppliers of the relevant main products, with the highest &#8211; the first – positions held by Russia (oil/gas) and Sweden (paper/cardboard). Semi-finished products as an additional import emphasis are closely related to the main item: in Russia &#8211; oil products (to oil/gas), in Finland and Sweden &#8211; semi-finished products made of cellulose (paper/cardboard), Estonia – lumber (with woodwork).</p>
<p>Norway offers the highest shares in the main goods both in the export from Germany, and in the imports to Germany, but if for passenger cars, the figure is 19.2% of German exports, for oil/gas it is extremely high &#8211; 82.0% of German imports. Concentration of German imports on a single goods group is also characteristic of Russia (oil/gas &#8211; 66.6%) and Iceland (aluminum/aluminum alloys &#8211; 64.3%), while in other countries the figure is in the range of 6, 9 to 20.4%. In fact, German import from Norway, Russia and Iceland is monocultural, and monocultural are items of low-grade processing. Before the crisis, which began in autumn 2008, this one-sidedness did not prevent active growth of imports from these countries, but in 2008-2014 the cumulative decline in German imports from the Baltic States in the context of the four commodity groups appeared to be by about 3/5 due to the reduction of imports of oil/gas from Norway and Russia: Norway had more than ⅓, and Russia &#8211; about ¼ of this recession. As a result, imports from Norway in 2008-2014 decreased by 13.8%, while imports from Russia increased by 3.5%. However, this happened only because reduction of Russian imports of oil/gas was more than offset by a rise in imports of Russian oil products.</p>
<p>In the first quarter of 2015 this compensation was no longer valid. Trade turnover between Germany and Russia showed the most negative dynamics among the Baltic countries. Changes in the German-Baltic trade in the first quarter of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014 are presented in Tables 10 and 11.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table</strong><strong>  10.</strong><strong> </strong><strong>Trade between Germany and Baltic States in 2014-2015.</strong></p>
<table width="519">
<thead>
<tr>
<td rowspan="3" width="68"><strong>Country/Group of countries </strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="126"><strong>Turnover </strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="132"><strong>Export from Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="121"><strong>Import into Germany </strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="72"><strong>Balance for Germany </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="38"><strong>January – March </strong><strong> 2014</strong></td>
<td width="39"><strong>January – March </strong><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td width="49"><strong>Change, </strong><strong>2015/2014</strong></td>
<td width="42"><strong>January – March, </strong><strong>2014</strong></td>
<td width="38"><strong>January – March, </strong><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td width="52"><strong>Change, </strong><strong>2015/2014</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>January &#8211; March</strong><strong> 2014</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>January – March </strong><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td width="49"><strong>Change, </strong><strong>2015/2014</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>January – March, </strong><strong> 2014</strong></td>
<td width="36"><strong>January – March </strong><strong> 2015</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="77"><strong>Bln euros</strong></td>
<td width="49"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="80"><strong>Bln euros </strong></td>
<td width="52"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="72"><strong>Bln euros </strong></td>
<td width="49"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="72"><strong>Bln euros</strong></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="38">20,9</td>
<td width="39">23,3</td>
<td width="49">111,2</td>
<td width="42">11,4</td>
<td width="38">12,4</td>
<td width="52">109,5</td>
<td width="36">9,6</td>
<td width="36">10,8</td>
<td width="49">113,2</td>
<td width="36">1,8</td>
<td width="36">1,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="38">18,1</td>
<td width="39">12,4</td>
<td width="49">68,4</td>
<td width="42">7,5</td>
<td width="38">5,0</td>
<td width="52">66,1</td>
<td width="36">10,5</td>
<td width="36">7,4</td>
<td width="49">70,1</td>
<td width="36">-3,0</td>
<td width="36">-2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="38">8,9</td>
<td width="39">9,1</td>
<td width="49">101,8</td>
<td width="42">5,3</td>
<td width="38">5,6</td>
<td width="52">105,4</td>
<td width="36">3,6</td>
<td width="36">3,4</td>
<td width="49">96,5</td>
<td width="36">1,8</td>
<td width="36">2,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Denmark </strong></td>
<td width="38">7,1</td>
<td width="39">7,1</td>
<td width="49">99,8</td>
<td width="42">4,0</td>
<td width="38">4,4</td>
<td width="52">108,5</td>
<td width="36">3,0</td>
<td width="36">2,7</td>
<td width="49">88,3</td>
<td width="36">1,0</td>
<td width="36">1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="38">7,3</td>
<td width="39">6,5</td>
<td width="49">89,7</td>
<td width="42">1,9</td>
<td width="38">2,1</td>
<td width="52">106,5</td>
<td width="36">5,3</td>
<td width="36">4,4</td>
<td width="49">83,5</td>
<td width="36">-3,4</td>
<td width="36">-2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td width="38">3,9</td>
<td width="39">4,2</td>
<td width="49">107,5</td>
<td width="42">2,2</td>
<td width="38">2,3</td>
<td width="52">101,1</td>
<td width="36">1,7</td>
<td width="36">2,0</td>
<td width="49">116,0</td>
<td width="36">0,5</td>
<td width="36">0,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Lithuania </strong></td>
<td width="38">1,0</td>
<td width="39">1,0</td>
<td width="49">104,7</td>
<td width="42">0,6</td>
<td width="38">0,6</td>
<td width="52">104,9</td>
<td width="36">0,4</td>
<td width="36">0,4</td>
<td width="49">104,3</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td width="38">0,6</td>
<td width="39">0,5</td>
<td width="49">85,8</td>
<td width="42">0,5</td>
<td width="38">0,4</td>
<td width="52">81,0</td>
<td width="36">0,1</td>
<td width="36">0,1</td>
<td width="49">103,6</td>
<td width="36">0,3</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td width="38">0,5</td>
<td width="39">0,5</td>
<td width="49">94,0</td>
<td width="42">0,4</td>
<td width="38">0,3</td>
<td width="52">92,5</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
<td width="36">0,1</td>
<td width="49">97,7</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Iceland </strong></td>
<td width="38">0,2</td>
<td width="39">0,2</td>
<td width="49">100,3</td>
<td width="42">0,1</td>
<td width="38">0,1</td>
<td width="52">126,4</td>
<td width="36">0,2</td>
<td width="36">0,1</td>
<td width="49">88,2</td>
<td width="36">-0,1</td>
<td width="36">0,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>Baltic countries, total</strong></td>
<td width="38">68,5</td>
<td width="39">64,8</td>
<td width="49">94,6</td>
<td width="42">34,0</td>
<td width="38">33,2</td>
<td width="52">97,7</td>
<td width="36">34,5</td>
<td width="36">31,6</td>
<td width="49">91,4</td>
<td width="36">-0,6</td>
<td width="36">1,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong> </strong></td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="39"></td>
<td width="49"></td>
<td width="42"></td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="52"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
<td width="49"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
<td width="36"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="68"><strong>World, total</strong></td>
<td width="38">508,9</td>
<td width="39">528,1</td>
<td width="49">103,8</td>
<td width="42">278,3</td>
<td width="38">293,3</td>
<td width="52">105,4</td>
<td width="36">230,6</td>
<td width="36">234,8</td>
<td width="49">101,8</td>
<td width="36">47,6</td>
<td width="36">58,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Table</strong><strong> 11.</strong><strong> </strong><strong>Factors of growth/recession in trade between Germany and the Baltic States in 2014-2015.</strong></p>
<table width="510">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td rowspan="3" width="61"><strong>Country/group of countries </strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="149"><strong>Turnover Germany – Baltic States, </strong><strong>2015</strong><strong>/2014</strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="151"><strong>Export from Germany into the Baltic States, 2015/2014</strong></td>
<td colspan="4" width="148"><strong>Import into Germany from the Baltic States, 2015/2014</strong></td>
<td width="1"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="33"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>Recession</strong></td>
<td width="38"><strong>Share in growth </strong></td>
<td width="38"><strong>Share in recession </strong></td>
<td width="33"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>Recession </strong></td>
<td width="38"><strong>Share in growth </strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>Share in recession </strong></td>
<td width="33"><strong>Growth </strong></td>
<td width="40"><strong>Recession</strong></td>
<td width="38"><strong>Share in growth</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="38"><strong>Share in recession </strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="2" width="74"><strong>Bln euros</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="76"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="74"><strong>Bln euros</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="78"><strong>%</strong></td>
<td colspan="2" width="73"><strong>Bln euros</strong></td>
<td colspan="3" width="76"><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td width="33">+2,3</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+82,3</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="33">+1,1</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+56,6</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="33">+1,3</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+81,2</td>
<td colspan="2" width="38"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Russia</strong></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-5,7</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="38">-86,7</td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-2,6</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="40">-95,7</td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-3,1</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td colspan="2" width="38">-69,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td width="33">+0,2</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+5,7</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="33">+0,3</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+15,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,1</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td colspan="2" width="38">-2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,0</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="38">-0,2</td>
<td width="33">+0,3</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+18,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,4</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td colspan="2" width="38">-7,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,8</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="38">-11,4</td>
<td width="33">+0,1</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+6,7</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,9</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td colspan="2" width="38">-19,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Finland </strong></td>
<td width="33">+0,3</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+10,4</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="33">+0,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+1,3</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="33">+0,3</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+17,4</td>
<td colspan="2" width="38"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Lithuania </strong></td>
<td width="33">+0,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+1,6</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="33">+0,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+1,5</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="33">+0,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+1,1</td>
<td colspan="2" width="38"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,1</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="38">-1,3</td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,1</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="40">-3,3</td>
<td width="33">+0,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+0,3</td>
<td colspan="2" width="38"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Latvia</strong></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,0</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="38">-0,5</td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,0</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="40">-1,0</td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,0</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td colspan="2" width="38">-0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Iceland </strong></td>
<td width="33">+0,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+0,0</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td width="33">+0,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="38">+1,0</td>
<td width="40"></td>
<td width="33"></td>
<td width="40">-0,0</td>
<td width="38"></td>
<td colspan="2" width="38">-0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="61"><strong>Baltic countries, total</strong></td>
<td width="33">+2,8</td>
<td width="40">-6,6</td>
<td width="38">+100,0</td>
<td width="38">-100,0</td>
<td width="33">+1,9</td>
<td width="40">-2,7</td>
<td width="38">100,0</td>
<td width="40">-100,0</td>
<td width="33">+1,6</td>
<td width="40">-4,5</td>
<td width="38">+100,0</td>
<td colspan="2" width="38">-100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Note. The Baltic countries are presented in Tables 10 and 11 in descending order of their turnover with Germany in January-March 2015.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Russia accounted for more than 80% of decline of the German-Baltic trade, including more than 90% reduction in German exports and almost 70% reduction in German imports. The extent of the fall was 31.6% of turnover (including 33.9% for exports from Germany and 29.9% for imports into Germany). Noticeable, but not as dramatic, contraction of trade with Germany happened also in Estonia (-14.2% in turnover due to the decrease of exports from Germany by 19.0%) and in Norway (-10.3% in turnover due to 16.5% decline of imports in Germany). Two other countries &#8211; Denmark and Latvia &#8211; showed a moderate reduction in trade with Germany. The other five countries had a positive balance, with the biggest step forward made by Poland (it provided more than 80% of the growth of the German-Baltic turnover, including more than 50% of the growth of German exports and over 80% in increase in German imports). As a result, Poland, that was lagging behind Russia in turnover with Germany by 7.4% in 2012, surpassed Russia two-fold on this indicator in the first quarter of 2015.</p>
<p>The main products that led to a sharp collapse of the German-Russian trade:</p>
<ul>
<li>for exports from Germany &#8211; eight positions from the commodity group &#8220;finished products&#8221; (50.1% decline in the context of three-digit classification), namely: automotive components (13.7%), passenger cars (9.3%), aerial vehicles (6.8%), trucks (4.9%), machines without sectoral specialization (4.0%), office and computing equipment (3.9%), pharmaceutical products (3.8%), machinery for mining and construction (3.6%);</li>
<li>for imports into Germany &#8211; one position from the commodity group &#8220;raw material&#8221;, namely: oil/gas (84.4% decline in the context of three-digit classification); the negative trend was reinforced by reduction of imports of semi-finished products, namely oil products (10.7%), which is Russia&#8217;s second most important import goods, that previously performed the role of a shock absorber.</li>
</ul>
<p>The value of Russia as a trading company for Germany decreased markedly. The share of Russia in the export of goods from Germany declined from 2.6% in 2014 to 1.7% in 2015 (only three years ago, in 2012, it was 3.5%). As a German consumer the Russian Federation moved from the 12th place in 2014 to the 15th place in 2015. Russia’s best result was the 11th place in 2011-2012, and the worst – the 20th place in 1999. Russian automotive components descended from the 10th place in 2014 to the 18th place in 2015; Russia’s passenger cars &#8211; from the 15th to the 17th. If this trend persists, Russia can find itself already in two years in the third ten export partners of Germany, as it will cease to represent any serious business interest for Germany.</p>
<p>The share of Russia in the import of goods to Germany fell from 4.2% in 2014 to 3.1% in 2015 (the highest level of this indicator was recorded in 2012 &#8211; 4.7%). As a German supplier, Russia dropped from the 10th place in 2014 to the 12th place in 2015. In 2011-2013, the country kept the 7th place, in 1999 it was on the 16th place. In 2015, the Russian Federation retained the 1st place for the group &#8220;oil/gas&#8221; (its share in German imports amounted to 29.1%), but in the context of four-digit classification it kept the championship only for oil with a share of 28.2%, whereas for gas it moved to the 2nd place (with a share of 30.0%), losing to Norway (34.2%). Russia&#8217;s role in the import of oil/gas in Germany peaked in 2011 (36.8%); since then it has been steadily weakening, and since 2015 this trend has not been blocked, as before, by the increasing role of Russia in the German imports of oil products (2010 &#8211; 10.0%, 2014 &#8211; 23.3%, 2015 &#8211; 18.9%), and the other Russian products are not comparable with those main products in terms of imports in Germany. In the second ten import partners of Germany Russia will stay longer than in the same weight category for exports from Germany, but the probability of a significant reduction in the influence of Russian business on the German market is very high.</p>
<p>International trade, as well as the nature, abhors a vacuum. Collapsing trade relations with Russia will strengthen Germany&#8217;s orientation to other counterparties. Regarding the Baltic States, this would be beneficial, first of all, for Poland, Sweden and Norway: Poland will strengthen its leadership, Sweden will push Russia to the third place in terms of turnover, Norway will close the gap from Russia in terms of imports into Germany.</p>
<p><strong>List of references</strong></p>
<p>Statistisches Bundesamt. Genesis-Online Datenbank. Statistik 51000. Außenhandel. URL: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>[1] Here and elsewhere &#8211; calculated according to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt. Genesis-Online Datenbank. Statistik 51000. Außenhandel. URL: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online). Dataareperiodicallyupdated. The Baltic countries are understood as countries that along with Germany are included in the Council of the Baltic Sea States (Denmark, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Estonia).</p>
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