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		<title>How changing consumer habits disrupt the media landscape</title>
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				<category><![CDATA[Amber Bridge. Journal of Regional Studies]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Dr Christian Graggaber — Chief Digital Officer, Hubert Burda Media Russia, Russia.  The past years have seen a global shift in the media landscape which can be broken down into three major changes.  Consumers are moving from print to digital, they are switching from fixed to mobile driven consumption and the growth in the East [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p><strong><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">Dr Christian Graggaber </span><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">— Chief Digital Officer, Hubert Burda Media Russia, Russia. </span></strong></p>
<p><em>The past years have seen a global shift in the media landscape which can be broken down into three major changes.  Consumers are moving from print to digital, they are switching from fixed to mobile driven consumption and the growth in the East is exceeding the growth in the West. In addition consumers are empowered through internet, advertisers have more innovative ways for promoting their products and business in general is transforming to digital.</em></p>
<p><em>The article desribes the current market situation by comparing Germany and other developed countries with the development in Russia, outlines the challenges that media houses are facing and gives examples of success stories. Main conclusion is that media houses are competing today with a new generation of content providers. To attract lasting attention they have to reinvent the way they do business. </em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Few industries have been changed more by the arrival of broadband Internet and widespread ownership of mobile phones than the content creating industry. The media world or rather the consumption of content is undergoing rapid change; the most fundamental change in its history. The new market environment requires traditional content creators and publishers to diverge from their habitual way of doing business, to take risks and to innovate in order to define a sustainably successful path for the future. In fact it is more than innovation, which is required. It is a transformation.</p>
<p>Print publishers now need to adapt to an environment where their customers have started to consume content on other devices, such as on their PCs and mobile phones and in other environments, for example while on the go. Publishers of today need to be able to provide multiple consumer touch points for their content on all available devices and allow for their content to not only be passively consumed but to be actively interacted with. Customers do not even stay only customers but they have become suppliers of content and the Internet has turned the girl or boy next door with a blog into an online sensation with literally thousands, sometimes even millions of avid followers. This drastic change of consumer preferences and habits is forcing well established publishers to completely reinvent themselves.</p>
<p>In most developed countries, the Internet already represents the main motor of economic growth. The online world accounts for up to thirteen per cent of economic output and is driving the creation of new companies, new jobs and new opportunities.[1] It allows, with a few clicks of a mouse, for a Russian citizen to read a German newspaper or for a Polish fashion designer to reach a global marketplace. The Internet is breaking down language barriers and geographic barriers, changing global society forever. The Internet now accounts for 25 per cent of the increase in German exports in the last decade. For example between 2007 and 2011 nearly 30.000 small companies were founded in Germany using <em>Google</em> products. These companies now represent EUR 8+ billion in annual revenues and have created 100.000+ new jobs[2]. This development is visible in Russia as well, where the Internet turned into a profitable business worth up to 8.5% of GDP according to estimations of the Russian Government.</p>
<p>No wonder that media companies in general are taking on the challenge and seizing the opportunity to adapt their organisations. Well established players like global media group Hubert Burda Media (www.burda.com) already generate more than 50% of its revenues from digital ventures. Other media houses have chosen an even more radical and thus risky path to pursue a digital-only strategy. But we do not only see the well-established media houses changing. We also see new players coming into the market. In fact players that did not even exist ten or fifteen years ago are now dominating the market. One of the biggest such players is <em>Google</em>. In just a few years, starting in 1998, Google has grown to employ almost 50.000 people worldwide and it generated USD sixty Billion in revenues last year. A similar success story are <em>Yandex</em> in all Russian speaking territories and other emerging market heroes.</p>
<p>As consumers are inundated with daily offers of media, the greatest challenge is relevancy.</p>
<p>In today’s world it is no longer enough to create content and deliver it to an audience. The challenge is to create relevant content and deliver it to the relevant audience on the right device and at the right time. Moreover, consumers expect more than a one-way information flow. They expect engagement and interaction. To attract lasting attention publishers must understand their customers much more intimately than before and inspire them to engage and interact with their content. Only if a media publication succeeds in doing so, it will find a permanent place in people’s lives, now and in the future – no matter via which mode of delivery, online, mobile or classic print.</p>
<p>Media companies need to be at the forefront of this transformation in order to not be overrun by it. They need to not only follow the changes but drive the changes. Consumers have become emancipated and loyalty to old established print brands, as evidenced by the decline in national print newspaper circulation, has evaporated. Digital only publishers, such as <em>Mashable</em> and <em>The Huffington Post</em> on the contrary have rapidly built multi-million readerships.</p>
<p>Also Burda successfully started to prepare itself for these challenges more than a decade ago and identified three ingredients to ensure a successful future.</p>
<ol>
<li>Understand the complexity and importance of further technological development and shape the technologies that will be preeminent to successfully run the businesses of tomorrow;</li>
<li>Have clear knowledge about the world today’s consumers live in; and</li>
<li>Anticipate future market trends.</li>
</ol>
<p>In the most developed online markets the media landscape is a mix of print and online. Contrary to what some Naysayers have said, print has not died… nor will it die. Both forms of media consumption will survive in the long term and complement one another. The same customer who might read his daily news during the week on his mobile phone, might buy a weekly summary print publication or a Sunday newspaper. He might choose to get the headlines digitally but then delve into the details in print or vice versa.</p>
<p>Reproducing print content online without any changes does not work. Simple PDF versions of magazines are not enough any longer. Since content is consumed in a different way today it also needs to be produced in a different way: bundled in different ways for different channels, more interactive including visual elements like video or photo. Particularly in online there is no one-size-fits-all strategy. Online content needs to draw customers in and engage them much more holistically.</p>
<p>In consumer-oriented Internet one has to create different types of digital products tailor-made for the consumer’s needs. The media’s core mission is to relate to people and their lifestyles and take on a positive and supportive role. The media’s job is to deliver products that are informative, entertaining and helpful. This has also been the case in the past, but the online and mobile channels can facilitate this much more effectively than print was ever able to.</p>
<p>Most importantly, online there is no place for mediocrity. Distribution is ubiquitous and instantaneous. Anyone can create content and the public will be the judge of that content. The measure of quality is now the number of likes and shares it receives and how quickly it does so. More so than ever before every single piece of content needs to be memorable and differentiated.  Average content can no longer be hidden in between columns over columns of newspaper roll. Every article, every video needs to stand on its own. Consumers expect targeted, rich, platform-optimised user experiences. If they don’t get it, they won’t come back to the content provider no matter who it is</p>
<p>Consumers are looking for content providers where they can interact with the content, the content provider as well as with each other. Examples like <em>Wikipedia</em> or <em>The Huffington Post</em> that Burda has recently successfully launched in Germany are even built on the back of user-generated content.</p>
<p>One main trend is multi device use – the future looks “mobile”</p>
<p>It’s been about four years since the launch of the iPad and about seven years since the first iPhone came out – few will doubt that we are in the age of mobile. Globally, the smartphone market passed a major milestone in 2013 with 1billion devices sold during the year. Global tablet sales surged 50% in 2013 and mobile sales surpassed PC sales for the first time, at the end of 2013[3]. By 2017, it is projected that smartphone sales will hit 1.8 billion representing 82% of total mobiles phone sold[4]. So what does this mean for Russia? Already mobile phone ownership in Russia is commonplace. In fact mobiles are so popular that more than 50% of owners own more than 1[5]. This leads many to believe that content consumption might skip the PC and laptops and go straight to mobile and tablet devices.</p>
<p>The increasing penetration of smartphones and tablets is already having an impact on magazines, with some publishers seeing huge jumps in mobile traffic. In the US, some magazines are getting up to 50 per cent of its traffic from mobile. Not so long ago, only in 2011, 86 per cent of Conde’ Nast UK’s traffic came from PCs. With less than 1 per cent via tablet and 14 per cent from mobile. Just two years later, desktop traffic had fallen to 58 per cent, while mobile had more than doubled to 30 per cent and tablets rose from 1 per cent to 12 per cent. Similar tendencies can be seen in German-speaking countries as well.</p>
<p>This required another wave of innovation whereby content owners and publishers needed to adapt their content again to another device with new dimensions and characteristics. In Germany we see for example that tablet users like the combination between mobile and print. They like to read magazines on their tablets – magazines that are originally published as print version but also made available via mobile devices. This explains that being online or being a digital native does not mean that society will become digital-only. Still consumers expect and also like to get the most out of the vast possibilities online media offers. And this is a major challenge for most media houses.</p>
<p>Chetan Charma, a mobile technology consultant, predicts that “we are entering the Connected Intelligence era”. These two operative words will change the industry vertical from scratch and make especially media houses look into defining new strategies on how to create and distribute content.</p>
<p>They are forced to change the way content sites are built and how they are monetised. Mobile is becoming the dominant platform in developed countries, still, many media houses face difficulties in finding the right way towards mobile applications. Germany is here not much ahead of Russia or other emerging countries.</p>
<p>Figures show for example that tablet magazine subscriptions still accounted for no more than 3 per cent of total magazine circulation in the first half of 2013, despite the growth of tablet ownership[6]. But it is expected that over the next 7 years magazines will undergo a huge change, with digital editions edging print by 2020 in major European countries like Germany and the US[7]. This development will bring one additional hurdle as there are many players in the market fighting for mobile user’s attention and time: Apps, social networks, games, etc. Content Publishers are therefore in a new way of competition with companies that have not been direct competitors previously.</p>
<p>In additional to a new way of competition, mobile also makes people use different applications at the same time. Thus the traditional silos of media types are disappearing.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Source: Barclays (2014), <em>Russian Internet and Media</em></p>
<p>Online media requires innovative ways for generating revenues</p>
<p>One challenge for media houses is that online media products – no matter if mobile or desktop &#8211; often require different ways of generating revenues than traditional media where the revenues come from ad sales and print copy sales. When turning print content into online content, dollars are often turned into pennies. Reason is that online content is expected to be offered for free and revenues from online ad sales are lower than from print ad sales. Despite this the share of adspend on Internet will significantly increase over time, mainly at the expense of Print.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Source: ZenithOptimedia</p>
<p>Three main revenue drivers are currently successfully used: First, transaction-generated revenues play an increasing role when defining successful business models. This means that online offers are free of charge and the business owner only gets a cut once a consumer has decided on purchasing something online. Second, CPM (or “cost per mille” which is the cost per thousand views) models are still popular. This is the marketing measurement index and it is used to monetize content in digital media via ad sales. The third source is revenues from direct sales. Either by selling content or by online retail businesses. One sub segment of this model is subscription based e-commerce. This model is very popular because people get the subscribed service on a regular basis no matter if it is online content, print content or products (food, toys, or clothes). We see growing demand for this model in Russia, although due to the lack of reliable infrastructure it is still at an early stage.</p>
<p>More and more media companies use all three ways of monetisation. As a consequence traditional media houses are also becoming retail companies because they enter direct sales. It is not for example only about showing people what they may like but also about telling them where to buy. Most successful business models follow the consumers to the point of transaction – the point of sales. And the point of sales is increasingly online.</p>
<p>Direct sales via internet is getting more and more important in Germany. The online retail market in Germany is up to almost 50 billion euros[8]. The market is expected to grow 12 per cent per annum through 2017, faster than in any other Western European country. E-commerce accounts for 83% of all revenues made online. The estimated share of online retail in Germany in total retail is 6.6% at the moment. Germany might be the fastest growing country in Western Europe, still, Russia is growing faster. No surprise, Russia’s e-commerce market is smaller than the German market. It was EUR 10,4bln in 2013, up 27% from 2012 and the growth rate is expected to be 35% annually reaching 4.5% of total retail by the end of 2015[9]. According to other statistics, the Russian e-commerce sector could grow to EUR 35-50bln by the end of this decade and exceed EUR 75bln in ten years[10]. Comparing Russia to Germany shows the massive growth potential that Russia has. The upcoming years will bring a lot of new online businesses, the vast majority of revenues will come from direct sales and media houses will have a good chance to get a big portion of the business – as they do in Germany.</p>
<p>Again, mobile devices start to play a leading role when it comes to generating revenues, as the devices can be used for more than just for consuming content. Managers are nowadays more and more talking about m-commerce instead of e-commerce. M-commerce is the delivery of electronic commerce capabilities directly into the consumer’s hand via wireless technology. Usually m-commerce is created via tablets or smartphones. Publishers associate it often with items featured in editorial copies that can be directly purchased. Mobile is now the key driver behind the growth of e-commerce. Whiles sales made on desktop or laptop computers are expected to grow by 9% in the UK in 2014, they are expected to increase by 62% on mobile devices. Another statistics show that 100 per cent of year-over-year online sales growth in the UK was entirely mobile in the second quarter of 2013[11]. Desktop revenue development was flat for the first quarter.</p>
<p>Until recently, integrating e-commerce and m-commerce into a publication or website was not in the focus of traditional editorial teams while also being labour- and cost intensive. Historically, the editor’s opinion was nearly sacrosanct. Editors had the power to make commercial initiatives fly or die. This is not any more the case at least in the US, UK or Germany. Times have changed and the media and media consumers don’t play the same rules any more. Editors recognised that they must change with the times in order to stay in business. One way as mentioned is to make content shoppable by integrating new technology.</p>
<p>If an editor recommends a certain handbag and the consumer likes it then the editor should not make it too hard for them to buy it.  In Germany there is companies that handle the various technological demands of making a magazine’s site or tablet edition shoppable while producing easy-to-use elegant shopping tabs and checkout options. Shoppable content is editorial containing rich, participatory information that does not disrupt the context. These images more than complement the text.  After having made written content shoppable one of the next big trends will be shoppable video content.</p>
<p>The easy access to products combined with curated content done by publishers convinces consumers more and more to make a purchase There is also a solutions for readers who do not want to make an immediate purchase. As on <em>Amazon</em> some sites offer a sort of wish list, enriched with a technology that trigger email alerts when an item’s price drops or an out-of-stock article becomes available. The consumer can access his or her list via mobile device, enabling them to call it up when they are shopping in a store. Statistics show that more than ninety per cent of users respond to these post-discovery notifications, establishing significant ongoing engagement.[12] Today, consumers go on an online discovery journey when shopping. Twenty years ago, consumers had limited ways to discover good deals, the purchasing path was limited to offline print titles for information gathering and offline retail stores for the purchase. Today, as news, communication and entertainment shifted online, the purchasing path shifted online, as well. Auto dealer specials are checked on their websites instead of in newspapers, the yellow pages have been replaced by <em>Google</em> and asking friends for a recommendation before a purchase is done on <em>Facebook</em>. Consumers do not distinguish between editorial and advertising, both forms of content are equally valuable when looking for a product. Shoppable content is still in its early stage but it seems that when a publisher makes editorial and advertising shoppable, their readers are spending more time engaging with those ads. It reinforces the idea that a consumer is going on a discovery journey where the type of content, or medium for that matter, is irrelevant.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Data management will help to identify and understand trends</p>
<p>One of the big factors for being successful in internet and identifying future trends is the collection and management of consumer data. And this factor is equally important for any online business model.</p>
<p>The idea of big data is not new: George Orwell’s classic <em>1984</em> which was written in 1949 was based on a sort of big data usage. We are still far away from even theoretically being able to use data as it was used in <em>1984</em> but still data analyses is getting more and more important.</p>
<p>Social networks, online shops, video portals, search engines – we all leave behind a vast amount of information on the internet. While consumers sometimes feel threatened by this it’s a real boom for companies who can use this data to optimize and align their offerings to meet customer needs. But not all businesses utilize this advantage. While today collecting data is neither complicated nor expensive companies often collect too much data and then do not know how to use it in a meaningful way.</p>
<p>To utilize big data in a meaningful way, companies need to change their behaviour patterns. Instead of traditional databases with historical information that verifies what customers have already purchased, now they have a flood of unsorted data volumes that must be evaluated quickly and without rigid framework in order to detect trends and the resulting interests early on. This requires new IT solutions and business structures. Not only in Russia but also in Germany companies are still often at an early stage of changing their habits. In Germany they especially worry about data protection when using big data analysis. There is no faster way to lose a customer’s trust than to use data for a purpose other than the one previously announced   .</p>
<p>However having big data results in a competitive advantage. The e-commerce retailer <em>Amazon.com</em> now gathers so much data that this is comparable to a major research institute. But, just having data does not make you a winner.</p>
<p>Companies need to learn to interpret and take the right actions after the analysis. Having big amount of data can change the way companies compete because they simply can test upfront their decisions by analysing big data. Big data might tell companies where the consumer is moving to. As mentioned above companies have to follow the consumer to the point of transaction – the point of sale. Big data will help companies move into this direction by better satisfying consumer’s needs. An extremely loyal customer base (as we could see it in print until some years ago) is a hard thing to find nowadays. Businesses that want to succeed must respond quickly to new needs. Online retailers are now able to track the behaviour of individual customers from Internet click streams. In the future they will also be able to update their preferences and model their likely behaviour in real time.</p>
<p>In 2012, US retail giant <em>Target</em> created an algorithm to identify pregnant customers in their second trimester using purchase data (such as the buying of prenatal vitamins) and other factors, some purchased, some collected by the company itself[13].  In Retail this is quite common now. Until not so long ago publishers had to do the analysis via simple circulation numbers: up here down there…but why? Big data collections helps to look into the future and analyse trends instead of looking at static circulation numbers.</p>
<p>Still today most great products are a result of visionary and strong teams and not simply a result from big data analysis. Having the ability to make data-driven decisions is getting more and more important, though. It is a helpful basis for any decision taking process. Sometimes big data shows how people use a product in ways the responsible managers did not expect. It provides a good insight into how a product can be used and improved and companies can further communicate with consumers and build loyalty.</p>
<p>Internationally, there are already successful examples of magazines publishers using cutting edge data algorithm. The Atlantic Group for example launched a magazine that provides intelligent content customised via a given consumer’s interaction with the site[14]. Advertising blocks showing up on a chosen website or within the email interface are also a result of big data analysis. Chances are likely that the advertising seen is for a product the user searched for but did not purchase, yet.</p>
<p>Because of big data, media content supply could be disrupted in the same way as the music industry was disrupted about a decade ago. In the 90s and earlier people consumed curated music sold via CDs. This was later replaced by MP3s. Today individualised playlists are compiled by companies like Pandora or Spotify. The same could happen to magazines and books. In Germany and the US there are companies experimenting with robot journalism. It screens available, fresh content and tailors it for consumers by supplying the consumer only with content that is most interesting for him or her. By this, consumers can for example read an article about the results of the latest football game of the preferred team focusing on the performance of the consumer’s favourite football player instead of giving an overall general review of a game. One of the first companies offering this service is <em>Automated Insights</em> for <em>Yahoo.</em></p>
<p>In other words publishers just might deliver consumers with content and see what they like. Then they can watch and analyse their reading habits and finally fine-tune the delivered content according to the consumer’s preferences. In a nutshell, data driven content and the way it is consumed by consumers are important to creating work that is engaging and has a high return on investment.</p>
<p>Print is reinventing itself</p>
<p>I previously mentioned that the future is a hybrid model between print and digital. There is not only a clear tendency of integrating print into digital but also vice versa integrating the possibilities of digital into print. Since quite some time we see a growing creativity when it comes to print publishing and especially advertising agencies play a leading role in this. <em>FIPP</em> – the worldwide media association – collected best practice examples for its “Innovations in Magazine Media 2014 World Report”. Some of the examples prove that publishing houses find smart ways of bringing digital into print. And if it is done in a nice way then print will have a sustainable successful future, also in Russia.</p>
<p>In one of the print issues of Forbes magazine, <em>Microsoft</em> promoted its new Office 365 software by including a small wireless Wi-Fi router[15]. The router was placed in a four page insert that ran in a number of magazines sent to business and technology professionals targeted by <em>Microsoft</em>. The router could connect up to five devices to the internet and lasted for two to three hours before it had to be recharged. Another example of creative print was created by <em>Billboard</em> Brazil using NFC. Billboard Brazil has run a test in a special edition magazine with an NFC sticker on its front cover. The sticker encouraged consumers to hold their phone on the cover in order to instantly receive a playlist of some features artists without using QR codes and without downloading anything. The campaign had the goal to increase the knowledge about NFC and to explain people how to use it. NFC devices are also used in contactless payment systems, similar to those currently used in credit cards. Most people do not know they have NFC capability and even if they know they do not know how to use it. The ad in <em>Billboard</em> promoted NFC by sharing a positive experience with its users. Motorola was running a print ad campaign for its Moto X cell phone where consumers had the opportunity to try different colour combinations and see all of the options right before their eyes in a print ad. The advertising was made up of four batteries, three LEDs, some Plexiglas, and a series of buttons. The ad allowed readers to customise the Moto phone in 11 different colours, by tapping different keys to try out different looks.</p>
<p>Technology is a critical game changer that can create new business models and make old business models obsolete. New devices and communication channels continue to change the way media is consumed and media companies in the whole world are developing new approaches in order to sustainably and successfully reach consumers. The challenge is to on the one hand digitize and on the other hand maintain traditional operations during the transformation process. Publishing houses in Russia need to put in place a dual structure to maintain their traditional business model while implementing a second structure for digital. What we have seen in Germany is valid for all countries: The media industry is going through a major structural transformation brought about by a combination of factors, including the rise of digital media and as a consequence changes in the media-consuming habits of it consumers resulting in a deterioration of its traditional economic model. As a consequence media companies must reinvent themselves by seeking out new markets, new consumers and new business models to stay successful. The good thing for society is that the war for new successful business models will result in a high consumer focus of which everyone should benefit in the long run.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>[1]OECD (2013), The Internet Economy on the Rise: Progress since the Seoul Declaration, OECD Publishing</p>
<p>[2]Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Koeln Consult GmbH (2012), generationgoogle** Innovative Geschaeftsmodelle mit dem Internet</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>[3]IDC Corporate USA (2014), Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker</p>
<p>[4]NPD Display Search (2013), Smartphone Industry Quarterly Report</p>
<p>[5]Nielsen (2013), The Mobile Consumer – A Global Snapshot</p>
<p>[6]Alliance for Audited Media (2013), Semiannual Snapshot Report</p>
<p>[7]mediaIDEAS (2012), E-Reading Devices and Paginated Media Forecasts. 2011-2021: The Impact of a New Digital Content Market</p>
<p>[8]Ecommercenews.eu (2014), Ecommerce in Germany</p>
<p>[9]MorganStanley Research (2013), E-Commerce Disruption: A Global Theme – Transforming Traditional Retail<em>           </em></p>
<p>[10]East-West Digital News (2014), E-Commerce in Russia</p>
<p>[11]Capgemini (2014) &amp; IMRG (2014), IMRG Capgemini E-Retail Sales Index</p>
<p>[12]FIPP, “Innovations in Media 2014 World Report”</p>
<p>[13]FIPP, “Innovations in Media 2014 World Report”</p>
<p>[14]FIPP, “Innovations in Media 2014 World Report”</p>
<p>[15] Adweek.com (2013, David Kieferaber)</p>
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		<title>A Long And Winding Road: A specific way of each Baltic country to the Eurozone</title>
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		<description><![CDATA[Olenchenko Vladimir Anatolievich, PhD in law, senior researcher, the Center for European Research of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, of the Russian Academy of Science. Currently the topic of euro is unquestionably among the most relevant in Europe and all over the world. It is of interest to politicians and businessmen, economists [&#8230;]]]></description>
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<p><strong><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">Olenchenko Vladimir Anatolievich, </span><span style="color: #4c4c4c;">PhD in law, senior researcher, the Center for European Research of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, of the Russian Academy of Science.</span></strong></p>
<p><em>Currently the topic of euro is unquestionably among the most relevant in Europe and all over the world. It is of interest to politicians and businessmen, economists and citizens. The article is aimed at the analysis of the causes and motives of the desire of the Baltic republics to substitute national currencies with euro. This study may help understanding, why small European countries tend more than others to the introduction of the euro. The research was based on the method of comparing various factors, affecting the state of the Baltic economies, with the expectation to identify those, that are of key importance. The research investigated the circumstances and the mechanism of the Baltic republics joining the euro zone. The study showed, that the desire of the Baltic States to join the euro zone is caused by domestic and foreign economic circumstances. The Baltic leaders wanted to strengthen their authority among the local population and at the same time to promote maximum integration of the Baltics. Simultaneously foreign capital operating in the Baltics and pursuing its goals, dictates when and in what sequence to adopt the euro in the Baltics. In general, it is obvious that the North European capital is the main lever of the Baltic economies and its interests, in particular, introduction of the euro in the Baltic States.</em></p>
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<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>2014 was the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the membership of the Baltic countries in the European Union. The date was not widely celebrated neither in the EU, nor at the national level, as the results of the Baltic decades could not be called successful. De-industrialization, mass labour emigration, high unemployment, weak investment appeal, unclear economic outlook &#8211; here are the Baltic economies today, compared with initial conditions for EU accession. Nevertheless, the Baltic leaders continue the integration process. In particular, according to the adopted decision of the European Union dd. 01.01.2015, the euro is introduced in Lithuania and thus all three Baltic republics receive the status of the members of the euro zone (Estonia &#8211; from 01.01.2011, Latvia &#8211; from 01.01.2014).</p>
<p><strong>Historical background </strong></p>
<p>In the 90s of the twentieth century the states, that formed the Soviet Union or that were a part of the socialist community, faced the choice of a new path of its development due to fundamental changes in the world order.</p>
<p>Curious phenomenon in this regard happened in the Baltics &#8211; Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. Traditionally, they were positioned by American and European politicians and experts as an alien part of the Soviet system, in particular, their organic ties with Western Europe and the whole Western world was emphasised various times. So their singling out of the Soviet system was assumed to be comparable with the effect of overriping a fruit on the tree – you just touch it, and it will fall from its branches.</p>
<p>However, despite the fact that in the early 90s of the twentieth century, a number of key positions in the new political leadership of the Baltic republics was taken by candid russophobes, the general mood of the population was very far from being able to consider it anti-Russian. Moreover, &#8216;revolutionary&#8217; euphoria of the 90s was melting, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia drew more attention to the fore questions of supplying population with work essentials, the maintenance of normal functioning of the state.</p>
<p>In this sense, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia economically remained deeply integrated into the national economic relations of former Soviet republics, who had respectively serious influence on the political life of the Baltic republics. In general, on the eve of the 2000s the Baltics reflected a drift toward the observed prevalence of sentiment in favour of a preferred development of the Baltic republics within the existing historical and geographical ties, especially with Russia and Belarus.</p>
<p>It was clearly shown by foreign capital, primarily North European, that although had rushed to the Baltics, but for about 10 years had stayed in waiting position, not excluding the reversible movement of the Baltics to Russia. For example, the North European banks, which although had resources and expertise, avoided to open business on their own, preferring to acquire small share of the local capital, entering into its structure, retaining its name and acting on its behalf.</p>
<p>In this context the strategy of strengthening the retention of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in the area of attraction to the West, which was embodied in the fact, that the presidents of the Baltic countries were invited from the USA (Latvia &#8211; Vic Freiberg, Lithuania &#8211; Valdas Adamkus, Estonia &#8211; Henrik Ilves). During their presidential term these countries submitted applications to join the European Union. Those applications have become an indirect recognition of the fact, that the Baltic economies do not have the capacity of unsubsidized, independent and autonomous development. North European financial capital was selected as the source of borrowed funds.</p>
<p><strong>Applications for membership in the European Union </strong></p>
<p>Application of the Baltics for EU membership was submitted in the mid 90s, but they were satisfied only in the mid-2000s. It is reasonable to analyze, why it took more than 10 years. The main obstacle was that the concept of activities of the European Union did not provide its development to the east. Only in 2000, during the summit in Nice, the EU took the decision of principle possibility of its expansion to Eastern Europe and the Baltics. Another limiting circumstance was doubts of the European Commission on when and in what form (adoption in groups or individually) the EU could meet the demands, so that new members do not become a serious encumbrance to EU economy. As a result, the question of joining of the Baltics to the European Union was moved only with Jose Manuel Barroso team, who became the new leader of the European Commission. As it is known, his work as a chairman of the European Commission represented the consistent and persistent activities in the Euro-Atlantic direction of the European Union.</p>
<p>It is seen, that the entry of the Baltics to the European Union was not a decision of indigenous Baltic elite, but was introduced from outside. It is also clear, that this idea did not come from the European Union, which is conceptually and organizationally did not plan any activity in the eastern direction. In practice, the idea was implemented only by Barroso team. In other words, the above circumstances are likely to confirm, that the idea of joining the Baltics to the European Union and its practical implementation both have transatlantic origin. Officially, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia joined the European Union on 01.05.2004.</p>
<p><strong>The role of the North European financial capital</strong></p>
<p>The first few years of membership of the Baltics in the European Union were characterized by an unprecedented surge in the growth of the national GDP, which reached 10% [1(1)]. Outside observers were inclined to treat it due to the capacity of the EU and strongly exaggerated the idea, that the development of the Baltic countries was artificially constrained by the Soviet Union and therefore the other former Soviet republics should be guided not by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but by the European Union.</p>
<p>However, analysis of the structure of GDP formation in the Baltic countries during this period showed, that its major part consisted of financial transactions of North European banks, mainly Swedish (SEB, Swedbank). Northern Europeans aggressively lent funds to people and local businesses. The primary tool was lending at small percentage (sometimes less than 2%), but for a long term (40 years). Northern European banks thus implemented created by them in the 90es of the twentieth century competitive advantages of equal participation in local credit institutions and ensuring themselves some legal benefits.</p>
<p>As noted above, the North European capital by its nature is very cautious and before joining of the Baltic countries to the European Union it did not believe in many business activities. The new status of the Baltic countries was perceived by the North European capital as political and economical guarantee of further investments to the Baltics.</p>
<p>At the same time, high rates of GDP growth were perceived by Baltic population and leadership as real national economic recovery. The Baltics took initiatives for the entire European Union and almost considered themselves as equal to the founders of the organization.</p>
<p><strong>Reference points for the accelerated introduction of the euro</strong></p>
<p>It is significant, that almost immediately after joining the EU Latvia (national currency LVL) and Lithuania (LTL) appealed to the exchange rate mechanism -2 (MOK -2, Exchange rate mechanism (EKR) &#8211; 2), which is an integral part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), known colloquially as the euro zone. The mechanism provides the establishment of a fixed exchange rate of the national currency to the euro, on the understanding that its market rate can fluctuate only within ± 15%. Joining the mechanism is made on the basis of an agreement between the National Bank and the ECB. The two-year participation in the mechanism of the exchange rate without revision ratio (that is, without devaluations and revaluations) serves as the basis for the application to join the euro zone [4(1)]. As for Estonia, its currency (CZK) was initially pegged to the German mark and after the introduction of the euro in the EU the fixed exchange rate of the crown was transformed into a suitable fixed exchange rate of the euro.</p>
<p>Certainly the euro, which has become a reality in the European Union since 01.01.2002, provides a number of advantages to the countries within the euro zone. First and foremost is that the use of the euro in the netting minimizes the risk of loss, usually expected when changing money from one currency to another. Given that most of the commercial and financial transactions in the European Union are accounted for the domestic market, a Member State receives a certain guarantee against such risks. That leads to a relative alignment of prices, which reduces the possibility of speculative transactions related to exchange rate differences &#8211; an activity called as arbitration of exchange. The possibility of refinancing on a national scale and at the corporate level appears due to the issuance of bonds, denominated in euros [5(1)].</p>
<p>At the same time it should be emphasized, that the outlined advantages appear under certain conditions. The starting point is that these benefits work, when countries are the members of the euro zone. Currently, there are 18 members. As of 01.01.2015 Lithuania is to join them and then their number will reach 19. For comparison, it should be noted that the total number of countries – EU members is 28. It should be taken into account, that a number of countries has introduced the use of the euro as the national currency apart from the membership the euro zone. These countries fall into several groups. So one of the countries that consider the euro as the national currency only for their own in particular, Montenegro and Kosovo. Other countries are not members of the EU, but as per the agreement with the European Central Bank, they have received the right to use the euro, such as the Vatican. Neither one, nor the other group of countries belong to the euro zone and therefore cannot enjoy the full benefits of it.</p>
<p>It implies, that the Baltic countries theoretically faced several variants of behaviour in relation to the euro. Two were described above. One more variant was the biggest integration into the European Union and then raising the question of joining the euro zone. All three countries opted for rapid joining the euro zone.</p>
<p><strong>Fiasco of Lithuanian application for the euro</strong></p>
<p>In the early 90es taking into account prevailing anti-Soviet mood Lithuania assumed the role of the leader among the Baltic republics. It put forward the ideas, that required in its view, joint implementation, and often spoke on behalf of the Baltic republics. It was partly motivated by the fact, that Lithuania was the largest in terms of population and territory in the region, and its leaders seemed to be more active and so to say perter, than their Baltic neighbours. In particular, the initiative of Lithuania to cooperate within the Baltic countries was institutionalized by establishing inter-parliamentary body, which was named the Baltic Assembly.</p>
<p>It was very difficult to make this intention economically profitable. Generally Baltic economies are of the same type, based on the provision of services in the field of transit and production of agricultural and fishing products. By virtue of this fact, they are more prone to competition than cooperation. For example, during Soviet times their mutual trade accounted for only 5% of the national trade with other Soviet republics [6(1)]. In fact, the Soviet Union leveled the competition between them and provided the Baltic republics such a division of labour among the Soviet republics, which allowed them to prosper economically, without hindering each other.</p>
<p>However, Lithuania continued to proactively take on mission of unifying the Baltic republics and tried to push Latvia and Estonia for cooperation in the economic field. Basically, it relied on the fact, that Lithuania had a nuclear power plant (NPP Ignalina), which was built by the Soviet Union as a regional plant, in good faith to fulfill its role, and the Baltic economies were in a certain extent dependent on it. Lithuania also initiated various kinds of joint activities for the preparation of the Baltic republics to join the EU.</p>
<p>After the entry of the Baltics into the European Union Lithuania continued for a while to position itself as the leader of the Baltic republics and, in particular, persistently declared joint accession to the euro zone. At the same time, as if to confirm its leadership ambitions, Lithuania separately was preparing for applying to the introduction of the euro.</p>
<p>The procedure for submission and consideration of the application usually covers a two-year period, which is as follows. The application is filed at the beginning of the calendar year &#8211; around February and it is based on economic statistics of the previous year. Five indicators are considered as key factors, which are called the Maastricht keys and which reflect the rate of inflation, state debt, comparing with the average for the euro zone. In March, the application is reviewed at the meeting of EU finance ministers. If they support it, it will be sent for approval to the European Commission and then approved by the European Union summit in summer, meaning that the country&#8217;s accession to the euro zone will occur the following January. To support the application are important indicators of the economy on the eve of the application. These indicators are formed as a result of the comparison with the previous year.</p>
<p>Therefore, a country, that intends to apply for joining the euro zone, should think about prosperous economic performance and take measures to ensure the two years prior to the planned introduction of the euro. In addition, a two-year regime of the host country of the applicant in the exchange mechanism 2 must be also observed (described above).</p>
<p>Latvia and Lithuania which joined the European Union as of 01.05.2004, joined the mechanism of the exchange rate &#8211; 2 (IOC) in summer of the same year. Estonia, known to &#8220;fix&#8221; itself even earlier to the German mark, took the obligations under which it adopted the euro. Thus, in summer 2006, the Baltic countries could have considered themselves to fulfill obligations under the exchange mechanism-2 and qualify for joining the euro zone. However, there were no other necessary grounds, since the Baltics joined the European Union in the middle of the year and that year could not have been considered as a full-fledged economic year in the European Union. This year could have been the year of comparison. In other words, the only economic performance in 2005 was the basis for comparing the performance in 2006, i.e. the earliest period of application was only 2007.</p>
<p>Lithuania took the opportunity and at the beginning of 2007 applied to join the euro zone, while other Baltic republics abstained. The Lithuanian application did not find proper understanding of the European Union, who doubted, that all economic indicators of Lithuania quite reconciled and fully complied with the Maastricht requirements. Already at the first stage of consideration &#8211; at the meeting of finance ministers &#8211; the application was rejected in a gentle manner with a proposal to revise the issue later. However, the Lithuanian leadership insisted on the consideration of the application at the European Commission and obtaining an official response. It was negative on formal grounds: indicators of Lithuania at the average rate of inflation exceeded the established figures for a few tenths.</p>
<p>It was dramatic for Lithuania. Lithuanian experts at the time conceded that in case of refusal Lithuania would be able to re-apply in 8-10 years. Its economic potential, created during Soviet times, was subject to large-scale changes as per the structure of the division of labour in the EU, where there was no need, as it turned out, in Lithuanian industrial assets. In addition, the process of de-industrialization of Lithuania took place against the growing crisis that led to the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009.</p>
<p>The real reason for reticence of the European Commission in granting Lithuania&#8217;s membership in the euro zone was that North European capital, personified in the EU by North European countries, which opposed the idea. Lithuania’s transition to the euro would have slowed down the lending process and narrowed the credit lending to Baltic population and business. Loans were provided in the national currency &#8211; Lithuanian LTL. Its replacing with the euro would lead to a jump in prices &#8211; usually the euro is accompanied by a rise in prices by 20-25%, which would weaken the solvency of the population and its interest in lending. In a broader sense &#8211; it would serve as a &#8220;bad&#8221; example for Latvia and Estonia, which also were developing lending mechanism.</p>
<p><strong>The global crisis of 2007-2009</strong></p>
<p>Current international assessments and studies have the practice to determine the timing of the global crisis precisely by these years and to call it financial, economic, because it has happened during this period in the United States. So it was classified by US Fed officials. Apparently it served as an indirect admission that hotbed of crisis was USA, on the other hand it stated that it is still the largest economy in the world in terms of the impact on economic processes in the world and individual countries.</p>
<p>In the current period, many experts, resorting to a retrospective analysis of the events, that preceded the global financial and economic crisis, advised the conditions of the growing crisis. At the same time, if we look at studies of the period, especially Baltic ones, the beginning of the crisis was in doubt. Doubts were set out in such a way, that households and business retain a sense of expediency not to weaken the expansion of production, but to continue to resort to borrowing and investment plans unabated. This pertains not only to the Baltics, but since the focus of this article is there, it is reasonable to ask, what guided the researchers of that time.</p>
<p>Analysis of their status showed that they somehow were associated with northern European capital, whose influence they could not deny. The most authoritative Baltic experts are both full-time or engaged analysts of Swedish banks. They are supported by economic and financial Baltic media, which in turn are controlled by North European media groups. It is necessary to take into account the fact, that with all due respect to the Baltic experts, their names and their views are not considered as global and even regional, i.e. they cannot be counted among the original and most of them base their arguments, relying on the opinion of American and Swedish experts, besides they quote them often as a basis for their findings, i.e. findings for the Baltic economies.</p>
<p>It should be taken into account, that the economic processes of the Baltic countries are traditionally characterized by a certain inertia, meaning that they occur with some delay. In particular, under the influence of incentive estimates generated by north European capital, local businesses and households continued to be filled with borrowed funds and accordingly the operations increased the GDP. From this we can firmly state, that the Baltic processes are not in the center of the world, but on the outskirts or close to the edge, if you measure the effect of concentric circles. Secondly, they copy the &#8220;world standards&#8221; and they need time for the development and implementation.</p>
<p>As a result, the crisis in the Baltics if we analyse GDP, came in 2008 – 2010 [1(2)]. It is a kind of indicator of how much and to what extent the Baltic economy delays or you can say to what extent it is influenced by North European Capital.</p>
<p><strong>Introduction of euro in Estonia </strong></p>
<p>The outbreak of the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 led to several findings. The first &#8211; that the EU, that seemed unshakable to its members and outside observers, turned to be easily vulnerable to the crisis. Second &#8211; the fact that the EU as the union of the most European countries, was not ready for a crisis. There were no anti-crisis strategy, no established coordination mechanisms of member countries during the crisis. The third &#8211; that the Member States and national levels did not take proactive measures to mitigate the crisis and did not propose ways out of the crisis. In both cases the reaction took place in the spontaneous mode, which is called ad hoc.</p>
<p>However, a number of countries, particularly the North European countries, led the line for regional isolation in the European Union as a means of fencing from the crisis. In addition, the North European business took a number of preventive measures in case of deterioration of the situation in the country of investment. I mean the Baltic. In particular, the status of the North European banks changed, which converted into branches. Subtlety is that the branches were not necessarily to provide mortgage capital in contrast to full-fledged banks. New private companies were established, which bought the buildings of banks and the branches, and then branches of the banks rent it. This measure was effective for social-economic exacerbation in the country, as local authorities had nothing to nationalize the bank property, which looked only stationery. It was emphasized, that all North European banks were close to their parent banks or their parent banks were situated in Tallinn (Estonia).</p>
<p>These measures have shown, that northern european business seriously assessed the situation in the Baltic countries, allowing for the possibility of social and political actions of the process, caused by the crisis.</p>
<p>Apparently such a move prompted thoughts of persistent proposals from Baltic businessmen and a number of politicians, who called for the devaluation of national currencies. The materialization of appeals to the devaluation would mean a depreciation of the debt, obtained by local businesses and the community. While the figures appeared 20-30% devaluation, which was the same percentage fell to debt and creditors (North Europeans) and borrowers (Baltic business and households). Given the small scale of the Baltic, North European experts expected the activation of the principle of dominoes. An effective resistance could be the introduction of the euro, which the national authorities were not entitled to devalue, in addition euro would raise the amount of the debt (the debt was formed in the conversion of dollars into the local currency). Although the crisis in the euro zone experienced the incubation period (trudged public form in spring 2010), but for certain adept individuals in financial circles it had already been obvious.</p>
<p>Estonia was selected as key, that on one hand was determined by the North European capital as a springboard to the Baltics &#8211; head offices of represented companies were usually based in Tallinn (Estonia). Secondly, being the smallest and most absorbed by North European capital, economy in the Baltics, it could be easier made to meet the Maastricht parameters, comparing other Baltic economies.</p>
<p>In respect to established procedure in early 2010, Estonia applied and in the midst of the crisis in the euro zone received all necessary approvals, becoming as of 01.01.2011 a full member of the euro zone.</p>
<p><strong>Formation of conditions of joining of Latvia to the Eurozone</strong></p>
<p>The next candidate among the Baltic countries to join the euro area was Latvia. Her preference to Lithuania was due to a number of circumstances.</p>
<p>Thus, Latvian political leadership with its inherent hardness, typical for Latvians, strictly adhered to the principle of laying problems out of the crisis on the local population, which was achieved at the expense of the hard social sequestration of the budget and consistent wage cuts, reduction of which reached 40-50% of the pre-crisis level. At the same time the state firmly suppressed any attempts of national business to raise the question about the devaluation of the Latvian lat. Policy of containment and antisocial Latvian policy was full supported by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Their leaders believed possible to periodically visit Riga (Latvia), which repeatedly showed Latvian leaders as role models for the European countries during the crisis. Especially Latvia was often used in the debate on the crisis in the euro zone and for criticism of countries designated as the source of the crisis: Greece, Italy [6(1)].</p>
<p>At the same time Latvia faced faster and stronger than in the other Baltic countries growing moods of protest, which was becoming large-scale and resulted in open demonstrations and a clash with the police in Riga.</p>
<p>In parallel a new trend of convergence in the political and social level of the indigenous and Russian-speaking population began to develop, which culminated in the creation of a party, uniting in almost equal proportions both (party Soglasie). As one of the main slogans the united party declared the creation of a uniform civil society in Latvia. The trend developed in spite of the official line on the discrimination of Russian speakers in Latvia and the opposition to Latvians. The party won parliamentary elections of 2011 and municipal elections of 2013, culminating in the re-election as the mayor of Riga, the centre of political and social life of Latvia, the leader of Soglasie, Russian-speaking N. Ushakov.</p>
<p>To summarize the choices and processes in society, it signalled increased distance between the official authorities and the population. It seemed particularly alarming to representatives of foreign capital, especially financial Northern European. Of course, it was not about revolution, but changes could have been sudden and unpredictable. Accordingly, from any other more moderate leadership that would come to replace the current, one would expect a risk of devaluation of the debt. Probably one also considered the fact, that in the hierarchy of scales of North European presence in the Baltics, Latvia capital followed Estonia. North European capital controlled 80% of assets in the Estonian banking sector, 70 % -  in Latvia.</p>
<p>Intention to adopt the euro in these conditions, consistent with the wishes of the Latvian political leadership, which sought a way to increase its credibility, coincided with the interest of North European Capital and was supported by the IMF, World Bank, ECB.</p>
<p>However, the status indicators (see above) needed for a positive review of the potential of the Latvian application was far from the requirements. For their rapid and radical improvement Latvia decided to use foreign loans. It was organized in the form of bonds release in the amount of one billion, which was almost entirely acquired by American investors, not publicly named. Moreover, the transactions were concluded in the United States, where Latvian officials traveled for the relevant negotiations [9(1)].</p>
<p>The funds, obtained in this way by the Latvian authorities, brought the required performance for the introduction of the euro to the standards. In particular, some of these funds passed through social clauses of the state budget and increased consumer demand, stimulated the real sector and at the same time increased the level of debt repayment to Northern European capital and loan service. Improved performance for 2012 led to the submission by Latvia in 2013 the application for joining to the euro zone, which were approved by all EU authorities and as of 01.01.2014 of Latvia has got the status of a member of the euro zone.</p>
<p><strong>Promotion of Lithuania by joining to the Eurozone</strong></p>
<p>Overcoming of the global crisis of 2007-2009 by the Baltic republics occurs with appreciable difficulties. Labour emigration continues in a noticeable scale. Unemployment remains high. The market of investment proposals remains very narrow. With regard to such criteria as the restoration of the pre-crisis level of GDP, it is estimated by the profile of the EU Commissioner, that the Baltic countries may reach it by the end of the decade.</p>
<p>Accordingly, Lithuania &#8211; the last Baltic republic not covered by euro zone, has a difficult task to introduce the euro. We cannot say that Lithuania shows the worst performance among the Baltic States, but it has a number of specific features. Under these conditions it would be problematic for Lithuania to get EU approval of its potential application to join the euro zone. No improvement in sight and levers, at least required (Maastricht) economic indicators. Lithuania didn’t meet the same understanding among potential lenders, as Latvia did: over the past few years, the overall economic situation deteriorated and investors became more careful.</p>
<p>In this regard, the political leadership of Lithuania made a bet, apparently, on foreign policy activity, which apparently had to compensate the economic disadvantages of potential joining the euro zone for Lithuania. Win-Win was the maximum Lithuanian participation in anti-Russian projects.</p>
<p>The case happened during Lithuania&#8217;s Presidency in the EU, which occurred in the second half of 2013. The defining agenda was the implementation of the Eastern Partnership program, primarily designed to hold a dual EU summit in Vilnius (Lithuania): one on the Eastern Partnership, another &#8211; traditional EU summit in the second half of this year. The first expected to sign an association agreement between Ukraine and the EU, as well as the initialling of association agreements with Armenia, Moldova and Georgia.</p>
<p>Eastern Partnership Summit turned a failure in the sense that Ukraine proposed to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement, and Armenia refused to initialling. It is unlikely that these results can be regarded as favorable to Lithuania&#8217;s EU presidency as a success, despite the fact that Lithuanian officials in preparation for the Eastern Partnership summit crossed political ethics and international law in many cases [10(1)].</p>
<p>When initiating the desire of Lithuania to join the euro zone, it must be taken into account and that the European Commission of that time, which was personified by its Chairman Jose Manuel Barroso and his first deputy Ashton, was ideologically close to the Lithuanian leadership. Both adhered to outright Euro-Atlanticism in the foreign policy, virtually ignoring Europeanism as an independent ideological trend.</p>
<p>Such ideological affinity helped Lithuania to rectify the situation with the introduction of the euro. Initiated from outside destabilization of the situation in Ukraine, which led to the coup in February 2014, increased the credibility of Lithuania&#8217;s anti-Russian orientation, in particular, its activity was marked during the preparation and conduct of the Vilnius Eastern Partnership summit, which some observers interpreted as a prelude and momentum to Euromaydan in Kiev.</p>
<p>EC had reason to encourage Lithuania. Thus, in early 2014 the Lithuanian capital was visited by the Commissioner in charge of the euro, who made it clear to local leaders, that their possible application for accession to the euro zone could count on favorable consideration. Lithuanian president and prime minister hurried conversation to make public, by expressing the firm conviction that in 2015 their country becomes a member of the euro zone [11(1)].</p>
<p>Indeed, the Lithuanian application was considered without attracting widespread attention to it and &#8220;understanding&#8221; its weak performance, which were so far from matching that a special base calculation was applied, specifically beneficial for Lithuania, and the outcome document of the European Commission explicitly stated that Lithuanian indicators were obvious tend to deteriorate, which gained strength-to-date of the introduction of the euro. The authority of the European Commission headed by Jose Manuel Barroso, which expired 01.11.2014, was also taken account, as there were no doubts that the new European Commission will not allow condescending attitude to a mismatch Lithuanian performance requirements of Maastricht. These circumstances clearly indicated, that the decision on Lithuania&#8217;s accession to the euro zone from 01.01.2015 was based not on the economic considerations and not performing all the prescribed requirements of Lithuania.</p>
<p>Against this background, it is funny that a positive decision on the possibility of Lithuania to join the euro zone from 01.01.2015, was adopted by the same Commission, which rejected the Lithuanian application in 2007 with better indicators of the Lithuanian economy.</p>
<p><strong>Baltic States as an indicator of US attitude to the euro</strong></p>
<p>Getting Latvia a billion loan in the United States in the form of long-term deployment of Latvian bonds (see above) gave evidence, that major American business was interested in Latvia joining the euro zone. So money, obtained by the Latvian authorities in the United States, was sufficient to pour into the national economy in order to bring economic indicators of Latvia in accordance with the requirements of the euro zone and get an approval from the European Commission on the appropriate Latvian request. Moreover, while placing bonds in the USA, the Latvian officials did not hide their intentions with respect to the euro. If we compare these facts with the background of the time, when leading American financiers, for example, such as D. Soros offered apocalyptic scenarios for the future of the European Union, and predicted that the euro would soon disappear from the scene, it may cause some confusion. There are two explanations. Either only a part of American business retains an interest in co-existence with the dollar and the euro, and another part rejects such an alternative. Or either to take the crisis in the euro zone as a large-scale and long-term stock game on the world market, aimed at obtaining benefits from the sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate difference of the dollar and the euro. It seems reasonable to assume a combination of both.</p>
<p>One should also study the fact, that the attitude of the Baltic republics and Eastern European countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland) to euro is diametrically opposite after the deployment of the crisis in the euro zone. Thus, when joining the European Union, various countries were competing each other for the right of the first to join the euro zone. It was not until the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 and the beginning of the crisis in the euro zone (spring 2010). Then, Eastern Europe changed drastically its approach. They did not hesitate to announce publicly the decision to postpone the filing of applications for the introduction of the euro, not specifying the period of such break. Eastern European countries referred to the negative perception of the euro in their country and the difficult economic situation in Europe and the world. Slovakia, which is already a member of the euro zone, a widespread, including in the local parliament, held various debates about the feasibility of leaving the euro zone. At the same time the leaders of the Baltic republics, despite the observed and in their countries significant negative perception of the euro, steadily continued course of joining to the euro zone.</p>
<p>In particular, it should be noted, that the decision on joining of Lithuania to the region, as stated above, was of undeniably political character, and economic element was simply taken into account. The main criterion was taken unwavering loyalty of Lithuania to Euro-Atlanticism concept in its most conservative form. Lithuania is distinguished by the fact, that the Lithuanian commitment to Euro-Atlanticism has the character of active work on its promotion and especially in terms of anti-Russian contents. It should be noted, that the Lithuanian political leadership ignored public calls to hold a national referendum on the desirability of introducing the euro in Lithuania.</p>
<p>In general, some observers are inclined to see a significant part of the Euro-Atlantic component in the pursuit of the Baltic republics to participate in the activities of the euro zone in the sense that the expansion of the euro zone due to sluggish Baltic economies will undoubtedly weaken the euro zone and distorts the performance of its development, that somehow affects the authority euros, its quotations.</p>
<p><strong>The role of the euro for the further development of the Baltic economies</strong></p>
<p>Among the most obvious consequences of the introduction of the euro in the Baltic countries was the increase of prices of goods and services &#8211; an average by 20-30%. It has become real in Estonia and Latvia, and soon it will be felt by the population of Lithuania. If you wonder about the potential positive impact of the euro on the positive development of the economy, the euro supporters emphasize that the euro can save a significant part of the financial costs of turnover of goods and services in trade and economic relations in the European Union. This thesis is not disputed and is the result not only of theoretical calculations, but also long-term practice of EU activities.</p>
<p>However, the majority of the supporters of the euro forget the fact that saving effect begins to acquire practical importance only under certain scale of trade and economic operations &#8211; when it comes to the functioning of big capital and its relations also with big capital.</p>
<p>With regard to the Baltic, large capital is associated mainly with foreign capital, which is represented mainly by northern European capital. Therefore, it is logical to assume, that the main benefits of joining the Baltic states to the euro zone will receive foreign companies operating in the Baltic area.</p>
<p>Moreover, the inevitable price hike, that accompanies the introduction of the euro, a negative impact on competitiveness of agricultural products, which a substantial part of export of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. Their neighbours, also focusing on the export of similar agricultural products, will undoubtedly get price win. We can talk about Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.</p>
<p>Theoretically possible to consider the possibility of the euro as an instrument for the protection of force majeure in the national economy. In particular, what useful role could render the euro in a situation of confrontation between anti-Russian sanctions and other protective measures at the Russian sanctions regime with the EU. Neither the status of the euro, nor its theoretical purpose does not create the preconditions for the Baltic countries to count on him as a tool to compensate for their current difficulties, arising from active participation in the anti-Russian sanction activities.</p>
<p>One can hardly expect that the joining of the euro zone will improve the conditions of trade and economic relations with other members of the euro zone. The leading countries has used euro for more than 10 years, they have established stable relationships and the existing structure of the division of labour, they are not going to change because of the accession of the Baltic States. In other words, neither the EU nor the Baltic republics further diversify its economy in order to fit into the current in the euro zone of division of labor.</p>
<p>One may wonder on whether the euro will strengthen regional integration, with a view to strengthening cooperation between the Baltic States, which are not experts tend to  perceive as a single entity, what is a fallacy. Baltic economy, as noted above, are the same type that naturally pushes them to the centrifugal tendencies in the relations between them. In political terms, also observe the process of separation. For example. Estonia strongly focuses on their ethnic and geographic proximity to the Nordic countries and constantly raises the question of how to treat it as part of the Nordic countries, and not as the Baltic states. In this context, the euro does not have any resources other than the nominal, that would be a reason to say that the introduction of the euro could cement the unity of the notorious Baltic states, which appears only on the anti-Russian. As a general conclusion it can be stated, that the introduction of the euro in the Baltic countries cannot be considered a pulse or a tool to accelerate the development of the national capital and the advancement of the population.</p>
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		<title>Is the experience of the Nordic integration applicable to the Eurasian economic union?</title>
		<link>http://en.abfund.org/?p=1109</link>
		<comments>http://en.abfund.org/?p=1109#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Dec 2014 17:57:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Admin]]></dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Amber Bridge. Journal of Regional Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[№3 (3) 2014]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Denmark]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Integration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Finland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nordic Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Norway]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sweden]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Voronkov Lev Sergeevitch, Doctor of History, Professor the Chair of European integration, MGIMO University, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.  This article argues that there are no common standards of integration, applicable to all countries, regardless of their economic situation’s specificity and level of development as well as of the nature of their [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Voronkov Lev Sergeevitch, Doctor of History, Professor the Chair of European integration, MGIMO University, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. </strong></p>
<p><em>This article argues that there are no common standards of integration, applicable to all countries, regardless of their economic situation’s specificity and level of development as well as of the nature of their commonly agreed objectives they seek to achieve by means of integration. The purpose to create a single internal market in the EU has determined the toolkit of the European integration, the nature and powers of the EU institutions through which it is carried out. The author argues that the construction of the integration processes in the post-Soviet space in general and within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), in particular, in the image and likeness of the EU is not only unjustified, but also harmful. The founding treaty of the EAEU does not contain the purpose to construct a single internal market. The article emphasizes the high level of regional integration achieved by the Nordic countries, which has not been affected by the pattern of the EU integration. The Nordic integration began with the formation of a common labor market and creation within its framework of necessary conditions for high labor mobility. The objectives of the integration efforts of the Nordic countries, fundamentally different from the EU, are reflected in the nature of the institutions of regional cooperation and in the methods of their activity as well. The author recommends attentively looking at the Nordic integration experience to use its elements in the post-Soviet space. </em></p>
<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>Apart from Europe, integration processes cover today also other regions of the world, including the post-Soviet space. Such processes involve states with different levels of economic development, size, demographics, natural resources, quality of human capital, a position in the international division of labor, degree of development of market relations, participation in various international organizations and agreements and other indicators. It would be at least imprudent to assume that states entering integration processes must obey certain universal laws, undergo the same stages of integration, and create similar bodies with identical powers. The content of integration activities to a certain extent depends on the objectives of a particular state.</p>
<p>The European Union without proper justification is considered to be a benchmark of integration, and an example of how integration processes allegedly should unfold in the former Soviet Union. Common theories of integration, based on the experience of the EU, are designed to ascribe versatility and traits of objective law to the EU integration processes. However, copying of the EU integration experience can have very negative consequences for integration processes in the post-Soviet space. It would be advisable to study more closely the integration experience of other countries, particularly the Nordic countries, examine features of their integration model, and the problems that they solve by means of integration.</p>
<p>Trade and economic relations do not automatically evolve into integration. Free trade zones and customs unions can be considered as means of such relations. However, not all the participating countries are willing to develop integration. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) can serve as examples. Negotiations on a free trade area between the EU and NAFTA do not mean that their member countries are eager to take the path of integration.</p>
<p>A transition to conscious actions enabling convergence and merging of economies of states is equivalent to a strategic choice of ways for their further development. When deciding on joining an integration process one should have a clear idea of its long-term common goals so that participating states could use economic, political, legislative, social and other activities for the achievement of these objectives. A long and gradual character of integration requires reliable protection against fluctuations of the political and economic environment. Therefore a contractual basis is employed for this purpose and integration processes are carried out within the established permanent international intergovernmental organizations.</p>
<p>Initially, western European countries were planning to use development of integration processes to put an end toan infinite chainof warsbetween France and Germany that had been shaking Europe for centuries. Combined withthe continued presence of the troopsof the Western Allieson the territoryof the Federal Republic of Germany andinclusion of the latter in the North Atlantic Treaty integration processes were believed to help create realobstacles for therevivalof German militarismand reliablemonitoring toolsfor theeconomic and political developmentof Germanyafter the SecondWorld War.</p>
<p>These initial policy objectives, as they were successfully achieved, gradually began to take second place. The progressive extension of the EEC membership created a need for efficient development of its growing economic space, reduction of costs in cross-border commercial activities, providing conditions for profitable operation of companies in the participating states. As a result, integration processes within the EEC began to focus on the creation of a single internal market of the Community and on ensuring the most favorable conditions for the most competitive economies and companies of the member states not taking into consideration domestic production of each country.</p>
<p>The adoption of the Single European Act and the introduction of free movement of goods, services, capital and persons have determined the main tools for the creation of such a market. Efforts for consolidation of a single EU internal market and expansion of its rules to other states are camouflaged with attractive formulations such as &#8220;cohesion policy&#8221;, &#8220;neighborhood policy&#8221;, &#8220;Eastern Partnership&#8221;, etc. These perform more likely the functions of &#8220;soft power&#8221; of the EU rather than reflect the true essence of such activities. The European Commission has received the exclusive power to fully protect and improve the single internal market on the so-called &#8220;supranational&#8221; level, which is the most favorable for the most competitive economies and companies.</p>
<p>Often, the so-called &#8220;European idea&#8221; seems to be an ideological forerunner of the Western European integration. Some Russian and foreign experts believe that we will soon witness a political union of the member states of the EU capable of becoming a new state formation. Cooperation of the EU member states in the field of foreign policy, security and defense, domestic policy and justice and many other areas should be regarded as a step in this direction. However, the new Head of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said he was not going to create the United States of Europe and that he did not believe that &#8220;a united Europe could be constructed in opposition to a nation-state&#8221; (9, p.7). In fact, these areas of cooperation serve the practical needs of a single internal market and reinforce international ambitions of the EU by means of foreign policy and security.</p>
<p>Despite the common historical destiny, continued co-living in joint states, their geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic similarities, comparability of sizes, similarity of political cultures and political orders (2, pp.615-617), the Nordic countries do not aim at getting united into one single state. The &#8220;European idea&#8221;, despite the fact that these countries belong to Europe, has not had a considerable influence on their relationship. Three of the five countries in the region are relatively young independent states. Norway gained independence in 1905, Finland &#8211; in 1917, and Iceland finally became an independent state in 1944. That’s why these countries do not allow any attacks on their recently-found sovereignty in integration processes.</p>
<p>However, the Nordic countries have consistently highlighted the importance of regional cooperation for them. In 1939, the Swedish Foreign Minister Rickard Sandler said: &#8220;The North will be a political reality to the extent to which the nations are convinced that their welfare is provided by the Nordic cooperation and solidarity&#8221; (7, p.37). In March 1948, the Danish Prime Minister said in Stockholm: &#8220;Whatever happens, our peoples should be together. It would be unfortunate if we parted ways&#8221;(10, p.35). &#8220;We live in difficult times &#8211; the Prime Minister of Norway Einar Gerhardsen said in February 1953 &#8211; when the very environment necessitates that small countries that have a lot in common and that are located side by side, hold together&#8221; (5, p.217). Although regional cooperation has always enjoyed wide support among the Nordic public, however, as it was acknowledged in February 1953 by the Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft, their cooperation “had been quite irregular and random&#8221; for a long time (10, p.98).</p>
<p>To date, the Nordic countries have reached the most advanced and deepest level of regional integration of all known examples, with an integration path that is significantly different from the EU. Studying its features may be of interest to potential participants of integration processes in the post-Soviet space.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>“The Road Map” of the Nordic integration </strong></p>
<p>Integration processes in the European North have taken as a base the indisputable fact that the joint efforts of the Nordic countries can better protect their common interests than if they were acting separately. Regarding the Nordic integration processes it is appropriate to cite the Swedish scientist G. Adler-Karlsson: &#8220;Instead of looking for guidance in doctrinal theory, we have always preferred to find the best solutions that are practically achievable under given circumstances&#8221; (1, p.22).</p>
<p>In the early post-war years, the Nordic countries faced similar economic difficulties. In April 1948, the four Scandinavian countries officially joined the &#8220;Marshall Plan&#8221;. Within its framework, Denmark, Iceland and Norway received US aid in the form of gifts, Sweden &#8211; in the form of loans (7, p.276). As a result, they were able to partially upgrade their fixed capital in industry and agriculture and to restore economic ties among the countries of the region. Sweden, for example, was paying for the US loans with ships for Norway.</p>
<p>This was also encouraged by lower customs duties in comparison to other Western European states, significant devaluation of the Scandinavian currencies in 1949 (exchange rate of the Norwegian and Swedish Krones to the American Dollar fell by 30%, the Danish krone – by 44%), as well as their accession to the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which resulted in a partial reversibility of Scandinavian currencies within the EPU. As a result, the value of exports in each of the Scandinavian countries in 1948-1951 more than doubled (7, pp.276, 277).</p>
<p>Although Finland did not join the &#8220;Marshall Plan&#8221;, it was also receiving individual loans from its funds, as well as from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and from Sweden. By the end of 1956 the total amount of foreign loans in Finland was more than 68 billion FIM, with the share of loans from the US and Sweden being equal to 85% of that amount (4, p.18). By the beginning of the 1950s, the Nordic countries managed to complete the reimbursement of indirect losses caused by World War II (7, p.278).</p>
<p>In 1950 the North Economic Cooperation Committee that was established in February 1948, recommended that the Nordic countries participating in the &#8220;Marshall Plan&#8221; should begin creating a Nordic customs union. However, differences between the countries did not allow them to implement either this or any of subsequent attempts to create such a customs union. This gave impetus to the search for other ways of the &#8220;Nordic cooperation&#8221;.</p>
<p>In the late 1940s, Sweden was experiencing a rapid industrial rise and faced labor shortages. Other Nordic countries had problems with employment. As a result, steps were taken towards a more rational use of labor resources at the level of the Nordic region and towards formation of a common labor market. In 1951, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden concluded a convention that allowed their citizens to be employed in any of the Nordic countries without prior permission from the authorities, and agreed to facilitate moving of citizens from one country to another. In 1954 they created a regional free market for labor, and in 1957 they completed the design of a passport union. In the second half of the 1970s the passport and visa regime and customs checking were abolished for the citizens of the Nordic countries at border crossings. Icelandjoineditin 1982, FaroeIslands &#8211; in 1992.</p>
<p>In order to increase labor mobility within the region the Nordic countries took a series of synchronous measures in social policy and social legislation. In accordance with the Convention on Social Security, approved in 1955, citizens of these countries received the same rights, privileges and responsibilities regarding the size of the basic pension, old-age pensions, unemployment, disability, occupational injuries and sick leave, as well as additional payments when moving from one Nordic country to another. They were given an opportunity to enjoy the same social benefits as nationals of the host country.</p>
<p>The first steps in the field of subregional integration in the North of Europe were aimed at ensuring establishment of a general labor market, which were accompanied by adoption of a series of laws and administrative measures aimed at improving mobility and ensuring social rights of migratory workers. The labor market became a vast sphere of common interests of the Nordic countries, which became one of the key areas of their subsequent integration efforts. In the course of its creation, harmonization of legislation became the most important issue, which later evolved into one of the skeletons of the Nordic integration.</p>
<p>Unification of legislation of the Nordic countries began in the 19th century and reached a high level even before the start of integration processes between them. At that moment they had unified legislation on the activities of banks, in the field of property, commercial and civil law, as well as in the field of insurance, property possession, etc. The authors of the book &#8220;Scandinavia between East and West&#8221;, published in 1950 in the US, noted that &#8220;there are far more similarities between the laws of the Nordic countries, than, for example, between the laws of New York and Florida states&#8221; (10, p.109). The Northern Commission on cooperation in the field of law continued those efforts.</p>
<p>Within the framework of EFTA, which Denmark, Norway and Sweden joined in 1959 (Finland joined in 1961 and Iceland in 1970), the Nordic countries managed to reduce customs duties and abolish quantitative restrictions in mutual trade in industrial goods. The share of inter-Scandinavian trade, that previously had been 5-6% of the total value of foreign trade in the Nordic countries, significantly increased in the mid-1960s. The import share reached 19.2%, while the share of exports totaled 22.5%. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Scandinavian countries occupied the first place in trade with each other. Their share reached 87.7% of EFTA imports and 63.5% of EFTA exports (11, p.268). Trade between the countries in the region became a significant factor in their development and an another sphere of their common interests.</p>
<p>Despite the differences in the national security doctrines, the Nordic countries continued foreign policy cooperation also in the postwar period. Periodic meetings of the Prime Ministers, regular meetings of foreign ministers and representatives of the countries of the region to the United Nations Organization, permanent official contacts among the foreign ministries at the ambassadorial level and direct personal contacts among Heads of their divisions and departments, weekly meetings of Heads of delegations and daily meetings of delegates and representatives of the Nordic countries in the committees at the sessions of the UN General Assembly became common practice.</p>
<p>At the plenary sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations from 1956 to the beginning of the 1970s, they voted together on international issues in more than 80% of cases. Introduction within EFTA of a duty of 15% on imports of processed goods by Britain in October 1964 had caused solidarity actions the Nordic countries that achieved its abolition in November 1966. At the talks in the &#8220;Kennedy Round&#8221; (end of 1966 &#8211; spring 1967) the Nordic countries, acting jointly, managed to get concessions from the EEC on reductions of tariffs for their trade (11, pp.272-273). Thus, the small Nordic countries received strong indications of the effectiveness of their foreign policy cooperation in ensuring common interests.</p>
<p>After weighing the priorities of their further development, the Nordic countries, while in EFTA, made a strategic choice in favor of regional integration and signed the Cooperation Agreement between Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (&#8220;the Helsinki Agreement&#8221;) on March 23, 1962, in Helsinki. It became the legal basis document for their further cooperation and a &#8220;road map&#8221; of their integration efforts (12). This document with account of later amendments is still valid to this day.</p>
<p>Embarking on the path towards integration, the Nordic countries were certainly not striving to unite into a single state, and did not aim at creating a single internal market. <em>Their integration model is initially aimed at strengthening mutually beneficial foreign-policy cooperation of small sovereign and independent states, which, by means that are inherent in integration processes in the economic sphere, purposefully and pragmatically strengthen and extend old areas and create new areas of common or identical interests. This allows to build close and long-term cooperation on the international arena on a firm and constantly expanding basis of fundamental interests of socio-economic development, rather than on a shaky basis of temporary political arrangements and agreements and short-term, transient and situational factors.</em></p>
<p>A natural outcome of such an integration model is an influential community of states that preserve complete freedom in their economic and political decisions. The ability of such a community to effectively promote and protect common interests on the international arena is constantly growing with a simultaneous increase in the political weight of this community in the world. <em>For a group of small countries such interaction becomes an essential element of national security and independence of each of them.</em> On issues where their positions and interests diverge, they operate as separate and independent sovereign states.</p>
<p>In the Helsinki Agreement the Nordic countries defined top-priority areas of common or similar interests, for further expansion of which they decided to use their integration efforts. This document identified further measures for support and development of a common market of labor. In the sphere of legal cooperation they pledged to facilitate acquisition of citizenship of one Nordic state by nationals of another Nordic state, to seek to achieve maximum uniformity of legislation in the field of private law, as well as rules relating to criminal offenses and punishment. It recorded, in particular, an agreement to provide opportunities to investigate and prosecute crimes, committed in one of the countries in the region, in the other Nordic countries and enforce decisions of courts and other authorities of all states in the region on their territories. These provisions are intended, among other things, to ensure proper compliance with legislation by migrating citizens of Nordic countries.</p>
<p>The “road map” of regional integration includes a wide range of pragmatic measures of cultural interaction, which aims at preventing painful political, economic, social and cultural problems of integration of migrant workers from the other Nordic countries into the social and cultural environment of the recipient countries. It was decided to include in the curricula of Nordic schools studying of language, culture and social conditions of the other states in the region, and to provide an opportunity for students to study and take exams in the other Nordic countries.</p>
<p>The Nordic countries jointly fund committees of the Nordic cooperation in the field of primary, secondary and higher education, as well as adult education, regional programs of mobility for students and university teachers, pupils and school teachers. Their school and university curricula, textbooks and examination systems are standardized. Studying the languages of neighboring peoples is coordinated by the Secretariat of the northern languages and literature courses on the northern languages.</p>
<p>The Nordic countries have decided to ensure mutual recognition of diplomas at all levels of education, to coordinate employment services of the Nordic countries, harmonize qualification requirements for professions and work for the recognition of professional qualifications obtained in all countries of the region. They also agreed to work closely in the field of adult education, to unify the application of national provisions relating to workers&#8217; health, occupational safety, and to develop further exchanges between the countries in the field of literature, painting, music, theater, cinema and other cultural industries. The Nordic Culture Fund, founded in 1966, funds cultural projects within the region. There have been set up and in operation also numerous joint organizations of the Nordic countries in the field of culture and media.</p>
<p>As a result, citizens of the Nordic countries have a privileged position on their labor markets compared to citizens of other EU member states. Article 2 of the Helsinki Agreement contains a provision that &#8220;in the development of laws and regulations in any of the Nordic countries, citizens of all the other Nordic countries receive the same rights as citizens of this country&#8221;. Moreover, this provision should be applied &#8220;to all spheres of jurisdiction affected by the Agreement on cooperation&#8221;. In other words, citizens of the other Nordic countries shall not be considered as foreign labor on the labor market of each of these countries.</p>
<p>Having started integration processes with creating a common labor market and providing measures to promote their mobility, the Nordic countries have agreed to extend integration onto other areas. In the area of economic cooperation, they decided to hold consultations on economic policy issues, coordinate the measures they take regarding the impact of external factors on the economic cycle, to provide freedom of movement of capital among countries in the region, stressing that joint decisions in this area should ensure common interests of the Nordic countries in the field of payments and currency, and adhere to the division of labor among countries in matters of production and capital investment, as well as create favorable conditions for direct cooperation between the companies of two or more Nordic countries in these areas.</p>
<p>While regularizing the relations with the European Union, each of the Nordic countries was addressing possible consequences of their decisions for the Nordic cooperation. Supporters of the &#8220;People&#8217;s Movement against the EEC&#8221;, that was founded in 1971, were speaking, for example, of the need to strengthen the Nordic cooperation along with protection of the Danish national identity (6, p.517).</p>
<p>Denmark&#8217;s entry into the EEC in 1973 and the subsequent conclusion by the other Nordic countries of agreements with the EEC on the duty-free trade of manufactured goods helped to keep the trading mode, which existed among the Nordic countries in the framework of EFTA. Denmark&#8217;s membership in the EEC did not cause any specific problems for the Nordic cooperation until the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Its implementation was threatening to cause irreparable damage for the &#8220;Nordic cooperation&#8221;.</p>
<p>As a consequence, the Danish referendum on the accession of Denmark to the European Union gave a negative result. Ultimately Denmark joined the EU, but on special conditions, and the rest of the EU member states were forced to accept them (6, p.550). Special conditions for joining the EU in the future were also specified by Sweden. One of such conditions was smooth continuation of the &#8220;Nordic cooperation&#8221; (8, pp.77-79).</p>
<p>As part of the integration efforts the Nordic states began to work closely together in the field of scientific research and coordination of the use of allocated resources with the greatest efficiency, including establishment of joint structures and institutions to combine their academic potentials and financial capabilities.</p>
<p>The Nordic countries conduct numerous joint research projects, coordinate national science and technological programs. The main driving force in this area are joint academic institutions ensuring high standards of research, that are difficult to achieve at the national level. Among them are the Northern Academy of Innovation Research, Northern Institute for Theoretical Physics, Nordic Council for Arctic Medicine Studies, Northern Research and Production Program on Biotechnology, Nordic Volcanological Institute, Northern Arctic Program of Humanitarian Studies and others.</p>
<p>The scope of their integration efforts includes further cancellation of trade barriers among the Nordic countries, coordination of their technical and administrative customs regulations, simplification of customs procedures, development of transport communications and trans-border trade, joint economic development in adjacent areas of two or more Nordic countries, joint efforts to ensure their interests in international trade.</p>
<p>An important area of the Nordic integration, defined by the Helsinki Agreement, was the Nordic cooperation in the field of transport and communications, as well as environment. The Nordic countries hold mandatory consultations for construction of transport and communication networks, which involve two or more Nordic countries, and coordinate efforts to improve road safety. Border passport control has been simplified.</p>
<p>Countries in the region take into account environmental interests of the other Nordic countries on an equal basis with their own interests both in the legislative process and in the practical application of the laws. They harmonize rules for the protection of the environment, agree on standards and define criteria for pollution, coordinate activities aimed at flora and fauna conservation.</p>
<p>Important areas of agreed integration measures also include official statistics, health and medicine, production of alcoholic beverages, mutual recognition of licensing procedures or certification in the field of medical, technical and other security controls, coordination on issues of child and youth policy.</p>
<p>Given the characteristics of the Nordic integration model, special attention is paid to strengthening of the cooperation at the European and international level, designed to provide &#8220;opportunities for joint extraction of benefits for citizens and companies of the Nordic countries&#8221;. The governments of these countries are held responsible for ensuring mutual interests and values as it is specified by the Helsinki Agreement. Various government authorities of the region can directly communicate regarding issues that do not fall under the exclusive competence of their external relations. They coordinate activities to provide assistance to developing countries, jointly distribute information about the Nordic countries and Nordic cooperation, and provide support for Northern European citizens by diplomatic missions.</p>
<p>The Nordic integration is characterized by pragmatism and focus on solving specific problems. Implementation of the reached agreements dictated by long-term strategic interests of the Nordic states, allows to strengthen their cooperation in international affairs by constantly expanding the range of their common essential interests. As a consequence, the nature, structure, functions and powers of international bodies of the Nordic cooperation significantly differ from those existing in the EU.</p>
<p>The &#8220;Nordic cooperation&#8221; is performed in the framework of the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, at the meetings of Heads of governments, by specialized authorities of the Nordic countries and by special cooperation bodies.</p>
<p>One of the fundamental principles of the &#8220;Nordic cooperation&#8221; is active participation of the public in discussions and decision-making in this area. Practical implementation of this principle is the Nordic Council established in 1952. It was determined in the Helsinki Agreement as an &#8220;elected public assembly of the Nordic countries&#8221; and a form of cooperation of their governments. Its Charter has been adopted by each Nordic country as an internal act which has the force of law. This body is not endowed with legislative functions. It is authorized to investigate the main components of the Nordic cooperation, to adopt recommendations, prepare research reports and other documents. The members of the Nordic Council may make inquiries to the governments or to the Nordic Council of Ministers on the issues of the &#8220;Nordic cooperation&#8221;.</p>
<p>The Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) is a body of cooperation among governments. It is responsible for the interaction between them and the Nordic Council on the issues relating to their joint actions. It takes decisions aimed at implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement and the other agreements among the Nordic countries. The overall coordination of the Nordic cooperation rests with Prime Ministers. They are assisted in this by the Ministers responsible for this cooperation, and the Heads of state and government secretariats, that are members of permanent national committees of the Nordic cooperation.</p>
<p>The Chairman of the NCM is responsible for the coordination of the Nordic cooperation and initiatives for related matters. His or her decisions are taken unanimously and are binding. In the case of making decisions on issues requiring parliamentary approval, they will not take effect until the approval of the relevant national parliament. The NCM reports annually to the Nordic Council on the problems and prospects of the Nordic cooperation. At the same time, the Prime Minister of the presiding country shall submit a special report on cooperation among the governments of the Nordic countries regarding European and international affairs.</p>
<p>In other words, effective management of integration processes in Northern Europe are ensured by the northern cooperation bodies not endowed with any exclusive powers, special competences or so-called &#8220;supra-national&#8221; functions. These are not necessary as unanimous decisions of the Nordic Council of Ministers are binding and enforceable for the Nordic countries.</p>
<p>As a result of the consistent implementation of the Nordic integration model there is constant strengthening of the Nordic cooperation on international issues and convergence of their positions on many international issues. All the five Nordic countries have become members of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Arctic Council. They all participate in the activities of the &#8220;Northern Dimension&#8221;, despite the fact that some of them are not directly related to some of the regions listed here.</p>
<p>Before Finland and Sweden joined Denmark as members of the EU in 1995, Iceland and Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992. Its terms provided maintenance of the conditions for further practical realization of the integration model for all of the Nordic countries, along with participation in free movement of goods, services, capital and persons across borders with EU member states and joining the Schengen area (3, pp.126-127).</p>
<p>Denmark and Sweden stipulated for themselves special conditions for participation in the EU and Norway and Iceland did the same for the EEA. These conditions provide opportunities for further development of the &#8220;Nordic cooperation.&#8221; An important step in this direction was concluding of an agreement among the Nordic countries on cooperation in the field of defense (NORDEFCO) on 4 November 2009. This marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of their interaction on international issues and was a direct consequence of the deepening of the Nordic integration. In the EU framework they included clauses regarding their participation in the common EU policy on security and defense.</p>
<p><strong>Integration scenarios for the Eurasian economic union </strong></p>
<p>Integration processes in the post-Soviet space should develop with due regard to the characteristics of the participating countries and specific tasks, which they intend to solve by means of integration. Already at an early stage there should be formulated overall strategic and intermediate goals that member states intend to achieve with the use of integration mechanisms. Depending on the nature of these goals specific mechanisms for achieving them should be identified, as well as the specific role of integration levers, adapted to the economic, political, social and other conditions of the existing economic space.</p>
<p>General wordings of very vague objectives of the EAEU purposes, such as strengthening and modernization of the economies of member states, their convergence, increase of their competitiveness in the global markets, direct integration processes at servicing some of the current needs and improving of the existing situation according to the formula &#8220;movement is all, the ultimate goal is nothing&#8221;, rather than at achieving more or less distinct strategic objectives.</p>
<p>Such an approach allows little for conscious, focused and consistent creation of long-term legislative, economic, political, social and other conditions that would provide close interaction, interpenetration and fusion of economies of the countries entering the path of integration, as it does not contain any motivation that is crucial for them.</p>
<p>Orientation of the EAEU member states in their integration efforts on the experience of the EU, including institutional experience, would mean that they intend to build on the territory of the former Soviet Union the same single internal market, aimed at serving the needs and creating the best opportunities for extraction of benefits of the most competitive economies and companies of the member states and the EU. For most post-Soviet states, economic conditions of which have not yet recovered and have not acquired the necessary level of development and competitiveness, a rigid imposition of such rules could have a devastating effect on domestic manufacturers and economic independence as it happens with the economies of the East European EU member states. There are serious doubts that exactly this objective is optimal for integration processes in the post-Soviet space because of the large differences between the CIS and the EU as well as among post-Soviet states.</p>
<p>An institutional model of integration reproducing the one in the EU may also be unattractive for them as it envisages delegating of a part of sovereign powers of the member states to some supranational international executive authorities. For many post-Soviet states, that only recently gained their independence and sovereignty, an idea of a new superstate in the future is unattractive, and practical steps in this direction are considered counter-productive. There are also serious doubts that such a development will meet the fundamental interests of Russia and its companies, because overcoming of social and economic underdevelopment in these countries will be largely their duty.</p>
<p>It is obvious that the member states of integration processes in the post-Soviet space and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should identify those areas of common or similar interests that they would like to form with integration mechanisms, and, relating to them, identify specific tools for their practical implementation. Taking into consideration differences among post-Soviet states, discussions on common or similar interests of states and possible areas of their integration efforts can be performed both among all the participants of integration processes, and between different groups of states with regard to their economic specialization. Without this, they are doomed to copy existing integration models, which is currently the case.</p>
<p>It is advisable in this context to determine which of the following is preferable for Russia and other members of the EAEU: (a) creation of a single internal market of the EU-type, or (b) promotion of division of labor between the member countries and development of specialized production industries with the help of selective integration measures in each of the countries, or (c) purposeful formation of areas of common economic, social and other interests of the members states of the EAEU in order to strengthen the foundations of their close cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, security and defense policy, or, finally, (d) flexible combination of these measures with the account of development specifics of each of the post-Soviet states and the whole former Soviet Union. The general philosophic idea of the integration model of the Nordic countries and its individual elements can represent for Russia and other post-Soviet members of the EAEU a certain conceptual and practical interest.</p>
<p>When selecting areas of application of integration mechanisms one should pay attention primarily to those areas that, being inherited from the Soviet past, still remain essential for the economy. This could include, for example, infrastructure links among post-Soviet states. Further development and deepening of such links in the present circumstances with the use of integration mechanisms could be of mutual benefit and could contribute to the formation of common interests in this area.</p>
<p>Efforts related to regulation of labor markets in the post-Soviet space and its social and cultural reinforcements could be of paramount importance for application of integration measures, taking in to account the fact that the dynamics of the demographic situation in various countries of the CIS significantly differs. Cooperation in the field of educational and cultural policy, focused on servicing current and future needs of the labor force market and scientific and technical cooperation, could also become a program of long-term integration efforts of member states of the EAEU.</p>
<p>A specific feature of the new independent post-Soviet states is their continued breakaway from a single legal system of the Soviet Union. Therefore, cooperation in the field of law among them as a whole is unlikely to be successful. It should be selective and primarily related to the areas of interaction that will be identified as priority objects of their integration efforts.</p>
<p>Obviously, one can offer a lot of other areas to coordinate integration efforts in the post-Soviet space both with account of its specificity and experience of other integration groups. However in order to do this, it is necessary to determine what integration model and what strategic objectives potential participants would like to implement. The impression is that this is not completely clear yet.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>References:</strong></p>
<p>Antonov A.N. Shveziya: protivorechiviye process razvitiya. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znanie”, 1977</p>
<p>Voronkov L.S. Integrazionniye process na severe Evropy/”Evropeiskya integraziya” pod redakziyei Ol’gi Butorinoi. Moskva, 2011</p>
<p>Voronkov L.S. Obschee economicheskoye prostranstvo mezhdu Rossiyei i ES?/”Vestnik MGIMO-universiteta”, N. 4 (37), 2014</p>
<p>Voronkov L.S., Senyukov Yu. P. Finlandiya – nash severnyi sosed. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Znaniye”, 1977</p>
<p>Goloshubov Yu.I. Skandinavia i problem poslevoennoi Evropy. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mysl’”, 1974</p>
<p>Istoriya Danii. Pod redakziyei Stena Buska I Henninga Poulsena. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Ves’ mir”, 2007</p>
<p>Kan A.S. Vneshnyaya politika skandinavskikh stran v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauka”, 1967</p>
<p>Kuliabina L.N. Shezia v sovremennom mire. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Nauchnaya kniga”, 2005</p>
<p>Novaya komanda v Brussele/”Ekspert”, 3-9 Noyabriya 2014, N. 45 (922)</p>
<p>Prokofiev Vl. Severnaya Evropa i mir. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1966</p>
<p>Pokhlebkin V.V. Skandinaviya: tendenzii sovremennogo razvitiya/ “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya v Zapadnoi Evrope”. Pod redakziyeyi D.E. Melnikova. Moskva, Izdatel’stvo “Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya”, 1974</p>
<p>Helsinkskyi Dogovor o sotrudnichestve mezhdu Daniyeyei, Finlandiyeyi, Islandiyeyi, Norvegiyeyi I Shveziyeyi (http://eulaw.edu.ru/documents/legislation/eur_int_law/nordic.htm)</p>
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